{ "id": 1596982, "name": "RONALD CAVANAUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LANSING MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, Defendant (The Village of Lansing, Defendant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Cavanaugh v. Lansing Municipal Airport", "decision_date": "1997-05-01", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201496\u20141260", "first_page": "239", "last_page": "247", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 239" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2940751 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173712 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 N.E.2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" }, { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5269427 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" }, { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/47/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "\"[n]othing in the plain language of section 2 - 211 provides that the county clerk is the agent of the sheriff for the purpose of receiving service of process\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159540 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "\"[n]othing in the plain language of section 2 - 211 provides that the county clerk is the agent of the sheriff for the purpose of receiving service of process\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "493-94" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "495" }, { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5247128 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "114" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/225/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2972666 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 990", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "991", "parenthetical": "\"an order granting a motion to quash service of process is a final and appealable order\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3479220 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 1306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1309" }, { "page": "1309" }, { "page": "1308" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 1098", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2630320 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1103" }, { "page": "1103" }, { "page": "1102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/1098-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 N.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "383 Ill. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2487545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/383/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 N.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2554309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/84/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 N.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 3d 919", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2466980 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/6/0919-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 N.E.2d 1272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. App. 3d 828", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5482138 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/103/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 N.E.2d 980", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 795", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5107131 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0795-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2851222 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 987", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5209099 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0987-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 1196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906728 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887294 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0110-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 779, "char_count": 18118, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1919956179522969e-07, "percentile": 0.5916109394794832 }, "sha256": "ba00cd56b61f0b8d89a9d3d4c973500feaed1e3544133b2ac5b9552593d70b61", "simhash": "1:935838569f45fce6", "word_count": 3045 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:57:07.793358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RONALD CAVANAUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LANSING MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, Defendant (The Village of Lansing, Defendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Ronald Cavanaugh, appeals from the trial court\u2019s order quashing service and vacating a default judgment against defendant, Village of Lansing (Village). The trial court ruled that plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of section 2 \u2014 211 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 211 (West 1994)) for proper service on the Village and, without proper service, the judgment order is void. The relevant facts are as follows.\nOn January 27, 1993, plaintiff filed a complaint naming as defendants \"Lansing Municipal Airport\u201d and \"the Village of Lansing.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s allegations collectively referred to defendants as \"Lansing.\u201d Plaintiff alleged that, on October 22, 1989, his airplane was damaged on a runway at the airport when one wheel of the plane fell into a hole. Plaintiff alleged that the hole was caused \"when Lansing had removed a light standard from the runway.\u201d Plaintiff sought $66,520 in damages.\nTwo summons were issued on January 27, 1993. One instructed the sheriff to serve \"Lansing Municipal Airport,\u201d with a street address. The other summons requested service on \"Village of Lansing,\u201d with a street address. On February 1, 1993, a sheriff\u2019s deputy served \"Bob Malkas, Agent,\u201d at the airport administration office, and \"Darlene Goncher, Agent,\u201d at the office of the Village clerk. At that time, Katherine Dahlkamp was the Village clerk, and Robert West was the president of the board of trustees of the Village.\nOn February 3, 1993, Dahlkamp sent a letter to the insurance companies for the Village along with copies of both the summons and the complaint. Dahlkamp intended for insurance defense to be provided for both Lansing Municipal Airport and the Village. Counsel filed an appearance only on behalf of Lansing Municipal Airport, however, and argued that plaintiff\u2019s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 1994)). On July 8, 1993, Judge Kenneth Gillis dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs claim against Lansing Municipal Airport. The order further stated that \"[t]his cause shall continue to pend as to the co-defendant Village of Lansing.\u201d\nPlaintiff moved for default judgment against the Village. Although plaintiff filed a notice of motion and a notice of filing, neither was served on the Village. On July 14, 1993, without any prove up, default judgment was granted in favor of plaintiff and against the Village in the amount of $66,520. Plaintiff did not provide the Village with notice of the default judgment.\nOn October 16, 1995, plaintiffs counsel sent the Village a letter demanding payment on the default judgment. The letter stated: \"Given that more than two (2) years has [sic] elapsed since such judgment, the judgment is final and not appealable.\u201d The Village thereafter filed a special and limited appearance, a \"Motion to Quash Service and Vacate Default Judgment,\u201d a \"Motion to Correct Misnomer,\u201d and a \"Rule 183 Motion for Extension of Time\u201d to file a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 1994)).\nOn March 12, 1996, Judge Julia Nowicki granted the Village\u2019s motion to quash and vacated the default judgment on the grounds that plaintiff did not comply with the requirements for proper service on the Village. Specifically, the court held that plaintiff failed to serve either the Village clerk or the president of the Village board of trustees as required by section 2 \u2014 211 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 211 (West 1994)), and without valid service of process, the judgment is void. This appeal followed.\nWhile the parties do not raise the issue, we will first discuss our jurisdiction over this matter. This court is obligated to consider its own jurisdiction sua sponte. Salemi v. Klein Construction Co., 266 Ill. App. 3d 110, 639 N.E.2d 629 (1994). The jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to review of appeals from final judgments or orders, subject to certain statutory or supreme court exceptions. In re Petition to Incorporate the Village of Greenwood, 275 Ill. App. 3d 465, 655 N.E.2d 1196 (1995). The fact that an order contains the requisite language that there is no just reason for delay in enforcement or appeal does not make a nonfinal order appealable. Rice v. Burnley, 230 Ill. App. 3d 987, 596 N.E.2d 105 (1992). A judgment is considered \"final\u201d if it finally disposes of rights of parties either upon an entire controversy or upon some definite and separate branch thereof. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Rosewell, 262 Ill. App. 3d 938, 635 N.E.2d 413 (1992).\nHere, the trial court\u2019s order set forth a special finding that \"[t]here is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of this order,\u201d and plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. Yet, our research has revealed a split among Illinois courts as to whether an order quashing service is final and appealable. While some appeals have been dismissed on the grounds that such an order is interlocutory and not appealable (Nelson v. United Airlines, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 795, 612 N.E.2d 980 (1993); Stankowicz v. Gonzalez, 103 Ill. App. 3d 828, 431 N.E.2d 1272 (1981); Alexander v. Burke, 6 Ill. App. 3d 919, 287 N.E.2d 53 (1972); Mabion v. Olds, 84 Ill. App. 2d 291, 228 N.E.2d 188 (1967)), other decisions, including one by the Illinois Supreme Court, have determined that an order quashing service is final and appealable (Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E.2d 836 (1943); DiNardo v. Lamela, 183 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 539 N.E.2d 1306 (1989); In re Marriage of Kelso, 173 Ill. App. 3d 746, 527 N.E.2d 990 (1988); Connaughton v. Burke, 46 Ill. App. 3d 602, 361 N.E.2d 87 (1977)). In DiNardo, the second district of this court noted the disagreement among Illinois courts, but as we must do here, elected to follow the supreme court\u2019s reasoning in Brauer. DiNardo, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 1103, 539 N.E.2d at 1309. In Brauer, the supreme court stated:\n\"It is true, the order, in form, was only an order quashing the service of the summons. It was not an order dismissing the suit, nor was it in the form of a final judgment on the merits. Regardless of its form, however, it was a complete and final disposition of the case, based upon the conclusion the court had reached that appellee was not amenable to the service of process in the manner in which the summons was served. On that issue it was not only as effectual and conclusive but it was as final as any decision upon the merits. The result was the same.\nIf it should be held that an order of this character is not appeal-able, then there would be no method by which a plaintiff could obtain a review of an order of the trial court quashing the service of process.\u201d Brauer, 383 Ill. at 577-78, 50 N.E.2d at 841.\nBased on this language in Brauer, the DiNardo court held that \"in cases where the judgment is vacated due to improper service *** the effect of that order is to quash the service of process and an appeal may be had from this order.\u201d DiNardo, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 1103, 539 N.E.2d at 1309; see also Marriage of Kelso, 173 Ill. App. 3d at 749, 527 N.E.2d at 991 (\"an order granting a motion to quash service of process is a final and appealable order\u201d). Notwithstanding that other decisions have overlooked Brauer or deferred to the trial court\u2019s desire to retain jurisdiction (Nelson, 243 Ill. App. 3d 795, 612 N.E.2d 980; Stankowicz, 103 Ill. App. 3d 828, 431 N.E.2d 1272; Alexander, 6 Ill. App. 3d 919, 287 N.E.2d 53; Mabion, 84 Ill. App. 2d 291, 228 N.E.2d 188), we hold, as in DiNardo, that the trial court\u2019s order vacating the default judgment due to improper service was final and appealable.\nTurning to the parties\u2019 arguments on appeal, the relevant statute is section 2 \u2014 211 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 211 (West 1994)), which states:\n\"In actions against public, municipal, governmental or quasi-municipal corporations, summons may be served by leaving a copy with the chairperson of the county board or county clerk in the case of a county, with the mayor or city clerk in the case of a city, with the president of the board of trustees or village clerk in the case of a village, with the supervisor or town clerk in the case of a town, and with the president or clerk or other officer corresponding thereto in the case of any other public, municipal, governmental or quasi-municipal corporation or body.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 211 (West 1994).\nPlaintiff contends that the Village waived any argument concerning the requirements of section 2 \u2014 211 and that the default judgment should stand. Plaintiff stresses that Dahlkamp, the Village clerk, sent a letter with a copy of the summons and complaint to the Village\u2019s insurance companies two days after an employee in her office was served. Plaintiff further argues that the general appearance filed on behalf of Lansing Municipal Airport constituted a waiver of the Village\u2019s service argument. The Village responds that it is undisputed that plaintiff served neither the Village clerk nor the president of the board of trustees of the Village as required by section 2 \u2014 211, and it is irrelevant that Dahlkamp had actual knowledge of plaintiffs lawsuit. The Village further maintains that \"[i]f the appearance of the Lansing Municipal Airport, which is not a legal entity, but a facility owned by the Village of Lansing, is deemed the appearance of the Village, the defense of the Lansing Municipal Airport, and its dismissal based on Tort Immunity Act grounds, was in fact the defense and dismissal of the Village of Lansing.\u201d Finally, the Village urges that plaintiff had already settled with his insurance company and released any further claims arising from this incident long before filing this action.\nIn quashing service and vacating the default judgment, the trial court relied on Miller v. Town of Cicero, 225 Ill. App. 3d 105, 590 N.E.2d 490 (1992). In Miller, the plaintiff sued several defendants, including the Village of Stickney. A deputy sheriff left a copy of the summons with Lillian Rotrekl, an employee in the office of the village clerk of Stickney. The return stated that the sheriff served the summons \" '[b]y leaving a copy with Lillian Rotrekl, agent of said defendant.\u2019 \u201d Miller, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 106, 590 N.E.2d at 491. Following the entry of default judgment against it, Stickney filed a special and limited appearance and moved to quash service and vacate the default judgment. This court reversed the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to quash, stating:\n\"[T]he statute provides that with respect to a village, service must be made to the president of the board of trustees or the village clerk. [Citation.] Plaintiff served Lillian Rotrekl, an office clerk with general clerical duties. The parties do not dispute that Rotrekl was not the president of the board of trustees or the village clerk of Stickney. Thus, the service was obviously not in compliance with the plain language of the statute.\u201d Miller, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 110, 590 N.E.2d at 493-94.\nIt was also noteworthy in Miller that the plaintiff \"made no attempt to ascertain the proper person for service and include appropriate directions for the sheriff on the summons.\u201d Miller, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 114, 590 N.E.2d at 496. The summons simply gave the name \"Village of Stickney,\u201d with a street address.\nThis court recognized in Miller that our holding seemed to stress \" 'technicalities rather than the realities of the situation,\u2019 \u201d since there was no claim from Stickney that it did not receive the service of summons. Miller, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 113, 590 N.E.2d at 495. Yet, we concluded that this was a concern for the legislature, since a court must enforce the unambiguous and plain language of a statute. Miller, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 113, 590 N.E.2d at 495; see also Mauro v. County of Winnebago, 282 Ill. App. 3d 156, 159, 668 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1996) (\"[n]othing in the plain language of section 2 \u2014 211 provides that the county clerk is the agent of the sheriff for the purpose of receiving service of process\u201d).\nThe present case is indistinguishable from Miller. As in Miller, the summons here merely instructed the sheriff to serve \"Village .of Lansing,\u201d with a street address. It is also undisputed that the individual served, Darlene Goncher, is neither the Village clerk nor the president of the board of trustees. It is clear from Miller that service on an employee of a village clerk is not proper service, regardless of whether the village clerk later obtains actual knowledge of the lawsuit. We therefore cannot conclude that Dahlkamp\u2019s letter to the Village\u2019s insurance companies constituted a waiver of the argument that plaintiff failed to comply with section 2 \u2014 211. The trial court properly determined that the Village was not amenable to the service of process in the manner in which the summons was served.\nHaving concluded that Miller is directly on point, we further note that the case plaintiff relies upon is readily distinguishable. In Acosta v. Burris, 47 Ill. App. 2d 201, 197 N.E.2d 757 (1964), the defendant was unsuccessful in seeking to vacate a default judgment for improper service where the bailiff\u2019s return stated that the defendant had been personally served and the defendant failed to overcome this prima facie evidence. Indeed, the bailiff himself testified that he knew defendant for two years prior to serving him and identified him in open court as the individual he had served. Acosta, 47 Ill. App. 2d at 203, 197 N.E.2d at 758. Thereafter, the court mentioned the defendant\u2019s lack of due diligence and that he had tendered the case to his insurance company. Acosta, 47 Ill. App. 2d at 204, 197 N.E.2d at 758. Nevertheless, it is well settled that a party attacking a judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction due to defective service of process is not held to the due diligence requirements of a section 2 \u2014 1401 (735 ILCS 2 \u2014 1401 (West 1994)) petition for relief from judgment. State Bank v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986); Dec v. Manning, 248 Ill. App. 3d 341, 618 N.E.2d 367 (1993); DiNardo, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 1102, 539 N.E.2d at 1308. This is because a party seeking to vacate a judgment due to improper service is alleging that the judgment is void, and section 2 \u2014 1401 does not \"affect[ ] any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401(f) (West 1994). Accordingly, we need not concern ourselves with whether the Village exercised due diligence.\nWe also reject plaintiff\u2019s argument that the Village waived any defect in service through the general appearance filed on behalf of Lansing Municipal Airport. Plaintiff urges that, if the airport is not a legal entity and merely a facility owned and operated by the Village, then the appearance of the attorney on behalf of Lansing Municipal Airport amounted to a general appearance on behalf of the Village. Yet, if we accept plaintiff\u2019s argument, we would also be inclined to agree with the Village that the next step is to hold that the dismissal of Lansing Municipal Airport as a defendant was a dismissal of the Village, especially where plaintiff himself collectively referred to defendants as \"Lansing\u201d throughout his complaint and appellate briefs. Nevertheless, what plaintiff essentially is asking us to do is to uphold the default judgment in his favor on the grounds that the Village really did appear, even though plaintiff actually secured the default judgment against the Village by arguing to the trial court that the Village never appeared. This argument is not one we can comfortably accept or logically digest.\nIn short, we see no need to go beyond the clear and unambiguous facts in the record. The only general appearance in the record was filed on behalf of \"Lansing Municipal Airport.\u201d On July 8, 1993, the trial court dismissed Lansing Municipal Airport as a defendant, and the court\u2019s order specifically stated that \"[t]his cause shall continue to pend as to the co-defendant Village of Lansing.\u201d On July 14, 1993, plaintiff won a default judgment against the Village on the grounds that the Village had failed to appear and respond. Plaintiff did not give the Village notice of that default judgment until over two years later. Thereafter, the Village filed a special and limited appearance, the only appearance undeniably on its behalf, and moved to quash service and vacate the default judgment. Under section 2 \u2014 211 and Miller, it is clear that plaintiff did not comply with the requirements for proper service on the Village, and without valid service, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Village, and the judgment is void. All of this the record supports. We decline to go any further by holding that the appearance of the airport was an appearance by the Village or that the dismissal of the airport was the dismissal of the Village. With the vacation of the default judgment, plaintiffs action against the Village still stands. Plaintiff will have the opportunity to pursue his action against the Village on the merits, and the Village will have the opportunity to set forth any affirmative defenses, including that plaintiffs action is time-barred or that plaintiff has already released all claims against the Village through an insurance settlement.\nAccordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that the trial court properly granted the Village\u2019s motion to quash service and vacate default judgment. The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nWOLFSON, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jerome A. Tatar, of Richter & Jaros, of Oak Brook, for appellant.", "Ronald S. Cope, Mark A. Balkin, and Jon B. Kennett, all of Ancel, Clink, Diamond, Cope & Bush, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RONALD CAVANAUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LANSING MUNICIPAL AIRPORT, Defendant (The Village of Lansing, Defendant-Appellee).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201496\u20141260\nOpinion filed May 1, 1997.\nJerome A. Tatar, of Richter & Jaros, of Oak Brook, for appellant.\nRonald S. Cope, Mark A. Balkin, and Jon B. Kennett, all of Ancel, Clink, Diamond, Cope & Bush, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0239-01", "first_page_order": 259, "last_page_order": 267 }