{ "id": 1596920, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TAMARA L. GARBO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Garbo", "decision_date": "1997-06-02", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201496\u20140511", "first_page": "519", "last_page": "523", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 519" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" }, { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57346 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228635 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150166 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 1211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1215" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440611 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 970", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260385 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "972" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0970-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780263 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603065 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 987", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3557996 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0987-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 475, "char_count": 8391, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.262683731656366e-08, "percentile": 0.47824525676979623 }, "sha256": "06f9c48659952efcd21b99898a116ab26f7e4ed99b79b9c74e5bd6b94d83c5f1", "simhash": "1:78c4712f4951bab9", "word_count": 1429 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:57:07.793358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TAMARA L. GARBO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) from the order of the circuit court of Coles County dismissing its information charging defendant Tamara L. Garbo with the offense of driving while her license was suspended in violation of section 6 \u2014 303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(a) (West 1994)). The information was dismissed for failure to state an offense. 725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 1(a)(8) (West 1994). We affirm.\nThe information alleged that, in driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on February 22, 1996, defendant was driving while license suspended because her driver\u2019s license had been suspended for a statutory summary suspension violation of section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951h, par. 11\u2014 501.1) and the suspension was to be in effect until March 11, 1991, but because defendant had failed to pay the reinstatement fees, the suspension remained in effect on February 22, 1996. In People v. Johnson, 115 Ill. App. 3d 987, 989, 451 N.E.2d 28, 30 (1983), the court stated that a suspension is a temporary sanction for a specified period and failure to pay the reinstatement fees did not extend the period of suspension. See 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 204 (West 1994). The State argues that the legislature\u2019s enactment of section 6 \u2014 208.1 of the Vehide Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 208.1 (West 1994)) after the decision in Johnson indicated a legislative intent to extend the statutory summary suspension unless the reinstatement fees had been paid. We disagree.\nThe portion of section 6 \u2014 208.1 upon which the State relies is subsection (c), which states:\n\"(c) Full driving privileges may not be restored until all applicable reinstatement fees, as provided by this Code, have been paid to the Secretary of State and the appropriate entry made to the driver\u2019s record.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 208.1(c) (West 1994).\nThe reinstatement fee for summary suspension under section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Vehicle Code is $60. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 118(b) (West . 1994). Upon payment of the reinstatement fee at the end of any period of suspension, the licensee is entitled to reinstatement of driving privileges and return of her license if (1) the license has not expired, in which case the licensee may apply for a new license or (2) the licensee is not ineligible for some other reason. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 209 (West 1994). Section 6 \u2014 209 of the Vehicle Code has remained unchanged since Johnson. Section 6 \u2014 303(b) of the Vehicle Code allows the Secretary of State (Secretary) to extend the period of suspension upon receiving a report of conviction of any violation for operating a motor vehicle during the time the driver\u2019s license is suspended. 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 303(b) (West 1994). Therefore, if the legislature intended that the failure to pay reinstatement fees should effectively extend the period of suspension, the legislature could have so stated.\n\"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1992). The language of the statute is the best indicator of that intent, and aids for construing a statute will only be resorted to if the language of the statute is not clear. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994).\u201d Randall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 970, 972, 673 N.E.2d 452, 454-55 (1996).\nThe State argues that the fact section 6 \u2014 208.1 of the Vehicle Code was enacted after the decision in Johnson indicates a legislative intent to change the law. The legislature is presumed to know the construction courts have placed on a statute (see Hupp v. Gray, 73 Ill. 2d 78, 86, 382 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (1978)), and had the legislature intended to change the law it is likely that section 6 \u2014 209 would have been amended to reflect that intention and that the new section 6 \u2014 208.1(c) would not have used language similar to then-existing section 6 \u2014 209.\nThe State also argues that Johnson does not state the law here because it is based on the definition of suspension contained in section 1 \u2014 204 of the Vehicle Code, and section 6 \u2014 208.1 relates to \"statutory summary suspension.\u201d However, a statutory summary suspension is merely a type of suspension, and the fact it fits the definition of suspension in section 1 \u2014 204 is obvious from the specifically designated periods of temporary withdrawal by formal action of the Secretary of a person\u2019s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on public highways set forth in sections 6 \u2014 208.1(a)(1) through (a)(4) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 208.1(a)(1) through (a)(4) (West 1994)).\nThe State\u2019s final argument is that this court should give deference to the Secretary\u2019s interpretation of the statute. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State introduced a driving abstract from the Secretary certifying (1) the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was suspended for three months on December 18, 1990, pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Vehicle Code and (2) her license remained suspended on February 22, 1996.\nSome deference is afforded an agency\u2019s interpretation of a statute the agency is charged with administering and enforcing. Stroh Oil Co. v. Office of the State Fire Marshal, 281 Ill. App. 3d 121, 124, 665 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1996), citing City of Burbank v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 128 Ill. 2d 335, 345, 538 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (1989). However, the construction of a statute is a question of law considered de novo by a court of review. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 237, 664 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1996). While a court may give some deference to the agency\u2019s construction of an ambiguous statute, the courts are not bound by an erroneous construction. Boaden, 171 Ill. 2d at 239, 664 N.E.2d at 65. Moreover, section 6 \u2014 208.1(c) of the Vehicle Code is not an ambiguous statute. It simply does not say what the State wants it to say.\nWe further note that section 6 \u2014 115 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 115 (West 1994)) states, in substance, every driver\u2019s license issued shall expire four years from the date of its issuance and, with certain exceptions, five years from the date of issuance. Expiration dates for persons over 81 years of age are also shortened. Section 6 \u2014 115(e) provides that the Secretary may decline to process a renewal of any person \"who has not paid any fee or tax due under this Code.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 115(e) (West 1994).\nIn this case, under any scenario, the defendant, on the date of her arrest, February 22, 1996, did not have a valid driver\u2019s license. The license, which had been suspended to March 11, 1991, had long expired.\nThe present provisions of section 6 \u2014 208.1(c) of the Vehicle Code are consistent with Johnson because they speak of not \"restoring full driving privileges\u201d until a reinstatement fee is paid. 625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 208.1(c) (West 1994). The reference to \"full driving privileges\u201d implies the existence of driving privileges that are less than full. That is the status of the driving privileges of defendant here, as was the case in Johnson. As the suspension period had terminated here, as in Johnson, the defendant could drive a motor vehicle without being guilty of driving under suspension but may have violated some other provision of the Vehicle Code (see 625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 601(c)(2), 6 \u2014 112 (West 1994)).\nThe defendant may have been driving without a valid driver\u2019s license (625 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 101(a) (West 1994)), but defendant was not driving while her license was suspended since the period of suspension had terminated on March 18, 1991. The judgment of the circuit court of Coles County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGARMAN and GREEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "C. Stephen Ferguson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Charleston (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Daniel D. Yuhas and Elizabeth D. Caddick, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TAMARA L. GARBO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201496\u20140511\nOpinion filed June 2, 1997.\nC. Stephen Ferguson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Charleston (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Elizabeth D. Caddick, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0519-01", "first_page_order": 539, "last_page_order": 543 }