{ "id": 1596930, "name": "CHARLES R. LABATE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DATA FORMS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Labate v. Data Forms, Inc.", "decision_date": "1997-05-22", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201496\u20142668", "first_page": "738", "last_page": "743", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 738" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 1162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906802 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "312", "parenthetical": "\"malice\" in the context of interference cases means intentional and without justification; justification is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850233 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150184 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2690815 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 N.E.2d 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "394 Ill. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2472075 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73-74" }, { "page": "74-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/394/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477002 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" }, { "page": "60-61" }, { "page": "61-62" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258706 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 N.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 Ill. App. 3d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5135912 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/240/0550-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 568, "char_count": 11503, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.359565390050037e-08, "percentile": 0.5141863483160601 }, "sha256": "80e192f0390c49697fa8376c0f0abe06485a9100f6db94a55d79a06a6c3eec52", "simhash": "1:f70a65c0266f745a", "word_count": 1881 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:57:07.793358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHARLES R. LABATE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DATA FORMS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter being found liable by a jury, can a defendant challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint? Ordinarily, no. On occasion, yes. In this case, where the plaintiff claimed tortious interference with his business expectation with a third party, the answer is no.\nFACTS\nPlaintiff Charles Labate (Labate) alleged that his application for a purchase money mortgage was denied because Charles Thomas (Thomas), president of Data Forms, refused to verify Labate\u2019s past employment with Data Forms to a prospective lender. Labate alleged that Data Forms\u2019 refusal to supply this basic information was done with malicious intent, knowing that without this information the bank\u2019s approval of the mortgage would be denied.\nThe trial court found that Labate\u2019s complaint stated a cause of action and denied defendants\u2019 section 2 \u2014 615 motion for dismissal. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 1994). After discovery was exchanged and depositions were taken, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Again, the question was whether the facts stated a cause of action for intentional interference with a prospective business expectation.\nThe trial court maintained that a cause of action was stated and denied the motion. The case went to trial and a jury entered judgment in favor of Labate.\nOn appeal, no issues are raised regarding the sufficiency of the evidence at trial. A transcript of the trial is not before the court. Instead, defendants again question the sufficiency of the pleadings. They ask this court to decide whether a cause of action for intentional, tortious interference with a prospective business expectation was stated. Defendants ask us to reverse the judgment entered and grant judgment in their favor, finding that the trial court erred when it denied the motions for dismissal and for summary judgment. We affirm.\nDECISION\nSince the matter went to trial and Labate won a judgment in his favor, we first consider whether defendants\u2019 challenge to the pleadings and the trial court\u2019s denial of summary judgment, at.this juncture, are properly before this court. If they are not, that is the end of the matter.\nIn general, when a motion for summary judgment is denied and the case proceeds to trial, the order denying the motion for summary judgment merges with the judgment entered and is not appeal-able. Battles v. La Salle National Bank, 240 Ill. App. 3d 550, 608 N.E.2d 438 (1992). But where the issue raised in the summary judgment motion is one of law and would not be before the jury at trial, the order denying the motion does not merge and may be reviewed by the appellate court. Walters v. Yellow Cab Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 729, 653 N.E.2d 785 (1995).\nAlso, when a motion to dismiss is denied and defendant files an answer, the defendant, generally, is held to have waived any defects in the pleading. Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 60, 645 N.E.2d 888 (1994). An important corollary to the waiver principle \u2014 aider by verdict \u2014 provides that when a defendant allows an action to proceed to verdict, the verdict will cure all formal and purely technical defects or clerical errors, as well as \"any defect in failing to allege or in alleging defectively or imperfectly any substantial facts which are essential to a right of action.\u201d Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d at 60-61; Lasko v. Meier, 394 Ill. 71, 73-74, 67 N.E.2d 162 (1946).\nThere is an exception to the doctrine of aider by verdict, however. In Lasko, 394 Ill. at 74-75, the court said:\n\"The rule is *** that if the declaration omits to allege any substantial fact which is essential to a right of action, and which is not implied in or inferable from the finding of those which are alleged, a verdict for the plaintiff does not cure the defect. The question whether a complaint discloses a cause of action is always open to consideration in a court of review. There is a substantial and material difference between a complaint which alleges no cause of action and which may be questioned at any time and one which defectively or imperfectly alleges a cause of action and is good after verdict.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.)\nIf a complaint totally fails to a state of cause of action, its sufficiency can be questioned at any time, even if raised for the first time on appeal. Larkin v. Howlett, 19 Ill. App. 3d 343, 311 N.E.2d 367 (1974).\nBut, from a post-verdict viewpoint, what does it mean to fail to state a cause of action? How do we now differentiate between a defectively or imperfectly stated cause of action and a complete failure to state a cause of action?\nIn Adcock, the court explained:\n\"[The] exception applies only when a complaint fails to state a recognized cause of action. The exception does not apply where the complaint states a recognized cause of action, but contains an incomplete or otherwise insufficient statement of that cause of action.\nStated more succinctly, courts draw a distinction between a complaint that alleges no cause of action, which may be challenged at any time, and one which defectively or imperfectly alleges a cause of action.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d at 61-62.\nIt is not always easy to know whether a defendant\u2019s post-verdict challenge to the plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a cause of action is reviewable on appeal. As a matter of policy, in the interests of finality, post-verdict review of a complaint should not be a common occurrence.\nWe believe the supreme court in Adcock was trying to limit the scope of appeal that was suggested in Lasko v. Meier. Adcock involved a claim of civil conspiracy. And civil conspiracy, said the court, \"is a recognized cause of action in this State.\u201d Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d at 65. Having said that, the court then refused to consider Owens-Corning\u2019s claim that the judgment against it must be reversed because Ad-cock\u2019s complaint failed to allege \"any substantial facts which are essential to a civil conspiracy cause of action.\u201d Adcock, 164 Ill. 2d at 61.\nFactual deficiency, then, even where \"substantial,\u201d is not enough to overcome the doctrine of aider by verdict. On the other hand, we do not believe the supreme court was suggesting that merely labeling a complaint with the name of some recognized cause of action is enough to bar any post-verdict review, no matter how legally deficient that complaint might be. There must be some principled line between a complaint that states no cause of action and one that defectively or imperfectly alleges a cause of action. It seems to us where the complaint, whether based on statute or common law, sets out or implies the elements of the action, it is immune from post-verdict attack. The defendant, after losing at trial, should not be able to revisit a near miss in the pleading.\nIn this case, Data Forms does not complain about a factual deficiency. It contends the complaint was not merely imperfectly or defectively crafted, but that the cause of action does not exist at all because an essential element of it \u2014 the duty to perform the act requested \u2014 was neither pled nor inferable from the allegations of the complaint.\nIn order to determine whether Data Forms has an appeal, we inquire into the elements of the tort at issue and the allegations of it in plaintiffs complaint.\nTo set out a claim for tortious interference with a prospective business expectancy, a plaintiff must allege (1) plaintiffs reasonable expectation of entering into a valid business relationship with a third party, (2) defendant\u2019s knowledge of the plaintiff\u2019s expectancy, (3) purposeful interference by the defendant that prevents the plaintiffs legitimate expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship with that third party, and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from the interference. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill. App. 3d 154, 667 N.E.2d 425 (1996); OnTap Premium Quality Waters, Inc. v. Bank of Northern Illinois, N.A., 262 Ill. App. 3d 254, 634 N.E.2d 425 (1994).\nThe record shows that plaintiff alleged each of the elements of a tortious interference case. The allegations made by plaintiff, which defendants necessarily accept as true during the motion stage, are: (1) that the plaintiff\u2019s application for a purchase money mortgage was denied by the lending establishment based solely on defendants\u2019 refusal to supply verification of past employment; (2) that defendants were aware that plaintiffs loan approval was contingent on obtaining the employment verification; (3) that defendants, with admitted malicious intent to prevent plaintiff from obtaining the loan, refused to provide the necessary information; and (4) that plaintiff, having been denied the purchase money mortgage, was forced to pay \"points\u201d to obtain a different mortgage at a higher interest rate from a lender that did not require the employment verification.\nSince plaintiffs complaint set forth facts that would establish every element of a tortious interference cause of action, we decline to review the trial court\u2019s refusal to dismiss the complaint or grant summary judgment. In no case have we found that a fifth element\u2014 duty to perform (or not perform) the underlying act \u2014 is required before it can be said that a tortious interference cause of action is stated. As the court said in Rueben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Brauer, 275 Ill. App. 3d 300, 313, 655 N.E.2d 1162 (1995), \"The interest protected in a tortious interference case is the reasonable expectation of economic advantage.\u201d The \"duty,\u201d therefore, is to refrain from intentionally interfering with that expectation, not the performance of the underlying action.\nPlaintiffs cause of action was grounded on defendants\u2019 intentional and unjustified refusal to supply past employment information that was imperative for the realization of his business expectation, a purchase money mortgage. See Rueben H. Donnelley Corp., 275 Ill. App. 3d at 312 (\"malice\u201d in the context of interference cases means intentional and without justification; justification is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by defendant).\nPlaintiff alleged, and the affidavits and depositions in the record support the allegations, that Data Forms refused to verify Labate\u2019s past employment and confirm his dates of service in retaliation for Labate\u2019s having left the company.\nIt is clear from the record that Data Forms was aware that its refusal to provide the information would prevent Labate from obtaining the mortgage. In fact, that was the purpose of the refusal. Deliberate refusal can be purposeful.\nUnder these conditions, Labate alleged enough to state a cause of action for intentional interference with a business expectancy. Our conclusion is confined to the specific allegations of \"purposeful interference\u201d presented in this case. It should not be read as an intent to create a broad duty of employers to respond to requests for verification in every instance.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment entered in plaintiff\u2019s favor, and we find the trial court\u2019s rulings on the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment are foreclosed from review.\nAffirmed.\nMcNAMARA and BURKE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kevin R. Krantz, of Darnall, Polachek & Associates, of Addison, for appellants.", "Donald J. Parker, of Donald J. Parker, Ltd., of Downers Grove, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES R. LABATE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DATA FORMS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201496\u20142668\nOpinion filed May 22, 1997.\nKevin R. Krantz, of Darnall, Polachek & Associates, of Addison, for appellants.\nDonald J. Parker, of Donald J. Parker, Ltd., of Downers Grove, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0738-01", "first_page_order": 758, "last_page_order": 763 }