{ "id": 1596957, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY SMITH, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smith", "decision_date": "1997-06-03", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201496\u20141317", "first_page": "820", "last_page": "827", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 820" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "374 N.E.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448796 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564025 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2946340 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" }, { "page": "545" }, { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 N.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498959 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251694 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3641170 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477765 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574148 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238368 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 N.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872465 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. 2d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5362980 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 1052", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2581584 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1056" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/1052-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 640", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6192095 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" }, { "page": "71" }, { "page": "2609" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 964", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3155890 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "400 Ill. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307214 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/400/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 N.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. 2d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2775877 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/13/0290-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 735, "char_count": 14605, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4016380348078245e-07, "percentile": 0.6448097939300709 }, "sha256": "76dc69f521db1ad2f52d56411d839204525b57a8236854dc34a3ba938013f026", "simhash": "1:820d1d23fa7f8584", "word_count": 2367 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:57:07.793358+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY SMITH, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DiVITO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Stanley Smith was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. In this appeal, defendant contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nAt trial, Chicago police officer Quadir Dawan testified that at 1:30 p.m. on December 13, 1994, he and his partner, Officer Weather-spoon, were seated in an unmarked car conducting a surveillance of possible narcotics transactions at 1534 East 66th Place. Approximately 20 feet away, defendant and his codefendant, Kem Haynes, were standing in a vacant lot. On two separate occasions, the officers observed an individual approach defendant, who walked a short distance and retrieved something from the ground. Defendant then returned to where the individual and Haynes were standing and handed something to Haynes. Haynes handed the object to the individual in exchange for cash.\nAfter the second transaction, Officer Dawan called for assistance, whereupon two other officers apprehended defendant and Haynes. Officers Dawan and Weatherspoon then went to the location where they had observed defendant retrieve something from the ground. They recovered a wine bottle cap that contained seven clear, knotted plastic bags containing a white, rock-like substance, which was later determined to be cocaine. The officers also recovered $80 from Haynes. Although Officer Dawan inventoried the narcotics found inside the bottle cap, he did not inventory the $80 because of a general order exempting any amount under $135 from being inventoried.\nDuring cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Dawan if he recognized a copy of the general order of the Chicago police department with regard to the inventory of property. Officer Dawan stated that he was not familiar with the general order because it was dated 1981, and the order he was familiar with was dated 1986.\nThe parties stipulated that if called to testify, forensic chemist Jamie Sea would have stated that the plastic bags contained 1.13 grams of cocaine.\nFollowing the close of the State\u2019s case, the parties stipulated that the 1981 general order was in effect on December 13, 1994, and admitted the document into evidence. In closing argument, defense counsel noted that there was no limit on the amount of money to be inventoried in the general order.\nThe circuit court found defendant guilty of possession with intent to deliver. He was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant also pled guilty to violation of probation and was sentenced to a concurrent five-year prison term.\nDefendant contends in this appeal that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the facts were not sufficient to establish probable cause, much less guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In arguing that, at the time that Officer Dawan called for a back-up unit to arrest him, the facts were insufficient to warrant any police action beyond an investigatory stop, defendant essentially challenges the propriety of his arrest. Because he failed to raise this issue in the circuit court, he is barred from raising it for the first time on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 185, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Moreover, our review of the record provides no basis for application of the plain error doctrine. People v. Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d 394, 402, 566 N.E.2d 222 (1990). Accordingly, defendant has waived review of the sufficiency of the facts supporting his arrest.\nWaiver aside, the capacity to claim fourth amendment protection depends upon whether the police entered an area in which the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, typically his person, home, or belongings. People v. Janis, 139 Ill. 2d 300, 313, 565 N.E.2d 633 (1990); People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 311, 645 N.E.2d 195 (1994). Under the \"open fields doctrine,\u201d a person cannot claim a legitimate expectation of privacy in any unoccupied or undeveloped area beyond the immediate surroundings of his home. People v. Becktel, 137 Ill. App. 3d 810, 813, 485 N.E.2d 474 (1985). Here, because the cocaine that was the basis for his conviction was recovered from a vacant lot, defendant cannot invoke fourth amendment protection.\nDefendant also contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence that he had knowledge and constructive possession of the cocaine.\nA conviction will not be disturbed on appeal unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 226, 568 N.E.2d 837 (1991). The standard of review is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational finder of fact would have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hendricks, 137 Ill. 2d 31, 63, 560 N.E.2d 611 (1990).\nTo support a finding of possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the narcotics and that the narcotics were in his immediate and exclusive control. People v. Ray, 232 Ill. App. 3d 459, 462, 597 N.E.2d 756 (1992). Constructive possession may be established by proof that the defendant knew the contraband was present and that it was in his immediate and exclusive control. People v. Feazell, 248 Ill. App. 3d 538, 545, 618 N.E.2d 571 (1993). Knowledge may be shown by evidence of conduct from which it may be inferred that the defendant knew the contraband existed in the place where it was found. Feazell, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 545. The elements of knowledge and possession are questions of fact that are rarely susceptible to direct proof. Feazell, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 545.\nHere, Officer Dawan testified that on two separate occasions defendant, who was standing in a vacant lot, walked a short distance, retrieved something from the ground, returned to where an individual and Haynes were standing, and handed something to Haynes. Following defendant\u2019s arrest, Officer Dawan recovered a wine bottle cap and cocaine from the area from which defendant had twice retrieved something. Nobody else was seen in that area. Viewing those facts in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we cannot' conclude that no rational trier of fact could have found that defendant had knowledge of and control over the cocaine. Accordingly, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nWe note that defendant challenges neither the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to his intent to deliver nor Officer Dawan\u2019s credibility. Although it was shown that there was no money limit in the general order regarding inventory procedures, the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the resolution of any conflicts in the evidence are within the province of the trier of fact. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307, 537 N.E.2d 317 (1989). Here, the circuit court expressly found Officer Dawan to be credible. We find no basis in the record for reaching a contrary determination.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed. Pursuant to People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 374 N.E.2d 194 (1978), and the relevant statutory provisions, we grant the State $100 as costs for this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nRAKOWSKI, J., concurs.\nThe dissent\u2019s statement that the prosecutor \"stipulated that [Officer Dawan\u2019s] testimony was false in that department regulations made no exception for lesser amounts of cash\u201d and its repeated statements that the testimony was \"false\u201d are not borne out by the record. 288 Ill. App. 3d at 820-21. The parties merely stipulated that the 1981 general order was in effect on December 13, 1994, and admitted the document into evidence. In closing argument, defense counsel noted that there was no limit on the amount of money to be inventoried in the general order. Because there was no stipulation or admission that Officer Dawan testified falsely, it is not unreasonable to infer that he simply may have been mistaken as to the requirements of the inventory regulations.\nIn any event, the dissent relies on Officer Dawan\u2019s purportedly \"false\u201d testimony only insofar as it relates to the sufficiency of the evidence concerning defendant\u2019s intent to deliver. As we stated previously, defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of that evidence. Moreover, the dissent ignores the totality of the circumstances testified to by Officer Dawan \u2014 that defendant \"was approached by a male black subject on two separate occasions in that he upon being approached would walk a short distance in the vacant lot and retrieve from the ground an unknown item\u201d and walked \"over towards [Haynes] and handled] him this item.\u201d Although Officer Dawan admitted under cross-examination that he could not \"see the object at all,\u201d he was able to observe Haynes \"exchange that item for U.S.C.\u201d He also recovered seven individually wrapped packets of cocaine. Under those circumstances, we cannot conclude that the evidence was so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE DiVITO" }, { "text": "JUSTICE McNULTY,\ndissenting:\nOur supreme court has instructed us:\n\"[I]t is always the duty of this court to examine the evidence in a criminal case, and if it is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to raise a serious doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt the conviction will be reversed.\u201d People v. Coulson, 13 Ill. 2d 290, 296, 149 N.E.2d 96 (1958).\nBecause I find Officer Dawan\u2019s testimony regarding the exchange of money so unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt on the charge of possession with intent to deliver, I would reverse that conviction. Therefore, I dissent.\nContrary to the assertion in the majority\u2019s footnote, Dawan admitted that he never saw anything in the hands of defendant, Haynes, or the men who approached them. To support his conclusion that he witnessed a transaction or sale, he testified that he saw each man who approached Haynes give him money. Since Dawan arrested defendant and Haynes on the spot, any money they received they still had at the time of their arrest. The prosecutor stipulated that police inventory regulations required inventory of any such cash, regardless of amount. \"[Wjhere public officials are required to keep a record of their proceedings, such record constitutes the only lawful evidence of action taken, and cannot be contradicted, added to or supplemented by parol.\u201d People ex rel. Prindable v. New York Central R.R. Co., 400 Ill. 507, 512, 81 N.E.2d 201 (1948). Dawan admitted that the inventory sheet made no mention of cash found on either Haynes or defendant.\nTo rebut the inference that defendant and Haynes had no cash, Dawan testified that he found cash on Haynes and counted it, but he did not inventory the $80 because department regulations did not require inventorying amounts less than $135 in cash. The prosecutor stipulated that the testimony was false in that department regulations made no exception for lesser amounts of cash. Both the trial court and the majority here dismiss as insignificant the stipulation that Dawan testified falsely concerning police inventory regulations.\nOur supreme court has explained the purpose of police inventories:\n\"A range of governmental interests supports an inventory process. It is not unheard of for persons employed in police activities to steal property taken from arrested persons; similarly, arrested persons have been known to make false claims regarding what was taken from their possession at the station house. A standardized procedure for making a list or inventory as soon as reasonable after reaching the station house, not only deters false claims but also inhibits theft or careless handling of articles taken from the arrested person.\u201d People v. Dillon, 102 Ill. 2d 522, 527, 468 N.E.2d 964 (1984), quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 71, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609 (1983).\nAccordingly, the inventory procedures, as Dawan described them, would remove inhibition of police \"theft or careless handling\u201d of money taken from arrested persons, as long as the amount taken did not exceed $135. Police department regulations make no such exception, and they prohibit all theft from arrested persons. Dawan\u2019s false testimony besmirches the reputation of the police department by implying that its actual procedures permit theft from arrested persons as long as the amount taken is less than $135. His testimony on this issue is so unsatisfactory that it casts doubt on his entirely uncorroborated testimony that he witnessed money change hands in an apparent drug transaction. If defendant and Haynes had no money, the court has no reason to believe that they made any sale or engaged in any transaction with the two men who walked up to them. The small amount of narcotics found here lends no support to any inference of intent to deliver. See People v. McLemore, 203 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1056, 561 N.E.2d 465 (1990).\nThis court must defer to the trial court\u2019s determination of the credibility of witnesses, but \"[d]ue deference to the trial judge\u2019s appraisal of the witnesses\u2019 credibility does not excuse this court from its duty to examine the evidence to determine whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d People v. Butler, 28 Ill. 2d 88, 91, 190 N.E.2d 800 (1963). \"[A] court of review must reverse a criminal conviction where the evidence and/or the credibility of the witnesses is so improbable or so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.\u201d People v. Bailey, 265 Ill. App. 3d 262, 271, 638 N.E.2d 192 (1994). Dawan\u2019s admittedly false testimony concerning his reason for not properly recording his discovery of money renders his testimony that he saw money so unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt that defendant or Haynes ever received cash in exchange for packets of narcotics. Therefore, I would reverse the conviction for possession of narcotics with intent to deliver.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE McNULTY," } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Julie A. Hull, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Latisha Foster, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201496\u20141317\nOpinion filed June 3, 1997.\nMcNULTY, J., dissenting.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Julie A. Hull, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Latisha Foster, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0820-01", "first_page_order": 840, "last_page_order": 847 }