{ "id": 350984, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "1997-06-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201495\u20141273", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "6", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3227708 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/81/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092756 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082585 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 N.E.2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that fundamental fairness requires that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 986", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5410212 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that fundamental fairness requires that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159560 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280-81", "parenthetical": "cautioning litigants about ignoring the waiver rule only because \"substantial\" or \"fundamental\" rights are implicated" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 1121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2971650 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 2d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1582622 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126-27", "parenthetical": "attempted aggravated battery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/121/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5380629 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "attempted aggravated battery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564025 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19" }, { "page": "573-74" }, { "page": "2788-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228708 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48-51" }, { "page": "48-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 604, "char_count": 9696, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.243821620283089e-08, "percentile": 0.4320624484284605 }, "sha256": "99dadce621f09b71e8474733cbdbe218505eadc145f9bb200acf85f06b40cc37", "simhash": "1:9ba515283b98e267", "word_count": 1556 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:29:08.370768+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a joint bench trial with his codefendant, Tony Hays, defendant Terry Jones was found guilty of vehicular invasion and thereafter sentenced to a Class X 20-year prison term. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the circuit court abused its sentencing discretion.\nBACKGROUND\nAt trial, Carl Irps testified that on July 7, 1994, at approximately 5:30 a.m., he was waiting alone inside his van at the corner of Paulina Street and Jackson Boulevard in Chicago to begin pipefitting work in a nearby restaurant when defendant and Hays approached him. Defendant had an unlit cigarette in his mouth and motioned for a match. Irps indicated that he did not have one, whereupon defendant and Hays continued walking until they reached a stop sign at the corner. There, they stopped and continued to talk.\nDefendant and Hays then turned around and walked back to Irps, who by that time had found a matchbook. Irps rolled down his window and gave defendant the matchbook. Defendant took the matchbook from Irps and lit his cigarette. According to Irps, defendant suddenly lunged at him through the open driver\u2019s side window with a \"folding knife or something\u201d and said, \"I am going to cut you.\u201d Irps \"bailed for\u201d his passenger\u2019s side door, jumped out of his van and fled. Defendant and Hays followed. As he ran, Irps noticed a nearby hospital\u2019s security truck driving toward him. Irps pointed to his pursuers. The security officer driving that truck responded and began to chase defendant and Hays.\nIrps further testified that he was not cut or otherwise struck by defendant.\nDavid A. Schur, the hospital security officer who assisted Irps, testified that he was stationed on the Paulina Street bridge on July 7, 1994, in the early morning, and there saw defendant and Hays walking along Paulina toward Jackson Boulevard. According to Schur, defendant and Hays stopped in the middle of the Paulina Street-Jackson Boulevard intersection and then began walking toward a blue van. When they reached the van, defendant approached the driver\u2019s side window, reached inside and then \"back[ed] off.\u201d Schur drove closer. As he did, he saw defendant return to the front of the van and then run back toward the rear of the van. He then saw Irps running from defendant and Hays toward Van Bur\u00e9n Street.\nSchur further testified that as Irps fled toward him, he pointed at defendant and Hays and \"mumbled something about [them] trying to rob him.\u201d Schur radioed for assistance. He then got out of his truck and told defendant and Hays to stop. They did not and he gave chase.\nChicago police officer Patrick M. Finucane testified that he and his partner responded to Schur\u2019s radio call and shortly thereafter arrested defendant. Hays was later arrested by other responding officers.\nChicago police officer Daniel McWeeny testified that he spoke with Irps and Schur and then interviewed defendant. According to Detective McWeeny, defendant denied any attempt to rob Irps.\nNeither defendant nor Hays presented any evidence in their defense.\nFollowing closing statements, the circuit court found both defendant and Hays guilty of vehicular invasion. Specifically, the circuit court found that \"[defendant] reached into the van and with a knife or razor-like instrument *** attempted to cut [Irps].\u201d\nSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE\nDefendant initially contends that, although the evidence introduced against him established his intent to commit aggravated assault, a Class A misdemeanor, within Irps\u2019 van, it did not establish his intent to commit a felony therein.\nIn resolving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict a defendant, a reviewing court does not reweigh that evidence. See People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 48-51 (1989). Rather, it resolves such a challenge by determining whether, after viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Young, 128 Ill. 2d at 48-49, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573-74, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979). Only when the evidence of a defendant\u2019s guilt is so unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible, as to create a reasonable doubt, will a conviction be set aside. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989).\nSection 12 \u2014 11.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 states as follows:\n\"A person commits vehicular invasion who knowingly, by force and without lawful justification, enters or reaches into the interior of a motor vehicle *** while such motor vehicle is occupied by another person or persons, with the intent to commit therein a theft or felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12\u201411.1 (West 1994).\nHere, defendant\u2019s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is based upon the presumption that Illinois does not recognize the offense of attempted aggravated battery. We reject that presumption, for such an offense is recognized in this state. People v. Britz, 39 Ill. App. 3d 200, 202 (1976) (attempted aggravated battery); Macklin v. Commonwealth Life & Accident Co., 121 Ill. App. 2d 119, 126-27 (1970) (attempted aggravated battery); see 720 ILCS Ann. 5/12\u20141, Committee Comments\u20141961, at 215 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (attempted battery). Moreover, because attempted aggravated battery is a specific intent offense, a defendant convicted of such is also axiomatically deemed to have possessed the intent to commit aggravated battery. See 720 ILCS 5/8\u20144(a) (West 1994); People v. Miner, 46 Ill. App. 3d 273, 283 (1977). Aggravated battery is a Class 3 felony. 720 ILCS 5/12\u20144(e) (West 1994).\nThe circuit court implicitly found defendant guilty of attempted aggravated battery. We perceive no error in that finding. Indeed, we believe, as we did in People v. Hays, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1121 (1995) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, could have found defendant guilty of vehicular invasion beyond a reasonable doubt.\nPROPRIETY OF DEFENDANT\u2019S SENTENCE\nDefendant also contends that the circuit court abused its sentencing discretion. Specifically, defendant argues that his 20-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the 8-year sentence imposed upon his codefendant, Hays.\nAt the time of defendant\u2019s offense and his subsequent sentencing, the Unified Code of Corrections provided: \"A defendant\u2019s challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed within 30 days following the imposition of sentence.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u20148\u20141(c) (West 1994) (eff. August 11, 1993). The mandatory language of section 5\u20148\u20141(c) has been interpreted to mean that a defendant who fails to file a post-sentencing motion challenging the correctness of the sentence waives appellate review of the matter unless it appears that the trial court imposed consecutive or extended sentences without legal justification. See People v. Reed, 282 Ill. App. 3d 278, 280-81 (1996) (cautioning litigants about ignoring the waiver rule only because \"substantial\u201d or \"fundamental\u201d rights are implicated).\nHere, defendant essentially argues that he was denied fundamental fairness in sentencing. See People v. Brown, 249 Ill. App. 3d 986, 620 N.E.2d 1090 (1993) (holding that fundamental fairness requires that defendants similarly situated should not receive grossly disparate sentences). Defendant did not raise this issue before the circuit court in a post-sentencing motion. Accordingly, under Reed, we deem the matter waived.\nAlthough we deem the matter waived, we are mindful that the Illinois Supreme Court has granted the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal the Reed decision. Accordingly, in the interests of judicial economy, we note that even if this court were to consider defendant\u2019s argument, we would find no error.\nA sentencing determination is committed to a circuit court\u2019s sound discretion. Accordingly, such a determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is shown to have been abused. People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 492 (1981); People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153 (1977). Similarly situated defendants may not be sentenced to unreasonably disparate sentences. People v. Godinez, 91 Ill. 2d 47, 55 (1982). However, a disparity between the sentences of similarly situated defendants will not be deemed unreasonable on appeal if that disparity is \"warranted by differences in the nature and extent of the concerned defendants\u2019 participation in the offense.\u201d Godinez, 91 Ill. 2d at 55.\nHere, defendant\u2019s participation in the vehicular invasion was much greater than Hays\u2019. Defendant also had a more serious criminal history. Under these circumstances, the circuit court will not be found to have imposed an unreasonably disparate sentence upon defendant nor to have otherwise abused its sentencing discretion. See People v. Martin, 81 Ill. App. 3d 238, 245-46 (1980).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. As a part of our judgment, we also grant the State\u2019s request and assess $100 against defendant, as costs, for the State\u2019s defense of this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nBUCKLEY and GALLAGHER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Leslie V. Matlaw, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William D. Carroll, and Timothy Ray, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201495\u20141273\nOpinion filed June 30, 1997.\nLeslie V. Matlaw, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William D. Carroll, and Timothy Ray, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 19, "last_page_order": 24 }