{ "id": 350992, "name": "ROSIE L. STEWARD, Special Adm'r of the Estate of James Lee Steward, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BERNARD L. CRISSELL et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Steward v. Crissell", "decision_date": "1997-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201496\u20142444", "first_page": "66", "last_page": "74", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 66" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3522353 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5284773 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187153 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 N.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2631485 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 N.E.2d 1288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5288633 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431-38" }, { "page": "437-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2870127 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 950", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3624889 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0950-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 N.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2894983 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ohio St. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St.", "case_ids": [ 1057368 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st/156/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 A.L.R.2d 1148", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1151" }, { "page": "1151-52" }, { "page": "1151-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.E. 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4955601 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425-26" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/288/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 N.E.2d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5300597 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/61/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 N.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2824511 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/29/0572-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 983, "char_count": 20275, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.625354739694356e-08, "percentile": 0.4044508000273375 }, "sha256": "7952d324c886fcefecaf874212d6325f79ff53601bddfed507cb6a5f4f7eaafe", "simhash": "1:1aa69e32549fb783", "word_count": 3242 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:29:08.370768+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROSIE L. STEWARD, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of James Lee Steward, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BERNARD L. CRISSELL et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case turns on the admissibility of a toxicology report. James Steward died when his car hit a trailer. Rosie Steward, as special administrator of James Steward\u2019s estate, sued the trailer\u2019s owner and driver for negligence. The trial court admitted into evidence at trial the medical examiner\u2019s toxicology report, which showed an alcohol concentration of .162 in Steward\u2019s blood. Plaintiff appeals from judgment entered on the jury\u2019s verdict for defendants. We, too, find the report admissible under section 115 \u2014 5.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115\u20145.1 (West 1994)), and therefore we affirm.\nDefendant Bernard Crissell drove a truck and trailer for defendant North American Van Lines on January 11, 1992. Heading westbound on 95th Street somewhat after 11 p.m., he saw a sign indicating that the viaduct ahead of him had a clearance of only 12 feet 8 inches. Because his trailer was over 13 feet tall, he realized he needed to turn around. He turned left onto Dorchester, only to find a chain blocking the street. The street led to a business district, and authorities for that district closed that street at 6 o\u2019clock that night. Crissell pulled his truck up to the chain, stopped, and turned on his four-way flashers. His trailer then blocked both eastbound lanes and one of the two westbound lanes. He saw a security pickup truck coming towards him from inside the business district. A few minutes later Crissell heard a loud crash.\nPolice found Steward dead in his car. The trailer sheared off the top of the car as the eastbound car passed under the trailer. The car came to a stop 89 feet east of the trailer. The estate charged Crissell and North American Van Lines with negligently blocking the eastbound lanes without placing warnings adequate to give drivers time to react when they discovered the trailer after passing underneath the nearby viaduct.\nBefore trial plaintiff moved to bar the toxicologist\u2019s report and testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Dr. Nancy Wu Chen, chief toxicologist in the Cook County office of the medical examiner, explained department procedures for quantifying toxin levels in samples the department receives from the medical examiner\u2019s pathology department. The toxicology department received the samples labeled \"James Stewart\u201d at 1:44 p.m. on January 12, 1992. The file numbers matched Steward\u2019s files, and the subject\u2019s description also matched Steward\u2019s description. Dr. Wu Chen did not know when the pathology department drew the samples because her records show only the toxicology department\u2019s work. The court overruled plaintiffs objection to the foundation for the exhibit.\nOn cross-examination Dr. Wu Chen admitted that alcohol concentrations in the blood change somewhat after death, and the readings vary somewhat depending upon the part of the body from which blood is drawn. She knew neither from what part of Steward\u2019s body, nor how long after death, the pathologists drew the blood. She said, \"that question maybe it should be directed to a pathologist.\u201d Defendants\u2019 exhibits listed Dr. Deborah Kay as the pathologist who requested the toxicology report. Neither party subpoenaed Dr. Kay to testify.\nThe parties presented testimony concerning lighting, obstruction of the view for eastbound cars, Steward\u2019s speed, and the length of time the trailer remained across the lanes prior to the crash. Plaintiff argued that Crissell could have pulled off the roadway rather than turn left, and he could have put out the warning triangles kept in the truck.\nThe court instructed the jurors that statutory law forbids driving with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of .10, and if they found a violation of that statute, they could consider that violation in assessing negligence. The court also told the jurors that if Steward\u2019s contributory negligence was more than 50% of the proximate cause of the accident, they should return a verdict for defendants.\nPlaintiff argues that section 115 \u2014 5.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorize admission of the toxicology report because the alcohol in Steward\u2019s blood was not the cause of death. Section 115 \u2014 5.1 provides:\n\"In any civil or criminal action the records of the coroner\u2019s medical or laboratory examiner summarizing and detailing the performance of his or her official duties in performing medical examinations upon deceased persons or autopsies, or both, and kept in the ordinary course of business ***, duly certified by the *** medical examiner, shall be received as competent evidence in any court of this State, to the extent permitted by this Section. These reports, specifically including but not limited to the pathologist\u2019s protocol, autopsy reports and toxicological reports, shall be public documents and thereby may be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts, findings, opinions, diagnoses and conditions stated therein.\nA duly certified coroner\u2019s protocol or autopsy report, or both, complying with the requirements of this Section may be duly admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule as prima facie proof of the cause of death of the person to whom it relates. The records referred to in this Section shall be limited to the records of the results of post-mortem examinations of the findings of autopsy and toxicological laboratory examinations.\nPersons who prepare reports or records offered in evidence hereunder may be subpoenaed as witnesses in civil or criminal cases upon the request of either party to the cause.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115\u20145.1 (West 1994).\nThe argument in this case centers on the legislature\u2019s intention in restricting admissibility to \"the extent permitted by this Section.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115\u20145.1 (West 1994).\nAs the statute itself indicates, the medical examiner\u2019s records are \"public documents\u201d \"kept in the ordinary course of business.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115\u20145.1 (West 1994). As such they appear to be generally admissible under common law hearsay exceptions for public documents and business records, in the absence of the statute. See In re Estate of Ersch, 29 Ill. 2d 572, 578, 195 N.E.2d 149 (1963). Public documents are generally admissible because of \"the inconvenience to the public official in requiring him to testify, the trustworthiness of one charged with a public duty, and the fact that there is no motive for falsifying or misrepresenting.\u201d People v. Fair, 61 Ill. App. 2d 360, 366, 210 N.E.2d 593 (1965). The advisory committee commenting on the public documents exception embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) also noted that the documents reflecting regularly conducted governmental activities are made reliable \"by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record.\u201d Fed. R. Evid. 803, Advisory Committee\u2019s Note.\nAccordingly, public documents produced by coroners and county medical examiners were generally admissible in evidence until our supreme court decided Spiegel\u2019s House Furnishing Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 288 Ill. 422, 123 N.E. 606 (1919). In that case the plaintiff sought to recover worker\u2019s compensation from her dead husband\u2019s employer. The trial court admitted into evidence the verdict of the coroner\u2019s jury, which found that the decedent received the fatal wound while working on his employer\u2019s property. Our supreme court noted that the coroner\u2019s jury based its verdict solely on hearsay testimony concerning statements the decedent made about the injury, and the employer had no right to appear or present evidence to the coroner\u2019s jury. Spiegel\u2019s, 288 Ill. at 425-26. Even a judicial finding against an unrepresented party would not have a preclusive effect in a subsequent trial; the court reasoned that the quasi-judicial findings of a coroner\u2019s jury should have less effect. Spiegel\u2019s, 288 Ill. at 432. The court held:\n\"[I]t should be no longer *** that a coroner\u2019s verdict or inquest should be admissible as evidence in civil suits for the purpose of establishing personal liability against any individual in cases where the death of any person is charged or to establish a defense to such a suit, or for the purpose of establishing other issues between private litigants.\u201d Spiegel\u2019s, 288 Ill. at 430.\nThe committee on the federal rules noted problems similar to those that led to the holding in Spiegel\u2019s. When a public record includes an evaluative report, which may rely on inadmissible hearsay, like the coroner\u2019s verdict on cause of death, its admissibility is problematic. Fed. R. Evid. 803, Advisory Committee\u2019s Note. Police reports are generally inadmissible in part because they largely summarize hearsay from persons not under oath telling the police what they saw. Annotation, Admissibility of Report of Police or Other Public Officer or Employee, or Portions of Report, as to Cause of or Responsibility for Accident, Injury to Person, or Damage to Property, 69 A.L.R.2d 1148, 1151 (1960). Some reports include the officer\u2019s non-expert opinion on such matters as the cause of an accident. 69 A.L.R.2d at 1151-52.\nHowever, police reports may also include statements of facts the officer observed.\n\"An example is such a statement as that the skidmarks at the scene of the accident were 75 feet in length. Such an item *** should, so far as the hearsay rule is concerned, be admissible in evidence ***.\nIn other words, those portions of a public officer\u2019s report relating to the cause of or responsibility for an accident, injury, or damage may constitute statements of fact or they may represent a mere opinion or conclusion, and it would seem that a statement appearing in such a report relating to the cause of or responsibility for an accident or injury would properly be admitted in evidence if (1) it constituted a statement of fact, as distinguished from an opinion or conclusion, and (2) it represented the personal observations of the reporter, not a relaying of what someone else had told him.\u201d 69 A.L.R.2d at 1151-52.\nIn Carson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 156 Ohio St. 104, 100 N.E.2d 197 (1951), the trial court admitted into evidence a coroner\u2019s report under a statute that made the coroner\u2019s records admissible as evidence \"as to the facts therein contained.\u201d Carson, 156 Ohio St. at 111, 100 N.E.2d at 201. The supreme court of Ohio held that the trial court properly admitted the report as evidence of such facts as the decedent\u2019s age and the description of the fatal wound. However, the report also reflected the coroner\u2019s conclusion that the decedent killed himself. The court noted that courts of other states divided on the issue of whether coroners\u2019 opinions as to cause of death constituted statements of fact under similar statutes. Carson, 156 Ohio St. at 112, 100 N.E.2d at 202. The court held that the coroner\u2019s conclusion constituted an inadmissible opinion. Carson, 156 Ohio St. at 113, 100 N.E.2d at 203; see People v. Fiddler, 45 Ill. 2d 181, 185, 258 N.E.2d 359 (1970).\nIllinois statutes directly address the question that the Ohio court faced. The General Assembly adopted the holding of Spiegel\u2019s and the statute remains in effect. 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2201 (West 1994). Until 1982 the legislature also made the coroner\u2019s toxicology reports inadmissible in civil trials, but the legislature then eliminated the statute specifically restricting use of toxicology reports and added a provision to \"An Act in regard to evidence and depositions\u201d (Evidence Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 51, pars. 3.01 through 3.03), explicitly making such reports admissible in civil proceedings. See Schantz v. HodgeVonDeBur, 113 Ill. App. 3d 950, 951-52, 447 N.E.2d 1355 (1983).\nSection 115 \u2014 5.1 recodifies sections 3.01 through 3.03 of the Evidence Act. Section 3.01 provided:\n\"In any civil or criminal action the records of the coroner\u2019s medical or laboratory examiner summarizing and detailing the performance of his official duties in performing medical examinations upon deceased persons or autopsies, or both, and kept in the ordinary course of business ***, duly certified by the *** medical examiner, shall be received as competent evidence in any court of this State, to the extent permitted by Section 3.03. These reports, specifically including but not limited to the pathologist\u2019s protocol, autopsy reports and toxicological reports, shall be public documents and thereby may be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts, findings, opinions, diagnoses and conditions stated therein.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 51, par. 3.01.\nSection 3.02 permitted the limited use of a coroner\u2019s protocol or autopsy report to show cause of death. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 51, par. 3.02. Section 3.03 established that either party to a civil case had a right to subpoena as witnesses any persons who prepared the reports. Thus the restriction on use \"to the extent permitted by Section 3.03\u201d meant that none of the reports were admissible if the preparers failed to respond to subpoena or were otherwise unavailable for examination by any party who sought to examine them. See Affatato v. Jewel Cos., 259 Ill. App. 3d 787, 795-96, 632 N.E.2d 137 (1994). The section established special procedures for admission of reports prepared by persons since deceased. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 51, par. 3.03 (now 725 ILCS 5/115\u20145.1 (West 1994)).\nWe find that the restriction to use \"to the extent permitted by this Section\u201d (725 ILCS 5/115\u20145.1 (West 1994)) retains the meaning it had when enacted in three separate sections. The statements of relevant and material facts in certified records of the coroner or medical examiner, kept in the ordinary course of business, are all admissible in evidence, as long as the preparers of the reports are available for examination upon the request of either party. Such admissible facts include measurements of the scene, descriptions of the wounds, and medical reports, including toxicology reports, concerning the deceased. Assessments of the cause of death have more limited admissibility: the coroner\u2019s verdict, concerning the cause and material circumstances surrounding the death (see 55 ILCS 5/3\u20143025 (West 1994)), is entirely inadmissible in all civil proceedings for damages. 735 ILCS 5/8\u20142201 (1994). Only the coroner\u2019s protocol or autopsy report is admissible as evidence of the cause of death, again providing that the preparer is available by subpoena for examination. Section 115 \u2014 5.1 renders the toxicology report here admissible.\nPlaintiff claims that the court should not have admitted the report because the pathologist drew the blood under an unconstitutional statute, section 11 \u2014 501.6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501.6 (West 1992)). The pathologist drew the blood pursuant to section 3 \u2014 3013 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/3\u20143013 (West 1992)), which requires withdrawal of a blood specimen from all deceased car drivers in cases of accidental death involving motor vehicles. Plaintiff raises no constitutional objection to this statute. The unconstitutionality of section 11 \u2014 501.6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code is simply irrelevant to this case.\nPlaintiff asserts that defendants here failed to present a complete foundation for the introduction of the toxicology report, in that defendants did not prove full compliance with all procedures prescribed by section 3 \u2014 3013, and defendants presented no other evidence of Steward\u2019s intoxicated behavior. As the court pointed out in Wade v. City of Chicago Heights, 216 Ill. App. 3d 418, 431-38, 575 N.E.2d 1288 (1991), section 11 \u2014 501(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code specifically proscribes driving with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of .10 (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501(a)(1) (West 1992)), and evidence that a driver violated that statute is admissible evidence of negligence even without evidence of intoxication. Defendants did not need evidence of intoxication as a prerequisite for admission of the toxicology report. The trial court correctly instructed jurors to consider evidence of the statutory violation in assessing negligence. Wade, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 437-38.\nDefendants did not prove that the pathologist drew Steward\u2019s blood within six hours of his death, although the Counties Code instructs coroners to draw blood for toxicological testing within that time. 55 ILCS 5/3\u20143013 (West 1992). The sole witness from the medical examiner\u2019s office did not know when the pathologist drew the blood.\nCourts generally allow public records into evidence based in part on the presumption that public officials, with no motive to falsify records, will perform their assigned duties properly. Department of Conservation v. First National Bank, 36 Ill. App. 3d 495, 504, 344 N.E.2d 11 (1976); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.12, at 663 (5th ed. 1990). To overcome this presumption, the party challenging such records has the burden of presenting evidence to show that the records are unreliable. People v. Graney, 234 Ill. App. 3d 497, 503, 599 N.E.2d 574 (1992); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 803.12, at 663 (5th ed. 1990).\nPlaintiff here did not meet the burden of showing a statutory violation that might cast doubt on the reliability of the records. Plaintiff did not even exercise the right to subpoena Dr. Kay, the pathologist who requested the toxicology report, to determine whether pathologists drew the blood within the statutorily required six hours. The minor discrepancy between the name on the toxicology request, James Stewart, and the name of the deceased, is not sufficient to cast doubt on the procedures used or the relevance of the report, especially because James Stewart had the same file number and description as deceased here.\nSection 115 \u2014 5.1 establishes special requirements for determining admissibility of the public documents at issue here. The section requires certification of the record, which the medical examiner must keep in the ordinary course of business, and the record\u2019s preparer must be available to either party by subpoena. Since defendants met the foundational requirements for this relevant evidence, and plaintiff presented no evidence to show the medical examiner failed to use the appropriate procedures, the trial court correctly admitted the toxicology report into evidence.\nFinally, plaintiff complains about remarks defense counsel made in closing argument. Defense counsel said, \"Counsel went into this routine of \u2014 .\u201d When plaintiff objected, defense counsel offered to rephrase:\n\"Counsel then suggested to Mr. Crissell, well you should have [gone] to the right ***. You should have performed some type of a zigzag maneuver to get back to the other side.\nI put to you, ladies and gentlemen, that Counsel was not in the cab of the truck that night. Mr. Crissell was in the cab of that truck, and he made a decision that he could not perform any of these alternate *** maneuvers in order to prevent himself from blocking that roadway.\n* * *\n*** Counsel mentioned that Mr. Crissell was not properly trained on the placement of triangles. *** And then Counsel did a maneuver. He put them together in 30 seconds. Putting together the triangles in 30 seconds in your cab doesn\u2019t do it, folks. *** You [have] to place them out.\u201d\nThe comments did not egregiously mischaracterize plaintiff\u2019s arguments or amount to a personal attack on plaintiff\u2019s attorney. See Lewis v. Cotton Belt Route\u2014St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 217 Ill. App. 3d 94, 121, 576 N.E.2d 918 (1991). The comments were not so inappropriate as to fall outside the bounds of fair response to the arguments plaintiff raised. See Coffey v. Hancock, 122 Ill. App. 3d 442, 451, 461 N.E.2d 64 (1984).\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nRAKOWSKI and TULLY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael D. Gerstein and Melvin A. Weinstein, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Menges, Mikus & Molzahn, of Chicago (Timothy J. Reed and Scott G. Reno, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROSIE L. STEWARD, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of James Lee Steward, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BERNARD L. CRISSELL et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201496\u20142444\nOpinion filed June 10, 1997.\nMichael D. Gerstein and Melvin A. Weinstein, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nMenges, Mikus & Molzahn, of Chicago (Timothy J. Reed and Scott G. Reno, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0066-01", "first_page_order": 84, "last_page_order": 92 }