{ "id": 351194, "name": "PRAIRIE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNA BELL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Prairie Management Corp. v. Bell", "decision_date": "1997-06-16", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201495\u20142645", "first_page": "746", "last_page": "753", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 746" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 205", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the statutory provision requiring that the notice be sent by registered mail was intended merely to insure delivery rather than to determine the validity of service" }, { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 1012", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the statutory provision requiring that the notice be sent by registered mail was intended merely to insure delivery rather than to determine the validity of service" }, { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/1012-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "\"The statute does not purport to restrict the making of a demand or the service of a notice to the particular methods stated in the statute\"" }, { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5056942 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "\"The statute does not purport to restrict the making of a demand or the service of a notice to the particular methods stated in the statute\"" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/331/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5537464 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 224", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3627996 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 983", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "986" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5677395 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "abstract of op." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2430374 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "abstract of op." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/344/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5536620 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0167-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 696, "char_count": 14217, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0308731167821714e-07, "percentile": 0.5480236492552268 }, "sha256": "5a01a5c2453e785268e1ef92a086ff3792a00d8e66d2e0014bce3fa3f6965580", "simhash": "1:abee554e5f6d2fd0", "word_count": 2293 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:29:08.370768+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PRAIRIE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNA BELL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Prairie Management Corporation, filed a forcible entry and detainer action against defendant, Anna Bell, seeking to recover possession of the premises in which she and her five children live. After a bench trial, the trial court granted plaintiff possession of defendant\u2019s residential unit. Defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider and vacate the judgment for possession was denied. On appeal, defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether some of the testimony elicited at trial was inadmissible; (2) whether the trial court\u2019s reliance upon the inadmissible evidence constitutes reversible error; (3) whether, assuming that all the testimony elicited at trial was admissible, the court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (4) whether plaintiff\u2019s failure to serve its termination notice in accordance with the requirements of the governing statute deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (5) whether plaintiff\u2019s failure to serve its termination notice in accordance with the requirements of the governing statute prevented it from establishing an essential element of its prima facie case at trial.\nOn May 16, 1990, defendant entered into a written lease, subsequently extended, for the premises at 5523 West Washington, Unit 103, Chicago, Illinois, a residential unit at Boulevard Commons Apartments, managed by plaintiff. On February 24, 1995, plaintiff delivered a termination notice to defendant by placing a copy under her door and sending another copy to her by first-class mail. The notice alleged that defendant had violated her lease agreement by engaging in \"the sale and distribution of illegal drugs on the premises, which caused the Chicago Police Officers to kick [her] door in on Tuesday night, February 21, 1995.\u201d\nOn May 11, 1995, plaintiff filed a forcible entry and detainer action against defendant seeking possession of the premises. On May 26, 1995, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance and set the case for trial on June 16, 1995.\nAt trial, plaintiff\u2019s first witness was Eric Sanders, a Chicago police officer who works as an off-duty agent for plaintiff\u2019s security office. He has been employed by the city as a police officer for 12 years, working as a narcotics officer fighting organized crime for five years. He was working at Boulevard Commons Apartments on February 21, 1995. At approximately 11 p.m., he observed several young men selling illegal drugs on defendant\u2019s back porch. Prior to exiting his vehicle, Officer Sanders heard these men hollering \"rocks,\u201d which he understood to mean rock cocaine. He approached defendant\u2019s back porch stairs and announced his office. Two of these men ran into defendant\u2019s apartment through the back door. When Officer Sanders reached the apartment, the door was closed in his face. He drew his gun and kicked the door open. Upon entering defendant\u2019s apartment, he observed a \"bunch of kids.\u201d Defendant was not present; however, the officer stated that he believed he saw defendant\u2019s brother in the apartment babysitting her children.\nTwo days later, Officer Sanders again observed several men on defendant\u2019s back porch selling drugs. He called the 15th District tactical team, who arrived at the scene. Officer Sanders, three on-duty police officers, and two off-duty officers then proceeded back to defendant\u2019s unit, where they arrested a man who ran through and out of defendant\u2019s apartment carrying a controlled substance.\nOfficer Sanders concluded his testimony by stating that he spoke with defendant around midnight on February 23, 1995, and told her that he had been to her apartment on two occasions, that he believed drugs were being sold out of her unit, and that he was going to report her activity to plaintiff. Defendant responded by stating that she was not selling drugs.\nPlaintiff\u2019s second witness, Thea McCaskill, identified herself as plaintiff\u2019s property manager. She stated that she received a report from Officer Sanders regarding both the sale of the illegal drugs at defendant\u2019s unit and the kicking in of her door. She testified that within a couple of days of this report, her office received a call to repair defendant\u2019s door and the repairs were made. As a result of Officer Sanders\u2019 report, she issued and served a 10-day notice to quit to defendant. This notice stated that defendant\u2019s lease would be terminated on March 8, 1995, due to material noncompliance with the lease agreement. The notice stated that the activity of selling and distributing illegal drugs is a direct violation of both defendant\u2019s approved HUD apartment lease and the lease addendum for drug-free housing, which warns that \"a single violation shall be good cause for termination of the lease.\u201d The notice also stated that defendant violated the house rules and regulations, which provide that \"illegal drug use, sale or distribution of narcotics in or about the premises of the property *** shall be considered a violation of the lease and cause for eviction.\u201d\nMs. McCaskill further testified that defendant came into her office to discuss the allegations contained in the notice within the 10-day period provided for in the notice. Defendant claimed that the comments about her were untrue and that someone was \"picking on her.\u201d\nDefendant testified that Officer Sanders and the two other detectives who accompanied him to her apartment did not break down her door. Defendant claimed that Officer Sanders asked her if she saw anyone with a gun. She replied that she had not. Defendant testified that \"it was nothing about drugs,\u201d that no one had run through her apartment, and that she was cooking.\nAfter hearing all of the evidence, the trial court entered judgment for possession of defendant\u2019s unit in favor of plaintiff, staying enforcement of the order for 14 days. On June 30, 1995, defendant filed an amended motion to reconsider and vacate the judgment. On the same date, the court denied the motion staying enforcement of the possession order for the period through July 14, 1995. Defendant filed a motion to stay enforcement of the judgment for possession pending appeal that was granted by the court. On July 26, 1995, defendant filed her timely notice of appeal.\nWe are first asked to determine whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in allowing plaintiff to present evidence about the February 23, 1995, incident since it was not mentioned in the termination notice. Defendant claims that because the notice cited only to the incident occurring on February 21, 1995, testimony relating to any other occurrence should have been excluded at trial.\nThe general rule with respect to a landlord\u2019s notice to quit is that it must adequately inform the tenant of the landlord\u2019s intent to end the tenancy. Bismarck Hotel Co. v. Sutherland, 92 Ill. App. 3d 167, 173, 415 N.E.2d 517, 521 (1980). Paragraph 23(c) of defendant\u2019s lease states that a notice of termination for material noncompliance must state the grounds for termination with \"enough detail for the tenant to prepare a defense.\u201d\nIn this case, plaintiff\u2019s termination notice referred only to the first time that Officer Sanders witnessed drugs being sold at defendant\u2019s apartment. The incident observed by Officer Sanders two days later involved the same illegal activity. Its inclusion in the termination notice, while perhaps adding precision, would not have provided defendant with any additional information to assist in the preparation of her defense nor would it have made any clearer plaintiff\u2019s intent to end defendant\u2019s tenancy.\nFor the same reason, we do not find that it was improper for the trial court to permit testimony regarding the February 23 incident. Officer Sanders was merely testifying about the events he witnessed at defendant\u2019s apartment giving rise to the termination notice. In fact, the trial judge noted that such testimony was appropriate given that defendant denied the entire incident described in the termination notice. We are unpersuaded by the case relied on by defendant, Schneider v. Danielly, 344 Ill. App. 546, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951) (abstract of op.), since the facts in that case are distinguishable from those presented by the instant case.\nIn Schneider, the tenant\u2019s termination notice specified that the tenant was being evicted for committing acts that created a nuisance; at trial, evidence was introduced showing that the tenant had refused to allow the landlord onto the premises. In that case, the evidence presented at trial involved grounds for termination entirely different from those provided in the termination notice. In this case, the testimony pres\u00e9nted at trial involved the same activity that was the cause for possession. Contrary to defendant\u2019s contention, the admission of testimony relating to the incident occurring on February 23, 1995, is not prohibited by either defendant\u2019s lease agreement or applicable case law.\nSince the testimony was admissible, the trial court\u2019s reliance on it does not constitute reversible error. It is well established that the trial court\u2019s decision will not be reversed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Fields v. Sax, 123 Ill. App. 3d 460, 463, 462 N.E.2d 983, 986 (1984). \"[Ejven if the reviewing court disagrees with the trial court, or might have come to a different conclusion, the decision of the trial court will not be reversed if there is evidence to support it.\u201d Jaffe Commercial Finance Co. v. Harris, 119 Ill. App. 3d 136, 142, 456 N.E.2d 224, 229 (1983).\nIn this case, Officer Sanders testified that he observed the sale of illegal drugs at defendant\u2019s apartment on two separate occasions. A man was arrested for the possession of a controlled substance on defendant\u2019s premises. Ms. McCaskill\u2019s testimony corroborated Officer Sander\u2019s testimony that defendant\u2019s door had been kicked in and had to be repaired. Defendant admitted that Officer Sanders and two other armed police officers came into her apartment on February 23, but denied that anyone ran through her unit, that her door had been kicked in, and that it had anything to do with drugs. Conflicts in the testimony are to be resolved by the trier of fact. Jaffe, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 142, 456 N.E.2d at 229. In this case, the trier of fact found plaintiff\u2019s witnesses more persuasive than defendant. We do not find that the court\u2019s ruling in plaintiff\u2019s favor was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial.\nNext, we are asked to consider whether plaintiff\u2019s alleged failure to serve its termination notice in accordance with state law deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1994)) provides for three methods of serving a notice of termination upon a tenant who is in actual possession of the premises:\n\"Any demand may be made or notice served by delivering a written or printed, or partly written or printed, copy thereof to the tenant, or by leaving the same with some person of the age of 13 years or upwards, residing on or in possession of the premises; or by sending a copy of the notice to the tenant by certified or registered mail, with a returned receipt from the addressee ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 211 (West 1994).\nIn this case, plaintiff delivered its notice by placing one copy under defendant\u2019s door and sending another copy to her by first-class mail. Accordingly, defendant claims that the statutory requirements were not met and the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction.\nWe reject defendant\u2019s argument for a number of reasons. First, the manner of service of a landlord\u2019s termination notice is not a jurisdictional issue. This court in Morris v. Martin-Trigona, 89 Ill. App. 3d 85, 411 N.E.2d 530 (1980), held that the failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements may serve as a defense but it does not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.\nSecond, the methods of service suggested in the relevant statute are not meant to be exhaustive. See Ziff v. Sandra Frocks, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 353, 355, 73 N.E.2d 327, 328 (1947) (\"The statute does not purport to restrict the making of a demand or the service of a notice to the particular methods stated in the statute\u201d). Illinois cases have upheld a landlord\u2019s written notice even when the method of service deviated slightly from those noted in the statute. See, e.g., Vole, Inc. v. Georgacopoulos, 181 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1019, 538 N.E.2d 205, 210 (1989) (recognizing that the statutory provision requiring that the notice be sent by registered mail was intended merely to insure delivery rather than to determine the validity of service).\nFinally, defendant never objected to plaintiff\u2019s termination notice and admitted to actual receipt of the notice. In Vole, this court noted that the \"object of notice is to inform the party notified, and if the information is obtained in any way other than formal notice, the object of notice is attained.\u201d Vole, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 1019, 538 N.E.2d at 210. In Ziff, this court upheld the service of a landlord\u2019s termination notice against the tenant\u2019s contention that the notice was not served in accordance with the methods articulated in the statute, where the tenant expressly admitted actual receipt of the notice. Ziff, 331 Ill. App. at 355, 73 N.E.2d at 328. Defendant in this case also admittedly received actual notice of plaintiff\u2019s notice; she cannot claim now that plaintiffs failure to strictly comply with the statutory service requirements is fatal to its case.\nSince plaintiff satisfied the service requirement, plaintiff properly established all elements of its prima facie case.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Legal Assistance Foundation, of Chicago (Lawrence D. Wood and Jennifer J. Payne, of counsel), for appellant.", "Sanford Kahn, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard W. Christoff, of counsel), for ap-pellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PRAIRIE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANNA BELL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201495\u20142645\nOpinion filed June 16, 1997.\nLegal Assistance Foundation, of Chicago (Lawrence D. Wood and Jennifer J. Payne, of counsel), for appellant.\nSanford Kahn, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard W. Christoff, of counsel), for ap-pellee." }, "file_name": "0746-01", "first_page_order": 764, "last_page_order": 771 }