{ "id": 351147, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. RONNIE ROSS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ross", "decision_date": "1997-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201496\u20141534", "first_page": "1013", "last_page": "1018", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 1013" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "617 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 818", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2944637 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409968 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.W.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Mich. App. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2274270 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/158/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Mass. App. Ct. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass. App. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 1035672 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass-app-ct/40/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 N.W.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Mich. App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2157910 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/82/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 1221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150197 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" }, { "page": "138" }, { "page": "137" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 1015", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2688681 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11341150 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "714-15" }, { "page": "2528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" }, { "page": "905" }, { "page": "1879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 U.S. 98", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165250 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/361/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251541 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75278 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "944-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 N.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909178 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0195-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 703, "char_count": 12191, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1756120737917516e-07, "percentile": 0.5874556779179018 }, "sha256": "d2df898c9d3ef082f896386e20c9d9b74bda26bbfb7616ae7c434d73ef7e1c5a", "simhash": "1:329b92c39e140681", "word_count": 2024 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:29:08.370768+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. RONNIE ROSS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ZWICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Ronnie Ross, was charged with unlawful use of a weapon after officers, following a routine traffic stop, discovered a gun in the back seat of his automobile. Defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence and motion to suppress physical evidence were denied during the course of a consolidated bench trial. The sole issue presented is whether a police officer may ask a stopped motorist whether he has a gun in his vehicle after the motorist presents the officer with a firearm identification card. Because defendant is willing to concede the State\u2019s version of the relevant facts on appeal, we apply de nova review. People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 201, 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996); People v. Anaya, 279 Ill. App. 3d 940, 944-45, 665 N.E.2d 525 (1996).\nOfficer Robert McHale and his partner were patrolling near 119th and Halsted in Chicago at approximately 6 p.m. on August 9, 1995. They were in uniform and in a marked squad car. Officer McHale testified he observed the defendant\u2019s vehicle proceed through a red light at the intersection. The officers activated their police lights and curbed the defendant at 802 West 118th Street. They stopped within 15 feet of the back of defendant\u2019s car.\nMcHale testified that, as he approached from the passenger side, defendant hurriedly came out of the vehicle and met the officers near the back of his car. McHale\u2019s partner asked if defendant had a driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance. Defendant could produce neither, but did offer to the police a recent traffic ticket. When McHale\u2019s partner asked defendant for further identification, defendant produced a firearm owner identification (FOLD) card with his photograph on it.\nMcHale testified that, after seeing defendant\u2019s FOID card, his partner asked defendant if there was a gun in the car. Defendant said yes. After asking defendant\u2019s passenger to step out of the vehicle, McHale searched the car and found a leather-like pouch containing an unloaded .25-caliber Lorcin pistol in the back seat. A clip containing four bullets was also in the pouch.\nMcHale brought the gun to defendant, who confirmed he owned it. McHale then placed defendant under arrest, impounded his vehicle and ticketed defendant for failing to stop at a red light, failing to have proof of insurance, failing to register his vehicle, and disobedience to the traffic code.\nThe State argues that the gun found by Officer McHale, as well as defendant\u2019s statements about it, were properly admitted into evidence even though McHale did not have a warrant to search defendant\u2019s vehicle. Defendant does not contest the State\u2019s claim that McHale had probable cause to search the car after defendant told him about the gun, but argues his statement to McHale was obtained in violation of his fourth amendment rights. According to defendant, the gun in the vehicle was wholly unrelated to the traffic offense for which he had been stopped, thus warranting suppression of all of the fruits of the unlawful questioning.\nIn People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 387-88, 560 N.E.2d 309 (1990), the Illinois Supreme court recognized three theoretical tiers of lawful police-citizen encounters. The first tier involves the arrest of an individual supported by probable cause to arrest, without which the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures is violated. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 80 S. Ct. 168 (1959). The next tier involves the so-called \"Terry stop,\u201d a brief seizure that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to be within the bounds of the fourth amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The last tier does not involve police officers in their role as crime fighters but, rather, as community caretakers. This last tier involves no coercion or detention by the police when they approach a citizen to gather information, such as when the police investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 714-15, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973).\nSituations involving traffic stops are most closely associated with the middle, \"Terry stop,\u201d police function. Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984); People v. Penny, 188 Ill. App. 3d 499, 544 N.E.2d 1015 (1989). This is because the citizen has already been observed violating the law and is not free to disregard the officer\u2019s directions to stop. On the other hand, the contact between police officer and offender does not rise to the level of a full-blown arrest, in which nearly all of the individual\u2019s free will is overborne by the State.\nAs we have noted, simply because a Terry stop falls short of an arrest does not mean that a Terry stop fails to implicate a citizen\u2019s fourth amendment rights. On review of the propriety of a Terry stop, we make a two-prong inquiry. First, we consider whether the officer\u2019s actions in stopping the defendant were justified at their inception. Second, we consider whether the officer\u2019s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.\nIn this case, the defendant concedes that the initial stop of his vehicle was proper. He admits running a red light and has no quarrel with the officers\u2019 decision to pull him over, request to see his license and proof of insurance, and their issuing to him a ticket. Defendant argues, however, that the officers\u2019 subsequent action in questioning him about whether he had a gun in the car was not reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the stop. Defendant relies principally upon People v. Sinclair, 281 Ill. App. 3d 131, 666 N.E.2d 1221 (1996).\nIn Sinclair, officers stopped a vehicle that was travelling 55 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone. Officers issued a warning, but then requested the driver of the vehicle to step out and consent to the search of the car. Initially, the 16-year-old driver refused the search, stating that his lawyer had advised him not to consent. Sinclair, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 133. Undeterred, officers persisted, eventually convincing the young man to allow a search. Subsequently, one of the passengers in the vehicle, Sinclair, was found to possess marijuana.\nIn resolving the issue of whether the search of Sinclair was lawful, the court focused on the driver\u2019s tentative consent, concluding the officers had exceeded their authority under Terry by pressuring him to agree to the search. The court set forth the rule that once a driver states unambiguously that he will not consent to a search, the police must release the driver, car and passengers in the absence of probable cause to search or an \"articulable suspicion sufficient to prolong the investigatory stop.\u201d Sinclair, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 138. Because officers did not release the vehicle after the driver first declined the officers\u2019 request to search, the court determined that any contraband found thereafter was necessarily \"tainted by the illegality.\u201d Sinclair, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 137.\nThe State makes three arguments in response to the defense\u2019s claims. First, it distinguishes the facts of Sinclair by noting that, in this case, the defendant\u2019s production of a FOID card created the type of articulable suspicion Sinclair itself recognized would justify an extended Terry stop and questioning about whether there might be a gun in defendant\u2019s vehicle. See Sinclair, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 138. Second, the State asserts that officers involved in a Terry stop must be free to make reasonable inquiries regarding the existence of weapons in a stopped motorist\u2019s vehicle due to the extreme dangers such weapons present to their safety and the minimal intrusion such questioning presents to the defendant\u2019s rights. Lastly, the State argues that the facts of this case establish that any information the officers received regarding the gun was the product of defendant\u2019s decision, freely made, to discuss the question with the officers. Thus, the State claims, no fourth amendment rights are at issue at all in this case.\nWe need not address the State\u2019s second and third arguments, as we agree with the State\u2019s initial claim. Defendant asserts that the FOID card he gave to officers merely indicated \"compliance with the law\u201d and that any inquiry regarding the card exceeded the routine nature of the traffic stop. Defendant\u2019s argument, however, fails to recognize that even more basic information was conveyed to the officers by the FOID card, namely, that defendant owned a gun. We find Sinclair to be distinguishable because we agree with the State that the defendant\u2019s production of a FOID card created an independent basis upon which to continue and expand the officers\u2019 initial Terry stop. Once the officers were presented with an indication that the individual with whom they were dealing owned a firearm, it was only reasonable for them to be concerned about the whereabouts of that gun and to question him regarding it. This is particularly so here, where a passenger sat inside the car at the time of the police questioning of the defendant. That passenger had easy access to whatever firearm might be inside the vehicle.\nThe fourth amendment protects citizens only from \"unreasonable\u201d searches and seizures. Although decided under a fifth amendment analysis, we think opinions such as People v. Dunlap, 82 Mich. App. 171, 266 N.W.2d 637 (1978), and Commonwealth v. Kitchings, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 666 N.E.2d 511 (1996), are helpful in considering the reasonableness of the officers\u2019 conduct. In Dunlap, an officer observed an automobile passenger with a gunshot wound after the officer pulled the driver over for speeding. The court concluded that the officer\u2019s questioning regarding the whereabouts of the gun was proper in light of his observation of the wound. Dunlap, 82 Mich. App. at 174-75, 266 N.W.2d at 639. In Kitchings, the officer observed an ammunition clip inside the defendant\u2019s vehicle. The court found that the sight of the ammunition clip created in the officer an understandable concern for his safety. The court concluded that the officer\u2019s excited statement to the defendants, \"Where is the fucking gun?\u201d was therefore reasonable. Kitchings, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 598, 666 N.E.2d at 516-17.\nIn sum, we hold simply that when police officers reasonably suspect the presence of a gun at a traffic stop, as they did in this case, they may ask those at the scene regarding its whereabouts without violating the fourth amendment. We leave for another day the question of whether officers may ask about such weapons in all traffic stops as a matter of routine. Cf. People v. Edwards, 158 Mich. App. 561, 405 N.W.2d 200 (1987).\nAffirmed.\nGREIMAN, P.J., and THEIS, J\u201e concur.\nIn a supplemental memorandum of law submitted after oral argument, defendant notes, for the first time, that merely transporting a gun in a car in Chicago is not necessarily a criminal offense because such a gun could be \"broken down in a non-functioning state\u201d or \"not immediately accessible.\u201d See 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 2(b)(4) (West 1994). Defendant argues that the officers at the time of the search had no knowledge concerning the condition of the gun or its location in the car and, therefore, they did not have probable cause to search. Because this argument was not made in defendant\u2019s brief or reply brief, however, let alone in the trial court, it is waived. People v. Turner, 249 Ill. App. 3d 474, 481-82, 619 N.E.2d 781 (1993); People v. Wych, 248 Ill. App. 3d 818, 825, 617 N.E.2d 1285 (1993).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ZWICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Andrea Monsees, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Latisha Foster, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. RONNIE ROSS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201496\u20141534\nOpinion filed May 2, 1997.\nRehearing denied July 22, 1997.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Andrea Monsees, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Latisha Foster, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1013-01", "first_page_order": 1031, "last_page_order": 1036 }