{
  "id": 2499258,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Henry Gill, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gill",
  "decision_date": "1975-06-12",
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  "first_page": "356",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:27:57.823802+00:00",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Henry Gill, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nThe defendant, John Gill, was convicted of the murders of Thomas and Terry Morrissey on October 13, 1967. The trial court sentenced the defendant to death on November 20, 1968. On appeal the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the defendant\u2019s death sentence on June 4, 1973, and remanded the case to the circuit court of St, Clair County for re-sentencing. (People v. Gill, 54 Ill.3d 357, 297 N.E.2d 135.) The circuit court on April 19, 1974, resentenced the defendant to two consecutive terms of 100 to 300 years in the penitentiary.\nSince the facts of the instant case are presented in detail in the Illinois Supreme Court opinion (People v. Gill, 54 Ill.2d 357, 297 N.E.2d 135), we will not restate them here.\nThe defendant\u2019s sole contention on appeal is whether the circuit court sentenced the defendant under the proper statutory provisions regarding consecutive sentences. The Unified Code of Corrections, effective January 1, 1973, contained the following provision concerning consecutive sentences:\n\" # The aggregate minimum period of consecutive sentences shall not exceed twice the lowest minimum term authorized under Section 5\u20148\u20141 [which establishes possible minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment for each class of felony] for the most serious felony involved * (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Supp., ch. 38, \u00a7 1005-8\u20144(c).)\nThe Council Commentary to this section contained the following explanation regarding minimum consecutive sentences:\n\u201c* * * Because subparagraph (c) limits the minimum sentence to twice the lowest minimum authorized under 1005\u2014 8\u20141 for the most serious felony involved, the court may prefer to give a concurrent sentence in those situations where a higher minimum than the lowest authorized under section 1005\u20148\u20141 may be set by the court in a single case.\u201d Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, \u00a7 1005\u20148\u20144, Council Commentary (Smith-Hurd 1973).\nSubsection (c) of section 5\u20148\u20144 of the Code was amended in 1973. The amended language regarding consecutive sentences reads as follows:\n\u201c* * * The aggregate minimum period of consecutive sentences shall not exceed the highest minimum term authorized under Section 5\u20148\u20141 for the 2 most serious felonies involved. * * (Emphasis supplied.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 1005\u20148\u20144 (effective July 1, 1974).)\nBoth the sentencing provisions in effect when the defendant was originally sentenced on November 20, 1968 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, \u00a7 1\u20147(m)), and the consecutive sentencing provision now in effect provide for stricter possible penalties than the consecutive sentencing provision in effect when the defendant was resentenced by the circuit court on April 19, 1974.\nSection 8 \u2014 2\u20144 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 1008-2-4) provides:\n\u201cProsecution for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of this Act is not affected or abated by this Act. If the offense being prosecuted has not reached the sentencing stage or a final adjudication, then for purposes of sentencing the sentences under this Act apply if they are less than under the prior law upon which the prosecution was commenced.\u201d\nDue to the perfection of the instant appeal to this court, the original judgment on the defendant\u2019s conviction has never been finally adjudicated for purposes of applying the provision of the Unified Code of Corrections.\nIn addressing a sentencing question factually similar to the instant case (People v. Williams, 60 Ill.2d 1, 322 N.E.2d 819), the Illinois Supreme Court recently held that:\n* * the legislative intent was to apply the sentencing provisions of the Unified Code to those cases pending on appeal [Citations.] and where, as here, sentencing provisions in effect at the time sentence was imposed and at the time the appeal is decided are less favorable to a defendant than provisions enacted after sentence was imposed, and then repealed before the appeal was decided, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the more favorable intervening statute.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 60 Ill.2d 1, 16-17, 322 N.E.2d 819, 827-828.\nFollowing Williams, we find that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of the consecutive sentencing provisions in effect when he was resentenced on April 19, 1974. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 1005\u20148\u20144(c) (effective January 1, 1973, to July 1, 1974).) Under this consecutive sentencing statute, the aggregate minimum period of consecutive sentences could not exceed twice the lowest minimum term authorized under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 of the Unified Code for the most serious felony involved. Since the lowest minimum for murder under section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 1(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(c)) was 14 years, the sum of the two minimum sentences for each murder conviction cannot exceed 28 years. Consequently, the defendant could only have been consecutively sentenced to 14-year m\u00ednimums on each conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in sentencing the defendant to consecutive 100-year minimum terms.\nSince it is clear that the effective statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a7 1005 \u2014 8\u20144(c)) requires that the defendant\u2019s sentence be modified, we have chosen to reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court in accordance with the power granted this court by Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, \u00a7 615(b)(4)). Nevertheless, in view of the egregious nature of the offenses, which our supreme court described as \u201ca violent criminal rampage\u201d (People v. Gill, 54 Ill.2d 357, 297 N.E.2d 135, 139), we are not inclined to reduce the defendant\u2019s sentence as drastically as requested by the defendant. After reviewing the defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation and the seriousness of the offense as required by our constitution (Ill. Const., art. I, \u00a7 11) together with society\u2019s need for protection, we have decided that the defendant\u2019s sentence of two consecutive terms of 100 to 300 years should be reduced to two concurrent terms of 35 to 100 years. Sentences exceeding that imposed in the instant case have been upheld in severe cases. (E.g., People v. White, 22 Ill.App.3d 180, 317 N.E.2d 323; People v. Malcom, 14 Ill.App.3d 378, 302 N.E.2d 352; People v. Richards, 120 Ill.App.2d 313, 256 N.E.2d 475.) In view of the nature of the offenses, the manner in which it was committed, and the failure of the record to disclose any mitigating circumstances of a compelling nature, we do not feel justified in any further reduction of the sentence here imposed.\nAccordingly, we affirm the defendant\u2019s conviction and remand this cause to the circuit court of St. Clair County with directions that a corrected mittimus be issued in accordance with the views expressed herein.\nJONES, P. J., and G. MORAN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Stephen P. Hurley and Thomas F. Sullivan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.",
      "Robert H. Rice, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Robert L. Craig, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Henry Gill, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 74-348;\nFifth District\nJune 12, 1975.\nStephen P. Hurley and Thomas F. Sullivan, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nRobert H. Rice, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Robert L. Craig, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0356-01",
  "first_page_order": 380,
  "last_page_order": 383
}