{ "id": 2501485, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clyde Heiple, Jr., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Heiple", "decision_date": "1975-06-13", "docket_number": "No. 73-32", "first_page": "452", "last_page": "456", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 452" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "313 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill.App.3d 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2698393 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 N.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. App.3d 933", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5345152 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/20/0933-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill.App.3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5376348 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 978", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11752741, 11752552, 11752427, 11752654, 11752814, 11753199, 11752975, 11752882, 11753107, 11752498, 11753296, 11752598, 11753038, 11752376 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0978-07", "/us/401/0978-04", "/us/401/0978-02", "/us/401/0978-06", "/us/401/0978-08", "/us/401/0978-13", "/us/401/0978-10", "/us/401/0978-09", "/us/401/0978-12", "/us/401/0978-03", "/us/401/0978-14", "/us/401/0978-05", "/us/401/0978-11", "/us/401/0978-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill.2d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2896442 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill.App.3d 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2696838 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill.App.3d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5309046 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill.2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360801 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/28/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 N.E.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill.App.3d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2698966 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 N.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill.App.3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506003 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 N.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill.App.3d 1062", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2789935 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/1062-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2849499 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0159-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 544, "char_count": 9464, "ocr_confidence": 0.729, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.511375711507188e-08, "percentile": 0.486840159406977 }, "sha256": "0840b1158985577e4458e51de2c4837c09c03b7ceaddd13dd78db28cfc85f0ac", "simhash": "1:82cf36ecfbc9816c", "word_count": 1571 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:27:57.823802+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clyde Heiple, Jr., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal by the defendant, Clyde Heiple, Jr., from a judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict of guilty to the offense of burglary by the circuit court of Perry County and the imposition of a sentence of not less than 2 years\u2019 nor more than 6 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nThe defendant\u2019s sole contention on appeal is that the \u201cdefendant\u2019s conviction of burglary with intent to commit theft should be reversed because the evidence fails to establish the requisite beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d More particularly, the defendant claims that \u201chis intoxicated condition rendered him incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit a theft\u201d or, alternatively, \u201cthat the evidence nonetheless fails to establish his intent to commit a theft.\u201d\nSection 6\u20143 of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, par. 6\u20143) provides, in part, that,\n\u201cA person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally responsible for conduct unless such condition either:\n(a) Negatives the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense; or\n(b) Is involuntarily produced and * *\nIn other words, voluntary intoxication is no excuse for the perpetration of a criminal act; however, it may be used to negate intent where the intoxication is so extreme as to suspend all reason and make impossible the existence of a mental state which is an element of the crime. People v. Walcher, 42 Ill.2d 159, 246 N.E.2d 256; People v. Smith, 26 Ill.App.3d 1062, 325 N.E.2d 623; People o. Moore, 23 Ill.App.3d 212, 318 N.E.2d 676; People v. Huggy, 19 Ill.App.3d 247, 311 N.E.2d 355.\nThe issue is one to be resolved by the jury, as is the issue of credibihty of the defendant as weH as the other witnesses who testified. (See People v. Smith, 26 Ill.App.3d 1062, 325 N.E.2d 623.) The jury in the instant case was properly instructed on the offense of burglary and the lesser offense of criminal damage to property. The jury returned guilty verdicts to each of these offenses. Due to the fact that the offenses \u201cwere so closely related in time\u201d the trial court sentenced the defendant on the burglary only. The record here establishes that the jury was warranted in finding that the defendant\u2019s acts constituted the offense of burglary.\nThe defendant does not dispute the fact that he was discovered inside a store owned by Avey Woodside at approximately 1:45 A.M. on June 20, 1969. Nor is there any dispute that entry was gained by way of a broken window. Instead, the defendant claims that \u201chis intoxicated condition rendered him incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit a theft.\u201d\nOur review of the defendant\u2019s defense of intoxication focuses initially on the testimony of George Heiple (the defendant\u2019s uncle), Lina Heiple (the defendant\u2019s wife), and the defendant, all of whom testified that the defendant was either \u201cpretty drunk\u201d or \u201creally drunk\u201d on the night in question. The defendant testified that he could not remember anything about his entrance into Avey Woodside\u2019s store or the events immediately preceding such entrance, and can only recall events transpiring after he was taken into custody by police officers.\nConflicting with the foregoing testimony concerning the defendant\u2019s inebriated condition was the testimony of Norman Vo gel, Deputy Sheriff Wilbur McCrary, Avey Woodside and Trooper Carlos Tolbert. Norman Vogel, who reported the break-in, and Deputy McCrary testified that the defendant was able to crawl out the broken window of Woodside\u2019s store without any trouble or assistance. Deputy McCrary testified that he did not notice anything unusual about the defendant\u2019s appearance or actions. McCrary couldn\u2019t say if the defendant had been drinking. Likewise, Avey Woodside was unable to determine if the defendant had been drinking. Norman Vogel testified that he would say the defendant had been drinking from the defendant\u2019s loud speech. Trooper Tolbert testified that he could tell that the defendant had been drinking because of some of his actions and the smell of an intoxicant. Nevertheless, he did not think the defendant was drunk. While he acknowledged that he did not administer any tests to determine the degree of the defendant\u2019s intoxication, he testified that the conversation he had with the defendant at the scene of the crime failed to reveal any indication that the defendant was intoxicated.\nIn this case there is little question that the defendant was drinking; however, it is less than clear whether the defendant was intoxicated. The defendant admitted that he drank voluntarily. Under these circumstances it was for the jury, as the triers of fact, to determine not only the credibility of the witnesses, but, ultimately, if the defendant\u2019s degree of intoxication had advanced to the stage where it suspended all of the defendant\u2019s power to reason and made it impossible for the defendant to entertain the requisite element of intent to commit a theft. (See People v. Smith, 26 Ill.App.3d 1062, 325 N.E.2d 623.) From the foregoing review of the record we cannot say that the jury\u2019s determination that the defendant was not iiitoxicated to so great a degree was in error.\nSimilarly, we find the evidence proffered in the trial court sufficient to sustain the jury\u2019s conclusion that the defendant entered Woodside\u2019s store with the intent to commit a theft. While the defendant testified that he was unable to remember the events immediately preceding his entry into Woodside\u2019s store, he did testify that Nickelson, who emerged from the store building at the same time as defendant, rented from Avey Woodside and owed him money for back rent, groceries, and a door into which Nickelson had fired a shotgun. Defense counsel directed his closing remarks to the argument that while the defendant may have been guilty of criminal mischief to property he did not enter the building with the intent to commit a theft. We would be inclined to agree with the defendant but for the testimony of Avey Woodside and Norman Vogel.\nNorman Vogel testified that on the morning in question he was sleeping in the living room of his father's house which was approximately 50 yards south of Avey Woodside\u2019s store. Upon being awakened by the sound of glass breaking, he looked out his window and observed two figures running in a westerly direction from the Woodside store. Five or ten minutes later he observed the figures return from the west, at which time he telephoned the sheriff\u2019s office in Perry County.\nAfter the defendant had been ordered out of the store by Deputy McCrary and taken into custody, Avey Woodside, the owner of the store, was notified. He testified that he arrived and opened the front door of the store. Various things had been scattered on the floor. The glass was broken out of two showcases, but none of the merchandise had been removed. Woodside never was able to determine if any merchandise had been taken. He did, however, discover a paper sack containing change on a counter in the store. He testified that he usually put the change hi a sack and hid it near the cash register when he closed the store. While he could not remember where he had hidden the sack on this particular night, he was \u201csure\u201d that he had hidden it. Woodside further testified that when he entered the store the cash register was open. He had closed the cash register when he had left the store the previous evening. The witness identified People\u2019s Exhibit No. 2 as a photograph depicting the change sack on the counter where it was discovered. On cross-examination the witness testified that he was \u201cabsolutely sure\u201d that he had not left the change sack on the counter.\nIn view of the above testimony by Woodside and Vogel we find that the jury was justified in returning a guilty verdict to the charge of burglary. In particular, we reject the defendant\u2019s argument that \u201cthe evidence in the case at bar indicated that the premises were entered not for the purpose of committing theft, but for the inconsistent purpose of vandalizing the store.\u201d (See People v. Johnson, 28 Ill.2d 441, 192 N.E.2d 864; People v. James, 24 Ill.App.3d 112, 320 N.E.2d 20; People v. Semma, 19 Ill.App.3d 776, 312 N.E.2d 746.) As has often been held, intent may be inferred from circumstances that legitimately permit that inference (e.g., People v. Koshiol, 45 Ill.2d 573, 262 N.E.2d 446, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 978). This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury in cases in which the facts could lead to either of two inferences unless the inference accepted by the jury is inherently impossible or unreasonable (People v. Edwards, 21 Ill.App.3d 354; People v. Hister, 20 Ill. App.3d 933, 314 N.E.2d 562; People v. Brooks, 19 Ill.App.3d 808, 313 N.E.2d 293). We do not find the inferences the jury drew from the evidence proffered in the trial court either inherently impossible or unreasonable.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court of Perry County and the sentence imposed thereunder.\nJudgment affirmed.\nCARTER and KARNS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul Bradley and Allen L. Wiederer, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Michael K. Grabowski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pinckneyville (William B. Starnes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clyde Heiple, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 73-32;\nFifth District\nJune 13, 1975.\nPaul Bradley and Allen L. Wiederer, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMichael K. Grabowski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pinckneyville (William B. Starnes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0452-01", "first_page_order": 476, "last_page_order": 480 }