{ "id": 1725018, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES V. FAULKNER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Faulkner", "decision_date": "1997-10-14", "docket_number": "No. 5-95-0241", "first_page": "391", "last_page": "396", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 391" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "663 N.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75246 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "694-95" }, { "page": "2065" }, { "page": "687-88" }, { "page": "693-94" }, { "page": "2064-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 1190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 1013", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2653496 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/1013-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 731, "char_count": 11976, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.725017473547342e-07, "percentile": 0.7045144330808476 }, "sha256": "eb1bf9aedc2a22bc2735018b735855893f7ce639aaa88a78d04c7db4125aa23a", "simhash": "1:f8be3dabfb871fdb", "word_count": 1840 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:42.526448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES V. FAULKNER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KUEHN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case features the disappearance of a man named William Rose. Rose vanished mysteriously in June of 1984. He has never been seen since, and his whereabouts remain unknown. It is quite reasonable to suspect that he will never be heard from again.\nIn 1987, the mystery surrounding Rose\u2019s disappearance unraveled into a bizarre tale of murder spun by defendant\u2019s offspring, Jimmy and Valerie Faulkner. Jimmy Faulkner offered an eyewitness account of Rose\u2019s unnatural demise. It is an eerie account of Rose\u2019s death and disappearance that the entire Faulkner family now disavows. When offered at defendant\u2019s trial, it found support in other evidence presented and rang true to the Williamson County jury that heard it.\nJimmy\u2019s testimony told of a dreadful night sometime in June of 1984. On that night, Jimmy\u2019s father insisted that Jimmy accompany him to his parents\u2019 bedroom. There he saw his naked mother on top of Rose, engaged in adulterous sexual intercourse. His mother did not appear surprised at his father\u2019s presence. She did pause, however, to ask why Jimmy was there. Apparently, Jimmy was brought to the bedroom by his father to witness a killing. Jimmy watched as his father plunged a knife blade deep into Rose\u2019s chest. As Rose\u2019s heart pumped, blood gushed from the wound. Rose was taken to the bathroom, placed into the bathtub, and watched until his life drained away.\nWhen the bedlam created by defendant\u2019s shocking deed subsided, defendant\u2019s wife, Judith, and his two children, Jimmy and Valerie, helped dispose of the corpse. Rose was wrapped in a drop cloth and stuffed into the family car\u2019s trunk. His remains were taken to a remote and abandoned strip mine pit, where they were left to suffer nature\u2019s ravages. The Faulkner family suffered silence and shared a dark secret for several years.\nDefendant currently serves a life sentence without parole. We affirmed his murder conviction in People v. Faulkner, 186 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 542 N.E.2d 1190 (1989). We are asked now to overturn a denial of postconviction relief.\nThis appeal raises but one question. Does defendant deserve a new trial because of trial counsel\u2019s failure to properly impeach Jimmy Faulkner? To prevail, defendant must show that counsel\u2019s neglect in attacking Jimmy\u2019s credibility was so deficient that counsel failed to function as the \"counsel\u201d guaranteed defendant under the sixth amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Defendant must show a degree of error that, in effect, vitiates counsel\u2019s contemplated constitutional role. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nDefendant\u2019s claim mounts two bases for impeachment never pursued by defense counsel at defendant\u2019s trial. Both clearly bear on the worth of Jimmy Faulkner\u2019s trial testimony.\nDefendant inveighs the failure to expose the true motivation behind his son\u2019s resolve to bear false witness against him. That motivation is set forth in a 1991 affidavit in which Jimmy repudiates his trial testimony. Jimmy belatedly swears that Rose\u2019s murder is a complete and outright canard. He swears that his testimony was no more than the false product of self-interest motivated by threats from authorities.\nShortly before the 1987 trial, Jimmy recanted his initial murder account. In a written statement to defense counsel, he insisted that his earlier statements to authorities were totally false. In his 1991 affidavit, Jimmy discloses that the written recantation was met by an unannounced and secret visit from authorities. Jimmy claims that the Williamson County State\u2019s Attorney and the case agent in charge of the investigation met with him in response to notice of Jimmy\u2019s recantation. Jimmy swears that authorities assured him that he and his other family members would be jailed unless he persisted in his fabricated eyewitness murder account. Thus, the trial testimony belies the truth. Jimmy testified to a pack of lies in order to protect himself and his family. Defense counsel did not expose Jimmy\u2019s deceit.\nDefendant also denounces the failure to adduce testimony from Helga Davis, a Faulkner family friend. Counsel was clearly aware of Davis and her bearing on Jimmy\u2019s testimony. Unquestionably, Davis possessed knowledge of prior statements to discredit that testimony. Jimmy confided to Helga Davis, prior to trial, that his initial disclosures about William Rose\u2019s untimely death were lies. He confessed to her that the testimony relied upon by the prosecution was a fabricated yarn.\nAt first blush, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim raises obvious shortcomings in trial counsel\u2019s efforts to discredit a'key prosecution witness. Upon closer examination, however, defendant\u2019s claim exhibits the worst of hindsight\u2019s ills. It offers an inconsiderate critique of trial counsel\u2019s work from a perspective that did not exist when the work was performed. Those in search of a constitutional peg for post-conviction relief often neglect warnings set forth long ago that constrain sixth amendment claims. The Supreme Court cautioned over a decade ago:\n\"Judicial scrutiny of counsel\u2019s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to secondguess counsel\u2019s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel\u2019s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. [Citation.] A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel\u2019s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel\u2019s perspective at the time.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct at 2065.\nCriminal defense lawyers are understandably constant prey for disgruntled defendants who equate their trial\u2019s adverse outcome with \"ineffectiveness.\u201d Counsel\u2019s assistance at trial does not, however, have to produce successful results to pass constitutional muster. Thankfully, highly competent defense attorneys applying masterful skills to righteous prosecutions of guilty defendants rarely prevail.\nIt is presumed that defense counsel pursue \"sound trial strategies.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. The need to engage this presumption arises only after convictions. Therefore, in all ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the defense strategies presumed sound did not work. The strategies must be shown to be more than unsuccessful to overcome a presumption of soundness. They must appear irrational and unreasonable in light of the circumstances that defense counsel confronted at the time. See People v. Moore, 279 Ill. App. 3d 152, 663 N.E.2d 490 (1996). Trial strategies are unsound only when no reasonably effective criminal defense attorney, facing similar circumstances, would pursue such strategies. The constitutional measure for legal representation is \"reasonably effective assistance.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693-94, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65.\nTo be sure, criminal defense lawyers shoulder a serious responsibility. They cannot assume representation of the criminally accused lightly. They must perform in a reasonably effective manner to assure the reliability of the trial process. Absent an objectively reasonable performance from trial counsel, the process to outcome may not instill the confidence that courts seek. See Moore, 279 Ill. App. 3d 152, 663 N.E.2d 490.\nCriminal defense lawyers are expected to provide the degree of assistance the constitution contemplates. The constitution contemplates assistance that appreciates and understands legal principles applicable to the case. It contemplates assistance that engages the rules of evidence and procedure designed to assure fairness. It contemplates assistance prepared to discharge legal duties skillfully and ethically. The constitution does not, however, contemplate clairvoyance.\nThe 1991 affidavit unquestionably bears witness to Jimmy Faulkner\u2019s lack of credibility. It evinces proof that Jimmy lacks any allegiance to an oath. Nevertheless, the affidavit does not establish that Jimmy would have enlightened anyone with his 1991 version of truth, had he been asked to share it in 1987. Nor does the affidavit tell us how counsel could divine this version of truth in the face of Jimmy\u2019s determined effort to conceal it. In 1987, Jimmy sang a tune of cold-blooded murder against his father. \"While that tune may have been orchestrated by the State, it was in harmony with other evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. In fact, Jimmy\u2019s 1987 resolve bypassed a chance to disclose the coerced nature of his testimony. When asked whether his testimony was motivated by anything told him by the Williamson County State\u2019s Attorney, he swore that the State\u2019s Attorney only told him to speak the truth.\nWhether Jimmy committed perjury at trial or in his affidavit is not at issue. Whether he would have yielded his deceit at trial if asked is also not at issue. Our inquiry deals solely with counsel\u2019s performance given the circumstances confronted at the time Jimmy testified.\nAt trial, counsel heard a markedly different version of truth than the one tendered in the 1991 affidavit. Jimmy swore that he saw his father commit murder. His testimony trumpeted caution and counsel heeded the warning. Counsel skillfully avoided inquiry absent a certainty of Jimmy\u2019s response. Counsel\u2019s avoidance of the unknown was particularly astute given his possession of Jimmy\u2019s written statement. The statement contradicted everything Jimmy testified to and provided undeniable proof that Jimmy was a self-confessed liar.\nDefense counsel\u2019s strategy appears decidedly sensible under the circumstances confronted. Assuming the 1991 affidavit\u2019s truth, we cannot envision a strategy the deployment of which would have evoked that truth. With apologies to Erie Stanley Gardner, in the real world, strongly motivated and determined liars do not betray their cloaked motives and confess their prevarications under skillful cross-examination.\nDefense counsel managed to expose Jimmy\u2019s word to the years of silence, before his accusation surfaced, to the belated accusation\u2019s recantation, and to admitted ulterior motives to lie. In addition, defense counsel confronted Jimmy with his pretrial admission to Helga Davis. Jimmy conceded that he told Davis that the Rose murder was a total fabrication. Under the circumstances of Jimmy\u2019s concession, defense counsel\u2019s strategy to forego Davis\u2019s testimony was sensible. The defense obtained a concession to the prior inconsistent statement. The concession removed any need to call Davis to establish that the statement was made. The removal of such necessity also removed the prosecution\u2019s ability to highlight the fond relationship between Helga Davis and Judith Faulkner, Jimmy\u2019s mother. In fact, calling Davis would not have impeached Jimmy. Rather, it would have diminished the earlier admission\u2019s impact.\nClearly, defense counsel\u2019s performance was well within constitutional standards. Defendant\u2019s imprisonment is not the result of any demonstrable shortcomings on trial counsel\u2019s part.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of postconviction relief.\nAffirmed.\nMAAG and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE KUEHN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and Donna Hickstein-Foley, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Charles Garnati, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marion (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kevin Sweeney, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES V. FAULKNER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 95\u20140241\nOpinion filed October 14, 1997.\nDaniel M. Kirwan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and Donna Hickstein-Foley, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCharles Garnati, State\u2019s Attorney, of Marion (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kevin Sweeney, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0391-01", "first_page_order": 409, "last_page_order": 414 }