{ "id": 1725023, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN FALCON, Plaintiff-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Falcon", "decision_date": "1997-09-12", "docket_number": "No. 1-96-3270", "first_page": "538", "last_page": "546", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 538" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "46 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "382 Ill. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2478877 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/382/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 1180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5434916 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 N.E.2d 1290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5566993 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 933", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333179 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182768 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "sexual assault offenses were not committed as part of single course of conduct when committed on different days with substantial interruptions of time between them" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810501 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "sexual assault offenses were not committed as part of single course of conduct when committed on different days with substantial interruptions of time between them" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 N.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 1098", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5367340 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/1098-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 973", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544486 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927700 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 N.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156840 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159560 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544483 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75410 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295580 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 1169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295553 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780286 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 N.E.2d 1326", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1335-36" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5290053 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619-20" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1321" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3410726 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "953" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2693626 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 933", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "938", "parenthetical": "Hartman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333179 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744-45" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810501 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0188-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 741, "char_count": 17043, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.226684795779869e-08, "percentile": 0.43138229294449215 }, "sha256": "97b8df04a13a08c63ab087a7589db26f0e4bca0cd0f78ab67556d56929dc09cf", "simhash": "1:8813b1ccbdf781e6", "word_count": 2794 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:42.526448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN FALCON, Plaintiff-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ZWICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Juan Falcon, was charged by indictment with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of all counts and the abuse convictions were merged by the trial court with the assault convictions. Subsequently, defendant was sentenced to three terms of 25 years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The 25-year terms were ordered to run consecutively pursuant to the mandatory sentencing provisions of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1996) (hereinafter, we refer to the Unified Code of Corrections as \"the Code\u201d). Defendant now appeals both his conviction and sentence.\nOn appeal, defendant raises five issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court improperly allowed the admission of so-called \"other crimes\u201d evidence; (2) whether the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support his convictions; (3) whether his trial counsel was so ineffective as to deprive him of his fundamental right to due process; (4) whether mandatory consecutive sentences pursuant to the provisions of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code were improper; and (5) whether his combined sentence of 75 years\u2019 imprisonment is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions, but remand the case for resentencing. Consistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23), we publish our judgment in the form of an opinion only with regard to defendant\u2019s sentencing issues.\nAlthough defendant has raised the issue of sentencing on appeal, w\u00e9 note that defendant has failed to file a posttrial motion challenging his sentence in the trial court. The State argues that this omission constitutes a waiver of any challenge defendant may now wish to bring concerning his sentencing. For support, the State relies upon the amended terms of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) (West 1996)), which provides that a defendant \"shall\u201d file a postsentencing motion if he wishes to preserve sentencing issues for further appeal. According to the State, our supreme court\u2019s decision in People v. Lewis, 158 Ill. 2d 386, 634 N.E.2d 717 (1994), which held that the failure to file a postsentencing motion does not result in waiver, is no longer controlling, following the General Assembly\u2019s amendment to section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c).\nWe reject the State\u2019s waiver argument, as have the better reasoned appellate decisions to consider the issue. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 285 Ill. App. 3d 394, 673 N.E.2d 1169 (1996); People v. Porter, 285 Ill. App. 3d 50, 52, 676 N.E.2d 1 (1996); People v. Cook, 279 Ill. App. 3d 718, 726, 665 N.E.2d 299 (1995). But see People v. Rogers, 286 Ill. App. 3d 825, 677 N.E.2d 13 (1997); People v. Reed, 282 Ill. App. 3d 278, 280, 668 N.E.2d 51 (1996); People v. McCleary, 278 Ill. App. 3d 498, 501, 663 N.E.2d 22 (1996); People v. Moncrief, 276 Ill. App. 3d 533, 541, 659 N.E.2d 106 (1995). Even were we to accept the State\u2019s waiver argument, however, we note that even those cases relied upon by the State have acknowledged that whether a defendant\u2019s sentence is properly imposed is generally a question that concerns the defendant\u2019s fundamental constitutional right to liberty. As such, even if waiver were to apply, we would address defendant\u2019s sentencing arguments under our plain error doctrine. See People v. Ritchey, 286 Ill. App. 3d 848, 677 N.E.2d 973 (1997); Reed, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 281; McCleary, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 501-02; Moncrief, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 535.\nDefendant first argues that his consecutive sentences, which the trial court indicated were mandatory under the terms of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) of the Code, were not proper under that section. This section provides for mandatory consecutive sentencing for each offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault when a defendant: (1) commits the assault in connection with other criminal acts, (2) those other acts also resulted in convictions for which defendant is being sentenced, and (3) when all the acts are together part of a \"single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.\u201d Consecutive sentences are not appropriate under the terms of the statute unless the defendant\u2019s convictions meet these requirements. See generally People v. Williams, 263 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 638 N.E.2d 207 (1994).\nDefendant notes that the indictments under which he was charged did not indicate, either expressly or impliedly, that his criminal acts were committed as part of a \"single course of conduct.\u201d Indeed, our examination of the indictments shows the State failed to allege defendant\u2019s crimes occurred at any specific point in time whatsoever. Rather, the indictments merely state that defendant molested J.M. in three different ways over a period of several months.\nJ.M. testified that defendant sometimes inserted his finger into J.M.\u2019s anus before engaging him in either oral or anal sex, but J.M.\u2019s testimony did not indicate this was always the case. J.M.\u2019s testimony appears to indicate that, sometimes, defendant simply had oral sex with J.M.; other times, defendant simply had anal sex. During closing argument the prosecutor stated that the evidence established each of the allegations in the indictments by proving defendant molested J.M. in the following ways: (1) penetration by defendant\u2019s finger into J.M.\u2019s anus, (2) penetration by defendant\u2019s penis into J.M.\u2019s mouth, and (3) penetration by defendant\u2019s penis into J.M.\u2019s anus.\nAt oral argument before this court, the State recognized the lack of evidence indicating precisely when and how often defendant molested J.M. Moreover, although the evidence established that defendant committed more than eight acts of criminal sexual assault against J.M., the evidence was clear that no more than two of these acts occurred during any \"single course of conduct.\u201d See People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 194, 613 N.E.2d 740 (1993) (sexual assault offenses were not committed as part of single course of conduct when committed on different days with substantial interruptions of time between them). The trial court\u2019s decision to sentence defendant to three consecutive terms was therefore conceded by the State to be error. The State agreed with defendant\u2019s counsel that, if we reject the State\u2019s waiver argument, the case must be remanded for resentencing.\nThe question remains, however, as to whether, on remand, the trial court may find that two of the defendant\u2019s criminal acts were committed as part of a single course of conduct, so as to require two of defendant\u2019s sentences to be served consecutively pursuant to the mandatory consecutive sentencing provisions of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a).\nDefendant points out that it is impossible to tell from the record which of the eight or more assaults J.M. testified occurred constituted the basis for the jury\u2019s three convictions. Although he concedes it is possible the jury convicted him for committing two acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault during one course of conduct and a third act during another, it is also equally possible that the jury convicted him for committing three separate and distinct offenses on different days, each of which constituted its own \"single course of conduct.\u201d If defendant\u2019s convictions were for crimes that were independent acts, mandatory consecutive sentences are improper.\nThe State\u2019s position at oral argument before this court was unclear with regard to the possibility of mandatory sentencing on remand. There was a suggestion that the State may argue on remand that mandatory consecutive sentences for two of defendant\u2019s three convictions is required under section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) in light of the testimony that defendant committed two acts of penetration against J.M. during several of the occurrences. Because the issue must be resolved for defendant to be properly sentenced on remand, we elect to address the question now rather than risk the prospect that defendant might receive a second improper sentence.\nSince our supreme court first addressed the issue of the meaning of \"single course of conduct\u201d in Bole, appellate courts have not developed a consistent or even coherent analysis of when courses of conduct are \"related,\u201d as opposed to \"separate.\u201d People v. Strickland, 283 Ill. App. 3d 319, 324-25, 668 N.E.2d 1201 (1996). It is clear, however, that when a defendant commits multiple acts of sexual assault separated by a substantial passage of time between the assaults, the assaults are treated as being \"separate,\u201d and not part of a \"single course of conduct\u201d for purposes of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 194.\nThus, in People v. Pence, 267 Ill. App. 3d 461, 641 N.E.2d 933 (1994), defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault for which he was sentenced to two mandatory consecutive terms pursuant to the provisions of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a). The appellate court noted in reviewing defendant\u2019s sentencing that the jury had been presented with evidence that the defendant assaulted the victim on more than five occasions, but the indictments stated only that multiple assaults had occurred over a six-month period of time. The court vacated the defendant\u2019s sentences and remanded the case for resentencing, stating: \"[Although there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that two of the offenses were part of a single course of conduct, the language of the charging document, the evidence at trial, and the general verdict of the jury do not permit the 'single course of conduct\u2019 conclusion required by Bole for mandatory consecutive sentencing.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Pence, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 466.\nHere, as in Pence, the State never established how defendant\u2019s three convictions related to any given \"single course of conduct.\u201d Thus, as defendant argues, it is impossible\u201d to determine whether the defendant was convicted by the jury of committing two acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault during a \"single course of conduct,\u201d or whether the jury\u2019s three convictions related to entirely separate occurrences. Although it is possible that the jury convicted defendant of committing two offenses during a single course of conduct, the record is simply insufficient to establish that the jury did so. In such a situation, consistent with Pence, we find defendant may not be sentenced to mandatory consecutive sentences under the terms of section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a).\nIn addition to being consistent with this court\u2019s prior holding in Pence and the supreme court\u2019s decision in Bole, we note that our analysis comports with the general principle that any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233, 253-54, 543 N.E.2d 1290 (1989). \" 'If a statute creating or increasing a penalty or punishment be capable of two constructions, undoubtedly that which operates in favor of the accused is to be adopted.\u2019 \u201d People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon, 65 Ill. 2d 366, 371, 357 N.E.2d 1180 (1976), quoting People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 215-16, 46 N.E.2d 929 (1943). Interpreting section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) in any other way on remand would have the effect of violating this hallmark of statutory construction.\nBecause the case must be remanded for resentencing, the question of whether defendant\u2019s sentence is excessive is premature and we decline to address it.\nFor the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed but defendant\u2019s sentences are vacated. The case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.\nAffirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded.\nGREIMAN, P.J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ZWICK" }, { "text": "JUSTICE THEIS,\nspecially concurring in part and dissenting in\npart:\nJ.M. testified he was born June 6, 1981. In July 1996, he testified to events occurring in the fall of 1993 and spring of 1994. Not surprisingly, he was unable to identify the specific dates on which those events took place, 34 months earlier when he was 12 years old.\nMy reading of the record is that J.M. testified defendant penetrated him on at least six days. Although the assistant State\u2019s Attorney at oral argument stated that multiple sex acts occurred on no more than two occasions, J.M.\u2019s testimony was that there were three of these events. On the first date, defendant penetrated him both digitally and with his penis. On another occasion, when J.M. performed oral sex on defendant for the first time, he again digitally penetrated the boy. During a still later event, defendant placed his finger in J.M.\u2019s anus and then penetrated the boy\u2019s anus with his penis.\nDespite that testimony, my colleagues find the consecutive sentences imposed on defendant must be vacated because they believe it is impossible to determine whether the jury\u2019s convictions relate to the occasions when multiple acts occurred in a single course of conduct. In support of their position, they rely on People v. Pence, 267 Ill. App. 3d 461, 641 N.E.2d 933 (1994). I disagree and join Justice Hartman in his dissent in Pence. See Pence, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 468, 641 N.E.2d at 938 (Hartman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).\nThe jury was presented with three sets of verdict forms, describing different types of sexual acts. If the jury had returned both guilty and not guilty verdicts, their meaning would have been unclear. However, the jury\u2019s return of three guilty verdicts was not unclear, and can only be interpreted to mean the jury accepted the testimony of J.M. and rejected the' theory of defense \u2014 an attack on J.M.\u2019s credibility.\nThe majority here and in Pence apparently create two new requirements before mandatory consecutive sentences can be imposed for assaults committed over a period of time. Must the State charge in the indictment the specific dates on which criminal acts were committed in a single course of conduct? Must the trial court give special verdict forms requiring the jury to determine which acts occurred on which dates? These requirements have no statutory basis nor support in case law, other than the majority\u2019s reading of Pence.\nIt is well recognized that the date of an offense is not an essential ingredient in child sex cases. People v. Barlow, 188 Ill. App. 3d 393, 402, 544 N.E.2d 947, 953 (1989). This court has long held that, in sex offense cases, flexibility must be given to the requirement that a certain date be specified in the charging document. People v. Long, 55 Ill. App. 3d 764, 772, 370 N.E.2d 1315, 1321 (1977). Furthermore, proof of the precise date alleged in an indictment is unnecessary unless the allegation of a particular time is an essential ingredient of the offense or a statute of limitations question is involved. People v. Wheeler, 216 Ill. App. 3d 609, 619-20, 575 N.E.2d 1326, 1335-36 (1991). Additionally, Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 3.01 states:\n\"The [(indictment) (information) (complaint)] states that the offense charged was committed [on) (on or about)]__If you find the offense charged was committed, the State is not required to prove that it was committed on the particular date charged.\u201d Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.01 (3d ed. 1992).\nAlso significant is that the statute does not impose the pleading and proof requirements created by the majority. The plain language is that \"[t]he court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part of a single course of conduct *** unless *** the defendant was convicted of a violation of Section 12 \u2014 13 or 12 \u2014 14 of the Criminal Code *** in which event the court shall enter sentences to run consecutively.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1992). While the majority is concerned with the rule of statutory construction that an ambiguous statute must be interpreted in the defendant\u2019s favor, our supreme court in People v. Bole has held the mandatory consecutive sentencing statute is \"clear and unambiguous.\u201d People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 197, 613 N.E.2d 740, 744-45 (1993).\nThe result of the majority\u2019s opinion here and in Pence is that a defendant who repeatedly assaults his victim in a single course of conduct and does so several times is punished less severely than one who commits a series of acts once. This is an absurd result.\nThe jury\u2019s unmistakable verdict was that defendant committed multiple acts of assault on at least three occasions. His convictions and consecutive sentences should be affirmed.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE THEIS," } ], "attorneys": [ "Joseph M. Lucas and Deborah A. Carder, both of Joseph M. Lucas, of Barrington, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and James Beligratis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN FALCON, Plaintiff-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 96\u20143270\nOpinion filed September 12, 1997.\nTHEIS, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJoseph M. Lucas and Deborah A. Carder, both of Joseph M. Lucas, of Barrington, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and James Beligratis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0538-01", "first_page_order": 556, "last_page_order": 564 }