{ "id": 1725139, "name": "KEITH COUNTRYMAN, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (FDL Foods, Inc., Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Countryman v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1997-10-16", "docket_number": "No. 2-96-1000WC", "first_page": "738", "last_page": "744", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 738" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146414 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2928217 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238241 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0281-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 706, "char_count": 14743, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7284983625715764e-07, "percentile": 0.7050210263223841 }, "sha256": "3462140a6d07b2b13242c04eb4c528f24f83f872b6a9fdb4b762d9f9abbd6a56", "simhash": "1:3abc1d540bf06c71", "word_count": 2334 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:42.526448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KEITH COUNTRYMAN, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (FDL Foods, Inc., Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant Keith Countryman and his employer, FDL Foods, Inc., entered into a settlement agreement on December 15, 1992, which provided for settlement of certain workers\u2019 compensation claims. The arbitrator found that the contract released claimant\u2019s claims against employer for all accidental injuries incurred through the settlement date. The Industrial Commission (Commission) affirmed. The circuit court reversed, holding that the settlement agreement did not preclude claimant from filing an additional claim for an alleged work-related back injury of August 15,1991. The issue on appeal is whether the settlement agreement is a general release of all claims incurred through December 15, 1992, including the back injury claim, or a limited release of just those claims specifically contained in the agreement. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nFACTS\nThe December 15, 1992, settlement agreement lists three distinct accident dates of May 2, 1988, March 26, 1991, and April 1, 1992. It refers to the location of the accidents as Rochelle, Illinois, and describes the periods in which claimant was temporarily totally disabled as being from June 1 to June 25, 1989, and March 26 to June 2, 1991. The agreement describes the nature of claimant\u2019s injury as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and elbow neuritis and states that claimant\u2019s hands, wrists, and elbows were affected by alleged repetitive motion.\nThe terms of settlement require employer to pay claimant $33,150 in full and final settlement of any and all workers\u2019 compensation claims \"for all accidental injuries allegedly incurred as described herein and including any and all results or developments, fatal or non-fatal, allegedly resulting from such accidental injuries.\u201d The contract further provides that \"settlement is based on [claimant\u2019s] present condition and specifically includes any other accident, injury, aggravation or onset of symptoms to the date of this settlement.\u201d\nThe settlement represents 25% loss of each arm less temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, group insurance payments, and unpaid medical expenses. Above the signature line, the contract states that claimant understands that by settling \"this claim\u201d he is giving up the right to any further medical treatment for the results of \"this incident\u201d and the right to additional benefits if his condition worsens as a result of \"this incident.\u201d\nAfter execution of the contract on December 15, 1992, claimant filed an adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1994)) for back injuries allegedly sustained on August 15, 1991, at claimant\u2019s place of employment in Rochelle, Illinois. Claimant gave employer oral notice of this incident and employer admits that at the time of settlement it knew of the potential claim for back injuries. Employer moved to dismiss the claim on the basis that the settlement contract released all accident claims through the date of settlement. The arbitrator dismissed claimant\u2019s application based on the contract release and the Commission affirmed. The circuit court reversed, holding that the release did not preclude claimant from filing an additional claim for the separate back injury.\nANALYSIS\nWhether a contract is ambiguous or clear is a question of law and a reviewing court may independently construe the contract unrestrained by the trial court\u2019s interpretation. Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 288 (1990); USG Corp. v. Sterling Plumbing Group, Inc., 247 Ill. App. 3d 316, 318 (1993). Where the contract is clear, its interpretation is a question of law to be determined only from the terms of the contract itself. Quake Construction, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d at 288; United Equitable Insurance Co. v. Reinsurance Co. of America, Inc., 157 Ill. App. 3d 724, 728-29 (1987). Where the contract is ambiguous, its interpretation is generally a question of fact subject to rules of contract construction and parol evidence. Farm Credit Bank v. Whitlock, 144 Ill. 2d 440, 447 (1991); UIDC Management, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 141 Ill. App. 3d 227, 230 (1986); Sol K. Graff & Sons v. Leopold, 92 Ill. App. 3d 769, 771 (1981). A contract is ambiguous where the language employed is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning or obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression. Meyer v. Marilyn Miglin, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 882, 888 (1995).\nWe conclude that the contract at bar is ambiguous because it contains conflicting release provisions that express different intentions. The first page of the settlement agreement lists three specific claims relating to injuries to claimant\u2019s arms, wrists, and elbows. It lists specific accident dates and describes the nature of the claimant\u2019s injury as bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and elbow neuritis. The second page of the agreement repeatedly refers to settlement for \"this incident\u201d and requires employer to pay claimant $33,150 in full and final settlement of any and all claims for all accidental injuries allegedly incurred \"as described herein,\u201d including any and all results or developments \"allegedly resulting from such accidental injuries.\u201d The settlement agreement also contains general and sweeping language that provides settlement is based on claimant\u2019s present condition and includes any other accident, injury, aggravation, or onset of symptoms to the date of settlement. This general language is inconsistent and conflicts with the specific language. Such conflict renders the contract ambiguous as a matter of law.\nWhere there is an ambiguity and if, after considering the contract language in light of parol evidence and rules of construction, doubt still remains as to the meaning of the contract, then the question of interpretation must be left to the trier of fact. Schneider v. Neubert, 308 Ill. 40, 43 (1923); United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Elder, 89 Ill. App. 3d 918, 921 (1980). If, however, the contract is susceptible to only one meaning when considered in light of parol evidence and rules of construction, the court may interpret the contract for itself. Schneider, 308 Ill. at 43-44; Vulcan Materials Co. v. Holzhauer, 234 Ill. App. 3d 444, 454 (1992); Zale Construction Co. v. Hoffman, 145 Ill. App. 3d 235, 242 (1986); United Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d at 922.\nThis case stems from employer\u2019s motion to dismiss claimant\u2019s back injury claim, wherein employer argued that the unambiguous settlement agreement barred claimant\u2019s claim. At the arbitration hearing, there was no parol evidence offered as to the parties\u2019 intent in entering into the agreement. Although employer\u2019s safety manager, Robert Long, was present with counsel, nothing in the record indicates that Long was there to testify or that the arbitrator prevented him from testifying as to the meaning of the agreement. If Long was there to testify, employer neglected to make an offer of proof, thereby failing to preserve the question for review. See Lukas v. Lightfoot, 131 Ill. App. 3d 566, 569 (1985). Moreover, employer did not argue below or on appeal that the arbitrator erroneously prevented it from offering parol evidence. In fact, employer\u2019s counsel stated at oral argument that he agreed with the arbitrator\u2019s decision to preclude parol evidence because he believed the issue of contract interpretation was a question of law.\nPertinent rules of construction provide that where an ambiguity exists in a contract due to a conflict between two of its provisions, the more specific provision relating to the same subject matter controls over the more general provision. R. W. Dunteman Co. v. Village of Lombard, 281 Ill. App. 3d 929, 936 (1996); AFSCME v. ISLRB, 274 Ill. App. 3d 327, 337 (1995); Carlile v. Snap-on Tools, 271 Ill. App. 3d 833, 839 (1995); Brzozowski v. Northern Trust Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d 95, 99 (1993); Carona v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 203 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951 (1990). Also, contract provisions and terms are to be interpreted as a whole and not in isolation. Effect is to be given to every provision because it is presumed that every clause was inserted for a purpose. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v. Acevedo, 140 Ill. App. 3d 107, 115 (1986); Joseph v. Lake Michigan Mortgage Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 988, 991 (1982).\nThe settlement agreement consists of a two-page document that uses conflicting specific and general release language. The entire first page of the document refers specifically to the named incidents and so does the majority of the second page. Only one sentence of the release found near the bottom of the first paragraph of the second page contains general release language. The general provision does not state, however, that the release includes but is not limited to the injuries incurred on the specified dates. Nor does the agreement refer in any way to claimant\u2019s back injury, even though employer admittedly knew that claimant had injured his back prior to settlement. Further, the settlement amount represents 25% loss of each arm less TTD benefits, group insurance payments, and unpaid medical expenses for the incident referred to in the agreement. There is no mention of payment for claimant\u2019s alleged back injury. Under rules of construction, the more specific release provisions must prevail.\nIn holding that specific provisions of a release override general provisions, the circuit court properly relied on Carona v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 203 Ill. App. 3d 947 (1990). Carona involved separate actions under the Federal Employer\u2019s Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. \u00a7 51 et seq. (1982)). The settlement contract between the employee and his employer contained a specific release provision from a work-related accident that occurred on a specified date. The contract also contained a general release from any and all claims, demands, suits, etc. whatsoever. The employee subsequently sued his employer for a separate accident that occurred before the settlement release. The trial court held that the employee could not bring the second claim because it was covered by the release. The appellate court reversed and remanded the cause, holding that the employee\u2019s second claim could proceed. The court held that the agreement contained both words of specific and general release from the accident specified in the agreement and the employer could not claim refuge under the broader release language that contradicted the specific phrase. Carona, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 951.\nEmployer contends Carona is inapplicable because in the instant case there is no internal contradiction in the release language. We disagree. Like the contract in Carona, this contract lists specific dates of accidents and dates that claimant was temporarily totally disabled. In addition, the contract states that claimant suffered injuries to both arms and that this settlement is for \"this incident\u201d and injuries incurred \"as described herein\u201d and \"resulting from such accidental injuries.\u201d The contract then goes on to provide a general release of all liability for any and all other accidents or injuries. There is nothing in the contract that refers to claimant\u2019s back injury or any other injury incurred on August 15, 1991, even though employer knew of this injury at the time of settlement. Therefore, employer\u2019s attempt to distinguish Carona is unpersuasive.\nThis is not to say that a release containing both specific and general language is ambiguous per se. See Bruner v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 219 Ill. App. 3d 177 (1991); Aqua-Aerobic Systems, Inc. v. Ravitts, 166 Ill. App. 3d 168 (1988); Cwik v. Condre, 4 Ill. App. 2d 380 (1954); Inter Insurance Exchange of Chicago Motor Club v. Andersen, 331 Ill. App. 250 (1947). Rather, the court must evaluate the intent of the parties and the nature and language of a settlement agreement on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the particular release is ambiguous.\nEmployer cites Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 Ill. 2d 317 (1984), to support its contention that the contract releases any and all claims under the Act to the date of settlement. Rakowski is inapposite. There was only one accident in Rakowski, not multiple injuries stemming from unrelated incidents as in this case.\nMoreover, the issue in Rakowski was whether the settlement release in favor of Rakowski and against Lucente covered claims for contribution. Lucente argued the release did not cover claims for contribution because no such claims existed at the time the release was executed. The court rejected this argument, holding that the right of contribution exists from the time the negligent acts are committed. The court then looked at the broad language of the release and found it covered any and all claims, including contribution, \"and particularly on account of all injuries, *** which have resulted or may in the future develop from an accident which occurred.\u201d Rakowski, 104 Ill. 2d at 323. The court reasoned that, as a matter of public policy, settlement should be encouraged. To add limitations not expressed in the general language of the settlement agreement would make those seeking settlement wary and uncertain of what they would accomplish by settlement. \"Holding the parties to the language of their release has the advantage of providing certainty and thereby encouraging settlement.\u201d Rakowski, 104 Ill. 2d at 325.\nWhile the policy reasons expressed in Rakowski ring true, the facts do not compel the same result here. In the instant case, claimant had multiple accidents and incurred separate injuries. The specific language of the settlement contract refers only to the injuries and accidents involving claimant\u2019s arms; it does not mention the alleged injury or separate accident to claimant\u2019s back, even though employer knew of this potential claim. Although the contract also contains \u00e1 general release from all claims to the date of settlement, the specific provisions relating to the release from specified injuries and accidents control over the more general provision because the contract is ambiguous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court holding that the settlement contract does not bar claimant\u2019s separate back injury claim.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and COLWELL, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RAKOWSKI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul A. Coghlan, of Stevenson, Rusin & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Peter F. Ferracuti and Peter C. Bobber, both of Law Offices of Peter F. Ferracuti, P.C., of Ottawa, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KEITH COUNTRYMAN, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (FDL Foods, Inc., Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 96\u20141000WC\nOpinion filed October 16, 1997.\nPaul A. Coghlan, of Stevenson, Rusin & Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nPeter F. Ferracuti and Peter C. Bobber, both of Law Offices of Peter F. Ferracuti, P.C., of Ottawa, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0738-01", "first_page_order": 756, "last_page_order": 762 }