{ "id": 1725069, "name": "DANA TANK CONTAINER, INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Dana Tank Container, Inc. v. Human Rights Commission", "decision_date": "1997-10-20", "docket_number": "No. 1-96-1374", "first_page": "1022", "last_page": "1026", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 1022" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505640 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965481 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/252/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156897 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147590 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0469-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 452, "char_count": 8284, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4317744589140065e-07, "percentile": 0.6514161636450619 }, "sha256": "7bb0a0a31746e7131da5f83e9280a23fe324523b5795e051b23ff81b736bc851", "simhash": "1:4d2348044a21f54e", "word_count": 1293 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:42.526448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DANA TANK CONTAINER, INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Dana Container, Inc., employed respondent, Melvin Wesley, as a tank washer from June 1985 until October 8, 1986. In July 1986, respondent filed a charge of race discrimination against petitioner with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. The charge apparently was brought pursuant to section 2 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which states that it \"is a civil rights violation\u201d for \"any employer to refuse to hire, to segregate, or to act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful discrimination or citizenship status.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 775 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102(A) (West 1992). Th.\u00ae charge was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because petitioner employed less than 15 persons. See 775 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101(B)(1)(a) (West 1992) (defining \"employer\u201d as \"[a]ny person employing 15 or more employees within Illinois during 20 or more calendar weeks within the calendar year of or preceding the alleged violation\u201d).\nFollowing the dismissal of respondent\u2019s race discrimination charge, petitioner fired respondent on October 8, 1986. On February 17, 1987, respondent filed another charge against petitioner with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (hereafter the Department), this time alleging that petitioner had fired him in retaliation for previously filing the charge of race discrimination. On May 22, 1991, the Department filed a complaint with the Illinois Human Rights Commission (hereafter the Commission) based on the retaliation charge.\nPetitioner did not defend the retaliation proceeding. On May 20, 1993, the administrative law judge (hereafter the ALJ) issued an order holding petitioner in default and setting a hearing date on the issue of damages and other relief.\nOn September 19, 1995, the ALJ issued an order and decision recommending that the Commission require petitioner to pay respondent $51,204, plus interest, as compensation for lost wages. On October 19, 1995, petitioner filed exceptions to the recommended order and decision, arguing that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charge because petitioner employed less than 15 employees and, therefore, was not an employer under the Act.\nOn January 8, 1996, the Commission entered an order and decision affirming the ALJ\u2019s recommended order and decision. The Commission explained that petitioner\u2019s status as an employer was irrelevant because respondent\u2019s retaliation complaint was brought under section 6 \u2014 101(A) of the Act (775 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 101(A) (West 1992)), which makes it a civil rights violation for a \"person\u201d to retaliate against another \"person\u201d for filing a charge of discrimination. The Commission noted that the Act defines \"person\u201d to include one or more corporations. See 775 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 103(L) (West 1992). Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, which the Commission denied. Petitioner then filed this timely appeal.\nIt is undisputed that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over respondent\u2019s initial claim of race discrimination because the petitioner employed fewer than 15 persons and therefore was not an \"employer\u201d as defined by the Act. Petitioner contends that since respondent\u2019s subsequent retaliation claim is premised on the race discrimination charge over which the Commission lacked jurisdiction, the retaliation claim cannot constitute a civil rights violation under section 6 \u2014 101(A) of the Act. Therefore, petitioner claims that the Commission should have dismissed respondent\u2019s retaliation claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\nThe resolution of this issue requires us to construe section 6 \u2014 101(A) of the Act. Because the construction of a statute is a matter of law, we may independently construe the Act. See Raintree Health Care Center v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 173 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1996).\nThe primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Augustus v. Estate of Somers, 278 Ill. App. 3d 90, 97 (1996). In determining legislative intent, the court first should consider the statutory language. Somers, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 97. Where the statutory language is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. Somers, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 97.\nSection 6 \u2014 101(A) states in relevant part:\n\"It is a civil rights violation for a person, or for two or more persons to conspire, to:\n(A) Retaliation. Retaliate against a person because he or she *** has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Act.\u201d 775 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 101(A) (West 1992).\nThe clear language of the statute protects a person from retaliation for making a charge under the Act. There is no requirement that the charge be meritorious or otherwise able to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Once a person has made a charge under the Act, regardless of the ultimate disposition of that charge, he is protected from retaliation therefor.\nIn the present case, respondent filed, in July 1986, a charge under the Act alleging that petitioner had racially discriminated against him. Later, in February 1987, respondent filed a charge alleging that petitioner had discharged him in retaliation for previously filing the charge of race discrimination. Respondent\u2019s retaliation claim falls within section 6 \u2014 101(A), regardless of the fact that the underlying claim of racial discrimination was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reject petitioner\u2019s argument that the Commission should have dismissed respondent\u2019s retaliation claim.\nPetitioner argues that it \"is simply unreasonable to assume that the legislature would expressly exclude small employers [fewer than 15 employees] from liability for unlawful discrimination, and then intend to implicitly make them liable for retaliating against charges for which they could never have been held liable [in the first place].\u201d We disagree. Article 2 of the Act, which governs employment discrimination, expressly prohibits \"employers\u201d from unlawfully discriminating. An \"employer\u201d is defined as persons with 15 or more employees. 775 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101(B)(1)(a) (West 1992). By contrast, section 6 \u2014 101(A) expressly prohibits a \"person\u201d from retaliating against another person because he made a charge under the Act. A \"person\u201d as defined in the Act can include an employer with fewer than 15 employees. See 775 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 103(L) (W\u00e9st 1992). Where the legislature uses certain words in one instance and different words in another, it intended different results. Costello v. Governing Board of Lee County Special Education Ass\u2019n, 252 Ill. App. 3d 547, 558 (1993). Thus, we find that the legislature intended section 6 \u2014 101(A) to apply to employers with fewer than 15 employees.\nPetitioner cites federal cases construing a similar provision under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e\u2014 3(a) (1994)). Petitioner claims those cases compel a result different from the one reached here. We need not delve into an analysis of those cases, since they are persuasive authority only and are not binding on us. Habinka v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 192 Ill. App. 3d 343, 378-79 (1989). Instead, we rely on the clear language of section 6 \u2014 101(A), which compels the conclusion that respondent\u2019s retaliation claim falls within its purview.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.\nAlthough the pleadings in this case refer to petitioner as Dana Tank Container, Inc., petitioner informs us in its appellant\u2019s brief that its proper name is Dana Container, Inc.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daley & George, Ltd., of Chicago (John J. George and Richard A. Toth, of counsel), for petitioner.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Janon E. Fabiano, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANA TANK CONTAINER, INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 96\u20141374\nOpinion filed October 20, 1997.\nDaley & George, Ltd., of Chicago (John J. George and Richard A. Toth, of counsel), for petitioner.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Janon E. Fabiano, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondent." }, "file_name": "1022-01", "first_page_order": 1040, "last_page_order": 1044 }