{ "id": 1725085, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN BILLINGSLEA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Billingslea", "decision_date": "1997-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-94-2555", "first_page": "1026", "last_page": "1036", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 1026" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455075 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473660 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 N.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 2d 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3283158 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/148/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "knowledge of past criminal activity in an area alone did not justify stop" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2691238 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "knowledge of past criminal activity in an area alone did not justify stop" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 1053", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2580887 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 1116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5098872 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1046", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3461677 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11320254 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108039 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553-54" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "1877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195479 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "1324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 N.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909178 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477765 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544524 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "953 F.2d 116", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10516801 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122-23" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/953/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "986 F.2d 651", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1087476, 661991 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "where the defendant asked to leave but was ordered to remain and then sat back down, he was seized even though he fled soon thereafter" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/vi/28/0241-01", "/f2d/986/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 2d 565", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12033563, 6221076 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/350/0473-01", "/us/486/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 567", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6221076 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "958 F.2d 1085", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10522435, 5684603 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1087", "parenthetical": "\"conversational tones\" of officers' speech suggest no seizure occurred" }, { "page": "1087" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/958/1085-01", "/us-app-dc/294/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "981 F.2d 536", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3811168, 1874935 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "considering fact that both officers were armed and in full uniform in finding that a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have felt free to ignore the officers" }, { "page": "540-41", "parenthetical": "finding the defendant had yielded to police authority and was thereby seized where the defendant froze and dropped a gun after being told to \"halt right there\" by officer" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us-app-dc/299/0047-01", "/f2d/981/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 40", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167951 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" }, { "page": "935" }, { "page": "1903" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "962 F.2d 451", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10521012 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-58" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/962/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "985 F.2d 151", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "928 F. Supp. 889", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3466897 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/928/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "936 F.2d 1561", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10536002 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1567", "parenthetical": "momentary yielding to show of authority sufficient to constitute seizure" }, { "page": "1566-67", "parenthetical": "finding a seizure where the defendant, having been commanded to \"hold it right there\" and urged not to run, paused momentarily before fleeing" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/936/1561-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 F.3d 1171", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10530746 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1180", "parenthetical": "holding that a \"crucial element\" of a seizure is the \"significant, present disruption of the targeted person's freedom of movement\" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/35/1171-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "activation of police lights on squad car did not constitute a seizure, as seizure did not occur until defendants yielded to officer in pursuit" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 912", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409192 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "916", "parenthetical": "activation of police lights on squad car did not constitute a seizure, as seizure did not occur until defendants yielded to officer in pursuit" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0912-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2691238 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5098872 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863", "parenthetical": "finding no seizure where, pursuant to officer's request, defendant voluntarily approached and attempted to produce identification" }, { "page": "863", "parenthetical": "where officer merely asked the defendant to approach and produce identification, no seizure occurred since record revealed \"no further evidence that defendant's freedom to walk away was in any fashion overcome by force or threat of force\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3461677 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "finding no seizure where detective approached defendant, who then voluntarily followed detective away from a group" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11320254 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "626-27" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108039 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185389 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "1877" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "508-09" }, { "page": "1876-77" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "1877" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "1877", "parenthetical": "considering the fact that the officers did not summon the respondent to their presence in finding that no seizure occurred" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0544-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1002, "char_count": 23241, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.327620692103837e-08, "percentile": 0.439994571112061 }, "sha256": "bc0518130ca57d20604e77ada8774f260647e894b1db5c823dbc03bd574fd7c7", "simhash": "1:1b961480775280ff", "word_count": 3934 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:42.526448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN BILLINGSLEA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nJohn Billingslea was convicted after a bench trial of unlawful use of a weapon, failure to possess a firearm owner\u2019s identification card and failure to produce evidence of firearm registration. He was sentenced to one year of probation. He argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. We affirm.\nAt a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, Chicago police officer Alvin Campbell testified that on January 8, 1994, at 11:40 p.m., he and his partner, Officer Merritt, were on routine patrol in a marked police car. As they approached 10659 South Champaign Street, Campbell saw defendant and two other men talking to the occupants of a parked car. Defendant was on the passenger side of the car and the two others were standing on the driver\u2019s side. The officers stopped their car because they were in a \"high narcotics area\u201d and defendant \"had just left the car [and] possibly *** could have had narcotics.\u201d Campbell did not have a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest, nor did he witness transactions between defendant\u2019s group and the occupants of the car.\nCampbell testified that as he and Merritt got out of their squad car, the other vehicle drove away. Defendant and the other two men then approached the officers. Merritt asked defendant\u2019s companions, \"Why don\u2019t you guys come over here[?]\u201d Simultaneously, Campbell asked defendant to come toward him. Defendant was no more than 15 feet away when Campbell called to him. As defendant approached, Campbell observed that defendant was wearing a coat that was open and his hands were in his pockets. Campbell \"saw a bundle\u201d in defendant\u2019s waistband. Campbell told defendant: \"keep [your] hands where I [can] see them.\u201d\nAfter taking a couple of steps in Campbell\u2019s direction, defendant turned slightly and took an \"evasive step\u201d away from Campbell. Defendant was then five to six feet away from Campbell. Campbell moved in front of defendant to block his path. Campbell explained that he did this to position himself so that he could catch defendant if he attempted to flee.\nAs Campbell moved in front of defendant to counter his evasive step, he twice told defendant to \"come here.\u201d Instead, defendant turned his back to the officer, removed an object from his waistband and threw it to the ground. Defendant then attempted to kick snow over the object he had tossed. When Campbell recovered the object from the snow, he saw that it was a .38-caliber handgun. While Campbell dealt with defendant, Merritt conducted a search of defendant\u2019s companions, during which she told them to \"grab the car.\u201d\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, reasoning that Campbell\u2019s conduct in calling defendant over to his vehicle did not amount to a \"stop\u201d under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Further, the trial judge reasoned that when defendant turned from the officer and threw the gun to the ground, he lost his right to privacy, as well as standing to contest the seizure of the weapon, because he had abandoned the weapon and it was in plain view on the ground. The trial judge did not address whether a seizure occurred when Campbell moved to block defendant.\nGenerally, we will not disturb a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 645 N.E.2d 195 (1994). But where, as here, neither the facts nor credibility of witnesses is disputed, we may review the ruling de novo. People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 201, 661 N.E.2d 310 (1996).\nA law enforcement officer does not violate the fourth amendment\u2019s guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure by approaching a person and questioning him. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 236, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983). But when a person\u2019s freedom of movement is restrained by physical force or a show of authority, he is seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). A show of authority amounts to a seizure when a reasonable person in the same circumstances would not feel free to \" 'go about his business.\u2019 \u201d Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398, Ill S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991), quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698, Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991).\nDefendant does not dispute that he voluntarily walked toward Campbell. At that point, the encounter was consensual and he was not seized. He argues that the confrontation escalated to a seizure when Campbell, without sufficient articulable facts to justify a Terry stop, told defendant to \"come here\u201d as he blocked defendant\u2019s path in response to defendant\u2019s evasive step.\nThe State argues that defendant was not seized until after he threw the weapon down and, at that point, defendant had abandoned the gun. The State argues that nothing Campbell did before defendant threw the gun down \"could be construed as a show or threat of force, and the officer did not confine or restrain defendant in any way.\u201d\nThe State relies on People v. Jackson, 149 Ill. App. 3d 156, 500 N.E.2d 537 (1986), and People v. Tilden, 70 Ill. App. 3d 859, 388 N.E.2d 1046 (1979), to support its contention that there was no seizure of defendant before he tossed the gun. In Jackson, the defendant voluntarily followed an officer to his car after the officer said, \"I would like to talk to you.\u201d Jackson, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 157. The officer said he intended to ask the defendant the whereabouts of another suspect. As they walked, the officer saw the defendant put a clear plastic bag containing white powder in his mouth. The court held that the defendant was not seized because there was no indication that the officer intended to arrest or restrain the defendant. Jackson, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 158.\nSimilarly, in Tilden, officers were responding to a report about a suspicious person when they saw the defendant in a nearby alley. As one of the officers approached the defendant, he began to walk away. The officer asked him to return and produce identification. As the defendant searched his pockets, the officer saw a gun in the defendant\u2019s waistband. The court held that the defendant had not been seized because the defendant\u2019s freedom to walk away had not been hindered by force or threat of force. Tilden, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 862.\nWe disagree with the State\u2019s assertion that Campbell\u2019s action lacked a show of force before defendant threw the gun to the ground. Unlike the officers in Jackson and Tilden, the officer here did more than ask for voluntary cooperation. We believe Campbell\u2019s action in stepping to block defendant while telling him to \"come here\u201d was a show of force indicating Campbell\u2019s intent to restrain defendant. Campbell\u2019s testimony confirmed that he intended to block defendant if he tried to flee. But that is not the end of our analysis.\nWhile an officer\u2019s show of authority may amount to a seizure (see Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398, Ill S. Ct. at 2386), we have held that a defendant is not seized when he ignores a show of authority. See People v. Ramirez, 244 Ill. App. 3d 136, 145, 613 N.E.2d 1116 (1993), citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, Ill S. Ct. 1547 (1991). In People v. Ramirez, the defendant fled from officers who had ordered him to halt. As he fled, he dropped a brown paper bag that contained cocaine. We held that the defendant was not seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment because there had been neither the application of physical force with lawful authority nor submission to the assertion of authority. Ramirez, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 145. We found that the bag had been abandoned, and we held that defendant\u2019s motion to exclude the evidence was properly denied.\nThis case is similar to Ramirez. While Campbell asserted authority when he blocked defendant, ordered him to \"come here,\u201d and ordered him to keep his hands where he could see them, defendant chose not to submit. Instead, he turned away, reached for an object in his waistband, and threw it to the ground. At that moment, defendant was not detained by physical force and did not submit to the assertion of authority. Campbell\u2019s recovery of the gun did not result from a search or seizure of defendant.\nThe record further establishes that Campbell had sufficient articulable facts to justify a Terry stop before he tried to detain defendant. An officer may lawfully detain a person to conduct a brief and limited investigation of possible criminal activity where there are articulable facts and rational inferences that lead the officer to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968); People v. Zamora, 203 Ill. App. 3d 102, 106-07, 560 N.E.2d 1053 (1990).\nWhen Campbell originally saw defendant, Campbell knew that defendant was near an occupied car in a \"high narcotics area.\u201d If this was all Campbell knew before he tried to detain defendant, his \"hunch\u201d would not have justified his intrusion. See People v. Hunt, 188 Ill. App. 3d 359, 362, 544 N.E.2d 118 (1989) (knowledge of past criminal activity in an area alone did not justify stop). But Campbell made several other relevant observations before attempting to stop defendant.\nCampbell testified that, as defendant began to walk toward the officers, he saw that defendant was wearing an open coat and that there was \"a bundle\u201d or \"bulge\u201d at his waistband. Defendant also had his hands' in his pockets. Campbell then ordered defendant to keep his hands where Campbell could see them. Defendant altered his course and took an evasive step away. These articulable facts, coupled with Campbell\u2019s knowledge that he was in a high crime area, gave him reason to block defendant.\nAn investigatory stop is proper when the articulable facts, together with natural inferences, make the intrusion reasonable. People v. Scott, 148 Ill. 2d 479, 503, 594 N.E.2d 217 (1992), quoting People v. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d 430, 436 (1980); People v. McGowan, 69 Ill. 2d 73, 78 (1977). We believe a reasonable officer in Campbell\u2019s position would be alerted to the possibility of criminal activity and that the better part of wisdom compelled Campbell\u2019s minimal intrusion of blocking defendant\u2019s path to detain defendant long enough to investigate.\nAffirmed.\nCOUSINS, P.J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAHILL" }, { "text": "JUSTICE LEAVITT,\ndissenting:\nI agree with the majority that Officer Campbell\u2019s actions in this case amounted to a show of force, contrary to the State\u2019s position. However, I believe defendant\u2019s response to Campbell\u2019s assertion of authority constituted a submission to that authority and that defendant was thereby seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. I also disagree with the majority\u2019s finding that, prior to the alleged seizure, Campbell had sufficient grounds to justify a Terry stop of defendant. Thus, I respectfully dissent.\nAs the majority correctly points out, \"a defendant is not seized when he ignores a show of authority.\u201d 292 Ill. App. 3d at 1030. See People v. Perez, 249 Ill. App. 3d 912, 916, 619 N.E.2d 887 (1993) (activation of police lights on squad car did not constitute a seizure, as seizure did not occur until defendants yielded to officer in pursuit); Ramirez, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 145. The seizure of an individual \"requires either physical force *** or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 697, Ill S. Ct. at 1551. The question then becomes, in the absence of any physical force applied to defendant, whether he submitted to Officer Campbell\u2019s assertion of authority. I would find that he did.\nThe determinative testimony by Officer Campbell, elicited on cross-examination, was as follows:\n\"Q. When you said in your arrest report, when you asked the defendant to come towards you, he refused, is that correct?\nA. Correct.\nQ. Explain to the court what you mean \u2014 what period of time are you referring to that he refused to come towards you?\nA. Those few seconds I said 'Come over here\u2019 at that time Mr. Billingslea originally took an evasive step. I walked to block his path, and said, 'come here\u2019. I repeated it again and at that time, he turned around and turned his back and threw the object.\u201d\nI disagree with the majority\u2019s assertion that Ramirez controls the present case. Based on the officer\u2019s own account, defendant clearly did not flee when confronted with Campbell\u2019s show of authority. That fact alone distinguishes the present case from Ramirez, as well as the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Hodari D., relied upon by this court in Ramirez. In both those cases, the defendants fled when first confronted by police officers.\nIn contrast to the immediate and unhesitating flight of the defendants in Ramirez and Hodari D., defendant in this case remained in the place where he was instructed to stop and was subsequently restrained by Officer Campbell. Defendant was approximately 15 feet from Campbell when Campbell asked him to approach him. Defendant continued towards Campbell, in obeyance of his order, until he was in very close proximity (five to six feet) of the officer. At this point, defendant \u2014 arguably \"seized\u201d already \u2014 decided to exercise his right to walk away. In response, the officer blocked defendant\u2019s path, ordering him to \"come here, come here.\u201d He testified that he did so to stop the defendant were he to run. Physical contact is not required to effectuate a seizure. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626-27, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 697, 111 S. Ct. at 1551. See also Kernats v. O\u2019Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1180 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a \"crucial element\u201d of a seizure is the \"significant, present disruption of the targeted person\u2019s freedom of movement\u201d (emphasis omitted)). A refusal to flee or otherwise escape is to be encouraged. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 111 S. Ct. at 1551 (presuming \"[o]nly a few [police orders to stop] *** will be without adequate basis\u201d). Under these circumstances, I would find that defendant\u2019s freedom of movement was sufficiently restrained such that he was \"seized\u201d within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991) (momentary yielding to show of authority sufficient to constitute seizure); Johnson v. Grob, 928 F. Supp. 889, 898 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (same). But see United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Holloway, 962 F.2d 451, 456-58 (5th Cir. 1992).\nIt is also clear that defendant was not acting \" 'voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation with the officer\u2019s investigation\u2019 \u201d when he submitted to the assertion of authority. (Emphasis omitted.) See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877, quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 935, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1903 (1968). A necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for a seizure is that a reasonable innocent person in the same circumstances as the defendant would not, due to the police conduct, feel free to decline the officer\u2019s request or otherwise terminate the encounter. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 111 S. Ct. at 1551; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398, 111 S. Ct. at 2386. Hence, it must be determined whether an individual\u2019s submission to an assertion of authority was the product of police coercion or, rather, manifested a genuine willingness on the citizen\u2019s part to cooperate with the officer\u2019s investigation; the former case is indicative of a seizure, while in the latter case the encounter remains consensual. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 508-09, 100 S. Ct. at 1876-77. Cf. Jackson, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 158 (finding no seizure where detective approached defendant, who then voluntarily followed detective away from a group); Tilden, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 863 (finding no seizure where, pursuant to officer\u2019s request, defendant voluntarily approached and attempted to produce identification).\nRelevant to this inquiry are such factors as \"the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer\u2019s request might be compelled.\u201d Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877. In this case a number of these factors support the conclusion that defendant was not submitting \"in a spirit of apparent cooperation\u201d with Officer Campbell. Defendant was faced, not with one officer, but two. Although not brandishing their weapons, both were armed and in uniform. See United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d 536, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (considering fact that both officers were armed and in full uniform in finding that a reasonable person in defendant\u2019s position would not have felt free to ignore the officers). The police conduct in relation to defendant\u2019s companions is also relevant. During Officer Campbell\u2019s encounter with defendant, Officer Merritt was simultaneously conducting a search of defendant\u2019s companions, both of whom had been told to \"grab the car.\u201d The fact that one\u2019s compatriots are forced to assume a position against the squad car while being frisked would not lead a defendant to believe that he was free to move about his business.\nNor did Campbell\u2019s manner of address in this case indicate to defendant that he was free to leave. Campbell did not approach defendant at first but, rather, ordered defendant to come to him (keeping in mind, again, that in defendant\u2019s presence his two companions were being forced to stop and position themselves against the squad car). See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877 (considering the fact that the officers did not summon the respondent to their presence in finding that no seizure occurred); United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (\"conversational tones\u201d of officers\u2019 speech suggest no seizure occurred). Perhaps most indicative of the coercion present was defendant\u2019s failed attempt to bring the encounter to an end. With Campbell five to six feet away, defendant decided to exercise his right to walk away and took a step in another direction, only to be confronted again by Campbell, who then repeated his earlier commands for defendant to come to him. Campbell testified he took this action so as to stop defendant were he to run. While the subjective intent of the officer is relevant only to the extent that the intent has been conveyed to the person confronted (Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 n.7, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 573 n.7, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1980 n.7 (1988); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 n.6, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509 n.6, 100 S. Ct. at 1877 n.6), defendant in this case was, no doubt, made fully aware of Campbell\u2019s intent to restrain him when the officer blocked his path. See Tilden, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 863 (where officer merely asked the defendant to approach and produce identification, no seizure occurred since record revealed \"no further evidence that defendant\u2019s freedom to walk away was in any fashion overcome by force or threat of force\u201d). In sum, the totality of the circumstances indicates that this was hardly a consensual \"benign police/citizen encounter.\u201d See Jordan, 958 F.2d at 1087.\nOther jurisdictions have found lesser restraints on an individual\u2019s freedom of movement sufficient to constitute a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993) (where the defendant asked to leave but was ordered to remain and then sat back down, he was seized even though he fled soon thereafter); Wood, 981 F.2d at 540-41 (finding the defendant had yielded to police authority and was thereby seized where the defendant froze and dropped a gun after being told to \"halt right there\u201d by officer); Morgan, 936 F.2d at 1566-67 (finding a seizure where the defendant, having been commanded to \"hold it right there\u201d and urged not to run, paused momentarily before fleeing); United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1991) (where officers followed the defendant through the airport and persisted in asking him questions following his refusal to consent to a search, the defendant was seized despite his continued unimpeded progress towards his destination, since such police persistence in the face of an attempt to terminate an encounter may be the equivalent of physical restraint).\nFinally, I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion Officer Campbell had sufficient articulable facts to justify a Terry stop before any seizure of defendant could have occurred. The State originally conceded as much, admitting that \"[i]f this was a Terry stop, and, therefore, a seizure of defendant\u2019s person before defendant threw down the weapon, this would have been improper and the weapon should have been suppressed by the trial court.\u201d The officers in this case simply had insufficient articulable facts to support an inference that an offense was taking place, had taken place or was about to take place. The majority points to Campbell\u2019s observation of a \"bundle\u201d or \"bulge\u201d at defendant\u2019s waistband, but there is no indication in the record that Campbell had any reason to believe that the \"bundle\u201d or \"bulge\u201d was a gun or contraband of any type. The majority also points out that defendant had his hands in his pockets, which, again, adds little if anything in support of a Terry stop. As to defendant\u2019s \"evasive step,\u201d any attempt by a citizen to terminate a consensual encounter with the police is obviously \"evasive\u201d from the officer\u2019s viewpoint. Such an exercise of one\u2019s right to walk away, if the right is not illusory, should not in my view be considered in assessing the propriety of a Terry stop.\nHere we have only the officer\u2019s testimony that he and his partner were suspicious of the defendant and his companions because they were standing by an occupied car in a \"high narcotics area\u201d and \"possibly *** could have had narcotics.\u201d This was simply insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify a stop. A police officer may not rely on \"mere hunch and suspicion\u201d to justify an intrusion into a citizen\u2019s right to move freely in our society. People v. Moore, 286 Ill. App. 3d 649, 654, 676 N.E.2d 700 (1997); People v. Hunt, 188 Ill. App. 3d 359, 362, 544 N.E.2d 118 (1989). I believe that the stop was improper and that the trial judge should have granted the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE LEAVITT," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Linda Eigner, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Christine L. Kornak, and Frank Kostouros, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN BILLINGSLEA, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 94\u20142555\nOpinion filed September 30, 1997.\nLEAVITT, J., dissenting.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Linda Eigner, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Christine L. Kornak, and Frank Kostouros, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1026-01", "first_page_order": 1044, "last_page_order": 1054 }