{ "id": 1725052, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINCOLN JOHNS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Johns", "decision_date": "1997-10-30", "docket_number": "No. 1-95-0492", "first_page": "1055", "last_page": "1059", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 1055" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147602 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55975 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198918 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 N.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477551 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 N.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "363" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544867 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295616 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0849-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 476, "char_count": 9445, "ocr_confidence": 0.714, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.0648933586475505 }, "sha256": "fe70db57cd08543bf894bd45dfbd65149c41b2c117c8be479f9855ba17758653", "simhash": "1:0287b74cf596eac2", "word_count": 1483 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:39:42.526448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINCOLN JOHNS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REMAND\nJUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Lincoln Johns, was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms of 50 years\u2019 and 10 years\u2019 imprisonment, respectively, for the two offenses. On direct appeal, defendant sought a limited remand to determine whether he was receiving psychotropic medication at any critical stages of the criminal proceedings where his presentence investigative report indicated that he was prescribed both Thorazine and Haldol while incarcerated awaiting trial, but did not specify the precise dates when he was receiving the medication. This court remanded the case for the purpose of determining the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s alleged ingestion of psychotropic medication. This court further ordered that, if the factual inquiry on remand revealed that defendant ingested psychotropic medication at the time of his trial or sentencing, the trial court was to vacate defendant\u2019s convictions, because it would be impossible to conduct a meaningful fitness hearing retrospectively nunc pro tunc the time of defendant\u2019s original trial. People v. Johns, 285 Ill. App. 3d 849, 674 N.E.2d 882 (1996). In a supervisory order issued on June 4, 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court denied the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal but remanded the case for additional consideration in light of People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997), which was decided after this court issued its decision. People v. Johns, 173 Ill. 2d 535, 683 N.E.2d 892 (1997).\nOur prior opinion sets forth in detail the facts adduced at defendant\u2019s trial and sentencing and disposes of any additional contentions made by defendant on direct appeal. On remand, we consider only how the supreme court\u2019s decision in Burgess impacts our disposition of defendant\u2019s contention concerning his alleged ingestion of psychotropic drugs. The parties have submitted additional briefs on the issue. Defendant argues that Burgess does not require that this court\u2019s decision be modified or reversed because this court has correctly determined that it would be impossible to conduct a meaningful retrospective fitness hearing. The State argues, however, that, in light of Burgess, this court\u2019s previous order should be modified to direct that the cause be remanded for consideration of all the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s alleged drug ingestion and provide that a retrospective fitness hearing be held and retrospective fitness finding be entered if warranted.\nIn People v. Burgess, the supreme court held that automatic reversal is not always appropriate where a defendant received psychotropic drugs during his trial but did not receive a fitness hearing, and \"conclude[d] that retrospective hearings are sometimes proper.\u201d Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d at 304, 680 N.E.2d at 364. In Burgess, the defendant, who was sentenced to death, argued on appeal that his convictions must be reversed because he had been taking two types of psychotropic medication during his trial. During the pendency of the appeal, the supreme court remanded the cause back to the trial court for the limited purpose of determining whether the defendant had, in fact, ingested those types of medications at or near the time of his trial. The trial court conducted a hearing, during which it was confirmed by a psychiatrist that the defendant had ingested two psychotropic agents while on trial. The psychiatrist further testified, however, that both drugs were taken at night and neither would have had any effect on the defendant\u2019s mental state during the day. Over the defense\u2019s objection, the State called the defendant\u2019s trial counsel as a witness at the hearing. He testified that he discussed all aspects of the trial with his client and that the defendant always seemed alert and coherent. The trial judge also entered written findings stating that he presided at trial and sentencing and that, on all occasions, the defendant appeared alert. The trial judge opined that the drugs received by the defendant had no effect on his mental functioning, moods, or demeanor in the courtroom.\nThe defendant argued to the supreme court that, based on the evidence confirming that he was taking psychotropic medication during his trial, he was entitled to a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104 \u2014 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 21(a) (West 1994)). The defendant further argued that, since he did not receive a fitness hearing at the time of his trial, he was entitled to a new trial under recent supreme court cases that have rejected the possibility of retrospective fitness hearings. See People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, 643 N.E.2d 712 (1994); People v. Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d 461, 655 N.E.2d 894 (1995); People v. Birdsall, 172 Ill. 2d 464, 670 N.E.2d 672 (1996); People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151, 670 N.E.2d 672 (1996).\nThe Burgess majority rejected the defendant\u2019s argument, stating:\n\"We agree with the State that a rule of automatic reversal is not always appropriate. As this case demonstrates, there will be some circumstances in which it can be said that the use of psychotropic medication did not affect the defendant\u2019s mental functioning in such a way that relief would be appropriate. We are aware that we have previously declined to make use of retrospective fitness hearings, noting the difficulty in determining, long after the conclusion of the underlying proceedings, the degree of mental functioning enjoyed then by the defendant. [Citations.] Nonetheless, we believe that, at least in the present case, there are sufficient reasons to depart from our previous practice of automatic reversal and to make a case-specific inquiry into the psychotropic drugs administered to this particular defendant.\u201d Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d at 303, 680 N.E.2d at 363.\nThe court went on to find that the testimony of the prescribing doctor, the trial judge\u2019s observations, and the defendant\u2019s own testimony at trial compelled the conclusion that he was suffering no impairment as a result of his ingestion of psychotropic drugs at the time of his trial and sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial based merely upon his act of taking these medications.\nTurning to the present case, we disagree with defendant that Burgess does not impact our original order. Instead, in light of Burgess, it becomes clear that we must modify our instructions to the trial court. As stated in our prior opinion, the record before us is very unclear as to the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s alleged ingestion of psychotropic drugs. The presentence investigative report stated that defendant claimed to have been taking Thorazine and Haldol while incarcerated awaiting trial. The report went on to state that defendant was no longer taking either drug, but it did not specify when he stopped. Also, although he did not request a fitness hearing, defense counsel referred to defendant\u2019s ingestion of \"Thorazine and another drug\u201d during his argument in mitigation at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing. Defense counsel also stated that defendant was taking prescription drugs \"[ejven to this day.\u201d The record on appeal is devoid of any further information.\nWe therefore still order a remand so that the trial court can conduct an inquiry into the factual circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s asserted psychotropic drug use. Under Burgess, however, automatic reversal is not required if the trial court\u2019s factual inquiry affirmatively determines that defendant was taking psychotropic medication at the time of his trial or sentencing. Instead, the trial court is to determine whether it would be possible and appropriate to make a retrospective fitness finding. As the court did in Burgess, the trial court may rely on testimony by prescribing physicians, defendant\u2019s testimony at trial, the trial court\u2019s recollection of defendant\u2019s demeanor, moods, and conduct at his trial and sentencing, and any other information deemed pertinent by the trial court. Defendant\u2019s convictions shall be vacated only if the trial court determines that defendant was not fit to stand trial or that it would be impossible to conduct a meaningful retrospective fitness hearing. If, however, the trial court determines that the evidence available clearly shows that defendant\u2019s mental functioning was not affected or impaired as a result of any ingestion of psychotropic medication, the court is directed to enter a retrospective fitness finding and defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences will stand. Finally, as stated in our prior opinion, if defendant\u2019s convictions are upheld, the trial court is instructed to correct the judgment order to reflect that defendant was convicted of one count of first degree murder, rather than two, and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm.\nRemanded with directions.\nZWICK and LEAVITT, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael Pelletier and Patricia Mysza, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Elizabeth A. Scholz, and Kent Delgado, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINCOLN JOHNS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 95\u20140492\nOpinion filed October 30, 1997.\nMichael Pelletier and Patricia Mysza, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Elizabeth A. Scholz, and Kent Delgado, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1055-01", "first_page_order": 1073, "last_page_order": 1077 }