{ "id": 847530, "name": "THOMAS O'SULLIVAN, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE COOK COUNTY BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellants and Cross-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "O'Sullivan v. Board of Commissioners", "decision_date": "1997-11-10", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201496\u20141296, 1\u201496\u20141510 cons", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "14", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258650 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3091741 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5358977 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "993 F.2d 1257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10518295 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1265" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/993/1257-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 F.3d 545", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11307453 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/43/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "990 F.2d 333", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10512288 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/990/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 F.3d 526", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10509210 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/10/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 L. Ed. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6203537 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "859 F. Supp. 1149", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7406716 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/859/1149-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781325 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "stating that, under the Illinois Human Rights Act, employers are strictly liable for acts of sexual harassment committed by their employees even though Title VII may require additional grounds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258767 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 17", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 232972 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "21-22" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "302-03" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "23" }, { "page": "302-03" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 886", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260433 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498549 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5204783 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2917712 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115527 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0101-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1219, "char_count": 32530, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.548627546539126e-08, "percentile": 0.28473706382109537 }, "sha256": "365c8c6371097def34f09f8929a983de7c67c889dbea80054316cf64194f7bba", "simhash": "1:a55028bf766fc743", "word_count": 5252 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:50.535591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THOMAS O\u2019SULLIVAN, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE COOK COUNTY BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellants and Cross-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal involves the review of an administrative determination. On August 8,1993, complaints were filed by Oak Forest Hospital of Cook County (the Hospital) and three of its employees against Thomas O\u2019Sullivan (O\u2019Sullivan). Henry Townes (Townes), the director of the Cook County Department of Human Resources, held a predisciplinary hearing on August 30, 1993. Thereafter, Townes discharged O\u2019Sullivan by letter effective September 3, 1993. A discharge appeal hearing was held on March 11, 1994, at which hearing officer Patricia Dixon presided on behalf of the County of Cook/Board of Commissioners of Cook County/Bureau of Human Resources (collectively, the County). On September 26, 1994, the County sustained O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s discharge from his supervisory position as chief engineer for the Hospital. O\u2019Sullivan filed a writ of certiorari. On September 28, 1995, the circuit court, after hearing oral arguments, remanded the case to the County ordering imposition of a penalty less than discharge. On March 25, 1996, the circuit court entered a final order affirming the County\u2019s entry of a sanction of demotion without back pay or related benefits. The County appeals, seeking reversal of the circuit court\u2019s orders of September 28, 1995, and March 25, 1996, and seeking entry of an order reinstating the County\u2019s sanction of discharge. O\u2019Sullivan cross-appeals, seeking reversal of the circuit court\u2019s order of March 25, 1996.\nThe issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether the County\u2019s findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) whether the County\u2019s decision to discharge was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unrelated to the requirements of service; and (3) whether the trial court properly affirmed the decision of the County whereby O\u2019Sullivan was demoted and reinstated without back pay or related benefits.\nO\u2019Sullivan was suspended from his job at the Hospital on August 8, 1993, as a result of complaints filed by three employees, Carolyn Klimp, Laura Finn, and William Belle. A pretermination hearing was held on August 30, 1993. At the hearing, Townes heard the complaints of Finn and Klimp. Because Belle was out of town, Townes was presented with Belle\u2019s written statement. After considering the facts presented at the hearing, Townes discharged O\u2019Sullivan by letter effective September 3, 1993. According to the letter, O\u2019Sullivan was charged with violation of Cook County\u2019s policy prohibiting sexual harassment, abusive behavior toward employees, and less than satisfactory work performance. O\u2019Sullivan appealed.\nOn March 11, 1994, the County held a discharge appeal hearing. The Hospital presented the testimony of Lathitha Chandrashekar, Finn, Klimp, and Belle. The County also heard testimony on O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s behalf from Thomas Kennedy, Gerald Donnelly, and O\u2019Sullivan.\nThe following testimony was elicited at the hearing. Chandrashekar testified that she was asked by the female Hospital director to investigate the charges of harassment alleged against O\u2019Sullivan. Chandrashekar testified that she spoke with the complainants, department staff, and O\u2019Sullivan. Chandrashekar wrote up her findings and presented them to Townes. She stated that she never told O\u2019Sullivan to stop his conduct.\nFinn testified that she had been an employee of the Hospital since July 1983 and had transferred into O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s department in 1990. She testified that O\u2019Sullivan expressed to her in certain ways that she was not a welcome addition. She testified that he assigned her to very difficult and unpleasant jobs so that she would want to leave. Finn stated that she felt if she completed her assignments, O\u2019Sullivan would see that she was doing her work and, therefore, she wouldn\u2019t have any further problems with him.\nFinn testified that O\u2019Sullivan had a tendency to cut out jokes and pictures and tape them up. She stated that one picture was of a woman pulling a plow and that O\u2019Sullivan had typed a caption on it that read \"that\u2019s the way it should be today.\u201d She also stated that O\u2019Sullivan had a habit of making comments that he thought were humorous. He made comments regarding women taking advantage of men when they go out to restaurants and how women never pay their fair share. Finn testified that O\u2019Sullivan had two Art Institute pictures on his office wall of nude women. She testified that once when she was in his office for a meeting he asked her if she liked his artwork. In response, she just shook her head. Finn stated that she believed it was in her best interest not to rock the boat with O\u2019Sullivan, to try to go along and not cause problems so that the work place would be mor.e \"settled.\u201d\nFinn testified that in 1992, when she was pregnant, O\u2019Sullivan assigned her to difficult jobs which entailed walking alone at the tops of ropes, working in the tunnels alone and working with the laundry oiler. She stated that while she was pregnant O\u2019Sullivan asked her if she needed a red flag taped to her stomach. She told him she didn\u2019t think that was funny and about three weeks later he asked her the same question again. About six months into her pregnancy, Finn and O\u2019Sullivan met with her union representative about the difficulty of her assignments. Finn requested a transfer to the computer room. O\u2019Sullivan asked her to think about any other jobs she could do during her last trimester and he said that he would think about the transfer. While O\u2019Sullivan never expressly denied Finn\u2019s transfer request, her assignment was not changed until after O\u2019Sullivan left. Finn stated that this time period was very stressful for her and that she would get up in the morning and not want to go to work for fear of what else would be done to her.\nFinn testified that after having worked in the boiler room for two years, she became eligible to take an engineer\u2019s test given by the City of Chicago. A prerequisite to taking the exam, however, is a letter from the chief engineer verifying that the candidate has worked on high steam pressure boilers for two years. When Finn asked O\u2019Sullivan for the letter, O\u2019Sullivan told her that she had to take a test first. Finn testified that O\u2019Sullivan had previously never required anyone to take a test before issuing the letter. Finn went to the associate administrator, John O\u2019Shaughnessy, who is O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s boss and also Finn\u2019s father, and complained to him about this new requirement. O\u2019Shaughnessy told Finn that she did not have to take a test. After Finn told O\u2019Sullivan about her conversation with O\u2019Shaughnessy, O\u2019Sullivan issued the letter.\nFinn testified that she complained to O\u2019Shaughnessy about O\u2019Sullivan on at least two occasions before the letter incident. Finn stated that O\u2019Shaughnessy told her that he didn\u2019t want to interfere because there might be a perception of bias or prejudice and that it might cause problems. Finn testified that, as a result, she felt that there was no one to turn to. She stated that, while she knew she could file a grievance with the union representative, she believed it would result in retaliation by O\u2019Sullivan and even more problems for her at work. Finn testified that when Dr. Rush joined the Hospital, she had open meetings with the employees. At that point, Finn felt as if she could no longer complete a day at work and so she decided to speak with Dr. Rush about O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s conduct.\nOn cross-examination, Finn testified that although she felt offended by O\u2019Sullivan, she did make attempts to be friendly with him. The copy machines were located outside his office so if she had to make copies she would stand by his door and talk to him. Finn stated that while her working relationship with O\u2019Sullivan was intolerable, she believed it was in her best interest to be nice to him so that hopefully things would change.\nKlimp, a mechanical assistant in heating and operating for the Hospital, and Finn\u2019s sister, testified that she began working at the Hospital in 1989 and was the first permanent woman in O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s department. She testified that during a St. Patrick\u2019s Day party, O\u2019Sullivan approached her and said, \"And to think Jerry Donnelly did not want women in this department.\u201d Klimp responded, \"Jerry Donnelly was not alone, was he?\u201d O\u2019Sullivan laughed and walked away. Klimp testified that the incidents had gradually progressed from there. For example, Klimp testified that when she was crabby, O\u2019Sullivan referred to her menstrual cycle. Additionally, O\u2019Sullivan asked Klimp to tell him when Dr. Rush had her period so that he would know when to avoid her.\nKlimp also testified regarding the two Art Institute pictures in O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s office. She testified that once while she was in O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s office discussing work, O\u2019Sullivan went up to one of the pictures and began brushing off the breasts and rear end of the nude woman in the picture. Klimp stated that this behavior, as well as O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s references to her menstrual cycle, was sexually offensive to her.\nKlimp also testified regarding the photo of the woman tied to the plow. Klimp stated that while she didn\u2019t know if O\u2019Sullivan was the one who hung the photo on the file cabinet outside his office, O\u2019Sullivan did show it to her. Klimp told O\u2019Sullivan that she did not think the photo was funny and told O\u2019Sullivan that she was going to send it to Dr. Rush. She further testified that she found the photo to be demoralizing to women.\nKlimp testified that, before the charges were brought, she told O\u2019Sullivan that he could not continue to treat people the way he was treating them. She informed O\u2019Sullivan that Dr. Rush was asking about how people were being treated and told him that he needed to change. Klimp stated that O\u2019Sullivan responded, \"I will quit first and learn to enjoy my retirement.\u201d Klimp testified that she never complained to anyone other than Dr. Rush about O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s actions.\nBelle, a black mechanical assistant at the Hospital, testified that he had worked in O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s department for about four years. Belle, like Finn, wanted to take the engineer\u2019s test administered by the City of Chicago and requested the standard letter verifying his two years of work experience in the boiler room from O\u2019Sullivan. O\u2019Sullivan refused to write the letter and told Belle that he was not smart enough to be an engineer, that he was already paid enough money, and that he had an arrogant attitude. O\u2019Sullivan told Belle that he would never write the letter for him.\nBelle testified that his problems with O\u2019Sullivan began during Belle\u2019s first year on the job when O\u2019Sullivan wrote him up for excessive absenteeism. Belle testified that he was not absent on the days for which O\u2019Sullivan wrote him up. After Belle investigated his personnel records and confirmed that the disciplinary letter was untrue, the letter was removed from his file and discarded.\nBelle testified that O\u2019Sullivan would post pictures of black criminals who resembled Belle or who had a name similar to Belle\u2019s on the bulletin board for all the engineers to see. Belle testified that O\u2019Sullivan made comments about the school sweaters that Belle wore to work and referred to them as gang symbols. Belle testified that O\u2019Sullivan made comments about the neighborhood Belle lived in. O\u2019Sullivan also mocked Belle for carrying a pager and, in front of other employees, asked Belle if he was doing something illegal.\nBelle also testified to an incident when, after working in a particularly dirty area, his clothes, face and hands became covered with a lot of black dirt and soot. O\u2019Sullivan approached him and in front of other engineers stated, \"I can\u2019t tell if you\u2019re dirty or if you\u2019re black.\u201d Belle became very upset and walked away.\nBelle also testified that once, after hearing O\u2019Sullivan say that he was having a dinner party, Belle asked O\u2019Sullivan if he could come over for dinner. O\u2019Sullivan responded, \"Yeah, you can come over for dinner, we\u2019ll be serving mixed vegetables.\u201d Bell\u00e9 testified that the comment referred to blacks and whites getting together.\nBelle also testified to an incident involving O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s instruction to him to put a plastic liner in an incinerator. Because the incinerator was about 20 feet long and 7 feet wide and because it was windy, Belle couldn\u2019t complete the task alone. Belle testified that he asked some white engineers to help him and they refused. O\u2019Sullivan directed Belle to have Kenneth Smith, another black mechanical assistant, help him. Belle asked Smith to help him but since Smith was not allowed to leave the computer room without specific orders from O\u2019Sullivan Smith told Belle he would have to wait. When O\u2019Sullivan saw that Belle had not completed the job, O\u2019Sullivan wrote up Belle, Smith and another black engineer. O\u2019Sullivan did not write up any of the white employees involved in the incident. Belle testified that it later took eight men to complete the task.\nBelle testified that he complained to Kennedy and Donnelly, his direct supervisors, about O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s racial comments and the way O\u2019Sullivan treated him. However, since O\u2019Sullivan was the \"big boss\u201d Belle was always referred back to him. Belle attempted to talk to O\u2019Sullivan about his conduct. Belle did not file a grievance against O\u2019Sullivan over O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s conduct because he did not feel it would help. Belle went to see Dr. Rush after O\u2019Sullivan mockingly told him that his evaluation had improved two points when it actually had only improved two-tenths of a point.\nIn defense, O\u2019Sullivan presented the testimony of Thomas Kennedy, chief engineer and former assistant to O\u2019Sullivan. Kennedy testified that he has worked for the Hospital for 17 years. Kennedy testified that neither Finn, Klimp nor Belle had ever complained to him about O\u2019Sullivan. The defense also presented the testimony of Gerald Donnelly, assistant chief engineer, who worked as O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s assistant for four years. Donnelly testified that he supervised Finn, Klimp and Belle and that none of them had ever complained to him about O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s conduct.\nO\u2019Sullivan testified in his own defense. O\u2019Sullivan stated that he worked for the County for close to 23 years. He stated that during that time he received an award for saving the County money and that he does not have any reprimands in his file. O\u2019Sullivan testified that O\u2019Shaughnessy was his boss and that they spoke on a daily basis. He testified that O\u2019Shaughnessy never told him that his daughters, Finn and Klimp, found O\u2019Sullivan sexually offensive. O\u2019Sullivan stated that neither Klimp nor Finn ever complained to him about his conduct and that on many occasions they would walk into his office and begin conversations.\nO\u2019Sullivan stated that he vaguely recollects comments made to Finn during her pregnancy about a red flag and comments made to Klimp about the Hospital director\u2019s menstrual cycle. O\u2019Sullivan also testified that he does recall removing tape residue from the picture of the nude woman in his office while Klimp was present. He also testified that neither Finn nor Klimp ever complained about the photos. O\u2019Sullivan testified that he did not show a picture of a woman tied to a plow to anybody. O\u2019Sullivan testified that he never received any reprimands from anyone regarding sexual harassment. O\u2019Sullivan stated that if Finn or Klimp had asked him to stop making comments that they thought were offensive he would have stopped.\nO\u2019Sullivan also denied posting pictures of black convicts and putting Belle\u2019s name on them; however, he did see one picture posted with Belle\u2019s name on it. O\u2019Sullivan does not recall Belle ever complaining about such pictures. He also stated that Belle never complained to him about offensive comments.\nO\u2019Sullivan stated that the reason he told Finn she would have to take a test to get the recommendation letter was because he wanted to make sure she was qualified and that he had considered making testing a prerequisite to getting the letter. O\u2019Sullivan stated that he denied the letter to Belle because Belle\u2019s evaluations were low.\nOn September 26, 1994, the County issued its written decision finding that O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s behavior created a hostile working environment justifying his immediate discharge. The County noted that employee abuse, of any kind, is a major rule of conduct violation. O\u2019Sullivan filed a petition for certiorari.\nThe trial court heard oral arguments on September 6, 1995. On September 28, 1995, the trial court remanded the case to the County with instructions to impose a penalty less than discharge. On February 27, 1996, the County entered a sanction of demotion to the position of fireman\u2019s helper, with no supervisory responsibilities and no back pay. On March 25, 1996, the trial court affirmed the County\u2019s sanction and entered a final order. The County appeals from the trial court\u2019s orders of September 28, 1995 and March 25, 1996, seeking to reverse the orders of the trial court and seeking entry of an order to reinstate the County\u2019s sanction of discharge. O\u2019Sullivan appeals the trial court\u2019s order of March 25, 1996.\nJudicial review of an administrative agency\u2019s decision to discharge a public employee involves a two-step analysis. The first step requires the reviewing court to determine whether the agency\u2019s decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 101 (1983); Caliendo v. Martin, 250 Ill. App. 3d 409 (1993)) while bearing in mind that the agency\u2019s findings are deemed prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 1992). The second step requires the reviewing court to determine whether the agency\u2019s findings of fact support the conclusion that sufficient cause for discharge exists. Walsh, 96 Ill. 2d at 105; Caliendo, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 415.\nThe County\u2019s first contention is that its findings of fact were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and should have been affirmed by the trial court. If there is evidence in the record that supports the administrative agency\u2019s decision, the decision must be sustained on judicial review. Yeksigian v. City of Chicago, 231 Ill. App. 3d 307 (1992). Because the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witness are determined by the agency, there need only be some competent evidence in the record to support the decision. Iwanski v. Streamwood Police Pension Board, 232 Ill. App. 3d 180 (1992). The fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable or that the reviewing court might have ruled differently based on the same evidence does not justify reversal of the findings of the administrative agency. King v. Justice Party, 284 Ill. App. 3d 886, 888 (1996). Because we find there is evidence in the record to support the County\u2019s findings, the findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence and should have been affirmed by the trial court.\nCook County rules and regulations governing employee conduct specifically prohibit employees from mistreating or abusing employees \"in any manner, including loud, abusive, insolent, or rude behavior, and racial or ethnic slurs.\u201d Oak Forest Hospital Rules and Regulations Governing Employee Conduct, \u00a7 2(B)(1) (1987). Cook County executive order 91 \u2014 4 specifically prohibits sexual and racial harassment in employment. Section 2(A)(2)(c) of executive order 91 \u2014 4 defines sexual harassment to include \"activities such as unwelcome sexual advances *** or activities of a sexual nature *** hav[ing] the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual\u2019s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.\u201d Cook County Exec. Order No. 91 \u2014 4, \u00a7 2(A)(2)(c) (1992). This language mirrors the definition of sexual harassment found in the Illinois Human Rights Act. 775 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101(E) (West 1992). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender and prohibits discriminatory conduct that creates a hostile work environment. 42 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 2000e \u2014 2(a) (1989); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).\nIn addition, the County\u2019s rules and regulations expressly prohibit harassment on the basis of any other protected status, including race. In particular, section 2(A)(3) of executive order 91 \u2014 4 provides that \"[s]lurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to a person\u2019s membership in a protected status constitutes harassment when this conduct *** has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment *** or unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual\u2019s work performance *** or *** adversely effects an individual\u2019s employment environment.\u201d Cook County Exec. Order No. 91 \u2014 4, \u00a7 2(A)(3) (1992).\nCook County rules and regulations also prohibit employees from \"failfing] to follow instructions or fail[ing] to work in accordance with County policies, procedures and/or practices\u201d and from \"perform[ing] at less than a satisfactory level in any job classification.\u201d Oak Forest Hospital Rules and Regulations Governing Employee Conduct, \u00a7\u00a7 2(B)(9), (B)(24) (1987).\nO\u2019Sullivan contends that because the definition of sexual harassment applied by the Hospital closely parallels the language contained in the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101(E) (West 1992)), as well as the prohibition against sexual harassment found in Title VII (42 U.S.C.S. \u00a7 2000e \u2014 2(a) (1989)), it is appropriate to look to both federal and Illinois law for interpretation. However, we note at the outset that this case does not involve the question of whether O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s conduct violated federal law. Rather, the question is whether O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s conduct violated his employer\u2019s rules and policies. Moreover, Illinois courts have noted that \"[the Illinois] Act need not be applied in lockstep with the Supreme Court\u2019s construction of Title VII.\u201d Trayling v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 273 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11 (1995), citing Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 518 (1994) (stating that, under the Illinois Human Rights Act, employers are strictly liable for acts of sexual harassment committed by their employees even though Title VII may require additional grounds). Additionally, the County asserts that based on Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 859 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1994), a company can interpret its own sexual harassment policy more stringently than federal law.\nO\u2019Sullivan relies solely on federal case law and contends that the alleged incidents complained of are isolated incidents and are not sufficient to create a hostile work environment under the standard of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). In Harris, the Supreme Court stated that Title VII is violated when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory-behavior that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a discriminatorily hostile or abusive working environment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 126 L. Ed. 2d at 301, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (reaffirming standard stated in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, All U.S. 57, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986)). Under Harris, there must be an objectively hostile or abusive environment and the victim must also subjectively perceive the environment as hostile or abusive. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22, 126 L. Ed. 2d at 302, 114 S. Ct. at 370. In determining whether the environment is objectively hostile, the totality of the circumstances should be analyzed. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 126 L. Ed. 2d at 302-03, 114 S. Ct. at 371. The Court listed the following factors to be considered, stating that no single factor is required: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee\u2019s work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 126 L. Ed. 2d at 302-03, 114 S. Ct. at 371.\nO\u2019Sullivan contends that there are at most four incidents attributable to O\u2019Sullivan: the pictures in his office, the comment regarding the Hospital Director\u2019s menstrual cycle, the conversation at the St. Patrick\u2019s Day party, and the remark about the red flag. O\u2019Sullivan argues that this conduct does not create a hostile work environment under the Harris test. O\u2019Sullivan cites Saxton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993), and Weiss v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993), for examples of behavior that do not rise to sexual harassment under Title VII.\nO\u2019Sullivan likewise contends that the incidents of which Belle complained were isolated and did not rise to a level of racial discrimination. O\u2019Sullivan cites Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1994), and Hong v. Children\u2019s Memorial Hospital, 993 F.2d 1257, 1265 (7th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that sporadic racial slurs are not enough to support a claim under Title VI. O\u2019Sullivan argues that his refusal to sign Belle\u2019s letter of recommendation to take the engineer\u2019s test was because of Belle\u2019s low performance. As for the pictures of ex-convicts, O\u2019Sullivan denied that he posted the pictures. O\u2019Sullivan asserts that the two remarks about being \"dirty\u201d and serving \"mixed vegetables\u201d do not rise to a level of a racial slur.\nAgain, we emphasize that the question for this court to decide is not whether O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s conduct violated federal law. The issue we must address is whether the record supports the County\u2019s determination. The County, after hearing testimony from all parties, determined that O\u2019Sullivan violated the County\u2019s rules and regulations. The record supports a finding of employee abuse based on racial and sexual harassment as well as less than satisfactory work performance. There is evidence in the record that O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s course of conduct in posting pictures of females, reference to female employees\u2019 menstrual cycles, assigning progressively difficult tasks to a pregnant employee, and his refusal to issue a routine letter of verification of work experience absent a test constitutes \"conduct of a sexual nature\u201d that could be degrading or offensive to a reasonable person under an objective standard and, therefore, satisfies the Harris test. O\u2019Sullivan has failed to cite any Illinois law in support of his argument to the contrary.\nSince we find that the County\u2019s finding that O\u2019Sullivan violated the County\u2019s policy prohibiting sexual harassment, employee abuse, and less than satisfactory work performance is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, the next issue for this court to resolve is whether the sanction of discharge was arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of service.\nCause for discharge has been defined by the Illinois Supreme Court as \"some substantial shortcoming which renders continuance in [the employee\u2019s] office or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and something which the law and a sound public opinion recognize as a good cause for [the employee] not longer occupying the place.\u201d Fantozzi v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 27 Ill. 2d 357, 360 (1963); see also Caliendo v. Martin, 250 Ill. App. 3d 409, 418 (1993). In reviewing the County\u2019s decision to discharge O\u2019Sullivan, the question is not whether this court would decide upon a more lenient sanction than discharge were it to determine initially what sanction would be appropriate. Sutton v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 91 Ill. 2d 404, 411 (1982). Rather, the question is whether this court could find, after considering the circumstances presented, that the County acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in discharging O\u2019Sullivan, or selected a type of discipline unrelated to the needs of the department. Sutton, 91 Ill. 2d at 411; Calomino v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 273 Ill. App. 3d 494, 499 (1995).\nThe County contends that the trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the County when it reversed the sanction of discharge and remanded for imposition of a penalty less than discharge. We agree. The trial judge, in reviewing the County\u2019s decision to discharge O\u2019Sullivan, stated that it was necessary to \"balance the equities in these matters.\u201d He inquired into O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s pension status and noted that O\u2019Sullivan worked for the County for 23 years. The trial judge then stated that \"maybe they should have demoted him, or maybe they should have started him on some course of rehabilitation.\u201d The reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the County, but should limit its review to a determination of whether the County acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Sutton v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 91 Ill. 2d 404 (1982).\nUnder the County\u2019s disciplinary action policy, an employee can be fired if he commits a major cause infraction; if he is guilty of a fourth offense; or if he repeated similar infractions for which there has been progressive discipline. O\u2019Sullivan contends that because neither sexual nor racial harassment is listed as a major cause infraction, and because during the 23 years preceding his suspension he never received any reprimands, progressive discipline was required. However, although the County does favor progressive discipline, the County recognizes that progressive discipline is not always feasible. Discipline may begin at discharge level in the case of a major cause violation. The County\u2019s rules provide that employee abuse is a major cause violation.\nIt is not unreasonable to read the prohibition against \"employee abuse\u201d to encompass sexual and racial harassment of employees. O\u2019Sullivan argues, however, that an interpretation of the County\u2019s rules which includes sexual harassment as a major cause violation renders the sexual harassment policies of the County meaningless and defeats their purpose. We disagree. The sexual harassment policy of the Hospital clearly states that anyone found to be in violation of the policy will be subject to disciplinary action ranging from verbal and written warnings to suspension, demotion or discharge. Likewise, executive order 91 \u2014 4 provides that anyone found to have violated the order shall be subject to employment sanctions, including discharge.\nNevertheless, O\u2019Sullivan contends that under the County\u2019s own rules, he should have received a written or verbal reprimand and, further, that he was entitled to the opportunity to be counseled and to change his conduct. The County, however, found that discharge was an appropriate sanction and we agree. The County noted that because O\u2019Sullivan was a department head, he was aware of the County\u2019s expectations with respect to discrimination, harassment, or any form of misconduct. The County also noted there was no indication of regret on the part of O\u2019Sullivan or that he would change his behavior if reinstated. The County also found that the complainants\u2019 testimony was credible and that their demeanor and attitude revealed that they were adversely affected by O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s behavior. The County\u2019s decision to discharge was not arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of service; therefore, we defer to the County\u2019s conclusion that the circumstances in this case warranted discharge.\nSince we affirm the County\u2019s imposition of the sanction of discharge, we need not address O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s contention that he is entitled to back pay or related benefits from the date of suspension.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we hereby reverse the order of the circuit court of Cook County remanding the case to the County for imposition of a sanction less than discharge. We likewise reverse the order of the circuit court of Cook County affirming the sanction of demotion. We remand the cause to the circuit court of Cook County with instructions to enter an order reinstating the penalty of discharge against O\u2019Sullivan and dismissing O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s cross-appeal.\nReversed and remanded with instructions.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and O\u2019BRIEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patricia M. Shymanski, John J. Murphy, and Sophia Lopez, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellants.", "Joseph V. Roddy, of Chicago (Tamara L. Cummings and Joseph V. Roddy, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS O\u2019SULLIVAN, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE COOK COUNTY BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNos. 1\u201496\u20141296, 1\u201496\u20141510 cons.\nOpinion filed November 10, 1997.\nRehearing denied December 22, 1997.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patricia M. Shymanski, John J. Murphy, and Sophia Lopez, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellants.\nJoseph V. Roddy, of Chicago (Tamara L. Cummings and Joseph V. Roddy, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 21, "last_page_order": 34 }