{ "id": 847496, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRENCE J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1997-11-21", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201495\u20140018", "first_page": "276", "last_page": "282", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 276" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3172942 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477642 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108-09" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307258 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138004 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258808 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 856", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5382683 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0856-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55995 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538233 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406-07" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407-08" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544906 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "525" }, { "page": "530" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520943 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0262-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 594, "char_count": 13488, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.513356900447567e-08, "percentile": 0.34453688226610896 }, "sha256": "fead44bbc909e9da9ac441ec1df55ce34f0a97bfc032a032bde9c65651790393", "simhash": "1:bc4adf6b70189cb1", "word_count": 2239 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:50.535591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRENCE J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn March 21, 1997, this court filed its opinion in the above-entitled case. See People v. Williams, 287 Ill. App. 3d 262 (1997). In that opinion, we affirmed defendant Terrence Williams\u2019 convictions and sentence. On October 1, 1997, our supreme court denied the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal. However, the supreme court\u2019s order also provided:\n\"In the exercise of this Court\u2019s supervisory authority, the Appellate Court, Second District, is directed to vacate the judgment entered in case No. 2 \u2014 95\u20140018 (March 21, 1997), and to reconsider the cause in light of People v. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d 523 (1997).\u201d\nPursuant to this order, we vacate our earlier opinion and reconsider the merits of the defendant\u2019s appeal.\nFollowing a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UTTW) (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1 (West 1994)), four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24\u2014 1.2(a)(2) (West 1994)), and involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 1994)). He was sentenced to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment on each count of aggravated discharge of a firearm, 4 years\u2019 imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter, and 5 years\u2019 imprisonment, for UUW, all sentences to run concurrently.\nOn appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the jury verdicts were legally inconsistent; (2) whether the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the offense of reckless conduct; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment on each count of aggravated discharge of a firearm.\nAccording to the testimony at trial, the defendant and the victim, Steven Potts, had a confrontation at an apartment complex. According to the defendant, after the confrontation and as he was leaving the building, he heard the victim say, \"I got you, nigger.\u201d The victim then fired a shot. The defendant turned around and fired his gun six times with his eyes closed. According to the defendant, he fired into the air \"above their heads\u201d because he wanted to protect himself and make the victim run away. One of the shots struck and killed the victim. The defendant\u2019s gun was a nine millimeter which held six cartridges.\nTwo of the victim\u2019s brothers and a friend of the victim were present and witnessed the incident. Each witness had a different version of the events. Jeff Potts testified that he heard the defendant say, \"I got you mother f-.....now,\u201d and then the defendant opened fire. According to Jeff, he heard seven shots fired. The other witnesses heard the gunshots but did not see who fired the gun. A defense witness testified he saw a gun in the victim\u2019s possession earlier in the evening. However, no gun was found on or near the victim\u2019s body.\nThe defendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that the jury verdicts finding him guilty of involuntary manslaughter and aggravated discharge of a firearm are legally inconsistent because they required the jury to determine that the defendant\u2019s mental state was both reckless and knowing at the same time.\nLegally inconsistent verdicts cannot stand because they are unreliable. People v. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d 396, 406-07 (1986). At a minimum, such verdicts suggest confusion or misunderstanding on the part of the jury. People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270, 281 (1996). Where inconsistent guilty verdicts are returned, the defendant is entitled to a reversal of the convictions and a new trial on all counts. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 407. Guilty verdicts are legally inconsistent if they indicate the jury\u2019s finding of mutually inconsistent mental states relating to the same conduct. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 407-08.\nA person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter when he unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification \"if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(a) (West 1994). The state of mind for involuntary manslaughter is recklessness: People v. Lee, 256 Ill. App. 3d 856, 860 (1993). A person acts recklessly \"when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 6 (West 1994).\nIn contrast, a person commits aggravated discharge of a firearm when he \"knowingly or intentionally *** [discharges a firearm in the direction of another person or in the direction of a vehicle he knows to be occupied.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.2(a)(2) (West 1996). The mental state required for that offense is that of \" 'knowingly or intentionally\u2019 discharging] a firearm under various described circumstances.\u201d People v. Folks, 273 Ill. App. 3d 126, 133 (1995). A person acts knowingly when \"he is consciously aware\u201d of the nature of his conduct or the results of his conduct. 720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 5(a) (West 1994).\nIn People v. Fomear, 176 Ill. 2d 523, 531 (1997), our supreme court specifically addressed whether the mental states of recklessness and knowledge are mutually inconsistent. In that case, the defendant was charged and convicted of both reckless conduct and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Fomear, 176 Ill. 2d at 525. On appeal, the defendant argued that the mental state of intent or knowledge required for the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm was irreconcilably inconsistent with the mental state of recklessness required for the offense of reckless conduct. Fomear, 176 Ill. 2d at 530.\nAfter reviewing its decision in People v. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d 396 (1986), the supreme court reversed the defendant\u2019s convictions as being legally inconsistent. The supreme court stated:\n\"[T]he argument that the mental states involved herein are not mutually inconsistent, because the mental state of knowledge 'includes\u2019 the mental state of recklessness, was raised and rejected in Spears. [Citation.] As the Spears court explained: 'The fatal flaw in this argument is that it totally blurs the distinction between the mental state of knowledge and the less culpable mental state of recklessness by assuming that the two invariably coexist.\u2019 Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 408. We continue to adhere to the holding of Spears, and its predecessor, People v. Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d 186 (1985), that recklessness and knowledge are mutually inconsistent culpable mental states.\u201d Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d at 531.\nIn the case before us, the defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and four counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. As these counts contain the inconsistent mental states of recklessness and knowledge, the convictions cannot stand. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d at 531. \"When a jury returns inconsistent guilty verdicts, the trial judge has a duty to send the jury back for further deliberations after additional instructions to resolve the inconsistency.\u201d People v. Porter, 168 Ill. 2d 201, 214 (1995). As the trial court herein failed to send the jury back for further deliberations to resolve the inconsistent verdicts, the convictions must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial on the involuntary manslaughter and aggravated discharge of a firearm charges. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d at 535.\nThe defendant\u2019s next contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on the offense of reckless conduct (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 5 (West 1994)). The defendant argues that reckless conduct is a lesser included offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm.\nSection 2 \u2014 9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines an included offense as an offense that \"[i]s established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 9 (West 1994).\nIn People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93 (1994), our supreme court adopted the \"charging instrument approach\u201d to identify a lesser included offense. This approach looks to the facts alleged in the charging instrument in identifying a lesser included offense. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107. Under this approach, an offense is deemed to be a lesser included offense if it is described by the charging instrument. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107.\nThe charging instrument approach does not require the lesser crime to be a theoretically or practically \"necessary\u201d part of the greater crime. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107. Rather, the lesser crime need only relate to the greater to the extent that the charging instrument describes the lesser. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107. The \" 'lesser offense must have a broad foundation in the instrument charging the greater,\u2019 or at least 'set out the main outline of the lesser offense.\u2019 \u201d Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107, quoting People v. Bryant, 113 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (1986).\nIn this case, the counts of the indictment charging the defendant with aggravated discharge of a firearm stated, in pertinent part, that the \"defendant! ] knowingly discharged a pistol in the direction of\u2019 the victim. The offense of reckless conduct is defined as follows:\n\"A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual by any means, commits reckless conduct if he performs recklessly the acts which cause the harm or endanger safety, whether they otherwise are lawful or unlawful.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 5(a) (West 1994).\nBased upon the charging instrument approach, we conclude that the offense of reckless conduct is a lesser included offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The act of discharging a pistol in the direction of an individual is a reckless act that would, if nothing else, endanger the safety of an individual. The only change to the instant indictment that would be necessary in order to establish the offense of reckless conduct would be to replace the mental state of knowledge with the less culpable mental state of recklessness. Therefore, we conclude that the indictment in this case does describe the foundation of the offense of reckless conduct. See 720 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 9 (West 1994); Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 107.\nHowever, the identification of a lesser included offense does not automatically give rise to a correlative right to have the jury instructed on the lesser offense. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 108. A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction only if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense and acquit him or her of the greater offense. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 108. A lesser included offense instruction is not proper where, on the evidence presented at trial, the factual issues to be resolved are the same as to both the lesser and greater offenses. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 108. A lesser included offense instruction is proper only where the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not required for conviction of the lesser included offense. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 108.\nThis evidentiary requirement is usually satisfied by the presentation of conflicting testimony on the element that distinguishes the greater offense from the lesser offense. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 108. However, where the testimony is not conflicting, this requirement may be satisfied if the conclusion as to the lesser offense may fairly be inferred from the evidence presented. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 108. The amount of evidence necessary to meet this factual requirement, i.e., that tends to prove the lesser offense rather than the greater, has been described as \"any,\u201d \"some,\u201d \"slight,\u201d or \"very slight.\u201d Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 108-09.\nIn the case before us, the defendant testified that, when he fired the gun, he closed his eyes and fired in the air \"above their heads\u201d in order to scare the victim away. At no time during the trial did the defendant admit that he knowingly fired the gun directly at the other men. Whether the defendant\u2019s firing the gun in the air, over the heads of the men with his eyes closed, constitutes firing the gun in the direction of another person is a factual question to be resolved by the finder of fact. We therefore conclude that there was some evidence in the record here from which it could have been inferred that the defendant was guilty of reckless conduct and that the jury should have been instructed as to that offense. See Novak, 163 Ill. 2d at 108.\nDeciding the case as we do, we need not reach the sentencing issue raised by the defendant.\nAs the defendant does not contest his conviction and sentence for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, that portion of the trial court\u2019s judgment is affirmed. However, the defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated discharge of a firearm are reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial as to those offenses.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.\nTHOMAS and RATHJE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GEIGER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Rita K. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (John X. Breslin and Domenica A. Osterberger, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRENCE J. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201495\u20140018\nOpinion filed November 21, 1997.\nRehearing denied January 15, 1998.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Rita K. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nDavid R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (John X. Breslin and Domenica A. Osterberger, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0276-01", "first_page_order": 296, "last_page_order": 302 }