{ "id": 847599, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER A. SWEBORG, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sweborg", "decision_date": "1997-11-26", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201496\u20140093", "first_page": "298", "last_page": "306", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 298" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "631 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2872235 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 251474 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 1379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122359 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 N.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796653 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564623 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2473289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2586480 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5119293 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 N.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872545 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544524 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "622 N.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2960836 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105961 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 1342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258510 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258631 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596961 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 690", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746351 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0690-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 784, "char_count": 17326, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.415980326110949e-07, "percentile": 0.6480487858558549 }, "sha256": "02d1bd22150c0c6246706bde0f5e6337af20c18c541a3f1171e2f6911d6cba59", "simhash": "1:a643b89e2bc23c97", "word_count": 2945 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:50.535591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER A. SWEBORG, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Christopher A. Sweborg, was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1994)) and unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(b) (West 1994)). He was sentenced to six months in the county jail, a concurrent term of 30 months\u2019 probation and a $500 drug assessment. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We find that the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress should have been granted because defendant did not consent to a search of the trunk and there were no articulable facts justifying the officer\u2019s search of the trunk.\nFacts\nJust after midnight on September 12, 1994, the defendant\u2019s car was stopped by a police officer because one of its taillights was not illuminated. The officer informed the defendant of the reason for the stop and asked the defendant to wait with him inside the officer\u2019s car. The defendant exited his vehicle and walked toward the police car. At that time, the officer asked the defendant if he could search the defendant\u2019s person. The defendant said he could, and the officer proceeded to pat down the defendant and to go through all the defendant\u2019s pockets. The pat down revealed no weapons or unlawful substances.\nInside the police car, the officer initiated a check of the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. From the check, he learned that the defendant was required to wear corrective lenses. Since the defendant was not wearing glasses, the officer questioned him about whether he was wearing contact lenses. The defendant attempted to show the officer his contacts, at which time the officer noted that the defendant\u2019s eyes appeared \"glassy, glossy and bloodshot.\u201d Based upon this observation, the officer asked the defendant if there was any open alcohol or cannabis in the defendant\u2019s car. The defendant said, \"No.\u201d\nThe officer then asked the defendant for permission to search the interior of the defendant\u2019s car. The defendant gave that permission. The officer searched the entire interior of the defendant\u2019s car \u2014 the back seat area, the front seat area and the glove compartment. He found only a small vial with brown-colored liquid in it which the defendant explained was incense.\nAfter searching the interior of the car, the officer asked the defendant for permission to search the car\u2019s trunk. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the defendant testified that the officer asked him what he had in the trunk and he replied that his guitar case and guitar were in the trunk. When the officer asked if he could search the trunk, the defendant testified that he said, \"No. I really don\u2019t want you to.\u201d The defendant testified that he protested again once the trunk was opened, saying, \"I thought I told you I didn\u2019t want you to look through my personal items.\u201d The officer testified that the defendant consented to a search of the trunk.\nUpon opening the trunk, the officer noted the presence of the defendant\u2019s guitar case. He opened the case and found the defendant\u2019s guitar and another smaller compartment with a fliptop lid. When the officer attempted to open the compartment, the defendant reached in and clasped his hand on top of the compartment, effectively preventing the officer from opening the lid. According to the defendant, he told the officer, \"I thought I told you that I didn\u2019t want you to look through my personal items.\u201d\nThe officer then asked the defendant what was in the compartment and the defendant answered that there were just personal items inside. The officer asked the defendant if there were any weapons in the compartment and the defendant replied that there were not. After inquiring about the contents of the compartment, the officer told the defendant to take his hand off the compartment and back away from the officer. The defendant did so. Then, despite defendant\u2019s previous protests, the officer opened the compartment and found a baggie containing a green leafy substance later determined to be cannabis and a closed tin box with eight square pieces of perforated paper containing LSD. At that time, the officer arrested the defendant.\nThe trial court found that the defendant had consented to the search of the interior of the vehicle and the search of the trunk. It found, however, that the defendant revoked his consent to search when the officer attempted to open the closed compartment within the guitar case. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the officer was justified in opening the compartment to protect himself. The court therefore denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nThe defendant argues first on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He urges us to hold that the entire search of the vehicle \u2014 both the interior of the \"passenger compartment and the trunk \u2014 were invalid. We find, however, that we need not examine the validity of the entire search because we hold that the officer was not justified in searching the trunk of defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nAnalysis\nAs a general matter, where there is no real question regarding the facts, determinations of probable cause should be reviewed de nova. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996); People v. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d 487, 680 N.E.2d 776 (1997). Where more than one inference may be drawn from the facts, however, the question remains one for the trier of fact. People v. Besser, 273 Ill. App. 3d 164, 652 N.E.2d 454 (1995). The trial court\u2019s determination concerning factual matters, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony, is entitled to deference (Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657; People v. Luckett, 273 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 652 N.E.2d 1342 (1995); Besser, 273 Ill. App. 3d 164, 652 N.E.2d 454), and this determination will not be disturbed on review unless manifestly erroneous (People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d 378, 447 N.E.2d 218 (1983); People v. Hamilton, 251 Ill. App. 3d 655, 622 N.E.2d 130 (1993)). It is only when neither the facts nor the credibility of witnesses is questioned that de nova review is appropriate. People v. Moore, 286 Ill. App. 3d 649, 676 N.E.2d 700 (1997). Because the defendant raises questions of fact and challenges the credibility of witnesses, de nova review is inappropriate here. Based on these cited cases, this court must give deference to the trial court\u2019s finding of fact and reverse its determination only if it is manifestly erroneous.\nConsent\nThe fourth amendment of the United States Constitution is designed to protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. The scope of police conduct is limited during traffic stops for minor traffic violations. People v. Hood, 265 Ill. App. 3d 232, 638 N.E.2d 264 (1994). An investigatory stop of a vehicle for a minor traffic violation is considered a Terry stop and is limited by the rules governing Terry. People v. Stewart, 242 Ill. App. 3d 599, 610 N.E.2d 197 (1993). A Terry stop contemplates a brief intrusion, as minimal as possible, to verify information or to ascertain whether criminal activities have in fact taken place. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. a. 1868 (1968).\nIn the case at bar, after thoroughly searching the interior of the car, the police officer testified that he asked the defendant what was in the trunk. The defendant replied that his guitar case and guitar were in the trunk. When the officer asked if he could search the trunk, defendant replied, \"No. I really don\u2019t want you to.\u201d The officer, on the other hand, testified that the defendant consented to a search of the trunk.\nThe trial court, faced with conflicting testimony regarding the verbal exchange, reasoned that the defendant gave his consent when he told the officer how to remove the keys from the ignition. This, we find, is reversible error. The court erred in attributing to defendant\u2019s actions acquiescence and consent to a search of the trunk. The evidence showed that the officer had difficulty removing the keys from the car\u2019s ignition and began shaking them. Defendant\u2019s response was simply to tell the officer to push a button under the steering wheel to release the keys. Defendant\u2019s statement to the officer regarding the release mechanism of the ignition cannot be construed as consent to search the trunk.\nIt is evident from the trial transcript that the court gave great relevance to defendant\u2019s statement regarding the keys. Having decided there was no way to prove exactly what was said between the defendant and the officer regarding consent to search the trunk, the court stated:\n\"So we\u2019d have to go to the actions, and here \u2014 and I realize a young man and a police officer in a uniform, there\u2019s an element here of coercion, but the Courts have ruled that just the uniform isn\u2019t coercion, which may be somewhat unrealistic, but I think that\u2019s the law.\nAt any rate, Mr. Sweborg helped with the keys. He, I believe, consented to the search of the trunk area.\u201d\nOrnelas dictates that the reasonable inferences drawn by the trial court are entitled to deference by the reviewing court unless they are manifestly erroneous. Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657. In the instant case, the inference drawn by the judge was unreasonable and manifestly erroneous. Consistent with the directions of Ornelas, we find that defendant did not consent to a search of the trunk.\nFurther, the record shows that defendant continued to state that he did not want the officer to search the trunk. Once the trunk was opened, he stated, \"I thought I told you I didn\u2019t want you to look through my personal items.\u201d When the officer tried to open the compartment inside the guitar case, defendant clasped his hand on top of the lid to prevent the officer from opening the lid. Whereas the court determined this action to be a withdrawal of consent, we find that consent to search the trunk and the items contained therein was never given. Defendant\u2019s actions were consistent with a denial of consent to search.\nWe also find troubling the court\u2019s unreasonable expectations of defendant and the efforts made at trying to rephrase how defendant could have said \"No.\u201d The court stated:\n\"I thought we had an idealistic Fourth Amendment defendant here when he said, 'No, I don\u2019t want you to,\u2019 but I think the Wo\u2019 is as to the trunk, but I think he wasn\u2019t concerned about privacy, and he wasn\u2019t \u2014 he may have been concerned about his search. If he was, there\u2019s just a slight difference in the terminology.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nFurther on, the court stated:\n\"And then the question comes down whether or not he consented to the box within the guitar case. Had he said when the trunk was opened, 'Go ahead and search, but leave my guitar alone,\u2019 'Go ahead and search, but don\u2019t open that case,\u2019 anything like that, that would have indicated\u2014\nWhatever his reasons are, I thought he would be a little more forthright on the stand, but maybe he hasn\u2019t studied his \u2014 didn\u2019t study his civics quite hard enough. He could have said on the stand today, 'Yes, there was cannabis in there, and I didn\u2019t want him to get it.\u2019 It\u2019s not the natural thing to do, however.\u201d\nWe find the court\u2019s reasoning to be erroneous. A \"No\u201d means literally that. There are no requirements for a defendant to couch his denial of consent in anything but a simple statement saying \"No.\u201d\nReasonable Suspicion\nHaving found that defendant did not give his consent to search the trunk, we next determine if the warrantless search of the trunk was based on articulable facts that the officer\u2019s safety or the safety of others was in danger. The mere fact that a person is stopped for a traffic violation does not afford a reasonable basis for believing that the person is armed and dangerous. People v. Day, 202 Ill. App. 3d 536, 560 N.E.2d 482 (1990). However, when an officer has properly stopped an individual and reasonably believes, based on specific and articulable facts, that his safety or the safety of others is in danger, then he may conduct a limited search of an individual for weapons. People v. Froio, 198 Ill. App. 3d 116, 555 N.E.2d 770 (1990). The sole purpose of the search is to protect the officer, not to gather evidence. People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153, 535 N.E.2d 837 (1989); People v. Morales, 221 Ill. App. 3d 13, 581 N.E.2d 730 (1991). The scope of the search must be a limited intrusion designed to discover instruments endangering the officer. People v. Kantowski, 98 Ill. 2d 75, 455 N.E.2d 1379 (1983). The search may extend beyond the individual\u2019s person to the area within his immediate control and from which he might gain access to a weapon. Froio, 198 Ill. App. 3d 116, 555 N.E.2d 770.\nIn the instant case, the officer patted down the defendant immediately after having pulled him over. A thorough search of the interior of the car revealed nothing suspicious and provided no basis for the officer to believe that defendant was armed and dangerous. After all, the officer had stopped defendant for a minor traffic violation \u2014 a faulty rear taillight. The officer had not stopped the defendant based on a belief that he had committed a dangerous felony, nor did the officer\u2019s radio check on the defendant reveal that he was a convicted felon or that any warrants were out for his arrest. The trial court agreed that upon completing the search of the interior of the car there was no reason for the officer to search the trunk. The court stated:\n\"As for the passenger area, I don\u2019t have any question but [t]hat there was a consent. Now, the officer could have stopped right there, I realize, and \u2014 and he didn\u2019t, and they usually don\u2019t. They usually go on and search the trunk, which makes sense generally, especially if they find something else, but that wasn\u2019t the case here.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nHaving found that the officer had no reason to search the trunk, the court should have ruled that the search of the trunk was improper and in violation of defendant\u2019s rights. An officer\u2019s authority to investigate a traffic violation may not become a subterfuge in order to obtain other evidence merely based on the officer\u2019s suspicion. Stewart, 242 Ill. App. 3d 599, 610 N.E.2d 197; People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 649 N.E.2d 605 (1995). This is even more true if there are no articulable suspicions to search the trunk, as was the case here.\nAs cited earlier, case law is clear that the sole purpose of the search is to protect the officer and not to gather evidence. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153, 535 N.E.2d 837; Morales, 221 Ill. App. 3d 13, 581 N.E.2d 730. The officer\u2019s safety was clearly not an issue during the search of the interior of the car and did not justify a search of the trunk. Any weapons that might have been contained in the trunk and in the compartment of the guitar case were not within the immediate control of defendant. While defendant was stopped for the taillight violation, the compartment was in a closed guitar case in a closed trunk. The car keys had remained in the ignition and defendant had made no attempt to remove them to unlock the trunk. Having found no suspicious or dangerous evidence after a thorough search of the interior of the car, the officer\u2019s search of the trunk was a fishing expedition and exceeded the scope of his authority.\nWe find that the officer\u2019s search of the trunk was conducted absent valid consent. Further, we find no articulable facts justifying the search of the trunk. Based on our review of the evidence produced at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and following the dictates of Ornelas to defer to the trial court\u2019s determination of factual matters unless they are clearly erroneous, we conclude that the court committed reversible error when it admitted evidence obtained in violation of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights against illegal search and seizure.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial judge\u2019s ruling denying the defendant\u2019s motion to-suppress. Because the State cannot prevail on remand without the evidence that we have held should have been suppressed, we also reverse his conviction and sentence outright. People v. Evans, 259 Ill. App. 3d 650, 631 N.E.2d 872 (1994). The remaining issues raised by the defendant are rendered moot by our decision.\nReversed.\nMICHELA, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SLATER" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with all of the majority\u2019s conclusions. I believe, however, that its analysis of the \"consent\u201d issue could be more succinctly stated. It is sufficient to say that consent to a search is not given when the defendant does nothing more than tell the officer how to remove the keys from the car. The defendant\u2019s clear refusal to consent to a search was overridden by the officer, leading to an illegal search. The rest of the analysis is surplusage and unnecessary to this decision.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Kenneth D. Brown, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Ted J. Hamer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (John X. Breslin and J. Paul Hoffmann, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER A. SWEBORG, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201496\u20140093\nOpinion filed November 26, 1997.\nLYTTON, P.J., specially concurring.\nKenneth D. Brown, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nTed J. Hamer, State\u2019s Attorney, of Cambridge (John X. Breslin and J. Paul Hoffmann, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0298-01", "first_page_order": 318, "last_page_order": 326 }