{ "id": 847511, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE A. GAYTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gayton", "decision_date": "1997-12-19", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "442", "last_page": "446", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 442" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 1085", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2481328 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1095" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/1085-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 N.E.2d 1153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1156" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538801 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "where appellate court is unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would have been the same, erroneous admission of evidence requires new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 1033", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872469 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1046", "parenthetical": "where appellate court is unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would have been the same, erroneous admission of evidence requires new trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 935", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "939" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 N.E.2d 1087", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1089", "parenthetical": "\"The word 'any' has broad and inclusive connotations\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3129726 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "\"The word 'any' has broad and inclusive connotations\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/94/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 N.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383626 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 N.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834", "parenthetical": "\"police reports *** are not admissible as business records\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3541096 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834", "parenthetical": "\"police reports *** are not admissible as business records\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 823", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5784109 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0823-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 482, "char_count": 7470, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.1222556529907424e-08, "percentile": 0.3210905346219027 }, "sha256": "7482eb881edc8e0d1cdcb83b63db23b72e802cac10490ce292ab97189a870b46", "simhash": "1:b2818c244e0eaee8", "word_count": 1195 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:50.535591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE A. GAYTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Terrance A. Gayton was convicted of theft by deception. 720 ILCS 5/16 \u2014 1(a)(2) (West 1994). On appeal, he contends (a) the trial judge erred in admitting into evidence defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s abstract and police testimony about the contents of his criminal history sheet, and (b) the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse and remand for a new trial.\nThe evidence showed that defendant went to a used car dealership, placed an $1,800 down payment on a 1988 Chevrolet Baretta, and filled out a loan application for the balance. Some of the information on the application, including defendant\u2019s social security number, driver\u2019s license number, employer, and insurance carrier, was incorrect. Before the loan application was processed by the finance company, defendant was given possession of the car. When the finance company denied the application and detailed the reasons for its denial, the dealership notified the police, who subsequently arrested the defendant.\nI\nAt trial, the State argued that defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s abstract and testimony regarding the content of his criminal history sheet should be admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 5 (West 1994); People v. Tsom banidis, 235 Ill. App. 3d 823, 601 N.E.2d 1124 (1992). Under the applicable statute, a party seeking to introduce a business record must show that the writing was made as a record or memorandum of an act or event, the writing was made in the regular course of business, and it was the regular course of the business to make such a record at the time of transaction or within a reasonable time thereafter. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 5(a) (West 1994).\nIn seeking to introduce this evidence, the State contended that the records pertained to defendant\u2019s intent to defraud by revealing that defendant had previously used multiple social security and driver\u2019s license numbers. Defense counsel objected on the basis that the business records statute excludes records made during an investigation of an alleged offense or during an investigation relating to pending or anticipated litigation. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 5(c)(2) (West 1994); see also People v. Strausberger, 151 Ill. App. 3d 832, 834, 503 N.E.2d 832, 834 (1987) (\"police reports *** are not admissible as business records\u201d). Nonetheless, the prosecutor responded, \"We\u2019re not talking about the pending investigation. This is information that\u2019s been submitted based upon arrests and prior convictions ***.\u201d The trial judge overruled defendant\u2019s objection.\nThe admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. People v. Morrow, 256 Ill. App. 3d 392, 396, 628 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1993).\nAlthough business records may be admitted into evidence, the applicable statute provides exceptions to the rule. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 5 (West 1994). The statute specifically excludes writings or records made \"by anyone during an investigation of an alleged offense or during any investigation relating to pending or anticipated litigation of any kind.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 5(c)(2) (West 1994). \"An\u201d is the English indefinite article, equivalent to \"one\u201d or \"any,\u201d and \"any\u201d indicates \"all\u201d or \"every.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 77, 86 (5th ed. 1979); see also People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 94 Ill. App. 3d 431, 434, 418 N.E.2d 1087, 1089 (1981) (\"The word 'any\u2019 has broad and inclusive connotations\u201d). Thus, while the State\u2019s claims that the statute bars only those writings and records made in the course of investigating this specific offense, this is not what the statute says. In People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 677 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1997), our supreme court recently stated that \"[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and that inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute.\u201d The statute is clear: writings and records made within the context of investigating pending or anticipated criminal prosecutians are not to be admitted as business records. Here, the admission of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s abstract and testimony about his criminal history sheet constituted an abuse of discretion.\nFurther, we cannot accept the State\u2019s contention that any error in admitting this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A central issue in this case was the defendant\u2019s intent to defraud. Thus, during closing argument before the jury, the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized the significance of defendant\u2019s criminal history sheet and driver\u2019s abstract:\n\"There was a driver\u2019s license number reflected on the [financing] application. Again you\u2019ll see that application with a number on it. Whether that was a false number or not may be up to your interpretation *** you heard evidence and you\u2019ll see a document in the jury room that indicates this individual has three different driver\u2019s license numbers assigned to him *** remember the testimony that came forth from the individual from the Department of the State Police that showed the various social security numbers that had been at some point used by the Defendant. One of those numbers he had used previously was also the same number that was on the financial application. *** [WJhat doubt is here \u2014 is it reasonable? Is it reasonable in light of \u2014 numerous social security numbers? [Is it] reasonable in light of the numerous social security numbers? *** He gave false employment information; false driver\u2019s license information; false social security information. Did the salesman make a mistake on those numbers? I suppose it\u2019s possible. But is it reasonable to believe that he made the mistake on [what] was the same number this man had used before?\u201d\nUnder these circumstances, we reject the assertion that the error invited by the State was harmless. See People v. Berberena, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1033,1046, 639 N.E.2d 599, 608 (1994) (where appellate court is unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would have been the same, erroneous admission of evidence requires new trial).\nII\nWe have also reviewed defendant\u2019s claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove that a victim relied upon the alleged falsehoods and/or that defendant acted with the specific intent to defraud. See People v. Davis, 112 Ill. 2d 55, 62-63, 491 N.E.2d 1153,1156 (1986); People v. McManus, 197 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1095, 555 N.E.2d 391, 399 (1990). After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State (People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985)), we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence which, if believed by the trier of fact, could support a conviction.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is reversed and this cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nHOMER and SLATER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tracy McGonigle, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa and John F. Klunk, of Lockport, for appellant.", "Stewart Umholtz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRANCE A. GAYTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201496\u20140460\nOpinion filed December 19, 1997.\nTracy McGonigle, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa and John F. Klunk, of Lockport, for appellant.\nStewart Umholtz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pekin (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0442-01", "first_page_order": 462, "last_page_order": 466 }