{ "id": 847552, "name": "LUTHER STATLER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DOROTHY CATALANO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Statler v. Catalano", "decision_date": "1997-12-29", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "483", "last_page": "489", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 483" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159507 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603065 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 N.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" }, { "page": "12", "parenthetical": "Ryan, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959434 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32" }, { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 N.E.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" }, { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 Ill. App. 3d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2518425 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" }, { "page": "24-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/16/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 1022", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1023" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796745 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 983", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260328 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 973", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544399 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550857 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 N.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472774 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0397-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 654, "char_count": 12460, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9137331087264507e-07, "percentile": 0.7320409413830691 }, "sha256": "304f49271080012877ed77dd91149a586e5032eb2bf599dfc50608dbbd5bd306", "simhash": "1:e3b8b1ad3f3f6da0", "word_count": 2037 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:50.535591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LUTHER STATLER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DOROTHY CATALANO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KUEHN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Luther and Charleen Statler, and defendant, Dorothy Catalano, own adjacent tracts of land in Madison County. There is a private nonnavigable lake situated transversely on the property line between these parcels. This case marks an ongoing effort to define the parties\u2019 rights regarding the lake\u2019s surface waters, an issue which appears before us for the second time.\nPlaintiffs purchased their eight-acre tract from Carl and Dorothy Miller in 1972. This tract included a portion of the lake bed. Plaintiffs used the entire lake for swimming, boating, and fishing. Soon thereafter, the Millers constructed a fence that extended approximately six feet into th\u00e9 lake in order to keep their cattle from entering plaintiffs\u2019 property.\nIn 1975, the Millers sold 72 acres, including the remainder of the lake bed, to defendant. The land was vacant until 1977, when defendant\u2019s son, William Catalano, Jr., moved onto the property. He then purchased some cattle from the Millers. In 1979, when William encountered problems keeping the cattle on defendant\u2019s property, he installed a fence extending across the lake. This fence created a dispute as to the plaintiffs\u2019 rights regarding the lake\u2019s surface waters, which reached the Madison County circuit court.\nIn 1986, the circuit court determined that, under the prevailing case law, plaintiffs only had a property right to that portion of the lake that was above their land and that they did not have a right to use the entire lake. On March 22,1988, we affirmed the circuit court\u2019s judgment. Statler v. Catalano, 167 Ill. App. 3d 397, 411, 521 N.E.2d 565, 575 (1988).\nOn September 15, 1993, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Madison County circuit court, seeking a declaration of their right to use the entire lake. Plaintiffs subsequently amended the action to include a request for injunctive relief prohibiting defendant from interfering with their use of the entire lake. Defendant moved to dismiss this complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. On July 26, 1994, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s dismissal motion, finding that a change in law, specifically the supreme court\u2019s decision in Beacham v. Lake Zurich Property Owners Ass\u2019n, 123 Ill. 2d 227, 526 N.E.2d 154 (1988), rendered res judicata inapplicable to this case. On July 18, 1996, the trial court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting defendant from interfering with plaintiffs\u2019 reasonable use of the entire lake and ordering defendant to remove the fence extending across the lake. Defendant now appeals from the trial court ruling on her motion to dismiss and from the entry of the permanent injunction.\nDefendant initially contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint. She points to our 1988 opinion and again argues that res judicata barred plaintiffs\u2019 action. This contention presents a question of law rather than an issue of fact. DeLuna v. Treister, 286 Ill. App. 3d 25, 29, 676 N.E.2d 973, 976 (1996), appeal allowed, 174 Ill. 2d 558 (1997). \"Disputed questions of law are reviewed de nova.\u201d Davis v. Temple, 284 Ill. App. 3d 983, 989, 673 N.E.2d 737, 741 (1996). Therefore, \"we may substitute our determination for that of the trial court if we find such determination to be erroneous.\u201d People ex rel. Garnati v. $14,000 United States Currency, 227 Ill. App. 3d 64, 66, 590 N.E.2d 1022, 1023 (1992). We agree with the trial court\u2019s judgment that res judicata does not apply to this case.\nPlaintiffs argue that the trial court correctly found that an intervening change in law renders res judicata inapplicable to this case. Defendant urges that plaintiffs\u2019 argument is unsupported by Illinois law. Because this court has not yet addressed such circumstances, we are now faced with an issue of first impression: Does a change in the law resulting from judicial decision or statute subsequent to a case\u2019s adjudication eradicate the controlling effect, of that case\u2019s judgment on subsequent related litigation? We hold that it does.\nOur decision is guided by a case involving a strikingly similar argument, City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 16 Ill. App. 3d 23, 305 N.E.2d 639 (1973), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 59 Ill. 2d 29, 319 N.E.2d 9 (1974). In City of Des Plaines, a municipality sought to enforce certain zoning restrictions in 1966 against a sanitary district. The case eventually reached our supreme court, which held that the sanitary district was not subject to the municipality\u2019s zoning ordinance.\nIn 1972, the municipality filed a similar complaint in the circuit court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the municipality may regulate the sanitary district\u2019s land use activities pursuant to the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The district moved to dismiss the action based upon res judicata. The municipality argued that res judicata was inapplicable because the prior action involved the municipality\u2019s statutory powers, while the later action was founded on the home rule provisions of article VII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, thereby establishing a new legal relationship between the parties. The circuit court dismissed the action.\nOn appeal, the first district reversed the circuit court and held that res judicata was inapplicable, stating, \"The legal relationship of the parties, the issues advanced, and the questions of law which must be decided have been significantly altered by the present Illinois Constitution.\u201d City of Des Plaines, 16 Ill. App. 3d at 28, 305 N.E.2d at 643. The First District Appellate Court reasoned:\n\"The doctrine of res judicata is of judicial origin and has been characterized as a rule of convenience designed to prevent repet\u00edtious law suits over matters which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually and legally, but which must give way where there has been a change in the fundamental controlling legal principles. [Citation.] Similarly, the rule prevails in Illinois that res judicata extends only to the facts and conditions as they were at the time a judgment was rendered, and to the legal rights and relations of the parties as fixed by the facts so determined; and when new facts or conditions intervene before the second action, establishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the parties respectfully, the issues are no longer the same, and hence the former judgment cannot be pleaded as a bar in the subsequent action. [Citations.] Even though the basic facts have not changed, it is generally accepted that res judicata does not operate as an automatic bar where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation.\u201d City of Des Plaines, 16 Ill. App. 3d at 24-25, 305 N.E.2d at 641.\nWe believe that this logic is sound and applicable to the instant case.\nWe recognize that the supreme court overturned the first district\u2019s decision in City of Des Plaines. However, we do not view that reversal as a contradiction of the first district\u2019s conclusions regarding the effect of an intervening change in the law on the doctrine of res judicata. Rather, the supreme court merely disagreed with the existence of such a change in the law under the circumstances of that case. As defendant concedes in her brief, the supreme court language in City of Des Plaines grounds the reversal on the fact that there was no actual change in the law \u2014 only a change in the source of the municipality\u2019s power to enact such a law:\n\"It is apparent that the cause of action, the issues, the parties and the relief sought in this action are identical to those in the earlier case. It is equally apparent that the fact that plaintiff\u2019s power to enact a zoning ordinance now stems from section 6 of article VII of the Constitution of 1970 and not from a grant of authority by the General Assembly is irrelevant. While it is true that the dissenting opinion filed in the earlier case [citation] states that the contending municipal corporations 'are equal in status,\u2019 the rationale of neither the majority nor dissenting opinion is dependent upon that fact.\u201d City of Des Plaines, 59 Ill. 2d at 31-32, 319 N.E.2d at 11.\nWe further note that Justice Ryan\u2019s dissent recognized the first district\u2019s reasoning concerning the effect of an intervening change in the law on the doctrine of res judicata. City of Des Plaines, 59 Ill. 2d at 33, 319 N.E.2d at 12 (Ryan, J., dissenting). The fact that the majority failed to do the same does not constitute a quarrel with this logic because its decision did not necessitate that analysis. Therefore, we adopt the first district\u2019s view and hold that a change in the law resulting from a judicial decision rendered or a statute enacted subsequent to the adjudication of a case eliminates the controlling effect of that case\u2019s judgment on subsequent litigation.\nDefendant nonetheless contends that even if an intervening change in the law may eliminate res judicata\u2019s controlling effect, the doctrine still applies to this case. She argues that because Beacham is distinguishable from the present circumstances, there is no intervening change in the law applicable to this case. We disagree.\nOur supreme court\u2019s holding in Beacham is clear:\n\"We, therefore, affirm the appellate court\u2019s holding that where there are multiple owners of the bed of a private, nonnavigable lake, such owners and their licensees have the right to the reasonable use and enjoyment of the surface waters of the entire lake provided they do not unduly interfere with the reasonable use of the waters by other owners and their licensees.\u201d Beacham, 123 Ill. 2d at 232, 526 N.E.2d at 157.\nDefendant\u2019s attempts to factually distinguish this case from Beacham are unpersuasive. It is undisputed that the case before us involves multiple owners of the bed of a private, nonnavigable lake. Likewise, defendant\u2019s effort to create a distinction limiting the supreme court\u2019s holding to natural lakes only, not artificial lakes, is without merit. Such a distinction cannot be gleaned from that opinion.\nWe recognize that the First District Appellate Court rendered its decision prior to our initial March 22, 1988, decision. Our refusal to follow suit at that time is of no consequence, as we were not bound by that decision. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 539, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1992). We became bound by the first district\u2019s holding when the supreme court affirmed it and created an intervening change in the law. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to this case.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in permanently enjoining her from maintaining a fence extending across the lake and ordering her to remove it. She urges that, considering the propensity of the cattle to wander off her property through the lake, the fence was a \"reasonable use\u201d of the lake as contemplated in Beacham. We cannot agree.\nWe have addressed the standard of review applicable to permanent injunctions:\n\"In order for the issuance of a permanent injunction to be upheld on appeal, the trial court\u2019s determination is reviewed by a stricter standard [than preliminary injunctions]. The question is whether a trial court\u2019s decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. A trial court\u2019s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite result is clearly evident.\u201d Harper v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 19, 25, 667 N:E.2d 1382, 1386 (1996).\nOne owner\u2019s \"reasonable use\u201d of a lake may not unduly interfere with the \"reasonable use\u201d of another owner. Beacham, 123 Ill. 2d at 232, 526 N.E.2d at 157. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that \"[t]he fence in the lake on the Catalano property, which is near the Statlers\u2019 eastern boundary, is an undue interference with the Statlers\u2019 enjoyment of the lake.\u201d We cannot say that a decision to the contrary is clearly evident.\nAccordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOPKINS and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KUEHN" } ], "attorneys": [ "M. Joseph Hill, of Edwardsville, for appellant.", "G. Edward Moorman, of Alton, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LUTHER STATLER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DOROTHY CATALANO, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201496\u20140630\nOpinion filed December 29, 1997.\nM. Joseph Hill, of Edwardsville, for appellant.\nG. Edward Moorman, of Alton, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0483-01", "first_page_order": 503, "last_page_order": 509 }