{ "id": 847493, "name": "BERNARD J. McCULLOUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN KNIGHT et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "McCullough v. Knight", "decision_date": "1997-11-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201496\u20140775", "first_page": "591", "last_page": "600", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 591" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317110 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557077 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5667529 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court supervision revocation proceedings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "police department administrative discharge proceedings" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 891", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260358 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0891-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 N.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "incomplete record does not preclude review where issue can be decided without complete record" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434525 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/112/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 U.S. 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3903035 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "Brandeis, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "Brandeis, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "959-60", "parenthetical": "Brandeis, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/277/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 U.S. 206", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165005 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "1680" }, { "page": "1447" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/364/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Goldenhersh, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2972144 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209-10", "parenthetical": "Goldenhersh, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "209-10" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0200-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1021, "char_count": 21080, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.858096782166505e-08, "percentile": 0.36335863596680734 }, "sha256": "c2f4611181129b6ba660b1423f9bdb00e53a57bd9512168af297b82acba49799", "simhash": "1:facfea1a3f57f09b", "word_count": 3493 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:50.535591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BERNARD J. McCULLOUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN KNIGHT et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue presented for review in this appeal is whether evidence suppressed in a criminal case may be introduced later in an administrative hearing.\nBernard McCullough sought administrative review of a $500 fine imposed by the Chicago department of revenue for an unregistered firearm recovered from his vehicle. The circuit court upheld the department of revenue\u2019s decision. McCullough appeals. We affirm.\nPolice officer John Knight arrested McCullough on May 1, 1995, searched his vehicle, and seized a handgun. Two proceedings followed. The first was a criminal prosecution of McCullough for failure to register the firearm in violation of section 8 \u2014 20\u2014040 of the Chicago Municipal Code (Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 8 \u2014 20\u2014040 (amended July 7, 1992)). The circuit court suppressed evidence of the recovered weapon when the city admitted that Knight lacked probable cause to search McCullough\u2019s vehicle. The court discharged McCullough but ordered the weapon confiscated and destroyed.\nThere followed an administrative hearing before the department of revenue. McCullough\u2019s vehicle had been seized by Officers Knight and Dougherty at the time of his arrest in accordance with section 8 \u2014 20\u2014015 of the Chicago Municipal Code. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 8 \u2014 20\u2014015 (amended July 14, 1993). Section 8 \u2014 20\u2014015 provides:\n\"(a) The owner of record of any motor vehicle that contains an unregistered firearm or a firearm that is not broken down in a nonfunctioning state shall be liable to the city for an administrative penalty of $500.00 plus any towing and storage fees applicable under Section 9 \u2014 92\u2014080. Any such vehicle shall be subject to seizure and impoundment pursuant to this section. ***\n(b) Whenever a police officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle is subject to seizure and impoundment pursuant to this section, the police officer shall provide for the towing of the vehicle to a facility controlled by the city or its agents. *** [Tjhe police officer shall notify any person identifying himself as the owner of the vehicle *** at the time of the alleged violation, of the fact of the seizure and of the vehicle owner\u2019s right to request a vehicle impoundment hearing ***.\n(c) Whenever the owner of record of a vehicle seized pursuant to this section makes a [written] request *** for a vehicle impoundment hearing within 12 hours after the seizure, a hearing officer of the department of revenue shall conduct the vehicle impoundment hearing within 24 hours after the seizure ***. *** If, after the hearing, the hearing officer determines that there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is subject to seizure and impoundment under subsection (a), the hearing officer shall order the continued impoundment of the vehicle *** unless the owner of the vehicle posts *** a cash bond in the amount of $500.00 plus any applicable towing and storage fees.\n(d) Within 10 days after a vehicle is seized and impounded pursuant to this section, the city shall notify *** the owner of record of the date, time and location of a hearing that will be conducted pursuant to this section. *** If, after the hearing, the hearing officer determines by a preponderance of evidence that the vehicle contained an unregistered firearm or a firearm not broken down in a nonfunctioning state, *** the hearing officer shall enter an order finding the owner of record of the vehicle civilly liable to the city for an administrative penalty in the amount of $500.00. *** If the hearing officer finds that no such violation occurred, the hearing officer shall order the immediate return of the owner\u2019s vehicle or cash bond.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 8 \u2014 20\u2014015 (amended July 14, 1993).\nMcCullough paid the $500 bond for the release of his vehicle. He then filed a motion to dismiss the impoundment proceedings and for return of the $500, arguing that the search of his vehicle violated the fourth and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV), and article 1, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2).\nMcCullough argued at the hearing that evidence of the unregistered firearm was inadmissible in the impoundment proceedings because it had been suppressed in the criminal case. The hearing officer disagreed and held that McCullough was subject to the $500 administrative penalty.\nMcCullough filed a complaint in circuit court for administrative review. The circuit court affirmed the hearing officer\u2019s decision.\nWe first note that McCullough filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal, under Supreme Court Rule 329 (134 Ill. 2d R. 329), with a transcript of the hearing before the department of revenue. The motion was granted. The transcript was not certified by the trial court and had not been filed in or considered by the trial court. We will not consider references to this transcript because \"documents which are not a part of the trial court record and were not considered by the trial court will not be considered on appeal.\u201d State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stuckey, 112 Ill. App. 3d 647, 649, 445 N.E.2d 791 (1983). The failure to file the transcript in the trial court would allow us to affirm the hearing officer without further analysis. See Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 482, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984). The issue before us, however, is a question of law, reviewed de nova. The state of the record is such that we are able to address the question of law. See Dubey v. Abam Building Corp., 266 Ill. App. 3d 44, 46, 639 N.E.2d 215 (1994) (incomplete record does not preclude review where issue can be decided without complete record).\nOn appeal, McCullough argues that under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions the unconstitutionally seized firearm must be suppressed. But he cites no authority, as required under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341, for his claim under the Illinois Constitution. 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Estate of Strocchia v. City of Chicago, 284 Ill. App. 3d 891, 901, 672 N.E.2d 914 (1996). So we will only address his claim under the United States Constitution. We are aware that the exclusionary rule is applicable to state criminal trials. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961).\nMcCullough contends that the city\u2019s \"argument\u201d that \"the $500 penalty is not a sufficient amount to merit constitutional [protection] is *** ludicrous.\u201d But the city does not argue that McCullough is not constitutionally protected. The city correctly notes that whether the exclusionary sanction is proper in a particular case is \" 'an issue separate from the question whether the [fjourth [a]mendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.\u2019 \u201d United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 688, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 538-39, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2324 (1983). The point the city makes is that the severity of the penalty is an element to be considered in the balancing test employed to invoke or relax the exclusionary rule. McCullough labels this point \"ludicrous\u201d without addressing it. Such a strategy of appellate advocacy on an issue of some significance is more than a minor irritant for those who must read his brief.\nMcCullough argues that the department of revenue erred in relying on evidence obtained during an unconstitutional search. In support of his contention, McCullough cites Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 29 L. Ed. 746, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886). McCullough argues that the hearing officer\u2019s and circuit court\u2019s decisions were \"repugnant to and violative of over two hundred years [sic] of *** Supreme Court precedent of Boyd, which has been religiously followed without deviation.\u201d Miscounting the years and misstating the precedential history of Boyd aside, the case is relevant to the issue before us, though far from dispositive.\nBoyd was a forfeiture action brought by the United States against an importer of 35 cases of plate glass allegedly imported without payment of a customs duty. The penalty faced by the importer was forfeiture of the glass. Relying on an 1874 revenue statute, the trial court ordered the importer to produce company records that would aid the United States in its case against him. The Supreme Court held that the compulsory production of a person\u2019s private papers for use against him in a civil forfeiture proceeding violates both the unreasonable search proscription of the fourth amendment and the self-incrimination proscription of the fifth amendment. The Court further held that the unconstitutionally seized records could not be used against the defendant. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-35, 638, 29 L. Ed. at 752-53, 753, 6 S. Ct. at 533-35, 536.\nThe city argues that Boyd is distinguishable. Boyd involved a forfeiture of property of the kind that the Supreme Court has found to be punitive. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 701-02, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 175, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 1251 (1965); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634, 29 L. Ed. at 752, 6 S. Ct. at 534. McCullough simply gives us an extensive quotation from Boyd', he does not explain why the $500 fine and temporary impoundment here are comparable to the complete property forfeiture in Boyd. Even if the fine here could be characterized as punitive, Boyd is not the case from which to reason.\nThe city cites several Supreme Court cases that trace the evolution of the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment and establish the appropriate framework for analyzing this issue. See Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984); Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974). The city points out that, despite McCullough\u2019s claim that Boyd has been \"religiously followed,\u201d McCullough has ignored this evolution of Supreme Court use of the exclusionary rule. We agree. McCullough cites to Boyd as if it were the last and only word on the subject. In fact there have been thousands of words on the subject, all of which McCullough\u2019s brief ignores. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 446 n.15, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1056 n.15, 96 S. Ct. at 3028 n.15 (noting the multitude of opinions addressing the exclusionary rule).\nSince Boyd, the Supreme Court has held that \"[djespite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.\u201d Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 571, 94 S. Ct. at 620. Application of the exclusionary rule has been restricted to those areas where the remedial objectives of deterring unlawful police conduct are \"most efficaciously served.\u201d Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 571, 94 S. Ct. at 620. With this language in mind, the Supreme Court has developed a balancing test to measure the appropriate use of the exclusionary rule. We must balance the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule against the cost \"on the societal interest in law enforcement.\u201d Janis, 428 U.S. at 448, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1058, 96 S. Ct. at 3029. See also Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 787, 104 S. Ct. at 3485; Calandra, 338 U.S. at 349. 38 L. Ed. 2d at 572. 94 S. Ct. at 620-21.\nThe Supreme Court has refused to extend the exclusionary rule beyond criminal prosecutions in numerous cases. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 793, 104 S. Ct. at 3489 (deportation proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067,1087-88, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 (1976) (federal habeas corpus proceedings); Janis, 428 U.S. at 453-54, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1060, 96 S. Ct. at 3031-32 (federal tax assessment proceeding); Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613 (grand jury proceedings).\nIllinois courts have also refused to extend the exclusionary rule to some proceedings. See People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975) (probation revocation proceedings); Grames v. Illinois State Police, 254 Ill. App. 3d 191, 625 N.E.2d 945 (1993) (police department administrative discharge proceedings); People v. Grubb, 143 Ill. App. 3d 822, 493 N.E.2d 699 (1986) (court supervision revocation proceedings).\nPlaintiffs Boyd analysis is the \"absolutist\u201d argument of the type clearly rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529. In Dowery, our supreme court addressed whether evidence suppressed in proceedings on a substantive criminal offense could be used to revoke probation. In refusing to apply the exclusionary rule, our supreme court discussed the policies of the probation system and the interests of society. The court concluded that \"[m]erely because there may exist a technical deficiency in police conduct, a trial court should not be forced to release a defendant and return him to a probationary status where there is patent evidence of a serious probation violation.\u201d Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d at 206. The court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that failure to apply the exclusionary rule would result in police harassment of probationers, since there was no evidence of harassment in that case, and courts remain able to impose sanctions to deter harassment if demonstrated in a particular case. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d at 206-07.\nThe echo of a \"no exceptions\u201d approach is seen in Mr. Justice Goldenhersh\u2019s dissent in Dowery. Goldenhersh reasoned that \"[u]n-less the fourth amendment *** [is] to be reduced 'to a form of words\u2019 [citation] [it] must be interpreted to mean that evidence seized in violation of [its] provisions is not only not to be used in a 'criminal prosecution\u2019 but 'that it shall not be used at all.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d at 209 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). But the Illinois Supreme Court has rejected this approach, as has the United States Supreme Court.\nIn examining the costs of applying the exclusionary rule here, we find that the department of revenue would be unable to consider valuable and relevant evidence that would impede the truth-finding function of the hearing officer, as is usually the case when the exclusionary rule is employed. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 3412; Janis, 428 U.S. at 447, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1057, 96 S. Ct. at 3029. This would interfere with the public policy behind the administrative proceeding. The impoundment of the vehicle and the charging of costs to plaintiff are part of a municipal policy with which no one can quarrel: the elimination of unlawful weapons from the streets of the city. Applying the exclusionary rule would clearly hamper the city\u2019s ability to shift the costs of this endeavor to vehicle owners whose vehicles are being used to transport unlawful weapons.\nThe city argues that the application of the exclusionary rule to the department of revenue proceedings would add little deterrent effect beyond that already imposed: excluding the illegally obtained evidence in a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding, such as the one brought in the circuit court here. See Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046, 96 S. Ct. 3021. In Janis, the United States Supreme Court held that the constitution did not require application of the exclusionary rule in a civil tax proceeding brought by the federal government. The Court reasoned that police officers were sufficiently \"punished\u201d by exclusion of evidence in criminal prosecutions because the exclusion frustrates the criminal enforcement process, which was the duty and concern of police officers to ensure. Janis, 428 U.S. at 448, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1057, 96 S. Ct. at 3029.\nWe find Janis persuasive. McCullough makes no argument that officers in this situation would not be sufficiently deterred by the threat of suppression of evidence in the criminal or quasi-criminal prosecutions. McCullough has not shown, and we do not detect, an added deterrent effect in extending the exclusionary rule to the administrative proceeding that would warrant the cost to society: diminishing the power of the city to rid the city of illegal firearms and imposing on those who possess them the cost of reasonable steps to implement the policy. The circuit court did not err in finding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to the department of revenue proceedings.\nMcCullough cites other cases for the proposition that the evidence should be excluded: People v. Albea, 2 Ill. 2d 317, 118 N.E.2d 277 (1954), People v. Schmoll, 383 Ill. 280, 48 N.E.2d 933 (1943), and People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 446 N.E.2d 997 (1942). These cases are not on point. They are criminal cases that do not address whether the exclusionary rule may be invoked in an administrative proceeding. And all of them predate People v. Dowery by at least 20 years.\nMcCullough argues that People v. Buonavolanto, 238 Ill. App. 3d 665, 606 N.E.2d 509 (1992), provides \"additional authority\u201d supporting a reversal. Again, McCullough\u2019s argument merely consists of an extensive block quotation. McCullough\u2019s apparent argument is that the city is collaterally estopped from bringing the administrative action to impose on McCullough the costs of implementing an illegal firearms ordinance. The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that an issue raised and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be relitigated in a later action between the same parties. Sutiles v. Vogel, 126 Ill. 2d 186, 195, 533 N.E.2d 901 (1988). For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue being litigated in the latter suit must be identical to the one decided in the former. Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 192-93 (1997).\nBuonavolanto held that the State was collaterally estopped from litigating an issue in a criminal prosecution that had already been decided against the State in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Buonavolanto, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 670-73. This case is readily distinguishable. In the prosecution of McCullough, the circuit court only decided the factual issue of whether Knight\u2019s seizure was unconstitutional, a fact conceded by the city. Because it was a criminal proceeding, the illegally seized weapon was excluded. The circuit court had no reason to address the relevant legal question here: whether an illegally seized weapon must be excluded in a proceeding designed to shift the cost of gun control to owners of vehicles used to transport unregistered weapons.\nAffirmed.\nCOUSINS, P.J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAHILL" }, { "text": "JUSTICE LEAVITT,\nspecially concurring:\nI concur in the decision reached by my colleagues in this case, inasmuch as the decision accurately states the current state of the law in Illinois regarding application (or nonapplication) of the exclusionary rule in settings such as this. However, I believe that the law, as it now stands, fails to recognize one of the two historical justifications of the exclusionary rule; namely, the \"imperative of judicial integrity.\u201d See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1680, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1447 (1960). I would adopt the reasoning of Justice Goldenhersh in People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 209-10, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975) (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting) that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and section 6 of article I of our state constitution should not be used against an individual in any proceeding:\n\" 'Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commends to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means \u2014 to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal \u2014 would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.\u2019 \u201d Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d at 209-10, quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575, 72 L. Ed. 944, 959-60 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).\nFor these reasons, I specially concur.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE LEAVITT," } ], "attorneys": [ "R. Eugene Pincham, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Susan S. Sher, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Julian N. Henriques, Jr., Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BERNARD J. McCULLOUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN KNIGHT et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201496\u20140775\nOpinion filed November 26, 1997.\nRehearing denied January 9, 1998.\nLEAVITT, J., specially concurring.\nR. Eugene Pincham, of Chicago, for appellant.\nSusan S. Sher, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Julian N. Henriques, Jr., Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0591-01", "first_page_order": 611, "last_page_order": 620 }