{ "id": 847539, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT KING, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. King", "decision_date": "1997-12-12", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201494\u20143798", "first_page": "739", "last_page": "746", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 739" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317111 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the waiver language of section 5 - 8-1(c) is mandatory" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 N.E.2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499283 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 1002", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3317980 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/1002-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 N.E.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590228 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" }, { "page": "250", "parenthetical": "even if introduction of evidence of other crimes was erroneous, error was harmless where two eyewitnesses identified defendant and defendant provided inculpatory statement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661667 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2987752 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 N.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070395 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 N.E.2d 1200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2984278 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 N.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872522 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475380 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2513365 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" }, { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 1295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238453 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0147-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 751, "char_count": 16121, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.74970067961815e-08, "percentile": 0.4556580325725554 }, "sha256": "db19f616bf9938f7554fd439b43263d18fa944cdf736b62b65cf2d38ee07e96f", "simhash": "1:123af81e77766ae0", "word_count": 2642 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:37:50.535591+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT KING, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to a term of 40 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to provide the jury with a second degree murder instruction; (2) defendant was prejudiced by the admission of evidence of another crime; and (3) the trial court considered an improper factor in sentencing defendant. Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603).\nFor the following reasons, we affirm.\nThe relevant facts are as follows. According to defendant\u2019s court-reported statement, on September 3, 1991, defendant was recruited by fellow gang member Charles Murphy to participate in a shooting. Murphy approached defendant while defendant was standing on the street and asked defendant whether he owned a gun. Defendant responded affirmatively and walked across the street, where he retrieved a .38-caliber revolver. Murphy then told defendant to \"[g]o take care- of business.\u201d Defendant understood that to mean that he was to \"shoot the boys that did something to him [Murphy] earlier in the day.\u201d\nMurphy drove defendant to a location where defendant retrieved bullets for the gun. Murphy then drove defendant down an alley and pointed out the group of people on a porch that he wanted defendant to shoot. Murphy parked his car a block away and defendant exited the car. As defendant was walking down the alley, defendant saw one of the people on the porch \"reaching,\u201d which caused defendant to pull out his gun and fire six shots in the direction of the porch. Defendant did not see a gun in the hand of the person who was \"reaching.\u201d In fact, defendant did not see anyone on the porch holding a gun. One of defendant\u2019s shots fatally wounded Rodney Maholmes.\nAfter the shooting, defendant fled the scene and heard gunshots behind him. According to defendant, the shots were not being fired from the porch. Defendant then hid the gun and ran back to the car.\nAt trial, Carla Carthen testified that she was on the porch the night of the shooting. At approximately 10 p.m., she saw defendant, who was wearing a green Starter jacket, walk past the porch with another individual. The two came within 15 feet of the porch and Carthen heard them yell \"G.D.\u201d Three to five minutes later, defendant and the other offender returned and fired shots at the porch. Carthen ran into the house and heard someone say that the victim had been shot. Carthen then turned on the lights and saw the victim lying on the ground and bleeding. On September 4, 1991, Carthen identified defendant in a police lineup as one of the shooters. According to Carthen, no one on the porch had a gun.\nTony Allen also was present on the porch on the night of the shooting. Allen corroborated Carthen\u2019s version of the events, although he was unable to identify defendant when he first walked past the porch. Allen, however, did identify defendant in a police lineup the day after the shooting and testified that the individual who fired the gun was wearing a green Starter jacket.\nOn September 4, 1991, Detective Tony Maslanka arrested defendant a couple of blocks away from the scene of the shooting. At the time of his arrest, defendant was wearing a green Starter jacket. Defendant initially denied any involvement in the shooting, but he later confessed to his involvement and provided the court-reported statement summarized above. Detective Maslanka testified on cross-examination that he knew that defendant was 16 years old prior to his arrest. Detective Maslanka then confirmed that in his supplementary police report he wrote that he learned defendant\u2019s age after reading defendant his Miranda rights.\nThe parties stipulated that the cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the back. The parties further stipulated that if firearms examiner Richard Chenow were called to testify, he would identify the bullet retrieved from the victim\u2019s body as a .38-caliber bullet.\nDefendant\u2019s trial testimony was substantially similar to his court-reported statement. At trial, however, defendant never testified that he went with Murphy to shoot someone. Rather, defendant testified that he went with Murphy after a fellow gang member by the name of Terry Bell asked him to go to \"Dee-Dee\u2019s\u201d house with him. Defendant confirmed, however, that he was asked to retrieve his gun and that he brought his .38-caliber gun with him. Defendant did not testify that he stopped to retrieve ammunition for the gun.\nDefendant further testified that upon arriving at the scene, both he and Bell walked down the alley. Defendant and Bell walked past the porch once and Bell yelled out their gang affiliation to avoid an \"unnecessary confrontation.\u201d When Bell and defendant returned to the porch, defendant saw one of the occupants make a movement as though he were going to pull a gun out, and defendant responded by firing his gun about three times in the direction of the porch. Defendant testified that he pulled his gun out of his pocket because he felt threatened.\nAfter deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nDefendant initially maintains that the trial court erred when it refused to provide a jury instruction on second degree murder based on an unreasonable belief in self-defense.\nThe relevant portion of the second degree murder statute provides:\n\"(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he commits the offense of first degree murder *** and ***:\n(2) At the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code [justifiable use of force], but his belief is unreasonable.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 2 (West 1994).\nA defendant is entitled to jury instructions on the defenses that the evidence supports, even where the evidence is \"slight.\u201d People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147, 156, 565 N.E.2d 1295 (1990). However, there is a minimum standard that must be met before an instruction is justified. People v. Bell, 191 Ill. App. 3d 877, 885, 548 N.E.2d 397 (1989). A second degree murder instruction should not be provided where \"the evidence clearly demonstrates that the crime was murder and there is no evidence upon which a jury might find the defendant guilty of manslaughter.\u201d People v. Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546, 551, 413 N.E.2d 378 (1980).\nIn the present case, we find that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on second degree murder. Defendant maintains that such an instruction was warranted by his testimony that he felt threatened when he saw an individual on the porch make a movement as though he were reaching for a gun. However, even if defendant did possess an unreasonable belief in self-defense, we note that defendant testified that he responded by firing shots at the porch where several people were standing, not at the individual who made the alleged threatening movement. Such action does not denote self-defense.\nDefendant also maintains that the trial court erred in not providing the second degree murder instruction because the trial court based its refusal to instruct on the court\u2019s assessment of defendant\u2019s credibility. At the instruction conference, the trial court rendered the following ruling on defendant\u2019s motion for a second degree murder instruction:\n\"All right. Prepare your second degree degree [szc] instruction, I will mark it refused.\nThere is no evidence aside from the defendant\u2019s own self-serving statement for the first time given to anyone that this Court knows of here under oath at his trial that he saw anyone attempt to, as he states, up with a weapon.\nI don\u2019t think that that is sufficient evidence to support the giving of the second degree instruction. This offense, from the facts is murder or it is not guilty. One or the other.\u201d\nWhile the court\u2019s remarks do call into question defendant\u2019s credibility, they also address the insufficiency of evidence to support the giving of a second degree murder instruction. A trial court cannot refuse an instruction based on its view of a witness\u2019 credibility. People v. Roberts, 265 Ill. App. 3d 400, 403, 638 N.E.2d 359 (1994). Still, there is a minimum standard that must be met before an instruction is justified. Bell, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 885. Here, defendant\u2019s own testimony at trial did not support the existence of even an unreasonable belief in self-defense. The trial court determined that the threshold for issuing the instruction had not been met, and we find no error.\nDefendant next alleges that he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence of another crime. As noted above, during the State\u2019s case in chief Detective Maslanka testified on cross-examination that he knew defendant\u2019s age prior to defendant\u2019s arrest. Detective Maslanka then admitted that he wrote in a supplementary report that he learned defendant\u2019s age after he provided defendant with his Miranda rights. The prosecutor did not attempt to rehabilitate Detective Maslanka on this issue on redirect examination. However, after Detective Maslanka was cross-examined as to this same issue during the State\u2019s case in rebuttal, the following exchange took place:\n\"ASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: Detective Maslanka, you testified that prior to the defendant\u2019s arrest you knew he was 16, correct?\nMASLANKA: That is correct.\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: Tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury how you knew that?\nMASLANKA: It was learned through investigation that Robert King had been a suspect in another\u2014\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nASSISTANT STATE\u2019S ATTORNEY: You may finish your answer, Detective.\nMASLANKA: Through investigation it was learned that approximately 2 days prior to his arrest Robert King had been in area 3 as a suspect in a separate homicide investigation.\u201d\nDefendant maintains that introduction of the other crime evidence constitutes reversible error. The State responds that evidence of the separate murder investigation was properly introduced to dispel the inference that Detective Maslanka lied about when he learned defendant\u2019s age.\nEvidence of other crimes is not admissible to show a defendant\u2019s propensity to engage in criminal activity. People v. Baptist, 76 Ill. 2d 19, 27, 389 N.E.2d 1200 (1979). However, other crimes evidence may be admitted to show knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan or identification. People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 402 N.E.2d 238 (1980); People v. Johnson, 255 Ill. App. 3d 547, 562, 626 N.E.2d 1073 (1993). The decision of whether to admit evidence of other crimes is within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Young, 118 Ill. App. 3d 803, 808, 455 N.E.2d 845 (1983). Improper introduction of other crimes evidence may be deemed harmless provided that every element of the charged crime has been established by properly admitted evidence and the weight of the admissible evidence is so overwhelming that there exists no reasonable probability that a jury would have acquitted the defendant had the inadmissible evidence been excluded. People v. Wallace, 114 Ill. App. 3d 242, 250, 448 N.E.2d 910 (1983); People v. Thingvold, 66 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1007, 384 N.E.2d 489 (1978).\nIn the present case, we find that it was error for the trial court to allow the testimony that defendant was a suspect in a separate homicide investigation, but that such error was harmless. Detective Maslanka\u2019s testimony that he learned defendant\u2019s age when defendant was being investigated as a suspect in an unrelated homicide constituted evidence of another crime that cannot be placed into any category allowing admissibility. As to the State\u2019s assertion that this evidence of a separate murder investigation was properly introduced to dispel the inference that Detective Maslanka lied about when he learned defendant\u2019s age, we reject this assertion as being patently untrue.\nDuring the State\u2019s case in chief, the defense cross-examined Detective Maslanka about the discrepancy between his report and his trial testimony as to when he learned the age of defendant. On redirect examination, the State asked no questions regarding this issue. It was only during Detective Maslanka\u2019s testimony in rebuttal that the State brought out that the reason Detective Maslanka knew defendant\u2019s age was due to his knowledge of defendant being a suspect in a separate murder investigation. The only conceivable purpose for the State to elicit such information at that time was to prejudice the jury by implying that defendant murdered other persons as well as the victim in this case. Accordingly, we find that it was error for the trial court to allow and the State to elicit evidence of the other crime. However, we also find that such error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against defendant.\nHere, defendant provided a court-reported statement and testified at trial as to his involvement in the murder. Further, the police arrested defendant a few blocks from the scene of the murder, and defendant was wearing the same green jacket as the night before. In addition, two eyewitnesses saw defendant fire a gun from a distance of 15 feet and identified defendant in a police lineup. In sum, the evidence against defendant is so overwhelming that no jury could have acquitted defendant even if the evidence of the other crime was properly excluded. See Wallace, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 250 (even if introduction of evidence of other crimes was erroneous, error was harmless where two eyewitnesses identified defendant and defendant provided inculpatory statement).\nIn reaching our decision, we find a case cited by neither side to be instructive, People v. Watkins, 232 Ill. App. 3d 719, 597 N.E.2d 897 (1992). In Watkins, the trial court granted a motion in limine barring any State witness from mentioning that the defendant had been arrested on a murder charge in Texas. On direct examination of a police officer, the prosecutor elicited testimony that the defendant had been in custody in Texas on a murder charge \u2014 an act by the State even more egregious than in the case before us. In affirming the trial court\u2019s decision not to declare a mistrial, this court found that while it was error for the State to elicit testimony of the other crime, the error was harmless given the weight of the evidence against defendant. Watkins, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 730. Similarly, here, we find that it was error for the State to elicit evidence of the other crime but that such error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against defendant. However, the fact that we find the prosecutor\u2019s actions constitute harmless error does not relieve us of our duty to condemn these actions in the strongest possible terms.\nDefendant further alleges that the trial court considered an improper factor in sentencing defendant. We are compelled by statutory mandate to find that defendant has waived this issue by failing to file a posttrial motion alleging such error within 30 days as required by section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) (West 1994); see People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389 (1997) (holding that the waiver language of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) is mandatory).\nFor the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nGREIMAN, P.J., and ZWICK, J., concur.\nThe offense of voluntary manslaughter has been incorporated into the second degree murder statute (Pub. Act 84 \u2014 1450, \u00a7 2, eff. July 1, 1987).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Gordon H. Berry, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Nancy Colletti, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT KING, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201494\u20143798\nOpinion filed December 12, 1997.\nRehearing denied January 5, 1998.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Gordon H. Berry, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Nancy Colletti, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0739-01", "first_page_order": 759, "last_page_order": 766 }