{ "id": 35406, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY D. ELAM, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Elam", "decision_date": "1998-01-16", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201495\u20140405", "first_page": "313", "last_page": "324", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 313" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2593950 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384746 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 1372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5386205 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 1157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1164" }, { "page": "1164" }, { "page": "1164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 982", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3108842 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "990" }, { "page": "990" }, { "page": "990" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0982-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198905 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124" }, { "page": "1125" }, { "page": "1125" }, { "page": "1125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228419 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "270" }, { "page": "270" }, { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204502 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "2047" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688, 694" }, { "page": "693, 698" }, { "page": "2065, 2068" }, { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" }, { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3125912 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1104, "char_count": 25709, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.345434925059198e-08, "percentile": 0.27302846613837334 }, "sha256": "0dc01beb71cc92090167698a8440261f51c36ab9c7211b99aa3420c665c9a3fd", "simhash": "1:ee3a7e0c41768790", "word_count": 4165 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:51.326352+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY D. ELAM, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant, Gary D. Elam, was found guilty but mentally ill of home invasion, attempted kidnaping, and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections for a term of 20 years\u2019 incarceration for home invasion, to be served concurrently with a term of 15 years\u2019 incarceration for attempted kidnaping, and these terms were ordered to be served consecutively to a term of 20 years\u2019 incarceration for aggravated criminal sexual assault. Defendant appeals, contending that (1) trial counsel was ineffective in presenting the defense of guilty but mentally ill and (2) consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 40 years were excessive in light of defendant\u2019s criminal and mental histories and rehabilitation potential. We affirm.\nI\nOn May 23, 1994, defendant was charged by amended information with committing a home invasion in violation of section 12\u2014 11(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(1) (West 1992)), armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A \u2014 2 (West 1992)), aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(1) (West 1992)), residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3(a) (West 1992)), attempted kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1992)), and battery (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 3(a)(2) (West 1992)).\nThe event giving rise to these charges occurred on April 29, 1994, when defendant unlawfully entered the home of the victim, displayed a knife, and sexually assaulted her.\nThe victim testified that on April 29, 1994, she returned home after 7 a.m., having worked a night shift at a nursing home. Upon returning home, the victim bathed, set her alarm clock, and went to bed attired in some underpants. She fell asleep. Sometime later, someone entered her home. The victim thought it was her mother, who was coming to pick up some keys. The victim later discovered that it was defendant who had entered her home. The victim testified that she had never seen defendant prior to the day of the incident. Defendant wore jeans, a T-shirt, a bandanna, and a belt with a brown case for a knife.\nDefendant tried to pull the bedsheet down, but the victim held on to the sheet, asking defendant what he wanted. He informed the victim that he would not hurt her if she were calm but if she fought him, he would kill her. At that point, defendant began hitting the victim and pulled the sheet down. Defendant straddled the victim while still hitting her. The victim testified that she heard the sound of a snap being released and saw defendant lay down a knife. The victim opined that it was a hunting knife about 12 inches long. The victim stated that defendant laid the knife down as he knelt to kiss her breast. The victim pushed a pillow or a part of the bedspread over the knife.\nSubsequently, the victim\u2019s vision became blurred from defendant\u2019s blows to her head, so she stopped fighting and defendant removed her underpants. The victim told defendant she was menstruating. Defendant removed the tampon. The victim again began to struggle with defendant as he pulled her off the bed, turned her sideways on the bed, and unzipped his pants. Defendant tried to insert his penis into the victim\u2019s vagina. When his penis made contact with her vagina, she scratched him and started fighting with defendant. Defendant fought with the victim on the bed and then got up and told the victim that she was going with him for a couple of days. Defendant threw a pair of jeans and a sweatshirt at the victim, and she put them on. Defendant allowed the victim to wash her face and, restraining her by the neck and waist, led her through the trailer to the outside steps. As they stepped outside, the victim asked defendant to permit her to go back in to get her purse. Upon her return, the victim broke free from defendant and swung her purse at him. Defendant grabbed the victim around the waist, lifting her up as he attempted to force her into the car. The victim kept kicking the car door shut. Defendant then took the victim back inside the trailer and began hitting her, telling her he had warned her of what would happen if she fought back.\nAt that point, the victim\u2019s mother came to the trailer. The victim\u2019s mother testified that she heard her daughter screaming and crying. She saw defendant on top of the victim, choking and hitting her. The victim was struggling to break free from defendant. The victim\u2019s mother tried to grab defendant\u2019s arms, attempting to separate the victim from defendant. Defendant shoved the victim\u2019s mother and told her to get out because it was none of her business. The victim\u2019s mother and the victim continued to struggle with defendant. The victim eventually broke free. Defendant fled from the residence and left in his car. The victim\u2019s mother described the car as a greenish-gray sedan with an antenna for a radio or CB. The victim\u2019s mother tried to read the license plate number on defendant\u2019s car and called the Pope County sheriff.\nBobby Hahn, a neighbor, observed a bluish-gray Chevrolet Cavalier car leaving the victim\u2019s driveway on the morning of the attack. Hahn was able to see the driver as the man backed out of the driveway. At trial, Hahn identified defendant as that man.\nIllinois State Police Trooper Terry Rochford investigated the April 29, 1994, incident at the victim\u2019s residence. Rochford interviewed the victim and recovered physical evidence at the scene, which included a brown electrical cord, a tampon, a knife, a bandanna, a pillowcase, sheets, and a comforter. Forensic reports indicated that one red cotton fiber found on the bottom sheet possibly originated from defendant\u2019s red underwear.\nThe police began pursuit of defendant around 1:20 p.m. on the day of the incident. The pursuit lasted about 10 minutes. Defendant\u2019s car was stopped at a roadblock. Defendant was placed under arrest and given Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)). Defendant was then taken to the Pope County sheriff\u2019s office and questioned.\nIllinois State Police Special Agent Craig Short interviewed defendant. Short testified that defendant stated that he awoke at 3 a.m. on Friday, April 29, 1994. Defendant watched television for a while and then went for a drive. While driving east on One Horse Gap Lake Road, defendant encountered a white female driving a white pickup truck. Defendant turned around and followed the truck to the victim\u2019s residence. Defendant watched the victim enter the trailer. Defendant drove by, turned around, and returned, pulling into the driveway behind the victim\u2019s truck. Defendant entered the trailer through an unlocked door and walked through the kitchen, past the bathroom, and into the bedroom, where he found the victim lying in bed. Defendant told the investigators that he remembered the woman awakening and asking who he was and what he was doing there. Defendant remembered fighting with the victim and the victim\u2019s mother but did not recall sexually assaulting the victim. Defendant accurately described the exterior and interior of the victim\u2019s residence. Defendant admitted to having a knife with him upon entering the victim\u2019s residence. During the interview, defendant was wearing a belt with an empty knife holder.\nDr. Michael Althoff, a psychologist, testified as an expert witness for defendant. Dr. Althoif evaluated defendant as to his mental state at the time of the offense. Based upon interviews with defendant, relatives, and jail personnel, as well as a review of medical records, notes from defendant, and police reports, Dr. Althoff diagnosed defendant as suffering from bipolar disorder, a severe mental illness. Dr. Althoff concluded that defendant was not insane at the time of the incident but, rather, defendant fit the legal definition of guilty but mentally ill. Dr. Althoff stated that in stressful conditions individuals with bipolar disorder commonly experience memory lapses. Because defendant could not recall his involvement in behavior related to the offense, Dr. Althoff was unable to determine defendant\u2019s intent at the time of the incident. Dr. Althoff opined that without the presence of a major mental illness and some significant stressors in his life, defendant would not have engaged in the behavior that became this offense.\nDuring the bench trial, defendant cross-examined the victim, attempting to elicit that defendant did not make sexual contact with the victim. Defense counsel was able to elicit from the victim that she never saw defendant with an erection and that she was unable to determine if he had an erection. Defense counsel, during closing argument, contended that the evidence before the court did not support either the armed violence count or the aggravated criminal sexual assault count beyond a reasonable doubt. Defense counsel insisted:\n\"The evidence before the Court in reference to all the counts in the informations, except for two, is certainly overwhelming, and the two counts I want to briefly address the Court [sic] is [sic] the armed violence count and the aggravated criminal sexual assault count, because I think beyond a reasonable doubt the evidence does not support the contention that Gary Elam\u2019s penis came in contact with the victim\u2019s vagina. I want to refer the Court\u2019s attention to my cross[-]examination of her[,] which certainly flushed out the details of why she thought his penis had come in contact with her vagina, because she said his hands were on my legs, but I asked her the question, ['][I]s it possible some other part of his body, like his hands or his hips or some other part of his body had touched you there and you thought it was his penis[?\u2019], because she testified she never saw that he had a hard-on and she never felt that he had a hard-on \u2014 or an erection \u2014 and she said, '[W]ell, his hands were on my legs,\u2019 and that was the only thing she said. She said he unzipped his pants and he never took his pants off, and I submit to the Courtf,] given the fact that that is such an important element in these two counts, that the State has not met its burden of proof to show beyond a reasonable doubt that that\u2019s definitely what happened. I will just make that argument to the Court because it could have been the side of his pants, the edge of his zipper area that was touching her there instead of his penis because she did not see it.\u201d\nDefense counsel concluded by urging the court to consider defendant\u2019s mental illness in arriving at a judgment in the case, stating:\n\"[W]e would ask you to look at the overwhelming evidence on our side of the case about the state of mind this man had and the control he had over his faculties, and [we] would [ask you to] find that he was suffering from a substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior which afflicted him at the time of the commission of the offense, which impaired his judgement, but not to the extent that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior because I think what the evidence shows overwhelmingly from both sides of the coin is that Gary Elam, but for the fact that he suffers from this mental disorder, and but for the fact that he was suffering from this disorder on April 29th, 1994, would never have done anything like this. It was his illness that affected his ability to do the right thing, not to the extent that he didn\u2019t know right from wrong, but certainly led him down the path to do something that he would not have normally done, and, therefore, he is guilty but mentally ill, and that is why I am asking this Court to enter a judgement of not guilty of the two counts that I commented on, which were the armed violence count, which is Count Two, and the aggravated criminal sexual assault count, which is Count Three. Certainly the State\u2019s case has shown an attempt at that offense, but not a commission of it, and [we ask] that [for] any counts the Court finds him guilty on, that [sic] he be found guilty but mentally ill.\u201d\nAt the close of all the evidence, the court found defendant guilty but mentally ill on all counts. The court sentenced defendant to 20 years\u2019 incarceration for home invasion, to be served concurrently with a term of 15 years\u2019 incarceration for attempted kidnaping. The court further sentenced defendant to a term of 20 years\u2019 incarceration for aggravated criminal sexual assault, to be served consecutively. Defendant\u2019s motion to reduce sentence was denied. Defendant appeals.\nII\nDefendant maintains he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel\u2019s theory of defense was to present evidence and argument that defendant was guilty of all charges but suffered from a mental disorder. Trial counsel presented testimony from three witnesses, all of whom testified regarding defendant\u2019s mental illness. Defendant further insists that Dr. Althoff, defendant\u2019s expert witness, made statements during direct examination that conceded defendant\u2019s guilt. Likewise, trial counsel, in his closing argument, abdicated defendant\u2019s innocence by stating to the court, \"We are not disagreeing that Gary Elam committed a number of different crimes ***.\u201d Defendant argues that because counsel conceded defendant\u2019s guilt, trial counsel was ineffective and defendant\u2019s convictions must be reversed. We disagree.\nA defendant asserting the ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) that his counsel\u2019s performance \" 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness\u2019 \u201d and (2) that \" 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u2019 \u201d People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449, 461, 488 N.E.2d 513, 517 (1985), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 2068 (1984). However, there are some circumstances where the two-part test set forth in Strickland need not be applied. In Hattery, our supreme court stated, \"Where 'counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.\u2019 \u201d Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 461, 488 N.E.2d at 518, quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 668, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047 (1984). However, it is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel \"whenever the defense attorney concedes his client\u2019s guilt to offenses in which there is overwhelming evidence of that\u2019 guilt but fails to show on the record consent by defendant.\u201d People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 269, 538 N.E.2d 1118, 1124 (1989). \"In situations where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt and no defense, if counsel contests all charges he is liable to lose credibility with the trier of fact when it comes to charges where a legitimate defense exists.\u2019\u2019 128 Ill. 2d at 270, 538 N.E.2d at 1125.\nIn light of the facts in this case, we believe that defense counsel\u2019s representation subjected the State\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Likewise, counsel did not unequivocally abdicate defendant\u2019s innocence to the State\u2019s charges or concede all of the elements of home invasion, residential burglary, attempted kidnaping, armed violence, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and battery. Counsel, during trial and closing argument, asserted a theory of innocence with respect to two of the charges against defendant, namely, armed violence and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Counsel, during cross-examination of the victim, attempted to elicit details about defendant\u2019s alleged nonthreatening display of the knife and the alleged criminal sexual assault to show that the elements of these offenses had not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, during closing argument, counsel, referring to the victim\u2019s cross-examination testimony, maintained that the State did not meet its burden of proof because the evidence did not support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the armed violence and aggravated criminal sexual assault counts. Clearly, defense counsel\u2019s strategy does not indicate a wholesale abandonment of defendant\u2019s defense.\nFurther, defense counsel did not unequivocally concede all elements of the remaining counts of home invasion, residential burglary, attempted kidnaping, and battery but rather acknowledged that the evidence was overwhelming that defendant committed these acts. \"When faced with overwhelming evidence, counsel faces a difficult task.\u201d People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 396, 655 N.E.2d 873, 880 (1995). Here, had counsel contested all charges, he would have lost credibility with the trier of fact when it came to the armed violence and criminal sexual assault charges where a legitimate defense could be asserted. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d at 270, 538 N.E.2d at 1125. Rather than lose credibility by contesting the remaining charges in which there was overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt and no valid defense, counsel opted to ask the court for the entry of a judgment of guilty but mentally ill. We find that although defense counsel conceded defendant\u2019s guilt for home invasion, residential burglary, attempted kidnaping, and battery, counsel did not concede guilt for armed violence and criminal sexual assault. Therefore, defense counsel did not entirely fail to subject the prosecution\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing.\nIll\nBecause we conclude that defense counsel subjected the State\u2019s case to meaningful adversarial testing, we now apply the Strickland test to determine if counsel\u2019s representation was ineffective. \"Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be disposed of on the ground that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the claimed errors, without deciding the first prong, whether the errors were serious enough to constitute less than reasonably effective assistance.\u201d Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d at 271, 538 N.E.2d at 1125. Under Strickland\u2019s second prong, the defendant must show that \"there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068-69.\nDefendant claims that counsel committed error in presenting a guilty but mentally ill defense in the context of a trial. Defendant asserts that he could not be found guilty but mentally ill after a trial because he did not raise an insanity defense. Defendant further argues that mental illness is not an affirmative defense, unlike insanity, and that defense counsel\u2019s guilty but mentally ill defense at trial amounted to an attempt to enter a blind guilty plea. We disagree.\nOn November 7, 1994, defendant filed a motion for the County of Pope to pay for expert witnesses, and in the motion defendant stated that he intended to raise the insanity defense and sought payment of professional costs for defendant\u2019s psychological evaluation. On November 18, 1994, the trial court entered an order approving payment for professional services and testimony. The order stated that defendant intended to assert an insanity defense and that the psychological evaluation was necessary for the presentation of that defense. The record clearly shows that defense counsel intended to present an insanity defense.\nAfter evaluating defendant, reviewing his medical and psychological histories, and interviewing family members and others, Dr. Althoff concluded that defendant was not legally insane at the time he committed the offenses. Instead, Dr. Althoff diagnosed defendant as suffering from bipolar disorder, a severe mental illness. Dr. Althoff testified that memory lapses are common among persons with bipolar disorder and that defendant had experienced such a memory lapse with respect to his involvement in the offenses at issue here. Defendant\u2019s memory lapse prevented Dr. Althoff from determining defendant\u2019s intent at the time of the crime. Therefore, Dr. Althoff concluded that defendant fit the category of guilty but mentally ill.\nDefendant contends that the question of his insanity remains unresolved and that defense counsel should have sought a second opinion to determine whether insanity might exist. Defendant insists that defense counsel\u2019s failure to obtain a second medical opinion is akin to ineffectiveness claims based on the failure to investigate. A defense counsel\u2019s failure to investigate and discover witnesses favorable to the defendant may constitute ineffective assistance. People v. Lewis, 97 Ill. App. 3d 982, 990, 423 N.E.2d 1157, 1164 (1981). However, it must be shown \"not only that counsel\u2019s action amounted to incompetence, but also that defendant was substantially prejudiced as a result of the particular action, without which the result probably would have been different.\u201d 97 Ill. App. 3d at 990, 423 N.E.2d at 1164. In light of defendant\u2019s prior diagnosis of bipolar disorder and his extensive medical history with this illness, defendant has failed to present any evidence to demonstrate how a second medical opinion would have changed the outcome here. We decline to speculate as to the nature and impact of this omitted evidence. Such speculation cannot be a basis for a showing of ineffective representation. 97 Ill. App. 3d at 990, 423 N.E.2d at 1164. Further, defendant has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the omission of such expert testimony. Defense counsel is not required to manufacture a defense where no valid defense exists. People v. Flores, 245 Ill. App. 3d 149, 157, 613 N.E.2d 1372, 1378 (1993). Accordingly, we cannot conclude to a reasonable probability that a second expert\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s insanity at the time he committed the offenses would have led the court to a different result respecting defendant\u2019s guilt.\nIV\nLastly, defendant contends that in light of his criminal and mental health histories and rehabilitation potential, the court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to 20 years\u2019 incarceration for home invasion and 15 years\u2019 incarceration for attempted kidnaping, to be served concurrently, and 20 years\u2019 incarceration for aggravated criminal sexual assault to be served consecutively. Defendant claims that a total of 40 years\u2019 incarceration is excessive and that the trial court sentenced defendant to \"what was in effect first degree murder time.\u201d Defendant complains that the trial court failed to adequately consider that defendant suffers from bipolar disorder, a severe mental illness, and that defendant\u2019s only criminal history involves two nonviolent offenses. Defendant maintains that the court failed to balance these considerations with testimonies that defendant is stable and law-abiding while following his medical regime. Defendant further asserts that the court\u2019s sentence reflects a failure to consider defendant\u2019s sincere plea of remorse for his actions. We disagree.\nThe imposition of a sentence is a matter of the trial court\u2019s discretion. People v. Lintz, 245 Ill. App. 3d 658, 668, 615 N.E.2d 366, 372 (1993). When a sentence falls within the statutory limit and there is no abuse of discretion, this court will not vacate or reduce a sentence. People v. Camp, 201 Ill. App. 3d 330, 340, 559 N.E.2d 26, 32 (1990).\nThe record shows that the trial court considered and weighed the particular facts and circumstances of the case as well as defendant\u2019s prior history. The court acknowledged, as a mitigating factor, that defendant was acting under a severe emotional problem at the time the offense occurred. The court found as aggravating factors defendant\u2019s conscious decision not to take his medication to control his illness and defendant\u2019s slight criminal history. The court noted the seriousness of the crime defendant committed, and the court also noted that the incident could have escalated to a \"death-involved event.\u201d The court opined that the incident could have been precluded had defendant followed the prescribed medical regimen for controlling his mental illness. Considering defendant\u2019s statement of remorse, the court observed that the situation was a sad case for both the victim and her family and defendant and the Elam family.\nThere is no suggestion in the record that the court failed to give meaningful consideration to all mitigating and aggravating factors. Instead, the sentencing decision was the product of a careful balancing of all factors and a well-reasoned attempt to fit the sentence to the particular offender as well as the offense. Defendant argues that the court did not give sufficient consideration to defendant\u2019s remorse and rehabilitation potential. We believe that these factors were not disregarded by the court but rather were not viewed as pivotal factors in its decision. \"A trial court need not place greater weight on a defendant\u2019s rehabilitation potential than on the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public.\u201d Lintz, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 615 N.E.2d at 372. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its sentencing of defendant, and we decline to reduce the sentence.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Pope County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCHAPMAN and MAAG, JJ\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and Donna Hickstein-Foley, of Foley & Foley, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Evan Owens, State\u2019s Attorney, of Golconda (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Rebecca Sanders, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARY D. ELAM, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201495\u20140405\nOpinion filed January 16, 1998.\nDaniel M. Kirwan, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and Donna Hickstein-Foley, of Foley & Foley, of Chicago, for appellant.\nEvan Owens, State\u2019s Attorney, of Golconda (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Rebecca Sanders, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0313-01", "first_page_order": 331, "last_page_order": 342 }