{ "id": 35381, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACKIE LYNN CORRIE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Corrie", "decision_date": "1998-01-22", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201497\u20140050", "first_page": "496", "last_page": "508", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 496" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173172 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 N.E.2d 938", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "DiVito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5370906 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "DiVito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 868", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1107758 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment" }, { "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment" }, { "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1189-90", "parenthetical": "Ryan, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549914 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379-81", "parenthetical": "Ryan, J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "nonprecedential supreme court supervisory order" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "681 N.E.2d 1089", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1094", "parenthetical": "McCullough, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351027 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "McCullough, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295580 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 1191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1194" }, { "page": "1197" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993 Ill. Laws 2604", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586" }, { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317111 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 3420", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "643 N.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477642 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" }, { "page": "202" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2558523 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "317" }, { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0310-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1258, "char_count": 30560, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8265794994745134e-07, "percentile": 0.7201143773247012 }, "sha256": "edc88ed3350ca1f1020052371aa80dfb24994dc1ff13344c0d8fab035ff74b91", "simhash": "1:b36ed0ed7e85c9fe", "word_count": 5071 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:51.326352+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACKIE LYNN CORRIE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn November 1996, a jury convicted defendant, Jackie Lynn Corrie, of aggravated battery of a child, finding that she knowingly caused great bodily harm to her son, A.C. (born June 20, 1995), when he was under 13 years of age (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.3(a) (West 1994)). The trial court later sentenced her to 30 months\u2019 probation, subject to various conditions. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the court erred in instructing the jury; (2) the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the court erred in sentencing her. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nAt defendant\u2019s trial, the evidence showed the following. At approximately 7:15 a.m. on October 26,1995, defendant\u2019s mother, Karen Skaggs, picked up A.C. (who was four months old at the time) and his four-year-old brother to take them to their baby-sitter\u2019s house. Skaggs testified that A.C. was sitting in his car seat when she arrived at defendant\u2019s house, and he appeared to be \"fine.\u201d She stopped on the way to the baby-sitter\u2019s house to buy doughnuts and left the children in the car for a couple of minutes. When Skaggs dropped the children off at the baby-sitter\u2019s house, nothing seemed wrong with A.C. She left the baby-sitter\u2019s house shortly after 7:30 a.m.\nRobin Champion, A.C.\u2019s baby-sitter, testified that after Skaggs left, she put A.C. on the living room floor in his car seat. He was playing with some plastic toys and seemed fine. At some point, Champion began changing A.C.\u2019s clothes and noticed \"his whole body was limp,\u201d his head was tilted, and his eyes were partially closed. Champion then held A.C.\u2019s hands and tried to get him to respond. After a few seconds to a minute, she called defendant, who stated \"oh, my God, or oh, my gosh,\u201d but did not ask any questions about what was wrong with A.C. Champion denied shaking A.C. to get him to respond to her.\nA.C. was transported from Champion\u2019s house to BroMenn Medical Center (BroMenn). At BroMenn, A.C. was initially diagnosed with \"meningitis, encephalitis.\u201d Because his condition was worsening (he was experiencing seizures and a lessening level of alertness), he was transferred to St. Francis Medical Center (St. Francis) on the evening of October 26, 1995. Soon after his admission, A.C. underwent a computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). A radiologist initially interpreted the CAT scan as normal and the MRI as showing some areas of irritation in the brain.\nDr. Robert Cruse is a child neurologist and professor at the University of Illinois College of Medicine. On October 30, 1995, Cruse took over A.C.\u2019s care from Cruse\u2019s medical partner. On that date, Cruse examined A.C. and found him \"sluggish, lethargic, *** [and without] purposeful movement.\u201d He also examined A.C.\u2019s eyes and found hemorrhaging which had previously gone unnoticed. Cruse reviewed the previous CAT scan and found there was \"blood on the original CAT scan that had not been appreciated.\u201d Cruse then reviewed the MRI and the CAT scan with a neuroradiologist (a radiologist specializing in brain hemorrhage), who agreed that the CAT scan revealed blood and the irritation shown on the MRI was \"compatible with blood.\u201d Cruse stated that \"[a]t that point[,] it was clear there had been bleeding in the brain.\u201d Cruse also stated that most of the blood was on the surface of A.C.\u2019s brain, a condition which is \"quite abnormal.\u201d\nCruse then called in two ophthalmologists to more thoroughly examine A.C.\u2019s eyes. Cruse stated that their examinations confirmed the hemorrhage and showed retinal tears and blood on different layers of A.C.\u2019s eyes. Cruse also stated that after reviewing their examination findings, he changed A.C.\u2019s diagnosis from encephalitis to \"shaken baby syndrome.\u201d\nDr. Cruse testified that \"shaken baby syndrome is a term used for children who experience a vigorous, violent force of movement of their head forward and backwards.\u201d When a child is shaken, his head is \"going violently forward and backward with an acceleration/ deceleration force,\u201d which results in bleeding on the brain\u2019s surface between the skull and brain. Cruse also stated that such surface bleeding is typically the only symptom of shaken baby syndrome, and that, although he cannot give the exact amount of force required to cause the injuries suffered by A.C., it does require \"a very vigorous and violent force.\u201d Cruse opined that the onset of symptoms occurs within \"a few hours\u201d of a baby being shaken. He also opined that A.C.\u2019s injuries were significant, stating that the life-threatening injuries \"put him in [the] Intensive Care Unit, [and] caused coma and seizure[s] and hemorrhage to his brain.\u201d\nDr. Peter Lagouros was one of the ophthalmologists who conducted an eye examination on A.C. He observed hemorrhage with schisis (a splitting of the retinal layers) within both retinas and blood in the front of the retinas. Lagouros opined that the combination of schisis and hemorrhage \"is tantamount of Shaken Baby Syndrome, meaning there cannot be other causes.\u201d On cross-examination, Lagouros stated that it is possible for shaken baby syndrome to occur during vigorous resuscitation efforts on a baby. Lagouros also stated that the damage to the eyes of a baby suffering from shaken baby syndrome would \"[djevelop very quickly.\u201d\nJay Brenneman, an investigator for the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), testified that he first spoke with defendant on November 1, 1995, after Kathy McVey, a social worker at St. Francis, contacted DCFS. During the first interview, defendant gave the following story: (1) on October 25, 1995, she and her husband, John, went to bed around 10 p.m., at which time A.C. was fine; (2) defendant starting feeling ill during the night; (3) A.C. awakened around 3:30 a.m. and John fed him; (4) the next morning, John left for work without taking the children to the baby-sitter, so defendant called Skaggs and asked her to do so; and (5) defendant put A.C. in his car seat before Skaggs arrived.\nAt some point during the interview, Brenneman told defendant that he thought she knew what happened, and she replied, \"Is it possible that I could have done this and not known it?\u201d Brenneman said he did not believe so and that he wanted to know how many times she shook A.C. Defendant said, \"You\u2019re right, but I only did it twice.\u201d Defendant stated that as she was preparing to feed A.C. at around 6:45 a.m. on October 26, 1995, he was \"fussy.\u201d She shook him twice and told him to \"wait a minute\u201d for his bottle.\nAt this point in the interview, defendant began sobbing and said, \"No, wait, I couldn\u2019t have done this. I am just telling you this so[ ] you won\u2019t take my children from me.\u201d John then came into the room, and Brenneman told John what had taken place in the interview. Brenneman told John he thought defendant knew in her heart what happened. He then left defendant and John alone, and when he returned, defendant again admitted shaking A.C. Defendant signed a written statement indicating that she had shaken A.C. twice and that she was sorry for what happened.\nThe State also presented other evidence of defendant\u2019s conflicting statements, in which she sometimes acknowledged that she had shaken A.C. and then later recanted, claiming that she had been coerced into making those admissions.\nDefendant testified and denied ever shaking A.C. She stated that she was not feeling well on October 26, 1995, so she decided not to go to work. She called her mother around 7 a.m. and asked her to pick up the children and take them to the baby-sitter\u2019s house. Defendant put A.C. in his car seat around 7:05 or 7:10 a.m., and Skaggs arrived around 7:15 or 7:20 a.m. A.C. was smiling and \"normal.\u201d\nDefendant stated that during her initial interview with Brenneman, she denied any wrongdoing, and Brenneman began accusing her of shaking A.C. Defendant acknowledged that, at some point during the interview, she asked Brenneman if it was possible that she had injured A.C. and not realized it. He said \"no,\u201d and defendant asked what was going to happen. When he discussed the placement options for the children, she decided to lie so that the children would be placed with family members. Defendant also claimed that she was pressured into admitting that she had shaken A.C., which she denied ever doing.\nOn cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that she knew that infants\u2019 heads are \"particularly delicate\u201d and should not be allowed to \"flop\u201d around. Defendant also stated that she had seen a flyer at work entitled, \"Never Shake Your Baby.\u201d She denied that she had admitted shaking A.C. before John came into the room during the first interview. John testified and essentially corroborated defendant\u2019s version of events.\nDr. Mark Greenwald, an associate professor of ophthalmology at Northwestern University and an expert on shaken baby syndrome, testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. He stated that he does not know exactly how hard a person must shake a baby to cause shaken baby syndrome. He also stated that it is possible for a person to cause shaken baby syndrome in an accidental manner, \"particularly by someone maybe relatively inexperienced *** with infants.\u201d\nGreenwald first examined A.C. in December 1995, and he has treated him three or four times since. Greenwald diagnosed A.C. as having sustained a shaking injury and opined that A.C.\u2019s vision in his left eye will be normal or close to normal, but his vision in his right eye might \"suffer permanent visual loss.\u201d\nOn cross-examination; Greenwald testified that A.C.\u2019s injuries could have been inflicted on October 26, 1995. He also stated that shaken baby syndrome does not occur \"without repetitive deceleration.\u201d Greenwald further stated that he had never heard of a case in which a baby suffered shaken baby syndrome while strapped in a car seat.\nOn this evidence, the jury convicted defendant of aggravated battery of a child.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The Trial Court\u2019s Giving of the Pattern Instruction for \u25a0 Aggravated Battery of a Child\nDefendant first argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury. Defendant contends that the court needed to instruct the jury that, in order to find defendant guilty, it had to find more than that she knew she was causing her son \"bodily harm\u201d; defendant contends the jury had to find she knew she was causing \"great bodily harm.\u201d Defendant tendered instructions to the court consistent with this theory, but the court rejected them and used the standard instructions instead.\nThe trial court instructed the jury in accordance with Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 11.25 and 11.26 (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d), which read, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\"A person commits the offense of aggravated battery of a child when he, being a person of the age of 18 years or more, knowingly by any means, causes great bodily harm to any child under the age of 13 years.\u201d IPI Criminal 3d No. 11.25.\n\"To sustain the charge of aggravated battery of a child, the State must prove the following propositions:\nFirst Proposition: That the defendant knowingly caused great bodily harm to [A.C.] ***.\u201d IPI Criminal 3d No. 11.26.\nThe trial court also instructed the jury in accordance with IPI Criminal 3d No. 5.01B, as follows: \"A person acts knowingly with regard to the result of her conduct when she is consciously aware that such result is practically certain to be caused by her conduct.\u201d\nThe modifications of instructions No. 11.25 and 11.26 that defendant submitted \u2014 and the trial court rejected \u2014 read as follows:\n\"A person commits the offense of Aggravated Battery of a Child when she, being a person of the age of 18 years or older, knowingly causes bodily harm to another; and, at the time she does so, she knows the harm caused is great bodily harm.\nTo sustain the charge of aggravated battery of a child, the State must prove the following propositions:\nFirst Proposition: That the defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to [A.C.]; and\nSecond Proposition: That at the time she caused the bodily harm, the defendant knew that the harm she caused was great bodily harm ***.\u201d\nDefendant argues to this court essentially the same as she argued to the trial court, as follows:\n\"The crux of Defendant\u2019s complaint is that the jury could have concluded that the defendant knew that she was causing 'bodily harm\u2019; but in fact did not know that she was causing 'great bodily harm\u2019. Under that analysis, and under the instructions of the Court, the jury would convict, notwithstanding the fact that such analysis overlooks the requirement that the jury find that the Defendant knew that she was causing 'great bodily harm\u2019 to her ___>} son.\nIn effect (but without ever saying so directly), defendant here argues that IPI Criminal 3d Nos. 11.25 and 11.26 do not correctly state the law. As did the trial court, we reject this argument.\nThe primary case defendant cited to the trial court (and cites again on appeal) in support of her claim is People v. Shannon, 206 Ill. App. 3d 310, 564 N.E.2d 198 (1990), in which the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery and appealed, in part, on the ground that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to respond to an inquiry from the jury. In Shannon, the defendant was charged with throwing an object through the driver\u2019s window of a pickup truck and fracturing the driver\u2019s skull. However, the testimony conflicted as to how many of the youths present, in addition to the defendant, threw objects at the truck and whether the truck\u2019s driver had tried to run them over. Shannon, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 313, 564 N.E.2d at 200. The defendant contended that he did not throw the rock that hit the victim and, if he did, he did not intend serious injury.\nThe jury in Shannon was given the then-standard aggravated battery instructions (Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 11.05, 11.07, 11.08 (2d ed. 1981)) but during deliberations, it sent the following note to the trial court: \"On the first proposition for Agg. Batt.[,] clarify is it intent to throw the Rock and it Resulted in great Bodily Harm or is it to throw the Rock intending to do great Bodily Harm.\u201d Shannon, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 315, 564 N.E.2d at 202. Defense counsel asked the court to inform the jury that the latter definition was correct, but the court refused, instead telling the jury to look at the instructions and use its common sense. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty of aggravated battery.\nAs this recitation shows, the issue before this court in Shannon was not the appropriateness of the aggravated battery instructions; instead, the issue was whether the trial court erred by not responding to the jury\u2019s question. The Shannon court noted that although the IPI instructions regarding aggravated battery are readily understandable, the problem there arose because the jury might have been confused about the presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his act. The Shannon court noted that \"[n]o instructions relative to this issue were given to the jury.\u201d Shannon, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 317, 564 N.E.2d at 203. Thus, the court concluded that, regardless of the instruction defining aggravated battery, \"the jury could have based its verdict of guilt on [a] finding that the defendant did intend throwing the concrete, but without finding that beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant intended to cause the great bodily harm.\u201d Shannon, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 317, 564 N.E.2d at 203.\nThe analysis in Shannon does not apply to the present case for two reasons. First, the issue before us is not how the trial court should have responded to a question from the jury which revealed its confusion or uncertainty regarding the instructions it received; the jury here sent out no such note, and this record contains no indication that the jury had any trouble understanding the instructions it received. Second, and most significantly, the court in the present case gave the jury IPI Criminal 3d No. 5.01B, which had the practical effect of telling the jury about \"the natural and probable consequences of [the defendant\u2019s] act,\u201d about which the court in Shannon expressed concern. In our judgment, IPI Criminal 3d No. 5.01B fully addresses defendant\u2019s concern that the jury here might have convicted her if it found only that she may have intended bodily harm, not great bodily harm.\nIn People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 115-16, 643 N.E.2d 762, 773-74 (1994), the supreme court addressed the issue of the adequacy of jury instructions and wrote as follows:\n\"The purpose of jury instructions is to provide to the jury the correct legal principles applicable to the evidence, so that the jury may reach a correct conclusion according to the law and the evidence. [Citation.] In criminal cases, where Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions contain an applicable instruction giving due consideration to the facts and the governing law, the IPI instruction is to be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law. (134 Ill. 2d R. 451(a).) In determining the adequacy of instructions, a reviewing court will consider all of the instructions as a whole to ascertain if they fully and fairly cover the law.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nConsidering the instructions given in this case as a whole \u2014 as directed by Novak \u2014 we conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury.\nB. Sufficiency of the Evidence\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\nC. The Trial Court\u2019s Refusal To Sentence Defendant Pursuant to the \"Special Penalty Provision\u201d\nLast, defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to sentence her pursuant to the \"special penalty provision\u201d set forth in section 12 \u2014 4.3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.3(b) (West 1994)). That provision, since repealed by Public Act 89 \u2014 313, effective January 1, 1996 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 313, \u00a7 5, eff. January 1, 1996 (1995 Ill. Laws 3420, 3420-21)), in effect provided for a form of supervision for persons convicted of aggravated battery of a child \u2014 that is, the court was authorized to refrain from entering a judgment of guilt upon the convicted defendant and to place him or her upon probation. If the defendant fulfilled the terms and conditions imposed, \"the court shall discharge such person and dismiss the proceedings.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.2(b)(2) (West 1994).\nPrior to sentencing defendant, the trial court noted that she is a good person and a good parent, and the incident here \"occurred in no more than a few seconds out of a life of 28-plus years.\u201d The court further noted that although defendant could have accepted responsibility for her conduct, she was \"not going to be punished for exercising her right to go to trial.\u201d However, despite the extensive mitigating evidence defendant presented at her sentencing hearing, the court rejected the notion of sentencing defendant pursuant to section 12\u2014 4.3(b) of the Code (the \"special penalty provision\u201d under which a defendant may successfully complete probation and then have charges dismissed) (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.3(b) (West 1994)). The court remarked that such a sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense, and this case did not constitute the \"rare case\u201d which warrants the special penalty provision. The court then sentenced defendant to 30 months\u2019 probation.\nDefendant contends that the circumstances of this case showed her to be an excellent candidate for the \"special probation provision\u201d and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request to be sentenced pursuant to this special probation provision. Defendant claims that the court\u2019s explanatory remarks regarding why it was not going to sentence her under the special probation provision \"can only be interpreted as the imposition of additional penalty on the defendant as a consequence of her decision to fight the case and go to trial.\u201d\nIn response, the State first contends that defendant waived any contention of error because she failed to object to the trial court\u2019s findings during the sentencing hearing. The State claims that defendant, having failed to object in the trial court, should be barred from raising this issue on appeal.\nSince the State filed its brief, the supreme court decided People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997), holding that section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) (West 1994)), as amended by Public Act 88 \u2014 311, effective August 11, 1993 (Pub. Act 88 \u2014 311, \u00a7 15, eff. August 11, 1993 (1993 Ill. Laws 2604, 2615)), requires that \"sentencing issues be raised in the trial court in order to preserve those issues for appellate review.\u201d Reed, 177 Ill. 2d at 393, 686 N.E.2d at 586. The court went on to hold that \"the plain language now contained in section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 1(c) shows a clear legislative intent to make a post-sentencing motion the functional equivalent of a post-trial motion for purposes of preserving issues for appeal.\u201d Reed, 177 Ill. 2d at 394, 686 N.E.2d at 586.\nIn Reed, the defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, sentenced to seven years in prison, and sought to challenge his sentence on appeal as excessive. The consolidated case involved defendant Turner, who was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of life in prison and 30 years. On appeal, Turner sought to argue that the trial court improperly considered certain factors during sentencing. The appellate court rejected both defendants\u2019 sentencing claims on the grounds that they were waived because neither defendant filed a postsentencing motion, as required by section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Corrections Code.\nIn its conclusion, the supreme court in Reed seemed to agree with that disposition and wrote as follows:\n\"For the reasons stated, we find that defendants waived their contentions of error by failing to raise those issues in a post-sentencing motion in the trial court. Defendants do not argue that their sentencing challenges amount to plain error. Accordingly, the judgments of the appellate court are affirmed.\u201d Reed, 177 Ill. 2d at 395, 686 N.E.2d at 587.\nAt this court\u2019s request, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the effect of Reed on the issues before us. In her supplemental brief, defendant argues that Reed should not apply to her because the supreme court announced Reed during the pendency of her appeal. Defendant also argues that even assuming she waived the issue, the trial court\u2019s error amounted to plain error. We disagree.\n1. Waiver (or, More Correctly, Forfeiture)\nThe supreme court\u2019s decisions generally apply to all cases that are pending \u2014 including pending on appeal \u2014 when the supreme court announces its decisions, unless the supreme court directs otherwise. People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 365, 666 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (1996). Because the supreme court in Reed did not direct that its decision be applied prospectively only, Reed applies to the present case.\nNevertheless, defendant contends that Reed should not apply to her because (1) the appellate court districts had previously expressed conflicting views regarding the necessity of filing a postsentencing motion as a prerequisite to an appeal; and (2) she had followed People v. Porter, 285 Ill. App. 3d 50, 52, 676 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1996), in which this court held that section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Corrections Code, as amended, did not require the filing of a postsentencing motion.\nBefore addressing the issue of waiver further, we wish to discuss whether this issue is one of \"waiver\u201d at all. As our distinguished colleague, Justice McCullough, has written in dissent in an unrelated case, \"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Why would a defendant ever knowingly give up a day of credit?\u201d People v. Moore, 289 Ill. App. 3d 357, 365, 681 N.E.2d 1089, 1094 (1997) (McCullough, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), appeal denied, 175 Ill. 2d 545 (1997) (nonprecedential supreme court supervisory order).\nJustice McCullough\u2019s point is an excellent one and demonstrates the imprecise language courts of review too often use. In the present case, for example, we would be more accurate to frame the issue as follows: \"did defendant forfeit her right to raise the issue of her sentence on appeal?\u201d rather than asking whether she had waived that right.\nThis difference in terminology was discussed at some length in Justice Ryan\u2019s specially concurring opinion in People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 379-81, 522 N.E.2d 1184, 1189-90 (1988) (Ryan, J., specially concurring), where Justice Ryan pointed out that waiver is an intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege, whereas a procedural default \u2014 such as allegedly occurred in this case \u2014 relates to a failure by counsel to comply with certain procedural requirements. This failure results in the forfeiture of the defendant\u2019s right to raise that error on appeal.\nJustice Scalia has noted regarding the United States Supreme Court\u2019s use of the term \"waive\u201d instead of \"forfeit,\u201d that \"[t]he two are really not the same, although our cases have so often used them interchangeably that it may be too late to introduce precision.\u201d Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2, 115 L. Ed. 2d 764, 790 n.2, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2647 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also People v. Lann, 261 Ill. App. 3d 456, 479 n.11, 633 N.E.2d 938, 954 n.11 (1994) (DiVito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (\"Our courts have long used the term 'waiver\u2019 when perhaps 'forfeiture\u2019 might have been more accurate\u201d); see also T. O\u2019Neill, Terms \u201dWaiver\u201d and Forfeiture\u201d Often Interchanged in Error, Chi. Daily L. Bull., August 22, 1997, at 5.\nWe agree with the views expressed by the foregoing distinguished jurists and scholars, and we take this opportunity to indicate that in the future, we will try to use the terms \"waiver\u201d and \"forfeiture\u201d more precisely. Accordingly, we now continue our analysis of whether defendant forfeited her right under Reed to raise on appeal the issue of her sentence.\nIn People v. Crete, 113 Ill. 2d 156, 497 N.E.2d 751 (1986), the supreme court rejected a defendant\u2019s argument that the court\u2019s interpretation of an earlier version of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Corrections Code should not apply to his case where appellate court decisions on the issue were conflicting. In Crete, the supreme court interpreted section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Corrections Code to determine whether that statute\u2019s time period for the reduction or modification of a sentence was permissive or mandatory. The defendant argued that the statutory language was permissive and the court should interpret the statute to allow for a hearing on his motion to reduce his sentence. The supreme court in Crete noted that it had not previously addressed the issue and the decisions of the appellate court on the issue were conflicting. The court went on to conclude that the plain language of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) required that it be interpreted as mandatory. The court\u2019s interpretation defeated the defendant\u2019s claim, and the defendant argued that this interpretation should not be applied retroactively to his case. The supreme court rejected that argument, concluding that even though prior appellate court decisions had interpreted the statute in the manner urged by the defendant, the supreme court\u2019s decision did not constitute a change in the law which warranted prospective application only. Crete, 113 Ill. 2d at 163, 497 N.E.2d at 754.\nNor do we agree with defendant\u2019s contention that Reed should not apply to her because she relied upon a decision by this court (in the district in which her case arose), holding that section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Corrections Code does not require the filing of a postsentencing motion as a prerequisite to an appeal. In Granados, the supreme court addressed a defendant\u2019s contention that he had appropriately relied on a decision of his appellate district court (which conflicted with decisions in other districts), and it wrote as follows:\n\"There is only one Illinois Appellate Court [citation], and that court\u2019s pronouncements on the present issue were unsettled at the time of the defendant\u2019s crimes. Since our appellate court expressed conflicting views on the issue, the defendant had no basis for allegedly relying upon only one of those conflicting views and ignoring the other view.\u201d Granados, 172 Ill. 2d at 371, 666 N.E.2d at 1197.\nThus, at the time of defendant\u2019s sentencing in this case, the decisions of the appellate court were conflicting on how to interpret the amended version of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Corrections Code, and the supreme court had not yet addressed the amended version of section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c). Further, the supreme court in Reed did not direct that its decision be applied prospectively only. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Reed applies to defendant\u2019s case. Accordingly, we hold that defendant has forfeited any contentions of error at sentencing by failing to raise those issues in a postsentencing motion in the trial court.\nIn so holding, we note that the trial court did not admonish defendant that she needed to file a postsentencing motion to preserve for appeal any contentions of error at sentencing. We respectfully suggest that Supreme Court Rule 605 (145 Ill. 2d R. 605) be amended to require such an admonition so that defendants \u2014 such as the one in the present case \u2014 are put on notice that filing a postsentencing motion is a prerequisite to an appeal of sentencing issues.\n2. Plain Error\nThe material in this section is not to be published pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nKNECHT and GREEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "W. Keith Davis (argued), of Jennings, Novick, Smalley & Davis, P.C., of Bloomington, for appellant.", "Charles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JACKIE LYNN CORRIE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201497\u20140050\nArgued October 21, 1997.\nOpinion filed January 22, 1998.\nW. Keith Davis (argued), of Jennings, Novick, Smalley & Davis, P.C., of Bloomington, for appellant.\nCharles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0496-01", "first_page_order": 514, "last_page_order": 526 }