{ "id": 35368, "name": "WILLIAM A. MERRIFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Merrifield v. Illinois State Police Merit Board", "decision_date": "1997-12-30", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201497\u20140391", "first_page": "520", "last_page": "531", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251-52" }, { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466182 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648-50" }, { "page": "649-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 41", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43-44", "parenthetical": "discharge justified where officer lied during police investigation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3077192 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338-39", "parenthetical": "discharge justified where officer lied during police investigation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526-27", "parenthetical": "officer's association with reputed criminal warranted discharge" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833631 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489", "parenthetical": "officer's association with reputed criminal warranted discharge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264", "parenthetical": "upholding board's discharge of police officer who allowed runaway to live with him because such conduct was detrimental to the department's efficiency" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 861", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534381 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "upholding board's discharge of police officer who allowed runaway to live with him because such conduct was detrimental to the department's efficiency" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0861-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469434 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 1347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1353" }, { "page": "1353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5366163 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222746 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "954" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2981580 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" }, { "page": "205" }, { "page": "205" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115527 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "105" }, { "page": "105-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 1014", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" }, { "page": "1017", "parenthetical": "agency decisions are \"entitled to great weight as being the judgment of a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5783294 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 Ill. App. 3d 934", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5423790 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "938" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/253/0934-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1014, "char_count": 26911, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2519990976129386e-07, "percentile": 0.7816561892218427 }, "sha256": "ba0b65c209b2b1305239f98858df67fee004a48352651f2cf14b13b2b109b59a", "simhash": "1:e22d789c6707a766", "word_count": 4163 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:51.326352+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIAM A. MERRIFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 1991, defendant Illinois State Police Merit Board (Board) found that plaintiff, William A. Merrifield, had violated certain rules of conduct prescribed by defendant Illinois State Police (Department) and, on this basis, terminated his employment as a state police officer. In April 1991, Merrifield filed a complaint for administrative review of the Board\u2019s decision. In December 1995, the circuit court upheld the Board\u2019s decision. Merrifield subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, and in January 1996, the circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s ruling in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the matter for further consideration.\nIn June 1996, the Board issued an order reaffirming its prior decision. Merrifield filed a second complaint for administrative review in July 1996. In April 1997, the circuit court reversed the Board\u2019s ruling on one of the violations and, with respect to the other violations, determined that suspension \u2014 rather than discharge \u2014 was the appropriate sanction.\nThe Board appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred by reversing the Board\u2019s decision in part and imposing its own sanction where the evidence was sufficient to support Merrifield\u2019s dismissal. For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court and reinstate the Board\u2019s June 1996 decision.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. The Department\u2019s Complaint\nIn August 1990, the Director of the Department filed a four-count complaint with the Board requesting Merrifield\u2019s discharge for cause. Count I alleged that Merrifield\u2019s association with Brenda Houston, a convicted felon, violated Rule 21 of the Department\u2019s rules of conduct, which provides:\n\"Except as necessary to the performance of official duties, or where unavoidable because of other family relationships of the officer, officers will avoid regular or continuous associations or dealings with persons whom they know, or should know, are persons under criminal investigation or indictment, or who have a reputation in the community or the [D]epartment for present or past involvement in felonious or criminal behavior.\u201d Illinois State Police Directives Manual \u00a7 ROC \u2014 002, Rules of Conduct, Rule 21 (1996).\nCount II and paragraphs 14 and 15 of count III alleged that Merrifield lied to his immediate supervisor and to investigating officers in violation of Rules 41 and 42, respectively. Rule 41 provides as follows:\n\"Upon the order of the director, deputy director or a superior officer, officers will truthfully answer all questions specifically directed and narrowly related to the scope of employment and operations of the [Department which may be asked of them.\u201d Illinois State Police Directives Manual \u00a7 ROC \u2014 002, Rules of Conduct, Rule 41 (1996).\nRule 42 states:\n\"Officers are required to answer questions by, or render material and relevant statements to, competent authority in a [Department personnel investigation when said officer, prior to the interrogation!,] has been advised of his statutory administrative proceedings rights if the allegation indicates a recommendation for a demotion, suspension of more than 15 days or removal or discharge is probable, and/or his constitutional rights concerning self-incrimination if the allegation indicates that criminal prosecution is probable against that officer.\u201d Illinois State Police Directives Manual \u00a7 ROC \u2014 002, Rules of Conduct, Rule 42 (1996).\nFinally, count IV (misnumbered count VI in the complaint) alleged that Merrifield\u2019s aforementioned conduct constituted conduct unbecoming an officer in violation of Rule 7, which provides:\n\"Officers will conduct themselves on and off duty in such a manner as to reflect favorably on the [Department. Officers will not engage in conduct which discredits the integrity of the [Department or its employees, or which impairs the operations of the Department. Such actions will constitute conduct unbecoming an officer.\u201d niinois State Police Directives Manual \u00a7 ROC \u2014 002, Rules of Conduct, Rule 7 (1996).\nB. The Evidence Presented at the Board Hearing\nIn October 1990, a hearing officer serving on behalf of the Board held a hearing on the Director\u2019s complaint. The evidence presented during that proceeding showed the following.\nSince March 1975, Merrifield had been an Illinois state police officer assigned to the District 9 office in Springfield, Illinois. Merrifield and Houston met in May 1988 and shortly thereafter began dating. Previously, in February 1988, Houston had pleaded guilty to and was convicted in Michigan of the \"delivery/manufacture\u201d of between 225 and 649 grams of cocaine and, in July 1988, she was sentenced to 10 to 30 years in the Michigan Department of Corrections. In September 1989, the Michigan Appellate Court affirmed her conviction, and in May 1990, the Michigan Supreme Court denied her leave to appeal.\nHouston began serving her sentence at the Kalamazoo County jail in early August 1988. Prior to this time, Merrifield had no knowledge of either Houston\u2019s conviction or sentence. Shortly after arriving at the jail, Houston called Merrifield and informed him that she was incarcerated. Merrifield asked Houston why she was in jail but Houston did not provide a specific explanation. Rather, Houston told Merrifield only that she had \"gotten in some trouble.\u201d\nIn late August 1988, Houston was transferred to the Huron Valley Women\u2019s Facility in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Houston called Merrifield at that time and informed him of her transfer. In addition, Houston told Merrifield that she was in prison because she had been convicted of the delivery of a controlled substance.\nBetween August 1988 and May 1989, Merrifield visited Houston at the facility a total of 11 times. During these visits, Merrifield and Houston discussed plans for marriage and, on one occasion, Merrifield asked Houston to marry him. Houston was released from prison in May 1989 pending an appeal of her conviction and returned to Springfield, where she continued her relationship with Merrifield.\nIn August 1989, special agent Lewis Dillon of the Department\u2019s Division of Internal Investigation received a complaint letter from Merrifield\u2019s ex-wife alleging Merrifield was associated with a convicted felon \u2014 namely, Houston. Dillon checked Houston\u2019s criminal history, which confirmed she had a felony drug conviction in Michigan. Pursuant to the letter and criminal check, the Department, headed by Master Sergeant Jerry Courtney and Dillon, commenced an internal investigation of Merrifield\u2019s relationship with Houston.\nThe following occurred on or about November 2, 1989. Kim Frick, an Illinois state trooper working with Merrifield at District 9 office, received a telephone call from Houston. Frick later telephoned Houston at Merrifield\u2019s residence, and during the course of their conversation, Houston became angry with Frick. As a result, Frick felt threatened and feared retaliation. Frick\u2019s fears stemmed from a warning about Houston that Frick received in September or October 1989 from Mike Luster, a special agent with the Department\u2019s Division of Criminal Investigation, who knew of Houston\u2019s prior incarceration. Frick subsequently checked Houston\u2019s criminal history, which revealed the drug conviction. Frick told Ed Eskra, one of her supervisors, about the phone conversation and gave him a copy of Houston\u2019s criminal record. Eskra discussed Frick\u2019s phone call and Houston\u2019s criminal record with Merrifield\u2019s supervisor, Fred McKinnon. Eskra and McKinnon thereafter discussed the situation with Lieutenants Straub and Entman. At this time, Eskra and McKinnon were informed of the Department\u2019s internal investigation of Merrifield and Houston.\nDuring the first week of November 1989, McKinnon met with Merrifield to discuss the situation between Frick and Houston and Houston\u2019s criminal history. During the meeting, McKinnon showed Merrifield a copy of Houston\u2019s criminal record and informed Merrifield of Houston\u2019s prior conviction. Merrifield told McKinnon that he was not aware of Houston\u2019s particular conviction or the nature of her sentence. He further told McKinnon that he knew only that Houston had had \"some prior trouble.\u201d\nMcKinnon also testified that, after discussing Houston\u2019s criminal history, Merrifield stated that he had cancelled his wedding plans and Houston was moving out of his house. Merrifield later denied making these statements but testified that he may have implied to McKinnon that he did not intend to marry Houston.\nThe record indicates that at the time of McKinnon\u2019s meeting with Merrifield in November 1989, the following employees of the Department knew of Houston\u2019s criminal conviction: Courtney, Dillon, Frick, Frick\u2019s brother (also a state police officer), Luster, Eskra, Mc-Kinnon, Straub, Entman, special agent Latham, and state trooper Sturgeon.\nOn November 25, 1989, Merrifield and Houston were married in Las Vegas, Nevada. The wedding was scheduled approximately a month before this date. Merrifield and Houston remained married at the time of Merrifield\u2019s hearing.\nSometime after his marriage, Courtney and Dillon interviewed Merrifield in connection with the Department\u2019s internal investigatian. They advised Merrifield of his administrative rights and admonished him to tell the truth. In pertinent part, Merrifield told the investigators that (1) he was not fully aware of the criminal case against Houston; (2) he had told McKinnon that he was unaware of Houston\u2019s prior drug conviction; and (3) Houston never lived with him. He denied telling McKinnon he and Houston had cancelled their wedding plans.\nBased on his prior investigative experience and Merrifield\u2019s demeanor, Courtney testified he believed Merrifield lied during the interview. Merrifield, on the other hand, denied lying and stated any evasiveness in the interview was due to his attempt to carefully answer the investigators\u2019 questions.\nC. The Hearing Officer\u2019s Findings and the Board\u2019s 1991 Decision\nIn February 1991, the hearing officer determined that the Department failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence Merrifield\u2019s violations of Rule 21 in count I, Rule 41 in count II and Rule 42 in paragraph 14 of count III, but determined the Department sufficiently demonstrated violations of Rule 42 in paragraph 15 of count III and Rule 7 in count IV. In relevant part, the hearing officer found that Houston was not a person \"under criminal investigation or indictment\u201d or with a \"reputation in the community or the Department for present or past involvement in felonious or criminal behavior.\u201d Accordingly, the hearing officer concluded Merrifield\u2019s relationship with Houston did not violate Rule 21.\nIn addition, the hearing officer found Merrifield lied when he told McKinnon that he no longer intended to marry Houston and that Houston was moving out of his house. However, because the evidence did not show that Merrifield had been ordered to answer the questions posed by McKinnon as required by Rule 41, the hearing officer found no rule violation. Thus, the hearing officer concluded the Department failed to prove count II of the complaint. Furthermore, the hearing officer found Merrifield lied to Courtney and Dillon about his discussions with McKinnon. Thus, the hearing officer concluded that the Department adequately demonstrated a Rule 42 violation in count III. The hearing officer also determined that Merrifield\u2019s lies to McKinnon and to investigating officers Courtney and Dillon constituted conduct unbecoming an officer in violation of Rule 7 and found that the Board established the allegations of count IV. The hearing officer did not recommend an appropriate sanction.\nThe Board considered the hearing officer\u2019s recommendations and issued a decision in March 1991. Contrary to some of the hearing\u2019s officer\u2019s determinations, the Board concluded the Department had sufficiently proved all charges of the complaint and ordered Merrifield\u2019s employment terminated. Merrifield filed a complaint for administrative review, and the circuit court remanded the matter, directing the Board to issue a decision detailing its specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.\nD. The Board\u2019s 1996 Decision and the Circuit Court\u2019s 1997 Ruling\nIn June 1996, the Board issued a new decision adopting the hearing officer\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law to the extent they did not conflict with the matters set forth in the new ruling. The Board determined that (1) Houston\u2019s then-pending appeal was a logical extension of a criminal investigation; (2) Merrifield lied to McKinnon and Courtney; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to show that Houston had a criminal reputation in the Department because at least four departmental employees knew of her prior drug conviction; thus, Merrifield violated Rule 21. The Board concluded Merrifield\u2019s relationship with Houston and his untruthfulness tended to discredit the integrity of the Department and impair its operations in violation of Rule 7. On this basis, the Board ordered Merrifield discharged.\nIn July 1996, Merrifield filed a second complaint for administrative review and, in April 1997, the circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision in part and reversed it in part. The circuit court\u2019s order explicitly rejected the Board\u2019s finding that an appeal is an extension of a criminal investigation. The circuit court also determined that the knowledge of Houston\u2019s conviction by four departmental employees was insufficient to establish a criminal reputation. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded Merrifield\u2019s association with Houston did not violate Rule 21. The circuit court further determined that because Houston did not have a public reputation for criminal behavior, Merrifield\u2019s relationship with her could not reflect badly on the Department. Thus, Merrifield had not violated Rule 7.\nThe circuit court upheld the Board\u2019s finding that Merrifield lied to investigators in violation of Rule 42, but concluded that this single incident of misconduct did not warrant Merrifield\u2019s termination. The circuit court imposed a suspension of 30 days on Merrifield and ordered him reinstated effective 30 days after the Board\u2019s March 1991 ruling.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The Board\u2019s Motion To Strike\nInitially, we address the Board\u2019s motion to strike, which was taken with this case. In its motion, the Board argues that Merrifield\u2019s brief fails to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341 (155 Ill. 2d R. 341) because its factual statement is not fully supported by the record and improperly contains argumentative and conclusory assertions. The Board requests that we strike Merrifield\u2019s statement of facts in its entirety.\nAlthough Merrifield was not required to include a statement of facts in his brief (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(f)), he elected to do so. Accordingly, his brief needed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(6), which requires a party to cite facts \"necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and [supported by] appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6). The Board is correct that Merrifield\u2019s recitation of the facts contains improper argument and fails to accurately portray the evidence presented at the hearing. Nevertheless, the remaining portions of Merrifield\u2019s factual statement comply with Rule 341(e)(6). Where violations of supreme court rules are not so flagrant as to hinder or preclude review, the striking of a brief in whole or in part may be unwarranted. Cottrill v. Russell, 253 Ill. App. 3d 934, 938, 625 N.E.2d 888, 890 (1993). Merrifield\u2019s improper comments and inaccurate statements are not so misleading as to hinder our analysis. We conclude that Merrifield\u2019s properly asserted facts, coupled with the Board\u2019s recitations, are sufficient to permit review of the instant appeal. Thus, we do not strike Merrifield\u2019s statement in its entirety but will disregard those portions that do not comport with the supreme court rules.\nB. The Board\u2019s Decision To Discharge Merrifield\nThe Board argues that the circuit court erred by reversing the Board\u2019s decision in part and imposing its own sanction on Merrifield. The Board specifically contends that the evidence supports its findings that Merrifield violated Rules 21 and 7. The Board further contends that these violations constitute sufficient \"cause\u201d for Merrifield\u2019s dismissal and requests this court to reverse the circuit court\u2019s April 1997 order and reinstate the Board\u2019s June 1996 ruling. We agree.\nIn his brief, Merrifield does not specifically address the issue of whether the evidence supports the Board\u2019s ruling. Instead, Merrifield elects to challenge the content of the Board\u2019s decision. Merrifield argues that because the decision fails to set forth sufficient factual findings and legal conclusions as required under section 10 \u2014 50(a) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Act) (5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 50(a) (West 1994)), its ruling is arbitrary and capricious and, thus, cannot be sustained on review.\n1. Adequacy of Board\u2019s 1996 Decision Under the Act\nContrary to Merrifield\u2019s assertion, the Board\u2019s decision is not arbitrary and capricious. Section 10 \u2014 50 of the Act governs the decisions and orders of administrative agencies and directs, in pertinent part, that an agency\u2019s decision \"shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated.\u201d 5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 50(a) (West 1994). An agency is not required to make a finding on each evidentiary claim, and its findings need be only specific enough to permit an intelligent review of its decision. United Cities Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 235 Ill. App. 3d 577, 586, 601 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (1992). The Board explicitly adopted the factual findings and legal conclusions of the hearing officer to the extent they did not conflict with its June 1996 decision. The Board further explained its findings and conclusions where they diverged from those of the hearing officer. Because we deem the Board\u2019s findings and conclusions sufficient to permit an intelligent review of its ruling, we conclude the Board\u2019s June 1996 decision satisfies the mandates of section 10 \u2014 50(a) of the Act (5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 50(a) (West 1994)).\n2. The Board\u2019s June 1996 Decision\nOur review of the Board\u2019s decision to discharge Merrifield involves a two-step process. We must first determine whether the Board\u2019s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 101, 105, 449 N.E.2d 115, 117 (1983). The findings of the Board are deemed prima facie true and correct (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 1996)), and a reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence or make an independent determination of the facts (Grames v. Illinois State Police, 254 Ill. App. 3d 191, 202, 625 N.E.2d 945, 954 (1993)). Likewise, the assessment of witness credibility, the determination of the weight accorded to the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters within the province of the agency. Parro v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 167 Ill. 2d 385, 396, 657 N.E.2d 882, 887 (1995). A reviewing court is limited to ascertaining whether an opposite conclusion is clearly evident from the record or whether the agency\u2019s findings are unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based upon any of the evidence. Illini Country Club v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 263 Ill. App. 3d 410, 417, 635 N.E.2d 1347, 1353 (1994). If the record contains any competent evidence to support the agency\u2019s findings, the decision must be sustained on review. Illini Country Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 417, 635 N.E.2d at 1353.\nWe conclude that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the Board\u2019s findings. Although the Board\u2019s assertion that a \"criminal investigation\u201d encompasses a pending appeal is troublesome, the record supports the Board\u2019s determination that Houston had a criminal reputation within the Department. The Board found that at least four individuals within the Department knew of Houston\u2019s drug conviction at the time the Director filed the complaint in August 1990. In fact, the record indicates that at least 11 state police officers in the Springfield area knew of Houston\u2019s criminal past at that time. The Board could have reasonably concluded that the knowledge of Houston\u2019s criminal reputation by at least four departmental personnel sufficed for purposes of Rule 21.\nMoreover, the Board\u2019s determination that Merrifield\u2019s association with Houston and his lies about it tended to discredit the Department and impair its operations was not unreasonable. Merrifield maintained a regular and continuous relationship with an individual he knew was a convicted criminal. As the Board contends, this relationship may foster several problems within a law enforcement agency, such as creating conflicts of interest or the appearance of impropriety, and, thus, may serve as the basis for a Rule 7 violation. In addition, an officer\u2019s untruthfulness clearly discredits the integrity and thwarts the efficiency of the Department, particularly where, as in this case, an officer lies during the course of a departmental investigation.\nThe Board, and not a reviewing court, is in the best position to assess how an officer\u2019s conduct affects the Department\u2019s operations, and a reviewing court may not simply reweigh the evidence and substitute its own judgment for that of the Board. See United Cities Gas, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 586, 601 N.E.2d at 1017 (agency decisions are \"entitled to great weight as being the judgment of a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience\u201d). The circuit court erred by concluding that Merrifield\u2019s conduct could not adversely affect the Department. The Board acted reasonably in determining Merrifield\u2019s conduct was unbecoming an officer in violation of Rule 7. Based on the above, we cannot conclude the Board\u2019s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe second step in the analysis is to determine whether the factual findings are sufficient to support the Board\u2019s conclusion that \"cause\u201d exists for Merrifield\u2019s discharge. Walsh, 96 Ill. 2d at 105, 449 N.E.2d at 117. An officer with the Department may be removed only for \"cause\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 121, par. 307.14 (now 20 ILCS 2610/14 (West 1994))), which has been judicially defined as \" 'some substantial shortcoming which renders the employee\u2019s continuance in office in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law and sound public opinion recognize as good cause for his no longer holding the position.\u2019 \u201d Grames, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 205, 625 N.E.2d at 956, quoting Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Services Comm\u2019n, 85 Ill. 2d 547, 551, 426 N.E.2d 885, 887 (1981). Again, because the Board is in the best position to determine the effect of the officer\u2019s conduct on the operations of the Department, its determination of \"cause\u201d will be given considerable deference. Grames, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 205, 625 N.E.2d at 956. A reviewing court will not decide whether a less stringent punishment is appropriate and will overturn the Board\u2019s decision only if it is arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of service. Walsh, 96 Ill. 2d at 105-06, 449 N.E.2d at 117.\nThe Board found sufficient reason to terminate Merrifield\u2019s employment with the Department. As the record demonstrates, Merrifield violated certain departmental rules of conduct when he chose to have a close personal association with a convicted felon and again when he lied to his supervisor and later to investigators about the status of that relationship. The Board determined the operations and integrity of the Department would be adversely affected by Merrifield\u2019s conduct and could reasonably have determined that this conduct reflects a significant shortcoming that renders Merrifield\u2019s continued employment detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the Department. See McHenry v. City of East St. Louis, 210 Ill. App. 3d 861, 869, 569 N.E.2d 259, 264 (1991) (upholding board\u2019s discharge of police officer who allowed runaway to live with him because such conduct was detrimental to the department\u2019s efficiency); DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 31 Ill. 2d 482, 489, 202 N.E.2d 522, 526-27 (1964) (officer\u2019s association with reputed criminal warranted discharge); Slayton v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 102 Ill. App. 3d 335, 338-39, 430 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (1981) (discharge justified where officer lied during police investigation). As this court noted, the Department\u2019s officers must uphold its rules. Grames, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 205, 625 N.E.2d at 956. Based on the record in this case, the Board could reasonably have concluded that Merrifield\u2019s association with Houston, coupled with his lies to departmental personnel, impair this interest.\nMerrifield relies on Bell v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 161 Ill. App. 3d 644, 515 N.E.2d 248 (1987), to support his contention that the Board\u2019s order of discharge is arbitrary and capricious. In Bell, the court held the commission\u2019s decision to discharge an employee who allegedly falsified reports was arbitrary, unreasonable, and unrelated to the needs of service. Bell, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 648-50, 515 N.E.2d at 251-52. The court found the employee\u2019s errors were due to confusion and misunderstanding of newly introduced reporting methods and, as such, her conduct could not be deemed detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the commission. Bell, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 649-50, 515 N.E.2d at 251. However, Bell is inapposite because the evidence in this case does not indicate Merrifield\u2019s violations of the departmental rules were inadvertent. The record adequately demonstrates Merrifield knowingly maintained an ongoing relationship with a convicted felon and deliberately misstated the status of that relationship to fellow officers.\nThe Board found sufficient \"cause\u201d exists to justify Merrifield\u2019s discharge, and we cannot say its determination is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service. Because the record supports the Board\u2019s decision, we conclude that the circuit court erred by reversing the Board\u2019s decision.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court and reinstate the Board\u2019s June 1996 decision.\nReversed; Board\u2019s decision reinstated.\nGARMAN, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Marcia L. McCormick (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.", "Richard H. Narup and Matthew D. Bilinsky (argued), both of Drake, Narup & Mead, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM A. MERRIFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201497\u20140391\nArgued November 19, 1997.\nOpinion filed December 30, 1997.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Marcia L. McCormick (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.\nRichard H. Narup and Matthew D. Bilinsky (argued), both of Drake, Narup & Mead, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0520-01", "first_page_order": 538, "last_page_order": 549 }