{ "id": 35371, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEROY LADD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ladd", "decision_date": "1998-03-11", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201496\u20140006", "first_page": "928", "last_page": "939", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 928" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 1021", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385509 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3355945 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3292461 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5203527 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 1087", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2708579 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1089" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/1087-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ill. App. 3d 975", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3158684 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/90/0975-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1133" }, { "page": "1132" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2972100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0815-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563118 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2552917 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/85/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614933 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147041 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3535735 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 N.E.2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293316 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 1159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1162" }, { "page": "1162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927626 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101-02" }, { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.E.2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360118 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0493-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1199, "char_count": 27968, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.949619496660388e-08, "percentile": 0.5013796171128123 }, "sha256": "5c4d7f7e5b1f20fc18e3f1d751a11e33e94a6e33be1189bc5fa12ffdc833594d", "simhash": "1:abd83c2e7d778584", "word_count": 4569 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:51.326352+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEROY LADD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KUEHN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn April 9, 1995, defendant attacked his paramour with a knife. The police took him to jail that same day. He has been locked up ever since.\nDefendant stood trial on October 17, 1995. The jury deliberated to verdict the next day. It acquitted defendant of attempted murder but reached guilty verdicts on accompanying aggravated battery and armed violence charges. Defendant now serves 4- and 12-year concurrent prison terms imposed on the two guilty verdicts.\nThis appeal examines the 191 days from defendant\u2019s arrest to trial\u2019s commencement. We are asked to overturn defendant\u2019s convictions because he waited longer than 120 days in jail before trial began.\nHere is a recapitulation of the relevant events that occurred during defendant\u2019s jail stay awaiting trial:\nApril 9,1995\nState places defendant in custody.\nMay 5,1995\nDefendant waives preliminary hearing.\nMay 19,1995\nSt. Clair County grand jury indicts defendant for aggravated battery, attempted murder, and armed violence.\nJune 26, 1995\nDefendant files motion to dismiss complaint.\nJune 27,1995\nDefendant files pro se motion to dismiss.\nJune 29,1995\nDefendant seeks and obtains order setting motions for July 12,1995.\nAugust 14, 1995\nDefendant files pro se motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial rights.\nAugust 15,1995\nDefendant\u2019s lawyer files motion for speedy trial discharge and argues motion. Court allows defendant until August 25, 1995, to present additional authority in support of the motion.\nSeptember 15,1995\nThe court denies the motion for discharge.\nSeptember 26,1995\nThe court holds a status conference and sets trial for October 16,1995.\nOctober 16,1995\nThe court denies the motion to dismiss complaint.\nOctober 17,1995\nTrial begins.\nA speedy public trial is constitutionally guaranteed to every American citizen. U.S. Const., amend. VI. Since the State possesses the power to level accusation, the power to deprive freedom based on accusation, and the power to control trial\u2019s timetable, a speedy trial assures that due process means something. It secures the worth of other basic freedoms and promises the orderly administration of justice. It exists in recognition of a simple truth that \u201cjustice delayed is justice denied.\u201d\nIn Illinois, the prompt disposition of criminal cases assumes new meaning by recent constitutional amendment overwhelmingly approved by the people of this state. The Illinois Constitution, as it has since its inception, guarantees a speedy trial to any citizen accused of a criminal act. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 8. Now, it also guarantees any citizen that falls victim to a criminal act \u201ctimely disposition of the case following the arrest of the accused.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 8.1(a)(6) (amended November 3, 1992). In tandem, these assurances instruct that the speedy disposition of criminal charges is in everyone\u2019s interest. In Illinois, a speedy trial is most assuredly the basic thread essential to our fabric of justice.\nAdditionally, our lawmakers provide specific statutory guidelines that impose express time limits for the processing of criminal cases. Their design is to implement speedy trial rights. People v. Hamby, 27 Ill. 2d 493, 495-96, 190 N.E.2d 289, 291 (1963). Statutory time constraints also promote the innate fairness that prompt and orderly criminal justice brings. Our legislature has long guaranteed that \u201c[e]very person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried *** within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/103 \u2014 5(a) (West 1994).\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s trial began 191 days from the date he was taken into custody. Therefore, unless delay was occasioned by the defendant, his trial violates the statute\u2019s guarantee to speedy justice and his convictions cannot stand.\nWe review a September 15, 1995, order that denied defendant\u2019s speedy trial discharge motion. The order found that defendant\u2019s stay in jail for 191 days without a trial was due to delay that defendant occasioned. The trial court decided that time\u2019s march to the speedy trial deadline halted on June 26, 1995, when defendant filed a motion to dismiss the criminal complaint. Moreover, defendant\u2019s motion suspended statutory time constraints until the motion was resolved. Thus, the trial court\u2019s view of the motion\u2019s tolling effect suspends the statute\u2019s time clock from the motion\u2019s filing date until the eve of trial when the motion was ultimately denied.\nWe first examine the effect of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the statutory duty to commence trial within 120 days. The motion itself plainly lacks merit. Defendant raises the motion\u2019s obvious deficiencies and frames the question \u2014 whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that a patently meritless motion produces trial\u2019s delay. In effect, defendant argues that the motion causes no delay because of its facially worthless content and that it follows that no delay exists to attribute to defendant.\nThis argument is not dispositive of the case. A motion\u2019s content is a necessary consideration in deciding whether it causes delay. However, it does not control the essential question \u2014 whether the motion actually delays trial. Here, defendant\u2019s meritless motion actually causes such a delay.\nThis case turns on the effect of a June 29, 1995, order. The order set defendant\u2019s motion for hearing and disposition on July 12, 1995. The trial court\u2019s decision bypasses this order without comment.\nThe defendant scheduled the motion to dismiss complaint for hearing and disposition. The procurement of an order that calls for the motion\u2019s disposition produces two pertinent consequences. First, it causes a delay that defendant occasions regardless of the motion\u2019s content. Second, it fixes a date certain for the resolution of pending motions. After that date passes, the tolling effect lifts and time begins again to advance on the 120-day constraint.\nInitially, we discuss defendant\u2019s argument that the instant motions cannot produce attributable delay because of their content. As a general proposition, defendants are charged with delay that occurs from filing motions. People v. Hubbard, 276 Ill. App. 3d 98, 101-02, 657 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (1995). The statute\u2019s time constraints are suspended during that time naturally associated with processing such motions. People v. Lendabarker, 215 Ill. App. 3d 540, 553-54, 575 N.E.2d 568, 576-77 (1991). In addition, defendant bears the responsibility for setting his motions for hearing and disposition. A failure to do so tolls the statutory time period. People v. Jones, 145 Ill. App. 3d 804, 807, 495 N.E.2d 1330, 1333 (1986).\nThe trial court relied upon several cases that stand for the proposition that motions to dismiss charges work delay that is properly attributed to defendants. See People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268, 472 N.E.2d 455 (1984); People v. Frame, 165 Ill. App. 3d 585, 519 N.E.2d 482 (1988); People v. DeStefano, 85 Ill. App. 2d 274, 229 N.E.2d 325 (1967).\nNotwithstanding, the common attribution of delay because of defense motions does not mean automatic attribution of delay. See People v. Jump, 127 Ill. App. 3d 440, 468 N.E.2d 1278 (1984); People v. Ferguson, 46 Ill. App. 3d 815, 361 N.E.2d 339 (1977). The speedy trial statute contemplates more than the mechanical attribution of delay every time defendant engages in an act in pursuit of a defense. A per se rule does not exist. Speedy trial rights do not toll simply because a defendant files a motion. Ferguson, 46 Ill. App. 3d at 818, 361 N.E.2d at 341. If such a rule did exist, our inquiry could end here.\nNot all motions cause delay. \u201cWhether a motion in fact causes delay depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and the trial court must appraise the timeliness and complexity of the motion.\u201d People v. Montenegro, 203 Ill. App. 3d 314, 317, 560 N.E.2d 934, 936 (1990). The 120-day rule is suspended only \u201c \u2018when there has been actual delay of trial clearly attributable to the defendant.\u2019 \u201d People v. Grant, 104 Ill. App. 3d 183, 188-89, 432 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (1982), quoting People v. Perkins, 90 Ill. App. 3d 975, 979, 414 N.E.2d 110, 114 (1980), citing People v. Hannah, 31 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1089, 335 N.E.2d 84, 86 (1975).\nThere were actually two motions to dismiss on file. The trial court focused on defense counsel\u2019s June 26, 1995, motion to dismiss the complaint. Defendant filed a pro se motion to dismiss on the following day. Both motions were patently meritless.\nThe June 26, 1995, motion to dismiss the complaint sought the criminal complaint\u2019s dismissal and defendant\u2019s release from custody. The request raised the statutory call for a probable cause determination within 30 days of a defendant\u2019s arrest. See 725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 3.1 (West 1994). The motion relied entirely upon the absence of a timely probable cause determination. But defendant knowingly waived such a determination less than 30 days after his arrest. On May 5, 1995, defendant appeared in open court and waived his scheduled preliminary hearing. Defendant thereby surrendered the statute\u2019s protection.\nFurther, the motion sought defendant\u2019s release. Assuming that the State violates section 109 \u2014 3.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/109 \u2014 3.1 (West 1994)), which it did not, the violation would not result in defendant\u2019s release. See People v. Clarke, 231 Ill. App. 3d 504, 596 N.E.2d 872 (1992).\nAnd finally, the motion sought the complaint\u2019s dismissal. The State procured and obtained a valid grand jury bill of indictment on May 19, 1995. The motion pursued a pointless act where the indictment had already supplanted the complaint as the charging instrument.\nThe June 27, 1995, pro se motion asked that the \u201ccase be dismissed.\u201d The motion asserted the grand jury\u2019s failure to indict within 30 days, the victim\u2019s desire not to press charges, the absence of the victim\u2019s signature on the criminal complaint, and defendant\u2019s claim that he acted in self-defense.\nClearly, any prosecutor worth his salt needs but a moment to prepare for these motions. A cursory reading exposes their obvious deficiency. We note that when finally asked to speak to defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss complaint, 123 days after defendant filed it, the prosecutor disposed of the motion\u2019s worth in two sentences. He simply pointed out that the law did not extend the remedy sought and that even if it did, defendant was afforded a timely preliminary hearing.\nThe usual reason for the attribution of delay where defense motions raise a challenge to charges is absent here. Since the motion did not challenge the indictment\u2019s validity, it cannot possibly threaten the prosecution\u2019s progress. It caused neither a departure from the State\u2019s trial preparation nor a barrier to trial\u2019s orderly advance. The motion harbored no chance of success. It portended no harm to this prosecution. It merely laid there and awaited a hand to deny it.\nNonetheless, a pretrial motion\u2019s merit is not the definitive measure of its tolling effect. Hubbard, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 102, 657 N.E.2d at 1162. The question is always whether the motion, regardless of its worth, actually causes delay. Here, defendant\u2019s motions clearly caused a delay, albeit for a reason other than the one the trial court assigned. Defense counsel procured a special setting for the court to conduct whatever proceedings were necessary to dispose of the two motions. This met defendant\u2019s responsibility to call his motions up for disposition. It also set the timetable for disposition. The delay that followed is clearly a delay that defendant occasioned. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s attribution of delay to the extent that the delay related to time\u2019s passage from June 29, 1995, to July 12, 1995.\nThe trial court, however, attributed delay to defendant from June 26, 1995, to the day it denied the discharge request and beyond. The State pursues this position and argues that the motion\u2019s tolling effect does not dissipate until the motion was denied on October 16, 1995. This position fails to account for the June 29, 1995, order that schedules a July 12, 1995, disposition of defendant\u2019s motions. The request for a date certain to decide the motions and the subsequent order allowing that request yield a day of some consequence to any tolling effect thereafter ascribed to defendant\u2019s two motions.\nWhen the sun retreated over the horizon on July 12, 1995, defendant\u2019s motions remained unaddressed and undecided.\nThe judge who entered the June 29, 1995, order and scheduled the July 12, 1995, hearing was not the judge who decided the discharge motion. On August 15, 1995, when defendant presented the motion, a judge unfamiliar with earlier events noted the June 29, 1995, order, pondered the July 12, 1995, setting, and wondered what happened. Defense counsel offered the following:\n\u201cWe have not did [sic] nothing [sic] to toll my client\u2019s time in this case. The time has continued to run. We have did [sic] nothing to toll his time. *** [I]t was set for July 12. Mr. Stern was out of town. That was why that case was continued from that time period. I believe it was \u2014 he was on vacation or something and wasn\u2019t back in at that time.\u201d\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Stern responds:\n\u201cAnd as to the vacation[ \u2014 ]that I may have been on vacation on July 12, 1995,1 did not move to continue any cause. And there are a number of [assistant] State\u2019s [A]ttorneys in the building who fill in on vacation schedules. So I \u2014 to my knowledge, the State in no way caused any delay in any hearing.\u201d\nApparently, nothing happened on July 12, 1995. Other than the clouded recollections of the attorneys involved, the record is devoid of any reason or explanation for why nothing happened. While the burden of proof rests with the defendant to establish a violation of the 120-day rule, delay cannot be attributed to defendant where the record is silent. People v. Grant, 104 Ill. App. 3d 183, 188, 432 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (1982); People v. Cunningham, 77 Ill. App. 3d 949, 952, 396 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1979). Here, the failure to dispose of defendant\u2019s motions on the date set for disposition is unaccounted for. The record is silent. It affords no justification for the attribution of further delay to defendant. After July 12, 1995, there is simply no reason to assign the pendency of the two motions as a cause for trial\u2019s delay that defendant occasions. '\nThe comments of Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Stern are instructive. He defended against the claim that any inaction was due to his absence by insisting that he did not move to continue any hearing. Further, he noted that even if the hearing was postponed due to his vacation, it did not have to be. He points to the everyday presence of other assistants available to carry the torch. All of this is no doubt true, but it offers nothing to justify the attribution of further delay to defendant.\nThe reason is simple. The right to a speedy trial embraces the duty of officials other than prosecutors. Not all delays chargeable to the State are delays directly pursued by, or even with the desire of, those who prosecute. The State is an entity that includes members of the judiciary. In this instance, the court, not the defendant, was obliged to do something. The court might have procured another assistant to take Stern\u2019s place if, indeed, Stern was unavailable. The court might have briefly continued the motions to another date when Stern would be back in town. Or the court might simply have proceeded without an assistant State\u2019s Attorney present. The motions are deficient on their face. A simple reading instructs on the State\u2019s position. Indeed, both motions cry out for summary disposition.\nThere is one thing the court could not do. The court could not simply ignore the scheduled hearing date, allow defendant to remain in custody, and thereby indefinitely suspend the right to speedy trial. The setting compels the court to either dispose of the motions at the appointed hour or account for why they remain undecided. Contrary to the implication in Stern\u2019s comments, jailed defendants bear no responsibility to find standby prosecutors or otherwise secure someone prepared to prosecute them. Defendant cannot be made to shoulder trial\u2019s delay because of pending motions, after he sets those motions for hearing and disposition and no one decides to show up. As far as we know, defendant spent July 12, 1995, in jail. Based on this record, he simply cannot be blamed for delay incurred because of inaction on that date.\nThus, the trial court abused its discretion when it charged defendant with delay occasioned after July 12, 1995.\nThe tolling effect of the pending July 12, 1995, setting lifts after the scheduled disposition on that date inexplicably fails to take place. The time delay from June 29, 1995, to July 12, 1995, was, nonetheless, properly attributable to defendant. Therefore, on August 15, 1995, when the discharge motion presented itself for decision, the time chargeable to the State stood at 115 days. The statute\u2019s deadline had not passed, but the time clock was running, and the deadline was close at hand. After argument on the motion, the trial court allowed defendant until August 25, 1995, to present authority for his position. It reserved its ruling and ultimately rendered a decision denying the discharge motion 30 days later on September 15, 1995.\nAn accused is entitled to discharge if his trial begins more than 120 days after arrest, allowing for all delays that he himself causes. People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 438-39, 660 N.E.2d 832, 839 (1995). Clearly, time ran out far in advance of defendant\u2019s October 17, 1995, trial date. Defendant qualified for discharge on the day trial began. However, defendant failed to raise a motion for discharge after the time ran. The discharge remedy is not automatic. It graces only those defendants who properly assert it. People v. Garcia, 251 Ill. App. 3d 473, 477-78, 621 N.E.2d 1035, 1038-39 (1993).\nThus, the effect of the 30-day delay after defendant asserted his right to discharge determines the outcome of this case. If the prematurely raised motion for discharge suspended the running of the statute, the trial court\u2019s decision correctly denied defendant\u2019s request for discharge. If time was tolled pending the decision on the motion, only 115 days of chargeable time existed on September 15, 1995. Moreover, since defendant failed to raise his right to discharge at a time when the facts entitled him to it, defendant forfeits the discharge remedy. Defendant must therefore prevail, if at all, on the August 15, 1995, discharge motion. If that motion was correctly decided, defendant forfeited his speedy trial rights.\nOur dispositive inquiry is whether defendant\u2019s premature discharge motion ripened into a meritorious motion during the trial court\u2019s advisement period. If so, by the time the decision was reached, defendant deserved the discharge requested and the trial court reached the wrong result. If the statute ran after August 15, 1995, but before September 15, 1995, defendant\u2019s convictions cannot stand.\nThe question of a discharge motion\u2019s effect on the speedy trial statute was initially addressed by our supreme court in 1953. The court held that the filing of a discharge motion is not an act that delays trial. It further held that \u201cthe fact that the trial court did not immediately hear his motion and later took it under advisement [does not] tend to show that the trial was delayed by any act on the part of defendant.\u201d People v. Tamborski, 415 Ill. 466, 473, 114 N.E.2d 649, 653 (1953). In 1966, the supreme court cited Tamborski for the proposition that a motion for discharge is not a motion the filing of which causes delay attributable to the defendant. People v. Moriarity, 33 Ill. 2d 606, 611, 213 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1966). Our court has consistently adhered to this precedent. See People v. Uryasz, 32 Ill. App. 3d 825, 336 N.E.2d 813 (1975); People v. McKinney, 59 Ill. App. 3d 536, 375 N.E.2d 854 (1978); People v. Rideout, 193 Ill. App. 3d 884, 550 N.E.2d 632 (1990); Hubbard, 276 Ill. App. 3d 98, 657 N.E.2d 1159.\nTherefore, our task seems simple enough. If we abide the concept of stare decisis, follow our high court\u2019s decision, and apply the math, the trial court was wrong to deny the discharge motion. The State\u2019s chargeable time under the statute swelled from 115 days to 145 days while the issue awaited decision. Since defendant\u2019s assertion of his right to discharge is not an act that delays trial, the speedy trial statute ran before a decision was made. It follows that on the day the trial court reached its result, the result it reached was wrong.\nAlthough our task seems simple, things are not always as they seem.\nWhile defendant\u2019s speedy trial rights were still intact, defendant sought the court\u2019s agreement to prolong the decision on the discharge motion to a time beyond the statute\u2019s 120-day deadline. At the close of argument on August 15, 1995, concerned about the June 29, 1995, order, the court asked for the submission of authority that might define its effect. The State provided two cases. The court asked defense counsel if he wished to respond and, if so, how much time he wanted to submit additional authority. Counsel asked for a week, and the court granted counsel until August 25, 1995. The trial court agreed, at defendant\u2019s behest, not to consider or decide the discharge motion before August 25, 1995.\nIn addition, this court has recently departed from the rule enunciated in Tamborski and has decided cases that attribute delay in processing discharge motions to defendants. See People v. Medina, 239 Ill. App. 3d 871, 607 N.E.2d 619 (1993); People v. Colts, 269 Ill. App. 3d 679, 645 N.E.2d 225 (1993); People v. Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d 292, 664 N.E.2d 256 (1996). Our northern brethren shun Tamborski and call for an examination of the facts and circumstances of each case. They establish criteria to determine whether the delay associated with a discharge motion falls to the defendant. The attribution of delay depends upon \u201cthe timeliness of the motion, the complexity of the motion, whether the facts necessary to decide the motion are readily available, and the length of the continuance.\u201d Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 300, 664 N.E.2d at 262-63.\nOur colleagues treat supreme court precedent in a manner that strains our role as an intermediate court of review. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when our supreme court has declared law on any point, only it can modify or overrule its previous opinion and lower courts are bound by such decision. Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 5, 9, 666 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1996), aff'd, 178 Ill. 2d 474, 687 N.E.2d 1021 (1997).\nIn Andrade, the court discounts numerous appellate court decisions that follow the Tamborski precedent precisely because each is traceable to that precedent. According to the Andrade opinion, we have consistently adhered to unsound work on the part of the high court:\n\u201cIn *** Tamborski [citation], the court found [that] the time necessary to process defendant\u2019s motion to discharge was not chargeable to him. However, the court cited no authority for this holding. In People v. Moriarity [citation], the court declared the rule and simply cited to Tamborski.\u201d Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 298, 664 N.E.2d at 262.\nIt is simply not our place to discard Tamborski and create an analytical approach at odds with its clear edict. This holds true whether our supreme court cites authority that supports its holding or not.\nNotwithstanding, the first district cases that address this question reach results perfectly compatible with Tamborski.\nTamborski stands for the proposition that the act of filing a discharge motion does not toll a defendant\u2019s right to speedy trial. Such an act does not delay trial. It rather seeks discharge on a contention that time\u2019s passage already renders the prosecution infirm. It places at issue whether defendant\u2019s further incarceration is legal. Thus, there is sound reason to address discharge motions swiftly and to reach prompt but deliberate decisions once they are filed.\nTamborski expressly states that courts cannot unilaterally delay hearings on such motions or take them under advisement and attribute the delay for such acts to defendants. However, defendants can still occasion actual delays associated with bringing discharge motions. Nothing in Tamborski calls for instantaneous, uninformed trial court rulings on a matter of such import. Defendants cannot bring discharge motions in a manner that effectively circumvents adversarial response. See Andrade, 279 Ill. App. 3d 292, 664 N.E.2d 256. A defendant who files a discharge motion on the day trial begins, the effect of which causes the trial to start the following day, causes actual delay rightfully attributable to him. See Colts, 269 Ill. App. 3d 679, 645 N.E.2d 225. A defendant who agrees to the postponement of the decision on his discharge motion to a later date again causes actual delay attributable to him. See Medina, 239 Ill. App. 3d 871, 607 N.E.2d 619. None of these circumstances offend Tamborski\u2019s commands.\nIn our case, the trial court\u2019s agreement to defer the decision in order to allow defendant\u2019s submission of additional authority caused delay rightfully attributable to defendant. The fact that the delay occurred after defendant filed for discharge does not invoke the Tamborski rule. Defendant cannot pursue inaction on his discharge motion, gain the court\u2019s agreement to refrain from action, and subsequently raise Tamborski to assign the resulting delay to the State. When the trial court agreed, at defendant\u2019s behest, to await additional authority from defendant before it decided what to do, the motion was not under advisement. In effect, the motion was not submitted for decision until August 26, 1995. Defendant affirmatively precluded any processing of his motion until August 25, 1995, passed.\nThe 21 days of decision-making that transpired after the solicited grace period present a different question. After August 25, 1995, defendant sought immediate discharge and awaited decision. His further stay in the St. Clair County jail does nothing to delay decision. The only conceivable act of delay was the tender of the question for decision. After August 25, 1995, defendant did nothing to actually delay trial.\nThis is not a case where defendant tendered the discharge motion for decision on the day trial began. Defendant\u2019s timing did not hinder the State\u2019s ability to offer a reasoned response to the discharge motion. The delay after August 25, 1995, is \u201cunder advisement\u201d delay, unilaterally engaged in by the trial court. Such delay cannot be charged to defendant. Tamborski, 415 Ill. at 475-76, 114 N.E.2d at 654.\nTherefore, time\u2019s passage dishonors the law\u2019s assurance of prompt and speedy justice on September 1, 1995. It validates defendant\u2019s demand for discharge on that date. Since the State\u2019s allowable time to commence trial is spent by the time September 15, 1995, arrives, the denial of the speedy trial discharge motion on such date was an abuse of discretion.\nAccordingly, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction.\nReversed.\nCHAPMAN and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.\nJudge Radcliffe was assigned this case on October 17, 1995. All matters prior thereto occurred before different judges.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KUEHN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Michelle A. Zalisko, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and Paige Strawn, law student, for appellant.", "Robert B. Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Paul B. Linton, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEROY LADD, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201496\u20140006\nOpinion filed March 11, 1998.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Michelle A. Zalisko, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, and Paige Strawn, law student, for appellant.\nRobert B. Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Paul B. Linton, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0928-01", "first_page_order": 946, "last_page_order": 957 }