{ "id": 45713, "name": "RHONDA S. NORTH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DARLENE HINKLE, as City Clerk for the City of Amboy and as a Local Election Official, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "North v. Hinkle", "decision_date": "1998-03-06", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201497\u20140225", "first_page": "84", "last_page": "90", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 84" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351059 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4786626 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275-76" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "275-76" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/266/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596918 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780274 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0391-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 539, "char_count": 13367, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.535782604390014e-07, "percentile": 0.6719424568768295 }, "sha256": "89e6e1c38feb8f6b88e4ac213f2a25afe519c3782385a0e3567d9566d6c45c9a", "simhash": "1:9db47248643e3e7a", "word_count": 2191 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:11.490834+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RHONDA S. NORTH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DARLENE HINKLE, as City Clerk for the City of Amboy and as a Local Election Official, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DOYLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Rhonda S. North, Carl J. McCaffrey, and Christopher A. Jacobs, sought a writ of mandamus to compel defendant, Darlene Hinkle, as the city clerk of the City of Amboy, to certify plaintiffs\u2019 names for placement on the ballot for Amboy\u2019s April 7, 1997, municipal election. The trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 request, and plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.\nI. FACTS\nThe facts of this case are not in dispute. The plaintiffs sought to have their names placed on the ballot for the City of Amboy\u2019s April 7, 1997, municipal election. Plaintiff Rhonda S. North was running for city clerk, and plaintiffs Carl J. McCaffrey and Christopher A. Jacobs were running for seats as aldermen. On the last day for the filing of nominating papers, each of the plaintiffs filed with defendant a \u201cnonpartisan petition for nomination\u201d and a \u201cstatement of economic interest.\u201d However, none of the plaintiffs filed a \u201cstatement of candidacy.\u201d Shortly thereafter, defendant certified the names for the April 7, 1997, ballot and did not include any of the plaintiffs\u2019 names in that certification.\nPlaintiffs then filed a complaint for mandamus to compel defendant to certify their names for the ballot. Plaintiffs argued that defendant lacked the authority to withhold plaintiffs\u2019 names from the ballot. In support, plaintiffs cited section 10 \u2014 15 of the Election Code (the Code) (10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 15 (West 1996)). Under this section, plaintiffs argued, defendant can withhold a candidate\u2019s name from the ballot only if an objection to that candidate\u2019s nominating papers has been properly filed. Because no objections were filed against plaintiffs\u2019 papers, defendant was legally obligated to certify their names for the ballot.\nIn response, defendant argued that, under section 10 \u2014 8 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 8 (West 1996)), she has a duty to determine whether a candidate\u2019s nominating papers are in apparent conformity with the Code when filed. If they are, defendant may withhold that candidate\u2019s name from the ballot only if an objection has been filed. However, if the papers do not apparently conform to the Code, defendant is under no obligation to certify that candidate\u2019s name for the ballot. Defendant contends that this is critical because, although section 10 \u2014 5 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5 (West 1996)) states that all nominating papers must include a statement of candidacy, plaintiffs did not file statements of candidacy. Therefore, plaintiffs\u2019 nominating papers were not \u201cin apparent conformity\u201d with the Code and defendant was under no obligation to certify their names for the ballot.\nThe trial court agreed with defendant. In its memorandum order, the trial court explained that, because plaintiffs neglected to file statements of candidacy, their nominating papers were not \u201cin apparent conformity\u201d with the Code. Absent apparent conformity, defendant was under no obligation to certify plaintiffs\u2019 names for the ballot. The trial court therefore denied plaintiffs\u2019 request for a writ of mandamus. This timely appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Mootness\nAt the outset, we note that the April 7, 1997, election already has occurred and that all of the offices sought by plaintiffs in that election have been filled. Nevertheless, we will not treat this cause as moot.\nOne exception to the mootness doctrine allows a court to resolve an otherwise moot issue if the issue involves a substantial public interest. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395 (1994). The criteria for the application of the public interest exception are (1) the public nature of the question, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 395.\nIn this case, we are satisfied that the public interest criteria have been met. The procedures for certifying candidates for election to public office are doubtless of substantial public interest. In addition, the Illinois courts have not directly addressed the issue presented by this case in more than 80 years. Finally, we are convinced that the facts of this case are not unusual and are likely to recur. Accordingly, we will address the merits of this appeal. See Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 395-96.\nB. Certification of Candidates\nThe issue presented in this case is whether the trial court properly concluded that, under section 10 \u2014 8 of the Code, defendant possessed the authority to determine whether plaintiffs\u2019 nominating papers apparently conformed to the Code\u2019s requirements. The construction of a statute is a question of law, and therefore our review is de nova. Peterson v. Aldi, Inc., 288 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63 (1997).\nThe procedures for certifying a candidate\u2019s nominating papers are set forth, in relevant part, in sections 10 \u2014 8 and 10 \u2014 15 of the Code. Section 10 \u2014 15 states:\n\u201c[E]ach local election official with whom certificates of nomination or nominating petitions have been filed shall certify *** the names of all candidates entitled to be printed on the ballot.\u201d 10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 15 (West 1996).\nOf course, this language begs the question of which candidates\u2019 names are \u201centitled to be printed on the ballot.\u201d To answer this question, we must turn to section 10 \u2014 8 of the Code. Section 10 \u2014 8 states:\n\u201cCertificates of nomination and nomination papers ***, being filed as required by this Code, and being in apparent conformity with the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed to be valid unless objection thereto is duly made in writing.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 8 (West 1996).\nThus, as we read the Code, the candidates whose names are \u201centitled to be printed on the ballot\u201d are those whose nominating papers are (1) filed as required by the Code, (2) in apparent conformity with the Code when filed, and (3) not subject to a duly filed objection.\nIn this case, there is no dispute that plaintiff's followed the appropriate procedures for filing their nominating papers. Plaintiffs filed their papers on time and with the appropriate local election official. In addition, the parties agree both that no objections were filed against plaintiffs\u2019 nominating papers and that the local electoral board did not invalidate those papers. The dispute thus arises over whether plaintiffs\u2019 nominating papers were \u201cin apparent conformity\u201d with the Code when filed and whether defendant possesses the authority to make that determination.\nThe resolution of this issue is controlled by the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s decision in People ex rel. Giese v. Dillon, 266 Ill. 272, 275-76 (1914). Although the court rendered Dillon prior to the legislature\u2019s enactment of the Code in its current form, the issue in Dillon is identical to that presented in this appeal. In addition, despite its octogenarian distinction, the analysis set forth in Dillon remains both sensible and relevant.\nIn Dillon, the residents of La Salle filed a petition with the town clerk to have the question, \u201cShall this town become anti-saloon territory?\u201d placed upon the ballot. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 273. When the clerk refused to place the question on the ballot, the residents filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk to place the question on the ballot. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 273. In response to the petition, the clerk argued that he was under no obligation to place the question on the ballot because the submitted petition did not comply with the law. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 274. Specifically, the clerk argued that (1) the signatures on the ballot were not those of legal voters and were not given in person, and (2) the sworn statements at the bottom of each page were neither signed by a resident of La Salle nor sworn to by an officer having authority to administer an oath. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 274.\nIn affirming the trial court\u2019s granting of the writ of mandamus, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that the responsibility for determining whether an election petition apparently conforms to the law rests with the town clerk. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 275-76. Specifically, the clerk\u2019s duty is \u201cto determine whether, upon the face of the petition, it is in compliance with the law.\u201d Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276. If the petition on its face appears to comply with the statutory requisites, the clerk may not look outside the petition to determine whether in fact it does comply; he must submit the question to the voters. Dillon, 266 111. at 276. Because the validity of signatures and the authority of officers cannot be determined by examining the face of an election petition, the court concluded that the petition was in apparent conformity with the law and thus that the clerk was obligated to submit the question to the voters. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276.\nHowever, the court continued, had the petition not appeared on its face to have complied with the statutory requisites, the clerk would have had no duty to submit the question to the voters. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276. For example, by examining the face of the petition, a clerk can determine whether it contains the requisite number of signatures. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276. If it does not, the petition is not in apparent conformity with the election statutes and the clerk has no duty to certify the question for the ballot. Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276.\nIn this case, plaintiffs concede that their nominating papers were not in apparent conformity with the Code when filed. Indeed, although section 10 \u2014 5 of the Code states that all nominating papers shall include a statement of candidacy (10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 5 (West 1996)), plaintiffs did not file statements of candidacy with their papers. Whether nominating papers include statements of candidacy is not a question whose resolution demands a convening of the local electoral board. On the contrary, this is precisely the type of question that can be answered by a facial examination of the papers themselves. Plaintiffs\u2019 nominating papers were not in apparent conformity with the Code, and defendant was empowered to make that ministerial determination. See Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276. Having made that determination, defendant was under no obligation to certify plaintiffs\u2019 names for the ballot. See Dillon, 266 Ill. at 276.\nAs our conclusion suggests, we find plaintiffs\u2019 position unconvincing. First, plaintiffs\u2019 reading of section 10 \u2014 8 is contradicted by the plain language of that section. Section 10 \u2014 8 does not state that all nominating papers are deemed valid unless they are subject to a duly filed objection. Rather, the Code states that all nominating papers, \u201cbeing filed as required by this Code, and being in apparent conformity with the provisions of this Act,\u201d are deemed valid unless they are subject to a duly filed objection. (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 8 (West 1996). Clearly, section 10 \u2014 8 contemplates that the question of whether papers were duly filed and in apparent conformity with the law when filed is a threshold question that will be answered through a procedure other than statutory objection. Otherwise, the qualification, \u201cbeing filed as required by this Code, and being in apparent conformity with the provisions of this Act,\u201d aside from making no sense, would be wholly superfluous. A statute must be construed to avoid absurd results, and an interpretation that renders any part of that statute superfluous must be avoided. Cummings v. City of Waterloo, 289 Ill. App. 3d 474, 480 (1997). Because plaintiffs\u2019 reading of section 10 \u2014 8 results in both absurdity and superfluity, we decline to adopt that reading.\nWe also emphasize that our conclusion is supported not only by the language of the Code and the decision in Dillon but also by concerns for public policy. Consider the consequences if we were to abandon Dillon and adopt the rule urged by plaintiffs, namely, that a local election official must certify all nominating papers unless a written objection to those papers is duly filed. A candidate who filed his nominating papers 30 days after the deadline would be entitled to have his name appear on the ballot unless some member of the public took affirmative steps to challenge those papers. Any scrap of paper containing only a scribbled name and the words \u201cnominating papers\u201d would have to be treated as valid, at least until the local electoral board ruled otherwise. Clearly, this rule is unworkable. There must be a gatekeeper to turn away nominating papers that do not even purport to conform to the law. As did the court in Dillon, we believe that the local election official serves this function.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nAccordingly, because plaintiffs\u2019 nominating papers were facially deficient, defendant was under no obligation to certify plaintiffs\u2019 names for the ballot. The trial court therefore properly denied plaintiffs\u2019 request for a writ of mandamus.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lee County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nINGLIS and McLAREN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DOYLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas Suits, of Law Offices of M. Thomas Suits, P.C., of Polo, for appellants.", "Rolfe F. Ehrmann, of Ehrmann, Gehlbach, Beckman, Badger & Lee, of Dixon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RHONDA S. NORTH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DARLENE HINKLE, as City Clerk for the City of Amboy and as a Local Election Official, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201497\u20140225\nOpinion filed March 6, 1998.\nThomas Suits, of Law Offices of M. Thomas Suits, P.C., of Polo, for appellants.\nRolfe F. Ehrmann, of Ehrmann, Gehlbach, Beckman, Badger & Lee, of Dixon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0084-01", "first_page_order": 104, "last_page_order": 110 }