{ "id": 45730, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IAN E. PITTS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Pitts", "decision_date": "1998-03-02", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201497\u20140071", "first_page": "182", "last_page": "193", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 182" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35380 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 655", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 4336", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 4321", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 4320", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 4310", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 4307", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 4306", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 4323", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 4453", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 1372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1379-81" }, { "page": "1379" }, { "page": "1380" }, { "page": "1380" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544904 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514-18" }, { "page": "514-15" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 1285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1290-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2852366 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 N.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520943 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 1359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2494585 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 911", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258589 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913-14" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0911-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 1221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1224" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3229022 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 N.E.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456117 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0212-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1166, "char_count": 27702, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.279092128916675e-07, "percentile": 0.8706542350538583 }, "sha256": "a8ed27de02e8392c7c44b4b4f8f46a72d461c7795f758c335f2c0ca94e5ebe5e", "simhash": "1:ba2669a5bb408f37", "word_count": 4640 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:11.490834+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IAN E. PITTS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn June 1996, the State charged defendant, Ian E. Pitts, with two separate counts of attempt (first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 4(a) (West 1994); 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995)), two separate counts of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A \u2014 2 (West 1994)), armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 2(a) (West 1994)), aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18 \u2014 4(a)(3) (West 1994)), and burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 1(a) (West 1994)). In August 1996, defendant pleaded guilty to both attempt (first degree murder) counts and armed robbery, pursuant to the State\u2019s agreement to dismiss the remaining charges. The parties had no agreement regarding the sentence the trial court would impose.\nIn October 1996, the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years in prison on each attempt (first degree murder) conviction and six years in prison on the armed robbery conviction, with all sentences to be served consecutively.\nAt the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated its agreement with the prosecutor that defendant would have to serve 85% of his prison sentences as a result of the then-recently enacted \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d statute (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1995)), which modified section 3 \u2014 6\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2) (West 1994)) to limit good conduct credit to no more than 4.5 days per month for a prisoner serving a sentence of attempt (first degree murder).\nDefendant appeals, arguing that (1) his aggregate 36-year prison sentence was excessive and constitutes an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion; and (2) Public Act 89 \u2014 404 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 40, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 111. Laws 4323-27)), which created the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d statute, is unconstitutional because (a) it violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a7 8(d)), and (b) it violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2). We reject defendant\u2019s first argument but agree that the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d statute violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nWhen defendant pleaded guilty in August 1996, the trial court adopted the factual basis previously presented at codefendant Jody Rinderer\u2019s guilty plea hearing. The parties also stipulated that Amanda Jones, another codefendant, would testify that the three male codefendants (defendant, Rinderer, and Jason Gaddis) agreed ahead of time that they were going to kill Victoria Bridgeman and steal her car. After the attack, defendant admitted that he had stabbed Bridgeman.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial court received evidence from both parties, including a personality inventory regarding defendant and a presentence report prepared by the probation department. The court also heard arguments and suggestions of counsel.\nInformation before the trial court at the sentencing hearing revealed the following. Bridgeman met defendant through a friend\u2019s neighbor and had known him for approximately two years. Defendant subsequently introduced her to Gaddis and Rinderer. On the evening of April 23, 1996, Bridgeman, defendant, Gaddis, and Rin-derer were together in Bridgeman\u2019s car, which was parked \u201cin the country.\u201d Bridgeman was seated in the driver\u2019s seat, Gaddis was in the front passenger seat, and defendant and Rinderer were in the back. Bridgeman testified that Rinderer \u201chad been acting like a creep all night,\u201d telling her that she needed to respect him. After Bridge-man disagreed with him, the three codefendants left the vehicle ostensibly to use the bathroom.\nUpon returning three to five minutes later, each of them took a new position in the car, with defendant seated beside Bridgeman and Gaddis behind her. Bridgeman and Rinderer continued arguing, and Bridgeman turned to \u201cget input\u201d from Gaddis. At that point, Gaddis put a cord around her neck and began strangling her. Defendant then turned toward Bridgeman, kneeling on the front seat, and began punching her in the face. Bridgeman described that initial portion of the attack as follows:\n\u201cI was trying to get a hold of [Gaddis]. They were all yelling, and I had my \u2014 my right hand underneath the cord trying to pull it away from my neck, and [defendant] just kept hitting me and hitting me. They kept yelling \u2018Get her.\u2019 \u201d\nBridgeman lost consciousness. When Bridgeman awakened, her three assailants stood her up beside her car, and defendant hit her in the head with a whiskey bottle. They then began kicking her, yelling \u201cDie bitch.\u201d Bridgeman once again lost consciousness; when Bridge-man reawakened, her assailants were trying to drag her into a ditch. She tried to fight them off and \u201cwas stabbed a few times.\u201d Once in the ditch, they kicked her and continued to yell \u201cDie bitch.\u201d Bridgeman estimated that her three assailants yelled \u201cDie bitch\u201d at least 100 times during the attack. Bridgeman began pleading for her life, telling them to leave her to \u201cdie in peace.\u201d At that point, someone kicked her again, and they drove away in her car.\nBridgeman then stood up and tried \u201cto head to safety.\u201d She stated that she had not gotten far when she saw the car turn around. She fell back to the ground on her stomach and heard them get out of her car. (By this time, her eyes were swollen shut.) One of the three walked up to her and felt for a pulse. She then heard someone say, \u201cShe isn\u2019t dead. Finish her off.\u201d After defendant and Gaddis prodded Rinderer to slash her throat, Rinderer did so. In an attempt to get them \u201cto leave when I was dying,\u201d Bridgeman grabbed her throat and acted like she was choking on her own blood. At that point, her three assailants returned to her car, turned up the stereo, and left. After once again losing and regaining consciousness, Bridgeman walked to find help.\nAs a result of the attack (during which she was stabbed at least 23 times), Bridgeman was hospitalized for one week and accumulated medical bills totalling $50,000. She has several scars, including \u201ca very big indentation\u201d on her head, one on her left eye, one across the bridge of her nose, one on her right cheek and across her nose to her left cheek, \u201ca very big slash\u201d on the right side of her throat, and others \u201call over\u201d her upper torso, including several scars on her breasts. Bridgeman described the impact of the attack on her life, as follows:\n\u201cI don\u2019t trust anybody. I used to trust absolutely everybody. Apparently not anymore. I am scared to go to my car. I am scared to be in the car. I cannot have anybody sitting in the backseat for fear what could happen if they do. And I can only be pretty much in well-lit areas with somebody like my sister and my mother.\u201d\nLouis Pitts, defendant\u2019s father, testified on his behalf that defendant had psychiatric problems growing up and had previously been hospitalized and medicated for his \u201coutburst disorder.\u201d Defendant stopped taking his medications because they caused side effects and were expensive, and he \u201cseemed to be doing pretty good.\u201d\nThe presentence report indicated that defendant, who was 16 years old at the time of the offense, was a member of a street gang, uses alcohol daily and drugs on a regular basis, sells drugs, and has an \u201cexplosive disorder\u201d that causes him to become violent when angry. In September 1993, the trial court adjudicated him delinquent for committing theft. Defendant subsequently violated court supervision by committing the offenses of aggravated battery and battery. He was then sentenced to probation, and after he violated several probation conditions, the court ordered his probation terminated as unsuccessful. In May 1995, defendant was again adjudicated delinquent for committing the offenses of battery and resisting a peace officer. While in the juvenile detention center after his arrest in this case, defendant committed 24 violations of detention rules, one of which involved aggressive behavior.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Defendant\u2019s Claim That His Sentence Was Excessive Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive prison sentence of an aggregate of 36 years. Specifically, defendant contends that because he was only 16 years old, had limited prior contacts with the juvenile justice system, and had a history of mental and emotional problems, the trial court \u201cfailed to fully appreciate the extent of [defendant\u2019s] rehabilitative potential.\u201d We emphatically disagree.\nA trial court\u2019s discretion in sentencing a defendant is entitled to great deference and weight, and this court will not alter that sentence on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. People v. Williams, 287 Ill. App. 3d 262, 270, 678 N.E.2d 334, 340 (1997).\nAt the sentencing hearing of defendant and his accomplices, the prosecutor argued that \u201c[t]his crime was devoid of any mercy\u201d and that the victim suffered at least 23 stab wounds on her face, neck, torso, and hands. Throughout her ordeal, she was addressed repeatedly with the cry of \u201cDie bitch.\u201d When her assailants realized they had not killed her, they lifted her up, slit her throat, and then left her for dead. The prosecutor also pointed out that defendant was a member of a street gang, has an explosive temper, consumes whiskey daily until he passes out, and sells cannabis to support himself.\nIn sentencing defendant, the trial court first stated its essential agreement with the prosecutor\u2019s arguments and then noted that the only thing worse the victim\u2019s assailants could have done was to murder her, and \u201c[t]hey came awfully, awfully close in attempting to achieve that.\u201d The court concluded as follows:\n\u201cIn our society!,] we cannot and will not tolerate this type of young men [sic] to be free upon the streets. We don\u2019t need these people. We don\u2019t need these types of crimes, and somebody has got to protect the society. In this particular case, it\u2019s the [j]udge. It\u2019s the [c]curt. And[,] therefore],] I intend to give each of these young men fairly extensive sentences to protect the public.\u201d\nWe agree without reservation with the trial court\u2019s conclusion, and in so holding, we reaffirm what we stated in People v. Johnson, 262 Ill. App. 3d 565, 572, 634 N.E.2d 1285, 1290-91 (1994), as follows:\n\u201cPeople who commit crimes like this forfeit their right to walk among us as members of a free society. The courts must do all they can to ensure that these terrible crimes \u2014 and the suffering they caused this innocent victim (perhaps for the rest of her life)\u2014 never again be visited upon some other innocent victim. By putting this vicious criminal behind bars for this lengthy period, the trial court fulfilled its obligation to protect society, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s sentence.\u201d\nB. The \u201cTruth-In-Sentencing\u201d Statute\nDefendant next argues that the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d statute violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution and is therefore invalid. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a7 8(d). Specifically, he asks this court to vacate the portion of his sentencing order requiring him to serve 85% of the sentence imposed and to clarify that he is to receive day-for-day credit to which he was entitled pursuant to section 3 \u2014 6\u20143 of the Code prior to the enactment of the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d statute. We agree.\nArticle IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: \u201cBills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a7 8(d). In Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 514-18, 680 N.E.2d 1372, 1379-81 (1997), the Supreme Court of Illinois recently discussed this provision \u2014 the so-called single subject rule \u2014 at length when it held that the legislature violated that rule in enacting Public Act 89 \u2014 428 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 428, eff. December 13, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4453)). In Johnson, the court wrote as follows:\n\u201cThe single subject rule is a substantive requirement for the passage of bills and is therefore subject to judicial review. ***\nThe term \u2018subject,\u2019 in this context, is to be liberally construed and the subject may be as broad as the legislature chooses. [Cita-tians.] Nonetheless, the matters included in the enactment must have a natural and logical connection. [Citations.] The rule prohibits the inclusion of1 \u201cdiscordant provisions that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate relation to each other.\u201d \u2019 [Citations.]\u201d Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514-15, 680 N.E.2d at 1379.\nWith these rules in mind, we examine Public Act 89 \u2014 404, effective August 20, 1995, which contains in one of its sections the amendment to section 3 \u2014 6\u20143 of the Code. Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 40, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4323-27) (amending 730 ILCS 5/3\u2014 6 \u2014 3(a)(2) (West 1994)). That amendment contains the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d provision of which defendant complains.\nPublic Act 89 \u2014 404 contains 10 separate sections that either amend or add to Illinois statutes. Defendant asserts that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 contains discordant provisions that have no legitimate relation to each other and, accordingly, violate the single subject rule of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, \u00a7 8(d). Defendant is partially correct in his assertion, but that is all that is required for this court to conclude that Public Act 89\u2014 404 is void because it violates the Illinois Constitution.\nThe first nine sections (sections 5 through 45) of Public Act 89\u2014 404 comply with the single subject rule when liberally construed. The 10 sections deal with or concern the following: (1) the authority of sheriffs (section 5) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 5, eff. August 20, 1997 (1995 Ill. Laws 4306)); (2) the authority of certain municipal police officers (section 10) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 10, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4306)); (3) a modification of the insanity defense (section 15) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 15, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4306-07)); (4) disbursement of proceeds from forfeitures under the Cannabis Control Act (section 20) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 20, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4307-10)); (5) disbursement of proceeds from forfeitures under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act and modifications of certain sentencing provisions under that act (section 25) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 25, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4310-20)); (6) the authority of a law enforcement officer beyond that officer\u2019s jurisdiction (section 30) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 30, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4320-21)); (7) the prohibition of jury trials for certain forfeiture cases (section 35) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 35, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4321-23)); (8) the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d addition to section 3 \u2014 6\u20143 of the Code, which is the subject of this appeal, as well as the creation of a \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d commission, a requirement that trial courts explain the new \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d provisions at the time of sentencing, and a modification of the insanity defense procedures (section 40) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 40, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4323-36)); (9) the inapplicability of homestead exemptions to drug asset forfeitures (section 45) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 45, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4336)); and (10) an amendment to the Hospital Lien Act providing a mechanism for nonprofit hospitals and hospitals operated by a unit of local government to file a lien upon claims and causes of actions of injured persons who have been treated by such hospitals for the payment of their treatment (section 50) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 50, eff. August 20, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 4336-37)). Section 50 further (1) provides that such a hospital has up to 30 calendar days to perfect and satisfy its lien; and (2) addresses the situation in which the person treated at the hospital obtains a verdict or judgment to be paid over time by means of an annuity or otherwise.\nAs this description makes clear, the first nine sections of Public Act 89 \u2014 404 (specifically, sections 5 through 45) concern some aspect of the criminal justice system and thus fall within the designation of one \u201csubject\u201d in the context of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. To put the matter another way, none of the first nine sections of Public Act 89 \u2014 404 is \u201cdiscordant\u201d with the others because all of them can be fairly considered as having a legitimate relation to each other. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 515, 680 N.E.2d at 1380. However, section 50, dealing with hospital liens, fails that test.\nThe State does not even attempt to claim that section 50 has some relationship to the other nine sections of Public Act 89 \u2014 404, which all pertain in some fashion to criminal law or procedure. Instead, the State contends that because the title to Public Act 89\u2014 404 is \u201cAn Act in relation to governmental matters, amending named acts,\u201d the 10 sections comprising Public Act 89 \u2014 404 need only relate in some fashion to governmental matters, and the State asserts that they do. We disagree.\nIn our judgment, the State proposes an exception to the single subject rule that would effectively swallow the rule and render the supreme court\u2019s recent decision in Johnson a nullity. Although the title of an act should be considered in an analysis of whether it violates the single subject rule of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the title cannot be dispositive; if we accepted the State\u2019s argument, nothing would be left of the single subject rule beyond the creativity of legislative drafters to make titles of acts as broad as possible.\nWhen the supreme court in Johnson spoke of the term \u201csubject\u201d in the context of the single subject rule, that court meant the substance of the legislative enactment at issue, which is contained within the body of the act, namely, the sections thereof. In this case, that means sections 5 through 50 of Public Act 89 \u2014 404. Accordingly, none of those sections can be discordant to the others for that act to pass constitutional muster. However, as we have demonstrated, section 50 is discordant to the other sections. Thus, we hold that no matter how liberally the single subject rule is construed, Public Act 89\u2014 404 violates that rule. See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 516, 680 N.E.2d at 1380.\nAs a last matter, the State argues that if this court were to find that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 was enacted in violation of the Illinois Constitution, then we should view the subsequent reenactment of the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d provision of section 3 \u2014 6\u20143 of the Code in Public Act 89 \u2014 462, effective May 29, 1996, as \u201cvalidating\u201d section 40 of Public Act 89 \u2014 404, which contained that provision. We disagree.\nThe offenses defendant was convicted of occurred on April 23, 1996. Public Act 89 \u2014 462, which the State seeks to use to \u201cvalidate\u201d the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d provision, was enacted May 29, 1996. Pub. Act 89 \u2014 462, \u00a7 280, eff. May 29, 1996 (1996 Ill. Laws 655-58). We agree with defendant that giving effect to Public Act 89 \u2014 462 under these circumstances would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 9, 10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 16. Viewing the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d statute as substantive is not very difficult when one realizes that, in this very case, what is at stake for defendant is whether he must serve 85%, or only 50%, of his 36-year aggregate prison sentence.\nBecause we hold that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 violates the single subject rule of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, we need not address defendant\u2019s other argument that it also violates defendant\u2019s constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws.\nIn so holding, we acknowledge the dissenting opinion of our distinguished colleague, Justice McCullough, and the recent decision of the Third District Appellate Court in People v. Watford, 294 Ill. App. 3d 462, 464 (1997), holding that a defendant\u2019s challenge to the truth-in-sentencing provisions of Public Act 89 \u2014 404 cannot be brought on direct appeal but may only be brought by filing an action in habeas corpus or mandamus. We respectfully disagree with Watford and Justice McCullough for the following reasons.\nAlthough section 3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2)(ii) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6\u2014 3(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1995)) may be self-executing as far as the Department of Corrections is concerned, Public Act 89 \u2014 404 does require a trial court (by the addition of subsection (c \u2014 2) to section 5 \u2014 4\u20141 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u2014l(c\u20142) (West Supp. 1995)) to discuss in open court the question of how much good-time credit the defendant being sentenced will receive. Further, although it is true that this new subsection provides that a trial court\u2019s error regarding this provision \u201cmay not be relied on by the defendant on appeal\u201d (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u2014l(c\u20142) (West Supp. 1995)), that statement addresses a different matter than the constitutional question before us in this case. Here, the question is not whether the trial court correctly stated \u2014 and applied \u2014 the truth-in-sentencing provision; instead, the issue is whether Public Act 89 \u2014 404 can constitutionally require the trial court to do anything regarding good-time credit.\nMoreover, we agree with defendant that the decision in Watford encourages piecemeal proceedings at the appellate level because many defendants will pursue a direct appeal while saving this issue to present in a subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus or habeas corpus. If Public Act 89 \u2014 404 is constitutionally defective, as seems clear to us, then we see no policy reason for not so holding at this point, when the issue has been fully briefed and argued.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand with directions that the trial court amend the sentencing order to reflect that defendant is eligible for day-for-day good-time credit as provided in section 3 \u2014 6\u20143 of the Code prior to any \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d amendments added thereto.\nAffirmed and remanded with directions.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH,\nspecially concurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI agree that the trial court should be affirmed in the imposition of sentences for defendant\u2019s armed robbery and two attempt (first degree murder) convictions. Defendant\u2019s claim that his sentence was excessive is waived for failure to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. People v. Economy, 291 Ill. App. 3d 212, 683 N.E.2d 919 (1997).\nI disagree that defendant is, in this appeal, eligible for day-for-day good-time credit. The majority finds that the defendant\u2019s argument that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution is well-taken. In the posture of this case, the constitutionality of Public Act 89 \u2014 404 should not be addressed.\nThe truth-in-sentencing provisions set forth in section 3 \u2014 6\u2014 3(a)(2)(ii) of the Code are self-executing. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2)(ii) (West 1996). The majority suggests that section 5 \u2014 4\u20141 of the Code imposes a requirement on the trial judge to state at the sentencing hearing what good-time provision applies under section 3 \u2014 6\u20143. This suggestion is a bootstrap attempt to validate the majority\u2019s determination that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 is unconstitutional.\nSection 5 \u2014 4\u2014l(c\u20142) provides that the trial \u201cjudge shall state on the record in open court the approximate period of time the defendant will serve in custody according to the *** regulations for early release found in Section 3 \u2014 6\u20143.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u2014l(c\u20142) (West 1996). But section 5 \u2014 4\u2014l(e\u20142) also provides: \u201cThis statement is intended solely to inform the public, has no legal effect on the defendant\u2019s actual release, and may not be relied on by the defendant on appeal.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u2014l(c\u20142) (West 1996). The purpose of the legislation appears to be a required admonishment to the public and not to the defendant. Supreme Court Rule 402 does not require the trial court to admonish a defendant as to what good-time credit he may receive under the provisions of article 6 of the Code. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6\u20143 (West 1996). Section 5 \u2014 4\u2014l(c\u20142) makes it clear that \u201c \u2018[t]he actual period of prison time served is determined by the statutes of Illinois as applied *** by the Illinois Department of Corrections and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u2014l(c\u20142) (West 1996).\nWith this background, I suggest the constitutionality of Public Act 89 \u2014 404 is not an appropriate issue to be raised by defendant in this direct appeal. Defendant entered a guilty plea and the State dismissed other charges. This issue was not raised at sentencing or included in defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider his sentence. The last sentence of Rule 604(d) is quite specific: \u201cUpon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to reconsider the sentence or withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall he deemed waived.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 145 111. 2d R. 604(d). The supreme court\u2019s language ought to be followed. The issue is waived.\nIn People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 454, 539 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (1989), the supreme court stated a constitutional issue may be raised at any time. In People v. Starnes, 273 Ill. App. 3d 911, 913-14, 653 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1995), the appellate court distinguished Bryant, finding that Bryant \u201cprohibits waiver of a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute under which a defendant is convicted.\u201d The Starnes court then found that pursuant to the reasoning in People v. Sales, 195 Ill. App. 3d 160, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (1990), waiver does apply to constitutional attacks on a collateral statute.\nAs the State argues, the truth-in-sentencing provisions are collateral to the statutes under which defendant was convicted and sentenced. As pointed out heretofore, chapter III of the Code concerns the Department of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 1\u20141 through 3 \u2014 15\u201413 (West 1996). Section 3 \u2014 6\u20143 is self-executing. The credit for time served issue under article 6 of the Code is not an issue to be properly addressed in direct appeal in this case. Section 3 \u2014 6\u2014 3(a)(2)(ii) provides that a prisoner serving a sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder \u201cshall receive no more than 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 6\u20143(a)(2)(ii) (West Supp. 1995). Determining credit for time served is the responsibility of the Department of Corrections, not the trial court.\nFor the reasons stated above, it is not necessary to address the State\u2019s argument concerning reenactment of the legislation in Public Acts 89 \u2014 428 and 89 \u2014 462, or Public Act 89 \u2014 656 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 656, \u00a7 15, eff. January 1, 1997 (1996 111. Laws 3500-01)).\nAs in Watford, the issue of constitutionality is not properly before this court. The trial court\u2019s orders should be affirmed in their entirety.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Arden J. Lang, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Lawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IAN E. PITTS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201497\u20140071\nOpinion filed March 2, 1998.\nRehearing denied April 9, 1998.\nMcCULLOUGH, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Arden J. Lang, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nLawrence R. Fichter, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0182-01", "first_page_order": 202, "last_page_order": 213 }