{ "id": 45749, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL WESTPFAHL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Westpfahl", "decision_date": "1998-03-23", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201496\u20140979", "first_page": "327", "last_page": "335", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 327" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3468232 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2979033 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163084 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3308853 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. App. 3d 1039", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5665051 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1056" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/143/1039-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794604 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4809979 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. App. 3d 986", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3136324 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/93/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2539834 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461579 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2921609 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2481130 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2974947 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5360433 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2828193 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5607912 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/0440-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 802, "char_count": 20402, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0093275514341403e-07, "percentile": 0.5417700028071135 }, "sha256": "5c26d5e4597ab02039629a39873e51500012bb9a1d11c65f42749679ff563c91", "simhash": "1:be82bd2efb51d8f1", "word_count": 3401 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:11.490834+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL WESTPFAHL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant, Michael L. Westpfahl, was acquitted of one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of L.B., a 13-year-old minor, and convicted of one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of the same individual. He was sentenced to a term of four years in prison. Defendant maintains on appeal that: (1) the trial court committed reversible error when it sua sponte conducted a competency examination of L.B. in the presence of the jury and then declared to the jury that she was \u201ccompetent\u201d to testify; (2) the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial based upon the erroneous examination in the jury\u2019s presence; (3) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of criminal sexual abuse; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to continue the trial. We affirm.\nAs the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we need not recite the evidence and findings of the trial court in detail. The parties may, however, be assured this court thoroughly reviewed the record in considering the propriety of those findings. We will discuss the facts only as needed to explain the holding in the case.\nThe defendant was charged with sexually abusing L.B., the daughter of his estranged paramour. Specifically, one count alleged that he reached under L.B.\u2019s shirt and bra, placing his hand on her breasts. The second count alleged that he placed his hand on L.B.\u2019s vagina.\nL.B. was the first witness presented at trial. The prosecutor began the direct examination of L.B. by asking some introductory questions. The trial judge then interrupted the prosecutor and declared that he was required to make a \u201cpreliminary inquiry\u201d of the witness due to her age. The judge then, in the presence of the jury, asked the witness several questions designed to determine whether she was capable of understanding the difference between the truth and a lie under oath, and whether she understood that it was morally wrong to lie under oath. After questioning the witness, the trial judge proclaimed that the witness was \u201ccompetent to testify.\u201d Defense counsel did not immediately object to the trial court\u2019s questioning; however, an objection was registered a short time later, outside the presence of the jury.\nAfter this examination by the trial judge, L.B. then testified that defendant engaged the two instances of sexual contact while on an afternoon outing. Her testimony regarding defendant\u2019s touching her breasts was very detailed and definite. Her testimony regarding the other incident was somewhat vague. She testified that defendant unzipped her pants; however, her testimony as to where he touched her was equivocal. Despite several attempts by the prosecutor to elicit testimony from L.B. that defendant had touched her vagina, no such testimony was given. L.B. testified that she asked defendant what he was doing, and he told her that he wanted to have sex with her.\nL.B. further testified that she immediately informed her mother of the incidents and that she was present when her mother confronted defendant about L.B.\u2019s accusations. L.B. testified that defendant admitted to her mother that the accusations were true.\nL.B.\u2019s mother testified that, immediately after the incident, L.B. told her what happened. She then confronted defendant and asked him \u201cif he stuck his hands down inside [L.B.\u2019s] bra.\u201d The defendant replied \u201cyes.\u201d She then asked him if \u201che unzipped [her] pants\u201d and he again replied \u201cyes.\u201d She asked defendant why he did those things to her daughter, and he responded that he was \u201ctrying to love\u201d her.\nDefendant testified, denying the allegations. However, as to his alleged admissions to L.B.\u2019s mother when she confronted him with the allegations, he stated that he \u201cmight have\u201d made the admissions in an effort to \u201ccalm her down.\u201d\nDefendant was convicted of the count related to touching L.B.\u2019s breasts but was acquitted of the count related to touching her vagina.\nOn appeal, defendant first maintains that the trial court committed reversible error when it conducted a competency examination of L.B. in the presence of the jury and then declared to the jury that the witness was \u201ccompetent\u201d to testify. Defendant maintains that the examination of L.B. by the judge, in the presence of the jury, violated section 115 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 14 (West 1994)). He further maintains that the trial judge\u2019s pronouncement of her as \u201ccompetent\u201d to tell the truth prejudiced him by giving the appearance to the jury that the judge also found her testimony to be credible.\nBefore reaching the merits of defendant\u2019s position, we must address the People\u2019s contention that the defendant waived this issue by not immediately objecting to the judge\u2019s examination of L.B., rather than waiting until after the examination had been completed to make the objection. In addition, the People claim that the issue was waived by the defendant\u2019s failure to state the statutory basis for the objection at the time the objection was made. See People v. Farella, 79 Ill. App. 3d 440 (1979).\nWe hold that defendant has not waived this issue. Although there is a general rule that failure to raise a timely objection at trial waives consideration of an issue on appeal (see People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176 (1988)), we note precedent holding that a less rigid application of the rule prevails where the basis for the objection is the conduct of the trial judge. People v. Tyner, 30 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1964); People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398 (1963); People v. Dorn, 46 Ill. App. 3d 820 (1977). As the issue in the instant matter involves the questioning of a witness by the trial judge, we hold that the defendant properly preserved this issue for review by registering an objection outside the presence of the jury and prior to the introduction of further evidence.\nTurning to the merits of defendant\u2019s argument, we must first determine whether the trial judge erred in conducting its sua sponte examination of L.B. in the presence of the jury and in announcing to the jury that it found her \u201ccompetent.\u201d Prior to conducting the examination, the trial judge announced that, as the witness was under 14 years of age, he was required to conduct an examination to determine her competency to testify.\nThe trial court\u2019s reasoning was erroneous in many respects. First, the presumption that competency hearings are required for witnesses under 14 years of age was abolished in 1989 when the current version of section 115 \u2014 14 of the Criminal Code (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 14 (West 1990)) was implemented. See People v. Trail, 197 Ill. App. 3d 742, 748 (1990). Since 1989, all witnesses, regardless of age, are presumed competent to testify. Second, as the Code has provided since 1989, a competency hearing is never to be initiated sua sponte by the trial judge but, rather, only by motion of a party objecting to the competency of the witness. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 14(c) (West 1994). Third, competency hearings \u201cshall be conducted outside the presence of the jury.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 14(c) (West 1994). We hold that the trial judge erred in conducting a sua sponte examination of L.B. in the presence of the jury.\nHaving determined that the trial judge erred, we must next determine whether the error rises to the level of reversible error. For the comments or questioning by a trial judge to constitute reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate that they were a material factor in the conviction or that prejudice appears to have been the probable result. People v. Anderson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 439, 463 (1993); People v. Brown, 200 Ill. App. 3d 566, 577 (1990).\nHere, defendant maintains that by questioning L.B. in the presence of the jury and then announcing that he found her to be competent, the trial judge was in fact conveying his opinion to the jury that she was testifying truthfully. Defendant maintains that L.B.\u2019s credibility was key to the case against him and that, absent the trial judge\u2019s improper questioning and comment as to her competency, the jury would not have found her credible. Defendant cites the split verdicts in support of his supposition that L.B. would have been found incredible absent the judge\u2019s actions. He argues that the \u201cnot guilty\u201d verdict on one ch\u00e1rge demonstrates that the jury questioned L.B.\u2019s credibility and that the trial judge\u2019s actions must have swayed the jury to convict him on the other charge. Thus, defendant maintains, prejudice resulted and the trial judge\u2019s actions were a material factor in his conviction.\nAfter a careful review of the record, we cannot agree with the defendant\u2019s assertion that he has demonstrated prejudice. First, we must note that while L.B.\u2019s testimony was, of course, crucial to the case against him, it was not the only evidence of his guilt on the charge for which he was convicted. Indeed, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming, when the defendant\u2019s admission to L.B.\u2019s mother that he had touched L.B.\u2019s breasts is considered. Had defendant denied making this statement, rattier than testifying that he \u201cmight\u201d have admitted to molesting the woman\u2019s daughter in order \u201cto calm her down,\u201d the evidence could have been considered closely balanced. As it was, unrebutted testimony that defendant admitted committing the offense for which he was convicted, along with the testimony of L.B. and her mother, constituted overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nIt is well settled that improper remarks or rulings by the trial court may be considered harmless error if there is overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Jenkins, 209 Ill. App. 3d 249, 257-58 (1991); People v. Franklin, 93 Ill. App. 3d 986, 994 (1981). The evidence against defendant in the instant case was overwhelming, and he has not established that the trial judge\u2019s questioning of the witness and pronouncing her competent resulted in substantial prejudice or constituted a material factor in his conviction.\nWe also find that defendant\u2019s reliance upon the split verdict as demonstrative of prejudice is without merit. Far from indicating that the jury questioned L.B.\u2019s credibility, the split verdicts were based upon the jury\u2019s careful assessment of the evidence before it and reflect its conclusion that the proof set forth as to the charge predicated on defendant touching L.B.\u2019s vagina was insufficient, but that the evidence was sufficient as to the charge predicated on touching her breasts. The split verdicts were not a result of the jury\u2019s questioning L.B.\u2019s credibility, nor were they a result of its desire to show deference to the trial judge, as defendant suggests. Rather, the split verdicts were a result of the jury\u2019s weighing of all the evidence.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s suggestion that prejudice should be presumed where a competency hearing is held in the presence of the jury. In making this argument, defendant compares the hearing required to take place outside the presence of the jury when a party challenges a witness\u2019s competency (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 14 (West 1994)) with the hearsay exception for testimony concerning out-of-court statements made by children under the age of 13 in prosecutions for sex crimes (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10 (West 1994)). This provision allows the admission of hearsay testimony of the child if \u201c[t]he court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10(b)(1) (West 1994).\nDefendant notes that absent a hearing outside the presence of the jury, it is reversible error to admit testimony of a child\u2019s out-of-court statement. People v. Mitchell, 155 Ill. 2d 344 (1993). People v. Smith, 221 Ill. App. 3d 605 (1991). He argues, by analogy, that the same result should occur where a hearing on competency is held in the presence of the jury. We do not accept defendant\u2019s analogy. Mitchell and Smith do not stand for the proposition that error occurs when a hearing is held in the presence of the jury. Rather, these cases stand for the proposition that error occurs when no pretrial hearing is held on the admissibility of certain hearsay, as there must be \u201csufficient safeguards of reliability\u2019 when dealing with hearsay testimony. Without such safeguards, improper admission of hearsay testimony may be presumed prejudicial. Smith, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 609. Defendant has shown no basis for extending the same presumption in matters not involving hearsay testimony.\nFor the above reasons, we find that defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial judge\u2019s erroneous questioning of L.B. and declaring her competent to testify in the presence of the jury was a material factor in the conviction or that prejudice appears to have been the probable result.\nDefendant next maintains that the trial court erred in not granting a motion for a mistrial based upon the trial court\u2019s error in examining L.B. in the presence of the jury. However, following our review of the record, we find that no motion for mistrial was ever presented. Therefore, we deem this issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for mistrial to be waived. We note however, that the decision to grant or deny a motion for a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and a ruling denying the motion is proper absent a demonstration of prejudice to the defendant. People v. Staten, 143 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1056 (1986); People v. Robinson, 68 Ill. App. 3d 747 (1979). As we have found no prejudice resulted from the trial court\u2019s erroneous examination of L.B. in the jury\u2019s presence and declaring her to be competent to testify, we likewise find no prejudice in the trial court\u2019s failure to grant a motion for a mistrial.\nThe defendant next argues that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant contends: (1) that the split verdicts on the two counts demonstrate the existence of reasonable doubt as to the count on which he was convicted; and (2) the People failed to prove that the touching of L.B.\u2019s breast was \u201cfor the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused,\u201d which is a necessary element of the offense of criminal sexual abuse. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 16, 12 \u2014 12(e) (West 1994).\nWhen the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the relevant question on appeal is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are the responsibility of the trier of fact. People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 226 (1991).\nViewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse against L.B. beyond a reasonable doubt. First, we do not view the verdicts on the two charges to be either legally or logically inconsistent. Legally inconsistent verdicts occur where both crimes arise out of the same set of facts and the verdicts necessarily involve the conclusion that the same essential element or elements of each crime were found both to exist and not to exist. People v. Frias, 99 Ill. 2d 193 (1983). Logically inconsistent verdicts, on the other hand, arise when verdicts, though not based upon the same elements, nonetheless involve both the acceptance and rejection of the same theory of the case proposed by the State or the defense. People v. Landwer, 254 Ill. App. 3d 120 (1993). Based upon these definitions, we find in this case that neither a legal nor logical inconsistency exists in the two verdicts.\nWe see nothing legally inconsistent between a verdict that acquits a defendant of the charge of sexual contact with the victim\u2019s vagina and a verdict that convicts a defendant of sexual contact with the victim\u2019s breasts. The two verdicts do not require that the same essential elements both exist and not exist at the same time.\nLikewise, the verdicts are not logically inconsistent. A review of the evidence shows that a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant fondled L.B.\u2019s breasts. L.B. specifically described the defendant as doing so, and the defendant admitted to L.B.\u2019s mother that he placed his hands inside L.B.\u2019s bra. The same reasonable jury could equally have concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant touched L.B.\u2019s vagina. While it is clear that defendant unzipped her pants and placed his hand inside, L.B. never testified that he touched her vagina. Moreover, defendant\u2019s admission to L.B.\u2019s mother was that he unzipped L.B.\u2019s pants, not that he had contact with her vagina. Thus, after viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the People, the different verdicts reached by the jury on the two charges fail to show that defendant was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal sexual abuse.\nDefendant also complains that the proof that he fondled L.B.\u2019s breast for the purpose of his or her sexual gratification is insufficient. Again, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could find the element proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Such proof can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. People v. Goebel, 161 Ill. App. 3d 113 (1987). In Goebel, the court looked to the deliberate and specific action of the defendant in touching the nine-year-old victim\u2019s breast in concluding that proof of such intent was shown, calling it a \u201cthoroughly reasonable\u201d inference for a jury to draw. 161 Ill. App. 3d at 125.\nHere, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People established that defendant deliberately touched L.B.\u2019s breasts and stated to her that he wanted to have sex with her. He subsequently told L.B.\u2019s mother\u2019s that his intent in doing so was so that he could \u201clove\u201d L.B. Under these circumstances, we find it is thoroughly reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant\u2019s purpose was for sexual gratification. We find that defendant was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of criminal sexual abuse.\nDefendant lastly maintains that the trial judge erred in not granting his request for a continuance of his trial based upon his trial counsel\u2019s request for additional time to prepare for trial. In support of the motion, defense counsel maintained that he wished to seek medical and psychological records of L.B. and her mother. The motion stated no reason for the request. The record also indicates that discovery had been initiated and completed by both parties and no motion or subpoena had been filed requesting the records. While defense counsel\u2019s motion was denied, the record indicates that the trial was delayed one day.\nIt is well within a trial judge\u2019s discretion to grant a continuance based upon the need for additional trial preparation, and it is only when the refusal to grant additional time prejudices the defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial that reversal is required. People v. Lewis, 165 111. 2d 305, 310 (1995). Reviewing the circumstances surrounding the request for continuance, and the trial court\u2019s denial of the request, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion, nor can we find that the defendant has shown that denial of the motion for a continuance prejudiced to his right to a fair trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCUSKEY, P.J., and HOMER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeffrey D. Bert, of Anderson & Nelson, of Rock Island, and Theresa L. Sosalla (argued), of LeClaire, Iowa, for appellant.", "Marshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Domenica Osterberger (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL WESTPFAHL, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201496\u20140979\nOpinion filed March 23, 1998.\nRehearing denied April 27, 1998.\nJeffrey D. Bert, of Anderson & Nelson, of Rock Island, and Theresa L. Sosalla (argued), of LeClaire, Iowa, for appellant.\nMarshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Domenica Osterberger (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0327-01", "first_page_order": 347, "last_page_order": 355 }