{ "id": 45764, "name": "MELVIN WADE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OSCAR L. BYLES et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Wade v. Byles", "decision_date": "1998-03-05", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20142009", "first_page": "545", "last_page": "548", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 545" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"dismissal is not mandated or the only form of relief afforded by that statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3046125 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "\"dismissal is not mandated or the only form of relief afforded by that statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 1242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477555 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 1282", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 979", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5389643 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "965 F.2d 534", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10521979 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/965/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.E.2d 973", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 2d 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5256909, 5257631 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/37/0295-01", "/ill-app-2d/37/0295-02" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228447 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 N.E.2d 1211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440611 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 1323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483569 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S. Ct. 311", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11664865, 11664737, 11664772, 11664474, 11664550, 11664969, 11664649, 11664818, 11664693, 11664629, 11664509, 11664921, 11664602, 11664573 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0935-12", "/us/519/0935-09", "/us/519/0935-10", "/us/519/0935-01", "/us/519/0935-03", "/us/519/0935-14", "/us/519/0935-07", "/us/519/0935-11", "/us/519/0935-08", "/us/519/0935-06", "/us/519/0935-02", "/us/519/0935-13", "/us/519/0935-05", "/us/519/0935-04" ] }, { "cite": "83 F.3d 902", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11645495 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/83/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "886 F. Supp. 654", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7841081 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/886/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 452, "char_count": 6397, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.3068883552670445 }, "sha256": "ecf6bf6c8189f4bf61c4bc12e5a4829a77c506ecee09fd62677afd8e3808f3f1", "simhash": "1:827cdc45dc2c8c04", "word_count": 1101 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:11.490834+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MELVIN WADE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OSCAR L. BYLES et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSection 13 \u2014 217 of the Civil Practice Law provides that a cause of action that is dismissed by a United States District Court judge for lack of jurisdiction must be refiled within one year from the date of dismissal. See 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 217 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). The statute contains no tolling provision for the time the dismissal is being appealed. The issue here is whether the statute means what it says.\nIn this case, the plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against the defendants on September 28, 1992, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. It alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (1988) and various state law claims. On May 25, 1995, the district court judge granted the defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the Civil Rights Act claim and dismissed the state law claims for lack of federal supplemental subject matter jurisdiction. See Wade v. Byles, 886 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1995).\nThe plaintiff then chose to appeal the district court\u2019s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The trial judge\u2019s decision was affirmed on May 13, 1996. See Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1996). The United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiff\u2019s petition for certiorari on October 15, 1996. See Wade v. Byles, 519 U.S. 935, 136 L. Ed. 2d 227, 117 S. Ct. 311 (1996).\nThen, on November 1, 1996, almost a year and a half after the dismissal in the federal district court, the plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. That complaint was based on the same acts alleged in the district court.\nThe trial judge dismissed the complaint as time barred pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(5). See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(5) (West 1992). This appeal followed. Reviewing this case de nova, as we must (see Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995)), we affirm the trial judge.\nThe plaintiff contends the one-year requirement was tolled during the pendency of the federal appellate process. This issue has been decided twice by our supreme court. In Hupp v. Gray, 73 Ill. 2d 78, 382 N.E.2d 1211 (1978), and again in Suslick v. Rothschild Securities Corp., 128 Ill. 2d 314, 538 N.E.2d 553 (1989), the supreme court held the language of section 13 \u2014 217 and its virtually identical predecessor (111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 83, par. 24(a)) is clear: there is no tolling while a case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction is on appeal. It follows here that once the district court judge dismissed the plaintiff\u2019s action it no longer was \u201cpending,\u201d appeal or not. See also Sager Glove Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 Ill. App. 2d 295, 185 N.E.2d 973 (1962).\nTo avoid the operation of section 13 \u2014 217, the plaintiff refers us to section 13 \u2014 216, which provides that when \u201cthe commencement of an action is stayed by *** statutory prohibition, the time of the *** prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 216 (West 1992).\nWhat is the \u201cstatutory prohibition\u201d? The plaintiff says it is contained in section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3), which provides for dismissal when another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause. The plaintiff cites Locke v. Bonello, 965 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1992), in support of his position.\nFirst, we note we are bound to follow Illinois Supreme Court decisions, not federal appellate authority. See SK Handtool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 246 Ill. App. 3d 979, 619 N.E.2d 1282 (1993).\nSecond, we are unwilling to say the supreme court was not aware of section 13 \u2014 216 and its predecessor when it decided Hupp and Suslick. After all, the two statutes are right next to each other in the Civil Practice Law.\nThe decision in Locke does not apply here anyway. In Locke, the defendant appealed from the plaintiffs\u2019 voluntary dismissal of their action, contending the trial court erred in failing to enforce a settlement agreement between the parties. The court was concerned about giving the defendant the \u201ckeys to the courthouse.\u201d Locke, 965 F.2d at 536. That is, to enforce section 13 \u2014 217 under these circumstances would allow the losing defendant to defeat the plaintiffs\u2019 Illinois cause of action unless they refiled within a year of the district court dismissal. That would give the defendant control of the plaintiffs\u2019 lawsuit.\nThe problem the court saw in Locke does not exist here. The plaintiff had control of his own lawsuit and was free to file it in the Illinois courts whenever he wished. The plaintiff chose to wait, trusting in his federal appeal. It turned out to be a bad decision. He is left without a remedy, consistent with the obvious purpose of section 13 \u2014 217\u2014to put an end to litigation. See Sepmeyer v. Holman, 162 Ill. 2d 249, 256, 642 N.E.2d 1242 (1994).\nThe plaintiff asks us to play out the scenario: if he had refiled within one year the defendants would have moved to dismiss, based on section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (\u201canother action pending between the same parties for the same cause\u201d) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (West 1992)), and the trial judge would have granted it, depriving the plaintiff of his cause of action. We do not claim such prescience. We will not speculate on what motion the defendants would have filed and what ruling the trial judge would have made, although we do note section 2 \u2014 619(a) authorizes a trial judge to grant \u201cother appropriate relief\u2019 as an alternative to dismissal. A stay, perhaps. See A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Swift & Co., 84 Ill. 2d 245, 252, 419 N.E.2d 23 (1980) (\u201cdismissal is not mandated or the only form of relief afforded by that statute\u201d).\nAt any rate, our duty is to read statutes as written (see Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990)) and to follow the decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court. That duty leads inexorably to our conclusion that the trial judge was right when he dismissed the plaintiffs lawsuit. We affirm.\nAffirmed.\nCERDA, P.J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kevin B. Rogers, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Stellato & Schwartz, Ltd., of Chicago (Esther Joy Schwartz, David S. Wayne, and Donald E. Stellato, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MELVIN WADE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OSCAR L. BYLES et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20142009\nOpinion filed March 5, 1998.\nKevin B. Rogers, of Chicago, for appellant.\nStellato & Schwartz, Ltd., of Chicago (Esther Joy Schwartz, David S. Wayne, and Donald E. Stellato, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0545-01", "first_page_order": 565, "last_page_order": 568 }