{ "id": 45736, "name": "NEPTUNO TREUHAND-UND VERWALTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT MBH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PATRICK H. ARBOR et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Neptuno Treuhand-Und Verwaltungsgesellschaft MBH v. Arbor", "decision_date": "1998-03-13", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201495\u20141864", "first_page": "567", "last_page": "577", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 567" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "926 S.W.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10011276 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/926/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "929 P.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Cal. 4th 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 4th", "case_ids": [ 341406 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-4th/14/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 P.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Haw. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 1961444 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/69/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.W.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Mich. App. 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2336446 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/184/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188627 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469943 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "846 F.2d 387", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1788322 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/846/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3481920 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ill. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2844622 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/43/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3092944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5201966 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636845 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Ill. App. 3d 925", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5376678 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/21/0925-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5197140 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 1000", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2945227 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/1000-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385277 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505965 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3429144 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. App. 3d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2647544 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/185/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498515 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5162310 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" }, { "page": "618" }, { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5117774 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 F. Supp. 204", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7402729 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "statements that defendant futures trader had \"expertise\" was merely \"puffing\" and statement that defendant would \"pick good trades\" was also not actionable because it was merely a prediction of future investment success" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/669/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 F.3d 1293", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10514920 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/10/1293-01" ] }, { "cite": "958 F. Supp. 1285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 876864 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/958/1285-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639892 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156771 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3070566 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" }, { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569862 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 891", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260358 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0891-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 Ill. 2d 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 909171 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/169/0110-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1060, "char_count": 23250, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.417517994206733e-07, "percentile": 0.8006683015110148 }, "sha256": "24a0a559f80c5c8b299a12b0d5d83027b6cac75a85a5c9a8a32b5db3db797cf7", "simhash": "1:772b9d070c0b7051", "word_count": 3709 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:11.490834+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NEPTUNO TREUHAND-UND VERWALTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT MBH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PATRICK H. ARBOR et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case is brought on appeal from a May 19, 1995, order of the circuit court of Cook County, dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint with prejudice, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 1994).\nOn appeal, plaintiffs-appellants contend that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in determining that: (1) defendant-appellee Patrick J. Arbor had no duty to disclose to plaintiffs all material facts known to him relating to Thomas J. Farrell\u2019s fitness to be a commodities futures trader; (2) plaintiffs unreasonably relied on Arbor\u2019s letter of introduction; and (3) plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint failed to state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.\nThe following are the pertinent facts contained in the record. Plaintiffs, FESAG Financial Engineering Services (FESAG) and Nep-tuno Treuhand-Und Verwaltungsgesellschaft (Neptuno), are both companies based in Germany. In the summer of 1993, Thomas J. Farrell (Farrell) contacted Hans Peter Dietrich (Dietrich), principal owner of FESAG, regarding possible employment by FESAG as a commodities futures trader. In August 1993, FESAG hired Farrell as a trader, on the express condition that he provide a letter of reference from Patrick H. Arbor (Arbor) attesting to his experience, competence and integrity as a commodities futures trader. In response to FE-SAG\u2019s request, Farrell solicited a letter of recommendation from Arbor, chairman of defendant-appellee Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The letter, addressed to Dietrich and dated August 27, 1993, stated in its entirety:\n\u201cI have known Tom Farrell personally for over 13 years. He was an active full member of the Chicago Board of Trade. Tom has always proven to be an intelligent industrious and innovative young man.\u201d\nThis letter was delivered to FESAG upon Farrell\u2019s arrival in Germany on September 2, 1993.\nFESAG agreed to allow Farrell to trade German security futures on behalf of FESAG. Farrell agreed that he would not have more than 10 futures contracts open at any one time. Farrell began trading on September 10, 1993. He was supervised by a FESAG employee who monitored Farrell\u2019s trading activities. On September 15, 1993, Farrell was left unsupervised for approximately two hours. During this brief time, Farrell put himself and FESAG into a position with more than 5,900 futures contracts open. As a result of Farrell\u2019s activities, FESAG incurred losses of approximately $5 million. A subsequent inquiry by FESAG to the National Futures Exchange revealed that on July 16, 1993, Farrell had entered into a consent order with the Chicago Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), under which Farrell was barred from trading his own account or any other account in which he had an interest on any futures exchange for two years. In addition, FESAG\u2019s inquiry revealed that Farrell\u2019s floor broker registration had also been permanently revoked by the CFTC.\nOn April 4, 1994, plaintiffs commenced an action against Arbor and CBOT alleging that Arbor should have disclosed the disciplinary information about Farrell in his letter of recommendation. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 first and second amended complaints. The first count of the second amended complaint alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, the second count alleged fraudulent concealment, and the third count alleged negligent misrepresentation. After three failed attempts to plead a cause of action against Arbor and/or CBOT, plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider its dismissal or alternatively to enter a final order dismissing the second amended complaint with prejudice. The trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 motion for reconsideration and dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint with prejudice. The trial court dismissed the second amended complaint under section 2 \u2014 615 based on its finding that the letter contained no misstatements of fact and defendants owed plaintiffs no duty to reveal adverse information in a letter of reference because defendants and plaintiffs had no relationship with one another, and on the ground that plaintiffs\u2019 reliance was not justifiable.\nA section 2 \u2014 615 motion for dismissal should not be granted unless it clearly appears that no set of facts could be proved that would entitle plaintiffs to recovery. Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 115 (1995). \u201cIn ruling on such motion, only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters of which the court can take judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record may be considered.\u201d Mt. Zion, 169 Ill. 2d at 115. We review such orders de nova (Estate of Strocchia v. City of Chicago, 284 Ill. App. 3d 891, 898 (1996)), and all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences are taken as true. Mt. Zion, 169 Ill. 2d at 115.\nThe first issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs\u2019 complaint contained factual allegations sufficient to establish a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation.\nUnder Illinois law, the elements a plaintiff needs to plead and prove in a fraudulent misrepresentation complaint are: (1) a false statement of material fact; (2) knowledge or belief of the falsity by the party making it; (3) an intention to induce the other party to act; (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statements; and (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance. Board of Education v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428 (1989). Further, the reliance on the part of the plaintiff must have been justifiable. Soules v. General Motors Corp., 79 Ill. 2d 282, 286 (1980).\nIn the instant case, Arbor\u2019s letter of reference does not contain any false statement of material fact. Arbor\u2019s letter states that: (1) he had known Farrell personally for over 13 years; (2) Farrell was an active full member of the Chicago Board of Trade; (3) and Farrell had always proven to be an intelligent, industrious and innovative young man. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint contained no allegations that Arbor did not know Farrell personally or that Farrell was not a member of the Chicago Board of Trade. Defendants assert that Arbor\u2019s comments regarding Farrell\u2019s intelligence, innovativeness and industrious nature represent mere opinion and therefore cannot form the basis of an action of fraud, citing Soderland Brothers, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 278 Ill. App. 3d 606, 620 (1995).\n\u201cA representation is one of opinion rather than fact if it only expresses the speaker\u2019s belief, without certainty, as to the existence of a fact.\u201d Marino v. United Bank of Illinois, N.A., 137 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527 (1985), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 538(A) (1977); see also Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Village of South Barrington, 958 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1997).\nThe Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 538(A), provides:\n\u201cA representation is one of opinion if it expresses only\n(a) the belief of the maker, without certainty, as to the existence of a fact; or\n(b) his judgment as to quality, value, authenticity, or other matters of judgment.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 538(A) (1977).\nThe comment to this section provides:\n\u201cOne common form of opinion is a statement of the maker\u2019s judgment as to quality, value, authenticity or similar matters as to which opinions may be expected to differ. Thus the statement that an automobile is a good car is a relative matter, depending entirely upon the standard set as to what is a good automobile and what is not, and it is a matter upon which individual judgments may be expected to differ. The maker of a statement of this nature will normally be understood as expressing only his own judgment and not as asserting anything concerning horsepower, riding qualities or any of the dozen other factors that would influence his judgment.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 538(A), Explanatory Note, at 83 (1977).\nIntelligence, innovativeness and an industrious nature are personal qualities and whether they exist in a given individual is a matter upon which individual judgment may be expected to differ.\nIn Continental Bank v. Meyer, 10 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1993), the court reviewed a suit between a bank and borrowers who had invested in a horse-breeding limited partnership. There, the court held, \u201c[t]he defendants also allege that the bank officers stated that the horses were (necessarily \u2018would be\u2019) of the highest quality, and that the partnership would be managed by competent general partners. These statements are no more than opinion.\u201d Continental Bank, 10 F.3d at 1299. See also Nanlawala v. Jack Carl Associates, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 204, 207 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (statements that defendant futures trader had \u201cexpertise\u201d was merely \u201cpuffing\u201d and statement that defendant would \u201cpick good trades\u201d was also not actionable because it was merely a prediction of future investment success).\nWe hold that Arbor\u2019s comments regarding Farrell\u2019s intelligence, innovativeness and industrious nature represent mere opinion and, therefore, cannot form the basis of an action for fraudulent misrepresentation.\nAfter the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 original complaint and first amended complaint, which set forth only one cause of action for intentional misrepresentation, plaintiffs\u2019 second amended complaint set forth claims for fraudulent concealment and negligent misrepresentation in addition to the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs point out that in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation based on omission (fraudulent concealment) it has been held:\n\u201c[I]n order to prove the concealment amounted to a fraudulent misrepresentation the plaintiff must prove: (1) the concealment of a material fact; (2) the concealment was intended to induce a false belief, under circumstances creating a duty to speak [citation]; (3) the innocent party could not have discovered the truth through a reasonable inquiry or inspection, or was prevented from making a reasonable inquiry or inspection, and relied upon the silence as a representation that the fact did not exist; (4) the concealed information was such that the injured party would have acted differently had he been aware of it; and (5) that reliance by the person from whom the fact was concealed led to his injury.\u201d Stewart v. Thrasher, 242 Ill. App. 3d 10, 16 (1993).\nIn applying this holding to the instant case, there is no questian that the Arbor letter failed to disclose a material fact which, if known to plaintiffs, would have caused them to act differently. As to the requirement of \u201cunder circumstances creating a duty to speak,\u201d in Illinois, in order to prove fraud by the intentional concealment of a material fact, it is necessary to show the existence of a special or fiduciary relationship, which would raise a duty to speak. Magna Bank v. Jameson, 237 Ill. App. 3d 614, 618 (1992); Lidecker v. Kendall College, 194 Ill. App. 3d 309, 317 (1990). There is no duty to speak absent a fiduciary or other legal relationship between the parties. Magna Bank, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 618; Warner v. Lucas, 185 Ill. App. 3d 351, 355 (1989). The burden of proving that a fiduciary relationship exists lies with the party seeking relief. Magna Bank, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 618.\nPlaintiffs cite several cases in support of their position that defendants should be held liable for fraudulent concealment. In five of these cases, Kinsey v. Scott, 124 Ill. App. 3d 329 (1984), Tan v. Boyke, 156 Ill. App. 3d 49 (1987), Stewart v. Thrasher, 242 Ill. App. 3d 10 (1993), Heider v. LeeWards Creative Crafts, Inc., 245 Ill. App. 3d 258 (1993), and Mitchell v. Skubiak, 248 Ill. App. 3d 1000 (1993), there was a buyer-seller relationship between the parties. City of Chicago v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 233 Ill. App. 3d 1031 (1992), involved a landlord-tenant relationship.\nPlaintiffs cite St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Construction Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925 (1974), as the leading Illinois case on \u201chalf-truths\u201d for its holding that \u201ca statement which is technically true as far as it goes may nevertheless be fraudulent, where it is misleading because it does not state matters which materially qualify the statement as made. In other words, a half-truth is sometimes more misleading than an outright lie.\u201d St. Joseph Hospital, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 952-53. However, the defendant in St. Joseph Hospital was a manufacturing firm that had made representations to a construction firm building part of a hospital that its paneling was not \u201cflame rated.\u201d In fact the paneling had been tested and found to have a flame spread 17 times greater than the maximum allowed under the Chicago building code. While there was no privity in the traditional sense, this court held the manufacturing firm liable for damages. The defendant manufacturing firm did supply the defective paneling which was installed in the hospital. No such relationship exists here.\nPlaintiffs rely on Union National Bank & Trust Co. v. Carlstrom, 134 Ill. App. 3d 985 (1985), for its holding that \u201c[a] party may assume a duty to disclose information accurately by its conduct. That clearly was the case here. The bank voluntarily gave a detailed description of the Carlstrom\u2019s [sic] dealings with the Bank. In so doing, it undertook a duty not to deliberately conceal or misrepresent.\u201d Union National Bank, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 989. In that case, the plaintiff was a bank customer, and more importantly, the allegedly misleading information concerned the Carlstroms\u2019 account and was very detailed. This is not the case here.\nIn the instant case, plaintiffs admit that they had no prior relationship of any kind with Arbor and had no fiduciary relationship with the Chicago Board of Trade. There were no prior or anticipated business dealings between either the Chicago Board of Trade or Arbor and FESAG. In fact, the sole contact between the parties was Arbor\u2019s letter of reference. Further, it was Farrell who asked Arbor for the letter of reference. Based on the failure of plaintiffs to allege that a special or fiduciary relationship existed between plaintiffs and defendants, the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 fraudulent concealment claim must be affirmed.\nNegligent misrepresentation has essentially the same elements as fraudulent misrepresentation, except that the defendant\u2019s mental state is different. The defendant need not know that the statement is false. His own carelessness or negligence in ascertaining its truth will suffice for a cause of action. For negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must also allege that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff to communicate accurate information. Board of Education v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 452 (1989).\nDefendants assert that Illinois law will not support a cause of action sounding in negligent misrepresentation for purely economic loss unless the misrepresentation is made by one who is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, citing University of Chicago Hospitals v. United Parcel Service, 231 Ill. App. 3d 602 (1992), which relied on Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982).\nIn Moorman, our supreme court held that a manufacturer could not be held liable under a negligent misrepresentation theory for economic losses caused. However, economic loss is recoverable \u201cwhere one who is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions makes negligent representations.\u201d Moorman Manufacturing Co., 91 Ill. 2d at 88-89. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54 (1969), held that purchasers of residential housing could recover against a surveyor for the negligently inaccurate representations of the survey that caused economic loss to the purchasers even though no privity of contract existed between the purchasers and surveyor. Plaintiffs correctly point out that, in considering the holdings in these cases, in Board of Education v. A, C & S, Inc., our supreme court said, \u201c[w]e do not believe that Moorman and Rozny conclusively resolve [ ] the question of when and against whom a plaintiff may recover economic losses for a negligent misrepresentation.\u201d A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d at 454. Here, however, plaintiffs have failed to show that defendants owed any duty to plaintiffs to communicate accurate information.\nFurther, no recovery for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment or negligent misrepresentation is possible unless plaintiffs can prove justifiable reliance, i.e., that any reliance was reasonable. In determining whether there was justifiable reliance, it is necessary to consider all of the facts within a plaintiff\u2019s actual knowledge as well as those that he could have discovered by the exercise of ordinary prudence. Marino v. United Bank of Illinois, N.A., 137 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527 (1985), citing Soules v. General Motors Corp., 79 Ill. 2d 282, 286 (1980). If ample opportunity existed to discover the truth, then reliance is not justified. Central States Joint Board v. Continental Assurance Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d 600, 607 (1983). Here, plaintiffs admit they made no inquiry into Farrell\u2019s background other than their request to him that he supply a letter of reference from Arbor. Plaintiffs do not assert that they were prevented from making a further inquiry.\n\u201cA plaintiff has a duty to investigate further when the circumstances \u2018reasonably require, as a matter of prudence, that an investigation be undertaken.\u2019 [Citation.] *** \u2018In short, the crucial question is whether the plaintiffs\u2019 conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances and \u201c \u2018in light of the information open to him, that the law may properly say that this loss is his own responsibility.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d West v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 846 F.2d 387, 394 (7th Cir. 1988).\nPlaintiffs were hiring Farrell for a position in which he would have the ability to bind FESAG to any decision Farrell made in the futures industry. This potentially involved access to vast amounts of money in a volatile situation. In spite of this, FESAG and Neptuno assert that their reliance on Arbor\u2019s three-sentence letter as the sole support for their hiring decision was reasonable.\nPlaintiffs correctly point out that whether a plaintiff\u2019s reliance was reasonable is usually a question of fact and should be properly decided by the trier of fact. \u201cWhere it is apparent from the undisputed facts, however, that only one conclusion can be drawn, the question becomes one for the court.\u201d Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156 (1981), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 118 Ill. 2d 321 (1987). Here, plaintiffs\u2019 own factual allegations establish that plaintiffs\u2019 alleged reliance was unreasonable as a matter of law. Illinois courts have held that rulings on motions to dismiss generally do not dispose of actions, but allow plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints unless it becomes apparent that there is no set of facts that could be pleaded that would entitle a plaintiff to recover. University of Chicago Hospitals v. MPS, 231 Ill. App. 3d 602, 605 (1992). Here, there is no set of facts that could be pleaded that would entitle plaintiffs to recover.\nFinally, defendants point to two out-of-state employment referral cases as support for their position. In Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 184 Mich. App. 766, 459 N.W.2d 100 (1990), a summary dismissal was affirmed because a former employer had no duty to disclose a former employee\u2019s violent conduct to a prospective employer, even though the employee had received 24 disciplinary warnings. In Janssen v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 69 Haw. 31, 731 P.2d 163 (1987), a former employee of a cruise line who had been sexually assaulted by another former employee sued their former employer and the union that had referred the attacker for employment. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the union\u2019s contractual duty to refer prospective employees did not obligate it to investigate or screen applicants, and thus the union owed no such duty to the person attacked and no duty existed between the former employer and the person attacked.\nOur research reveals that two other jurisdictions have taken a different view of these \u201cnegligent referral\u201d cases. In Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, 14 Cal. 4th 1066, 929 P.2d 582, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (1997), a student sued a school administrator who allegedly sexually assaulted her and the administrator\u2019s former employers who gave him a positive recommendation.\nThe California Supreme Court held that: (1) the writer of a recommendation letter owes to prospective employers and third persons a duty not to misrepresent the facts in describing the qualifications and character of the former employee, if making the misrepresentations would present a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical injury to the prospective employer or third persons; (2) the former employers owed a duty to the plaintiff student not to misrepresent the qualifications and character of the administrator who allegedly committed the assault; (3) letters from the administrator\u2019s former employers made affirmative misrepresentations by positively evaluating the administrator\u2019s character and rapport with students without disclosing that disciplinary actions had been taken against him for alleged sexual misconduct with students; and (4) the student was not required to allege that she herself relied on the employer\u2019s misrepresentations, but only that her injury resulted from action taken by the recipient of the misrepresentations in reliance on them.\nIn Golden Spread Council, Inc., No. 562 of the Boy Scouts of America v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1996), a Boy Scout sued the Boy Scouts of America and the local Boy Scout council after the scout was allegedly sexually molested by a scoutmaster. The Texas Supreme Court held that the local Boy Scout council owed a duty to the potential troop sponsor that asked the council to introduce it to a potential scoutmaster. This duty extended to children and parents involved in the troop who relied on the council\u2019s recommendation. The council\u2019s affirmative act of recommending the scoutmaster created a duty to use reasonable care in light of information the local council had received about the scoutmaster\u2019s alleged prior conduct with other boys.\nWe decline to follow either line of cases here. Illinois has not recognized a cause of action for \u201cnegligent referral\u201d and this is certainly not the case to decide this issue.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS and ZWICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE QUINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., of Milwaukee, Wisconsin (William H. Levit, Jr., and Michael B. Apfeld, of counsel), and Peterson & Ross, of Chicago (Roderick T. Dunne, of counsel), for appellants.", "Foley & Lardner, of Chicago (Scott E. Early, Joan M. Kubalanza, and Charles R. Haywood, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NEPTUNO TREUHAND-UND VERWALTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT MBH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PATRICK H. ARBOR et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201495\u20141864\nOpinion filed March 13, 1998.\nGodfrey & Kahn, S.C., of Milwaukee, Wisconsin (William H. Levit, Jr., and Michael B. Apfeld, of counsel), and Peterson & Ross, of Chicago (Roderick T. Dunne, of counsel), for appellants.\nFoley & Lardner, of Chicago (Scott E. Early, Joan M. Kubalanza, and Charles R. Haywood, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0567-01", "first_page_order": 587, "last_page_order": 597 }