{ "id": 45774, "name": "ALEXANDER J. ARTHUR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUTHERAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Arthur v. Lutheran General Hospital, Inc.", "decision_date": "1998-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20140859", "first_page": "818", "last_page": "827", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 818" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 1031", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3307520 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1036" }, { "page": "1038" }, { "page": "1038" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/1031-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Ill. App. 3d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496924 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267", "parenthetical": "arrest on bench warrant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/29/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2797231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856", "parenthetical": "arrest on order of contempt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/32/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5655753 ], "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/328/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 N.E.2d 1309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3597714 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75332 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5-6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding deficiencies in certificates could affect the State's ability under the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 - 101 et seq. (West 1992)) to reinstate a petition for involuntary commitment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365856 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "finding deficiencies in certificates could affect the State's ability under the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 - 101 et seq. (West 1992)) to reinstate a petition for involuntary commitment" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3574647 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discussing the Code's notice of hearing provision in section 3 - 611" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738342 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "discussing the Code's notice of hearing provision in section 3 - 611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365854 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 N.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2506472 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2968469 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/252/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 N.E.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295589 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 792", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150223 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 1323", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483569 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 N.E.2d 1185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182682 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0595-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1062, "char_count": 21149, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.467553496408201e-07, "percentile": 0.6585598233719417 }, "sha256": "ab9405978441c5216054a07664d6ec60291acb87832b03dabaa7b591071db7c7", "simhash": "1:2ab538bfbf43ee48", "word_count": 3309 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:11.490834+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ALEXANDER J. ARTHUR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUTHERAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 100 et seq. (West 1996)) sets out a statutory plan for involuntary admission of mentally ill persons. This case raises the question of whether a false imprisonment cause of action exists for a person who is committed in violation of a time limit in the Code. We conclude that it does.\nFACTS\nSometime in 1990, Alexander J. Arthur (Arthur), a 52-year-old former construction worker, began to develop breathing trouble, purportedly from years of working with chemicals. He contacted the Social Security Administration to apply for disability benefits, but his effort proved fruitless and frustrating.\nOn June 12, 1992, Arthur was admitted to Resurrection Medical Center (Resurrection) with recurrent chest pain and shortness of breath. The emergency room staff requested a psychological consultation as part of Arthur\u2019s treatment.\nDr. Ann Walczynski (Walczynski) spoke with Arthur. According to her written consultation summary, Arthur displayed anxiety over his health and financial situation. Arthur also voiced aggravation at the Social Security Administration and its handling of his application for disability benefits. As Walczynski noted in her consultation summary:\n\u201cHe has become increasingly extremely angry to the point that he has been thinking about going to Springfield], Illinois,] and throwing one of the [Social Security Administration] officers out of the window and all the papers destroyed [szc], He also has been having thoughts of killing another staff member in that office in Springfield. His behavior has been progressively escalating; and on the day of this examination, he did throw a telephone set against the wall after one of the conversations with officers from Springfield. The patient says that he will not get satisfaction unless he \u2018hurts\u2019 these people.\n\u00edJ\u00ed ^\n*** [The patient] says that he actually never had any problems with depression prior to nine months ago. \u2018But I think I will have problems once I go to Springfield and punch these guys and kick him [sz'c]. They never tell me anything right, but I will get my satisfaction.\u2019 *** The patient admits to feeling hopeless and helpless but denies suicidal ideation. He says that he would rather have the other people to die and he is about to do it once he leaves the hospital.\n*** The patient does admit even on repeated questioning that he intends to hurt the staff members of these offices once he leaves the hospital.\u201d\nWalczynski recommended Arthur\u2019s transfer to the mental health facility at Lutheran General Hospital (Lutheran General), once his physical condition stabilized. Although Arthur agreed to voluntary admission, Walczynski drafted a physician\u2019s certificate for involuntary admission pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code). See 405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 100 et seq. (West 1996). Walczynski\u2019s certificate cited Arthur\u2019s potential \u201cto inflict serious physical harm\u201d on Social Security Administration staff members. The certificate, dated June 12, 1992, at 9 p.m., also said:\n\u201c[Patient] has been extremely angry with soc. security offices staff (Chicago + Springfield) and has been threatening to harm some staff members \u2014 once he leaves the hospital. Homicidal potential.\u201d\nOn June 14, 1992, at 9 p.m., although his physical condition had stabilized sufficiently to allow his transfer to Lutheran General, Arthur chose to remain at Resurrection to complete his physical treat-, ment with his own physician. Walczynski again spoke with Arthur. Although the record does not contain any notes from this meeting, Walczynski read her notes of it during her discovery deposition. Wal-czynski observed Arthur\u2019s \u201caffect is still angry when the issue of Social Security office staff is discussed.\u201d Walczynski concluded: \u201cContinue present treatment ***.\u201d However, Walczynski did not draft a second physician\u2019s certificate to memorialize this meeting.\nOn June 16, 1992, Arthur was transferred to Lutheran General as Walczynski\u2019s patient. When Arthur refused voluntary admission, Martana Ghera, a Lutheran General staff nurse, completed a petition for involuntary admission based on Walczynski\u2019s certificate, as well as her personal observations of Arthur\u2019s demeanor. The petition, dated June 16, 1992, at 7 p.m., said: \u201cPerson identified as Alexander Arthur is intensely angry and making aggressive and threatening statements directed at Social Security staff.\u201d Arthur was involuntarily admitted on Ghera\u2019s petition and Walczynski\u2019s certificate, executed 94 hours earlier.\nWhen Arthur complained about his involuntary admission and refused any treatment, Ghera telephoned Walczynski. Shortly thereafter, Walczynski arrived at Lutheran General and initially observed Arthur remained \u201cpotentially homicidal.\u201d Later that evening, as Wal-czynski spoke with Arthur and his daughter, Arthur said his threats against the Social Security Administration were not serious. In an astonishingly quick recovery from his psychosis, Arthur agreed to outpatient treatment to control his rage and was discharged the next day.\nOn June 15, 1994, Arthur filed a one-count complaint against Walczynski and Lutheran General. According to his complaint:\n\u201c[IJmmediately thereafter entering said hospital, the plaintiff, ALEXANDER J. ARTHUR, demanded of the said LUTHERAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, operating by and through their duly authorized agents, servants and employees, and the said DR. ANN WALCZYNSKI, and each of them, that he be released from the said hospital; that notwithstanding said demand, the said defendants, kept the plaintiff in a confined area and refused to release him from that confined area; further, that the defendant, operating as afore [szc] said, did then and there refuse plaintiffs demand to be released from said hospital and the defendant, and each of them, wrongfully detained and imprisoned the plaintiff against his will.\u201d\nArthur alleged this false imprisonment proximately caused \u201cgreat mental anguish, humiliation and shock.\u201d\nAfter some preliminary motion practice and discovery, Lutheran General and Walczynski filed motions for summary judgment. In his response brief, Arthur also asked for summary judgment.\nOn January 27, 1997, the trial court granted summary judgment to Lutheran General and Walczynski and denied Arthur\u2019s cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court said:\n\u201cI\u2019m not able to tell you that I\u2019m altogether satisfied that the law can be used in this manner to effectuate the taking of a person\u2019s liberty and then cloaking it in the concept that, well, it was done in accordance with the judicial procedure without making some examination as to what, if any were the motives, whether there was a good faith belief in the certifier that the individual involved was the appropriate subject of a commitment or not, but I don\u2019t make policy, and I don\u2019t make law and my duty is to follow the law as best that I understand it, and I think Olsen v. Karw[o]ski is controlling in this case. Like it, don\u2019t like it, it\u2019s irrelevant. Nobody has appointed me as a court of review, and I don\u2019t have the opportunity to be a judicial anarchist. I have to follow the law.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nDECISION\nAppellate review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Kotarba v. Jamrozik, 283 Ill. App. 3d 595, 669 N.E.2d 1185 (1996). This court must consider anew the facts and the law related to a case in determining whether the trial court correctly decided no genuine issues of material fact were present and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995); Deloney v. Board of Education of Thornton Township, 281 Ill. App. 3d 775, 666 N.E.2d 792 (1996). If the plaintiff fails to establish any element of the cause of action, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is proper. Flint v. Court Appointed Special Advocates of Du Page County, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 152, 674 N.E.2d 831 (1996). We may affirm summary judgment for any grounds that properly appear in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on those same grounds. Leavitt v. Farwell Tower Ltd. Partnership, 252 Ill. App. 3d 260, 625 N.E.2d 48 (1993).\nThe Code provides for involuntary commitment in a mental health facility. To begin the process of involuntary commitment, any person 18 years of age or older may present a petition to the director of a mental health facility, naming a respondent whose \u201cimmediate hospitalization is necessary for the protection of such person or others from physical harm.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601(a) (West 1996). This petition must include the following: (1) a detailed statement of the reasons for the respondent\u2019s involuntary commitment, \u201cincluding a description of any acts or significant threats supporting [involuntary commitment] and the time and place of their occurrence\u201d; (2) the name and address of the respondent\u2019s closest relatives; (3) the person\u2019s relationship with the respondent; and (4) any witnesses who may help prove these facts. 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601(b) (West 1996).\nAdditionally, the Code provides:\n\u201cThe petition shall be accompanied by a certificate executed by a physician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist which states that the respondent is subject to involuntary admission and requires immediate hospitalization. The certificate shall indicate that the physician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist personally examined the respondent not more than 72 hours prior to admission.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 602 (West 1996).\n\u201cEmergency [involuntary] admission to a mental hospital is an extreme step and it should not be invoked except in true emergencies.\u201d People v. Ralls, 23 Ill. App. 3d 96, 98, 318 N.E.2d 703 (1974). Because involuntary commitment seriously invades a patient\u2019s liberty, the Code requirements should be strictly construed in favor of the patient. In re Martens, 269 Ill. App. 3d 324, 327, 646 N.E.2d 27 (1995).\nHowever, in another context, the Illinois Supreme Court has held procedural deviations from the Code do not warrant reversal of an involuntary commitment order if the defects \u201ccould and should have been objected to immediately, could have been easily cured if timely objected to, and made no difference anyway.\u201d In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 419, 607 N.E.2d 134 (1992) (discussing the Code\u2019s notice of hearing provision in section 3 \u2014 611). Additionally, this court has held \u201cany deficiencies in the petition or accompanying certificates could not affect the court\u2019s power to enter the order of commitment.\u201d In re Wheeler, 152 Ill. App. 3d 371, 373, 504 N.E.2d 524 (1987). But see In re Tiffin, 269 Ill. App. 3d 581, 646 N.E.2d 285 (1995) (finding deficiencies in certificates could affect the State\u2019s ability under the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1992)) to reinstate a petition for involuntary commitment).\nIn Wheeler, a patient challenged her involuntary commitment, arguing the State used a section 3 \u2014 602 certificate which violated the Code\u2019s 72-hour rule. Specifically, the patient noted the certificate stated the doctor had examined the patient \u201cin April 1986\u201d and the certificate was signed on May 29, 1986, a span of at least 696 hours. We upheld the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction to order the patient\u2019s involuntary commitment. Wheeler, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 373. We found the deficient certificate did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction because \u201cit would not serve the interest of [the patient] or of society to reverse the trial court\u2019s decision because of technical defects in the first certificate.\u201d Wheeler, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 373.\nIn Tiffin, a patient was arrested for disorderly conduct, and the State filed a petition for involuntary commitment and obtained an order for detention and examination under the Code. On April 15 and 18, 1994, the patient was examined in a mental hospital, and his physician completed a section 3 \u2014 602 certificate. On April 21, the patient voluntarily committed himself. The State voluntarily dismissed the petition, obtaining leave to reinstate the petition within 21 days. On April 27, at least 216 hours after the certificate was completed, the trial court reinstated the involuntary commitment petition. The reinstated petition was attached to the certificates executed after the April 15 and 18 examinations.\nThe court found \u201csection 3 \u2014 602 anticipates fresh information will be used as a basis for changing a patient\u2019s status from voluntary to involuntary commitment.\u201d Tiffin, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 584. The court invalidated the reinstated petition because it relied on stale certificates, contrary to the Code\u2019s 72-hour rule. Tiffin, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 585.\nWhile Wheeler and Tiffin yield competing interpretations of this rule, the factual posture of Arthur\u2019s appeal creates still different problems. Arthur was not involuntarily committed pursuant to a court order that relied on a defective certificate. Instead, Arthur was committed overnight because of a defective certificate. In other words, Arthur\u2019s complaint did not challenge a court-ordered commitment but, rather, alleged a false imprisonment claim against the hospital and the certifying physician.\nContrary to the defendants\u2019 contentions, the Code does not preempt Arthur\u2019s common law claim. The Code does not supply a comprehensive statutory scheme to remedy unlawful admission. Instead, a common law claim provides Arthur an opportunity to recover for his overnight detention on a stale certificate.\nAdditionally, contrary to the defendants\u2019 suggestions, a common law negligence claim conceptually does not provide the proper vehicle to remedy unlawful admission. Negligence claims address unintentional malfeasance or nonfeasance. A negligence claim here would assert the following: in exercising due care, the defendants could have (or should have) prevented Arthur\u2019s involuntary admission. However, the defendants acted intentionally here; both Dr. Walczynski and Nurse Ghera intended to admit Arthur involuntarily. Arthur\u2019s admission was not an avoidable fluke that due care would have prevented.\n\u201cThe action for the tort of false imprisonment, sometimes called false arrest, is another lineal descendant of the old action of trespass [to person]. It protects the personal interest in freedom from restraint of movement.\u201d W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts \u00a7 11, at 47 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton).\nThe interest involved is \u201cin a sense a mental one,\u201d and false imprisonment may be maintained without proof of actual damages. Prosser & Keeton at 47. The tort is complete after \u201ceven a brief restraint on the plaintiffs freedom,\u201d and the plaintiff may recover nominal damages. Prosser & Keeton at 48. In short, the plaintiff has a dignitary interest in freedom from any restraint. See generally 19 Ill. L. & Prac. False Imprisonment & Unlawful Restraint (1991).\nIn Illinois, \u201c[t]o state a cause of action for false imprisonment, the plaintiff must allege that his personal liberty was unreasonably or unlawfully restrained against his will and that defendant(s) caused or procured the restraint.\u201d Vincent v. Williams, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5-6, 664 N.E.2d 650 (1996). False imprisonment requires an actual or legal intent to restrain. Lopez v. Winchell\u2019s Donut House, 126 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50, 466 N.E.2d 1309 (1984). However, imprisonment under legal authority is not false imprisonment. Shelton v. Barry, 328 Ill. App. 497, 66 N.E.2d 697 (1946). False imprisonment claims do not lie for a detention made by virtue of legal process issued by a court or an official with jurisdiction to issue such process. See Kay v. Boehm, 32 Ill. App. 3d 853, 366 N.E.2d 781 (1975); Jacobson v. Rolley, 29 Ill. App. 3d 265, 330 N.E.2d 256 (1975).\nIn order to determine the viability of Arthur\u2019s false imprisonment claim, we must determine whether Arthur\u2019s involuntary commitment was a detention under legal process. Olsen v. Karwoski, 68 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 386 N.E.2d 444 (1979), addresses this issue. We have found no other Illinois decision addressing a false imprisonment claim under similar circumstances.\nIn Olsen, on October 11, 1974, a patient was brought to the mental health facility at Mt. Sinai Hospital by the police pursuant to the Code\u2019s involuntary commitment provisions, after he was arrested for unlawful conduct at his wife\u2019s home. The patient\u2019s wife signed the petition, and at her behest without examining the patient, Dr. Dulin signed the certificate. Dr. Chun examined the patient at the hospital and signed another certificate. For unknown reasons, the patient was discharged that evening. On October 15, the patient was brought to Tinley Park Mental Health Center by the police pursuant to the Code\u2019s involuntary commitment provisions. Both Dr. Dulin and Dr. Chun signed certificates dated October 14, but neither examined the patient on that date.\nWe noted the petition and the certificate for involuntary admission are the gateway into the judicial process for commitment and thus part of that process. Olsen, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 1036. But, more importantly, we held:\n\u201cThe limitation upon the plaintiffs freedom of movement were the result of legal processes and thus not grounds for an action charging false imprisonment or arrest. *** The emergency admissions of which the plaintiff complains were the result of two legal police arrests.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 68 Ill. App. 3d at 1038, citing Kay, 32 Ill. App. 3d at 856 (arrest on order of contempt), and Jacobson, 29 Ill. App. 3d at 267 (arrest on bench warrant).\nThe court concluded the patient\u2019s false imprisonment claim against his wife and the two doctors must fail. Olsen, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 1038.\nWhile the court never said whether the petition/certificate process or the \u201clegal police arrests\u201d made the restraint a result of legal process, the cases on which the court relies \u2014 lawful arrest cases\u2014 clearly indicate the latter. We believe the Olsen court found the two legal police arrests, and not the defective certificates, were legal processes that shielded the defendants from liability for false imprisonment. In other words, the police arrests in Olsen rescued the defendants from the plaintiffs false imprisonment claims based on the defective certificates.\nAlthough we recognize the difficult and delicate balance between the need for quick involuntary commitment decisions and the rights of mentally ill patients, we distinguish this case from Olsen. Like the plaintiff in Olsen, Arthur challenges, and seeks damages for, his admission by health care providers responsible for his involuntary commitment. Unlike the plaintiff in Olsen, Arthur never was lawfully arrested by law enforcement officers. We are reluctant to place the force of the phrase \u201clawful process\u201d behind a statutorily inadequate certificate and petition, and we read Olsen accordingly.\nIn this case the time between certificate and admission was 94 hours, well beyond the statutory limit. It should not have been difficult for Lutheran General to make that calculation. It would have been easy enough for Walczynski to prepare another certificate the second time she saw Arthur at Resurrection on June 14. We do not believe we are imposing an unreasonable burden on anyone by requiring compliance with the clear terms of the statute. The liberty interest implicated in matters of involuntary commitment requires vigilance.\nCONCLUSION\nBecause we believe Arthur\u2019s false imprisonment claim raises fact issues that warrant further proceedings, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to the defendants and remand this case to the trial court. We affirm the trial court\u2019s order denying summary judgment to Arthur.\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part.\nCERDA, P.J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.\nOn the eve of oral argument, Walczynski filed a motion to cite section 6 \u2014 103 of the Code as additional authority.\nSection 6 \u2014 103 provides an exemption from liability for \u201c[a] 11 persons acting in good faith and without negligence\u201d in the preparation of certificates and petitions. 405 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 103(a) (West 1996).\nWe denied Walczynski\u2019s motion and will not consider this statute. Walc-zynski never raised this issue before the trial court and only raised it before this court after all the parties had completed their briefs, one day before oral argument was to take place.\nWhile we decline to rule on this statute\u2019s applicability, we note its exemption does not apply to bad-faith or negligent preparation of involuntary admission documents.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Pochis & Katz, of Chicago (Miles M. Dore, of counsel), for appellant.", "James W. Fessler and Michael Resis, both of O\u2019Hagan, Smith & Amundsen, of Chicago, for appellee Lutheran General Hospital, Inc.", "Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (David A. Kanter, Martha D. Owens, and Dara J. Keidan, of counsel), for appellee Ann Walczynski." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALEXANDER J. ARTHUR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LUTHERAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20140859\nOpinion filed March 19, 1998.\nPochis & Katz, of Chicago (Miles M. Dore, of counsel), for appellant.\nJames W. Fessler and Michael Resis, both of O\u2019Hagan, Smith & Amundsen, of Chicago, for appellee Lutheran General Hospital, Inc.\nWildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, of Chicago (David A. Kanter, Martha D. Owens, and Dara J. Keidan, of counsel), for appellee Ann Walczynski." }, "file_name": "0818-01", "first_page_order": 838, "last_page_order": 847 }