{ "id": 45734, "name": "MARY KAY COOPER SVERID, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF EVERGREEN PARK et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Sverid v. First National Bank", "decision_date": "1998-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20142615", "first_page": "919", "last_page": "923", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 919" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 N.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2787918 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "noting that the term \"goods and chattels\" in the Probate Act denotes tangible personal property, \"as distinguished from such items as stocks, bonds, mortgages, accounts receivable, notes and the like\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2455588 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179", "parenthetical": "noting that the term \"goods and chattels\" in the Probate Act denotes tangible personal property, \"as distinguished from such items as stocks, bonds, mortgages, accounts receivable, notes and the like\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/39/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.E. 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3335929 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/223/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 863", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5469557 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0863-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 N.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "under ejusdem generis, bequest of personal property \"in or about\" motel did not include money in bank account" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5344801 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718", "parenthetical": "under ejusdem generis, bequest of personal property \"in or about\" motel did not include money in bank account" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 N.E.2d 961", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "439 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3012667 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/108/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 N.E.2d 1179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1180" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2604230 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" }, { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "54 Ill. 2d 6", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2934771 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/54/0006-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 514, "char_count": 9296, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.325182748902551e-08, "percentile": 0.3355500648879529 }, "sha256": "a040547b6f7ce5785414a94b8ebe9fa386e8a10c10f8cb16a46e921af4f143a6", "simhash": "1:a2acfc5e37447732", "word_count": 1447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:51:11.490834+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARY KAY COOPER SVERID, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF EVERGREEN PARK et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THEIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAppellant, Mary Kay Cooper Sverid, appeals from the circuit court\u2019s interpretation of the last will and testament of the decedent, Marie Becker Moore. Appellant sought a declaration from the circuit court that decedent\u2019s bequest to her under the will of \u201cthe all of [decedent\u2019s] personal effects, household goods, and all other goods and chattels\u201d should be interpreted to include the more than $1 million in stocks and bonds held by decedent at the time of her death. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the executor, First National Bank of Evergreen Park, finding that the stocks and bonds passed under the will\u2019s residuary clause to the Principia Corporation (Principia), a Missouri educational institution. We affirm.\nDecedent\u2019s will consists of three pages, and its only beneficiaries are appellant and Principia. The relevant provisions of the will are as follows:\n\u201cSECTION ONE\nI give the all of my personal effects, household goods, and all other goods and chattels to my good friend, MARY KAY COOPER SVERID, in St. Joseph, Michigan.\nSECTION TWO\nI give the residue of my estate to PRINCIPIA CORPORATION at 13201 Clayton Road, St. Louis, Missouri 63131.\u201d\nAt the time of her death, decedent owned her residence, its contents and furnishings, and various certificates representing ownership of certain common stocks and bonds. Upon her death, most of decedent\u2019s stock and bond certificates were found in her safe-deposit box; however, some were found in and among decedent\u2019s household and personal possessions.\nDecedent\u2019s will was admitted to probate on July 24, 1996, and appellant sought a declaration that she, not Principia, was entitled to decedent\u2019s stocks and bonds, which in total valued over $1 million. Under section 1 of the will, all other tangible personal property of decedent including decedent\u2019s automobile was distributed in kind to appellant. The combined appraised value of these items was $9,075.\nUpon consideration of the parties\u2019 filings and after hearing oral argument, the court entered judgment in favor of the executor and Principia, having determined that Principia should receive decedent\u2019s stocks and bonds under the unambiguous terms of decedent\u2019s will. Ms. Sverid appealed.\nAppellant contends that the plain and obvious meaning of the phrase \u201cthe all of my personal effects, household goods, and all other goods and chattels to my good friend MARY KAY COOPER SVERID\u201d is to bequeath all of decedent\u2019s personal property to plaintiff, both tangible and intangible. She maintains that, on its face, the bequest contains no words of limitation as to tangible personal property, or property at a particular location, and suggests that the will\u2019s designation of appellant as decedent\u2019s \u201cgood friend\u201d reinforces the breadth of decedent\u2019s bequest to her. Appellant further suggests that decedent\u2019s use of the words \u201cthe all\u201d further denotes the inclusive scope of her bequest of personal property to Sverid, and signals decedent\u2019s intent to separate her property into the broad categories of real and personal property, not tangible and intangible property.\nAt a minimum, appellant suggests that the phrase \u201cpersonal effects\u201d is capable of two meanings: one inclusive of intangible personal property and one limited to tangible personal property. As a result, appellant alternatively maintains that the will is ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence of decedent\u2019s intent is vital to its correct construction. To the contrary, the executor and Principia contend that, under Illinois law, decedent\u2019s will unambiguously conveyed only tangible personal property to appellant.\nIn Illinois, words used in a will are construed according to their plain and ordinary meanings. Feder v. Luster, 54 Ill. 2d 6, 11, 294 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1973); Warren v. Albrecht, 213 Ill. App. 3d 55, 58, 571 N.E.2d 1179, 1180 (1991). Moreover, courts are charged with ascertaining a testator\u2019s intent by, wherever possible, giving effect to every \u201cword, phrase and clause\u201d in a will. Feder, 54 111. 2d at 11, 294 N.E.2d at 295. In addition, under the rule of ejusdem generis, when general words are preceded by specific words, the general words \u201c \u2018must be construed to include only things of the same kind as those indicated by the particular and specific words.\u2019 \u201d Brink\u2019s, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 108 Ill. App. 3d 186, 190, 439 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1982), quoting Bullman v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. .217, 226, 10 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1937); In re Estate of Lindsey, 13 Ill. App. 3d 717, 718, 300 N.E.2d 572, 573 (1973) (under ejusdem generis, bequest of personal property \u201cin or about\u201d motel did not include money in bank account).\nThough various Illinois courts have interpreted the language used in decedent\u2019s will, we are aware of no Illinois case construing the precise phrase or resolving the particular issue that is the object of this appeal. While the term \u201cpersonal effects\u201d usually means items having an intimate relation to a person, the term must be given meaning in the context in which it occurs. Landstrom v. Krettler, 105 Ill. App. 3d 863, 866, 435 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1982).\nAppellant primarily relies upon Andrews v. Applegate, 223 Ill. 535, 537-38, 79 N.E. 176, 177 (1906). There, our supreme court stated:\n\u201cThe word \u2018effects\u2019 in its primary and ordinary meaning includes only personal estate, goods, movables and chattel property. [Citations.] It denotes property in a more extensive sense than goods, and includes all kinds of personal property, such as shares of capital stock. [Citation.] The word is frequently found in wills, and, as a general thing, means personal property ***.\u201d\nWe do not agree with appellant\u2019s broad reading of Andrews that the phrase \u201cpersonal effects\u201d denotes both tangible and intangible personal property, inclusive of stocks and bonds. The precise phrase at issue in Andrews, \u201cmoneys and effects of every description not hereafter otherwise disposed of\u2019 expressly contemplated intangible personal property, specifically \u201cmoneys.\u201d Andrews, 223 Ill. at 536, 79 N.E. at 176. Additionally, floe Andrews bequest of \u201ceffects of every description not hereafter otherwise disposed of\u2019 expressly used the word \u201ceffects\u201d without qualification.\n\u20223 In this instance, decedent did not specifically include in the bequest of \u201cpersonal effects\u201d intangible personal property, nor did she expressly make the bequest unqualifiedly inclusive of \u201ceffects of every description.\u201d To the contrary, decedent made a bequest of \u201cthe all of [her] personal effects, household goods, and all other goods and chattels.\u201d Decedent\u2019s bequest of \u201cpersonal effects\u201d was conjoined with her bequest of other personalty already categorized as tangible property by some Illinois courts. See In re Estate of Berman, 39 Ill. App. 2d 175, 179, 187 N.E.2d 541, 544 (1963) (noting that the term \u201cgoods and chattels\u201d in the Probate Act denotes tangible personal property, \u201cas distinguished from such items as stocks, bonds, mortgages, accounts receivable, notes and the like\u201d).\nWe find Watkins v. Nobiling, 22 Ill. 2d 290,174 N.E.2d 858 (1961), more directly addresses the issues raised here. In Watkins, our supreme court was asked to decide whether decedent\u2019s bequest of \u201cmy joint belongings,\u201d when viewed in light of extrinsic circumstances, manifested an intent to devise real estate. In that context, the Watkins court made the following statement: \u201cSimilarly the word \u2018belongings\u2019 is ordinarily used to designate tangible personal property such as household goods and personal effects.\u201d Watkins, 22 Ill. 2d at 292, 174 N.E.2d at 859. This statement suggests that our supreme court has determined that the phrase \u201cpersonal effects\u201d denotes \u201ctangible personal property.\u201d\nAppellant questions the relevance of Watkins, suggesting that Watkins did not pose, and that our supreme court did not address or resolve, the precise question at issue here: whether the phrase \u201cpersonal effects\u201d may include intangible property. We do not agree. We do not find this contextual difference critical. Though the court referenced the phrase \u201cpersonal effects\u201d in the context of deciding whether the term \u201cbelongings\u201d was inclusive of real property, it nevertheless clearly identified \u201cpersonal effects\u201d as \u201ctangible personal property.\u201d\nMoreover, the Watkins designation of \u201cpersonal effects\u201d as inclusive of only tangible personal property is consistent with the words\u2019 plain and ordinary meaning. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1143 (6th ed. 1990) (the term \u201cpersonal effects\u201d is narrower than \u201ceffects\u201d and ordinarily includes only tangible property having an \u201cintimate relation to [the] person\u201d).\nTherefore, we find the circuit court correctly determined that, under the unambiguous terms of the will, the stocks and bonds passed to Principia under the residuary clause.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN, P.J., and HARTMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THEIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Raymond A. Fylstra, Noel P. Goudreau, and Daniel J. Kubasiak, all of Kubasiak, Cremieux, Fylstra, Reizen & Rotunno, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Gerard D. Kelly and Erin E. Kelly, both of Sidley & Austin, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARY KAY COOPER SVERID, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF EVERGREEN PARK et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20142615\nOpinion filed March 31, 1998.\nRaymond A. Fylstra, Noel P. Goudreau, and Daniel J. Kubasiak, all of Kubasiak, Cremieux, Fylstra, Reizen & Rotunno, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.\nGerard D. Kelly and Erin E. Kelly, both of Sidley & Austin, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0919-01", "first_page_order": 939, "last_page_order": 943 }