{ "id": 222663, "name": "CHARLES J. ROEDL, Petitioner, v. MIDCO INTERNATIONAL et al., Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Roedl v. Midco International", "decision_date": "1998-04-29", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201497\u20140481", "first_page": "213", "last_page": "220", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 213" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850356 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2561365 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365906 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" }, { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570132 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0840-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 611, "char_count": 14662, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1609256294233413e-07, "percentile": 0.5840576033583426 }, "sha256": "d51bda6e09a1dc8da0e4bc2236762f7c412aa7b6386d2cf83536c309659e924e", "simhash": "1:3a9b2c7977cb2099", "word_count": 2230 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:46.961592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHARLES J. ROEDL, Petitioner, v. MIDCO INTERNATIONAL et al., Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCharles J. Roedl, complainant, appeals from a decision of the chief legal counsel of the Illinois Department of Human Rights (the Department) sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal of complainant\u2019s charge of age discrimination against his former employer, Midco International (Midco), for lack of substantial evidence. On direct appeal to this court, pursuant to section 8 \u2014 111(A)(1) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 111(A)(1) (West 1996)), complainant argues that the chief legal counsel erred in sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal because the Department failed to consider all of the evidence. We affirm.\nFACTS\nOn May 10, 1996, complainant filed a charge of discrimination against Midco, alleging that Midco fired him on March 26, 1996, in discrimination of his age. Complainant worked for Midco for 17 years before his termination. He was 48 years of age when he was fired. In his charging form, complainant listed 24 instances where his superiors made \u201cnegative reference to [his] age.\u201d Complainant alleged that he had \u201cdocumented\u201d each of the instances in which someone negatively referred to his age.\nOn June 13, 1996, Midco filed a verified response to complainant\u2019s charge, denying that it fired complainant on the basis of his age.\nOn February 6, 1997, the Department dismissed complainant\u2019s charge for lack of substantial evidence. The Department\u2019s investigative report was attached to the notice of dismissal. The investigative report sets forth complainant\u2019s prima facie case as: \u201c1. Complainant was 48 years old. 2. Complainant was performing satisfactorily. 3. Complainant was discharged. 4. Complainant alleges Respondent does not discharge similarly situated younger employees.\u201d The Department accepted Midco\u2019s defense that \u201cComplainant was discharged as a result of his explosive temper.\u201d\nThe Department listed nine witnesses that the investigator interviewed personally or by telephone. The nine witnesses were all current or former Midco employees whose statements supported Mid-co\u2019s defense that complainant \u201chad temper outbursts and violent episodes that were becoming more frequent\u201d and that complainant\u2019s work became less effective as his temper outbursts increased. Several of the witnesses stated that they had heard complainant\u2019s superiors make statements about his health but that they had not heard any derogatory remarks concerning his age.\nIn rebuttal of Midco\u2019s defense, \"complainant asserted that he was no more volatile than any other employee. Complainant also informed the investigator that another employee, Bertha Dobson, whose age complainant did not know, \u201cwas discharged because of her age.\u201d Complainant did not submit any additional information and did not submit the \u201cdiary\u201d in which, he claimed, he detailed the negative comments by management regarding his age.\nMidco claimed in surrebuttal that other employees display their tempers at the work site occasionally, but \u201cnothing comparable to Complainant.\u201d Midco also claimed that Bertha Dobson was not fired due to her age but because she \u201cwas reluctant to learn to use a piece of equipment associated with doing her job.\u201d\nThe Department stated that its finding of lack of substantial evidence was based upon evidence supporting Midco\u2019s defense that complainant had become increasingly combative on the job and that complainant was aware of the issue created by his temper. The Department found that complainant\u2019s temper outbursts became more intense and frequent toward the end of his employment. The Department found that other Midco employees occasionally succumbed to temper outbursts, but never to the extent of complainant\u2019s behavior. The Department found no evidence to corroborate complainant\u2019s allegations regarding age-related comments. The Department concluded that complainant failed to show that Midco\u2019s \u201carticulated reasons for discharge were pretextual.\u201d\nOn March 13, 1997, complainant filed a timely request for review of the Department\u2019s dismissal of his charge of discrimination. In his 16-page argument, complainant argued, \u201c[M]uch of the information gathered [by the Department] was either untrue or deliberately distorted to cover up the fact that MIDCO management repeatedly referred to my age prior to my termination.\u201d Complainant charged that \u201ca complete and thorough investigation was not conducted.\u201d\nIn support of his request for review, complainant submitted his observations about the evidence and the Department\u2019s investigation. Complainant did not submit the testimony of any other witnesses. Although he frequently referred to the \u201cdiary\u201d in which he documented all of the derogatory comments about his age, he did not submit the diary or any other exhibits in support of his argument. The majority of complainant\u2019s argument is devoted to a discussion of the manner in which others, especially Rick Drumm, complainant\u2019s supervisor and Midco\u2019s chief executive officer, acted similarly to or worse than complainant. Complainant\u2019s viewpoint is that the testimony of the other Midco employees, who testified favorably for Midco, is not credible. Complainant argued that the Department\u2019s investigation was not thorough and that if a more thorough investigation were conducted, the Department would have known that Midco \u201cdeliberately\u201d concealed the age discrimination in complainant\u2019s termination.\nMidco responded: \u201cThe bulk of the material the Complainant has asserted in support of his Request for Review was not presented by him to the Department\u2019s investigator.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Midco charged, \u201cIt is fundamental that Complainant cannot sit on his hands during the investigation and wait until the Request for Review stage of the investigation to disclose his alleged facts and legal theories.\u201d Midco argued that much of complainant\u2019s argument was irrelevant and did not add anything to his charge of age discrimination and that the evidence considered by the Department\u2019s investigator was overwhelming.\nOn June 6, 1997, the chief legal counsel sustained the Department\u2019s dismissal of complainant\u2019s charge of discrimination. The basis for the chief legal counsel\u2019s decision was the lack of substantial evidence. In support of her order, the chief legal counsel listed the following findings of fact and reasons:\n\u201cDB]eginning in August 1989, and continuing until the time of his discharge, Complainant was repeatedly counseled by [Midco] that his behavior was inappropriate. The investigation documents numerous incidents when Complainant was unable to control his temper resulting in repeated physical and verbal outbursts.\n*** Because of such incidents, on March 26, 1996, Complainant was discharged for his inability to control his temper. The investigation is devoid of evidence that suggests that Complainant\u2019s age was a factor in [Midco\u2019s] discharge of Complainant. Accordingly, Complainant has failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish that [Midco\u2019s] stated reason is pretextual.\n*** Complainant, in his timely Request for Review, fails to present any relevant additional materials in support of his position, except to mention a diary in which he has documented all incidents of alleged age discrimination committed against him by [Midco]. Complainant has not shown good cause why he has failed to present this evidence to the investigator previously, however, and accordingly, it cannot be considered at this time.\u201d\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, complainant argues that the chief legal counsel erred in sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal of his charge of age\u2019 discrimination. Complainant insists that he presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of unlawful age discrimination. We agree that complainant established his prima facie case, and we find that both the Department and the chief legal counsel accepted this as well.\nA prima facie case of age discrimination is established by a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the complainant is a member of a protected class (age 40 or over), (2) he was doing the job well enough to meet his employer\u2019s legitimate expectations, (3) he was discharged or demoted, and (4) the employer sought a replacement for him. Southern Illinois Clinic, Ltd. v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 274 Ill. App. 3d 840, 847 (1995). In the case at bar, the evidence established that complainant was over 40, that he was doing his job well enough except for his inability to control his temper, and that he was fired. There is no evidence that complainant was replaced, but it is obvious from the record that both the Department and the chief legal counsel determined that complainant established a prima facie case of age discrimination.\nOnce a prima facie case of discrimination is established, \u201ca rebuttable presumption arises that the employer unlawfully discriminated against\u201d the complainant. Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 179 (1989). In order to rebut this presumption, the employer \u201cmust articulate, not prove [citation], a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.\u201d Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 179. In the case at bar, Mideo articulated its reason in response to complainant\u2019s charge: complainant\u2019s frequent, unreasonable temper outbursts.\nBy articulating \u201ca legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason\u201d for complainant\u2019s discharge, Mideo \u201ccarrie [d] its burden of production,\u201d and the presumption of unlawful discrimination fell. Zaderaka, 131 111. 2d at 179. Complainant was therefore compelled to prove by \u00e1 preponderance of the evidence that Midco\u2019s articulated reason, complainant\u2019s unreasonable temper outbursts, \u201cwas not its true reason[ ] but was instead a pretext for unlawful discrimination.\u201d Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 179. Complainant\u2019s burden in this regard was part of his ultimate burden to prove that Mideo unlawfully discriminated against him, which remained with complainant \u201cat all times.\u201d Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 179.\nWhether Midco\u2019s articulated reason for discharging complainant was pretextual is a question of fact. Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 180. Thus, the question before this court is whether the chief legal counsel\u2019s finding of no pretext is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 180; 775 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 101.1 (West 1996). The function of the chief legal counsel is the same as formerly assigned to the Human Rights Commission: \u201cto determine whether substantial evidence exists to warrant further proceedings on the charge.\u201d Whipple v. Department of Rehabilitation Services, 269 Ill. App. 3d 554, 556 (1995). It is not the function of the chief legal counsel to resolve questions of fact, which are entirely within the province of the Department. Whipple, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 556.\nThe reviewing court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the trier of fact, here the Department. Clyde v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 206 Ill. App. 3d 283, 291 (1990). \u201cFindings of fact are entitled to deference, and this is particularly true of credibility determinations.\u201d Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 180. Since the chief legal counsel reviewed the Department\u2019s findings of fact and was only to determine if substantial evidence existed to support complainant\u2019s charges, our review is limited to deciding whether the chief legal counsel\u2019s decision dismissing complainant\u2019s charge for lack of substantial evidence is \u201carbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.\u201d Marinelli v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 247, 253 (1994). Our review is of the chief legal counsel's decision, not the decision of the Department. Marinelli, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 253.\nComplainant could have shown that Midco\u2019s explanation of why it fired him was pretextual either directly, by showing that the discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the employer\u2019s explanation is not worthy of credence. See Southern Illinois Clinic, Ltd., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 846. Complainant argues, however, that he \u201cwas not given the opportunity\u201d to prove that Midco\u2019s explanation was a pretext for discrimination. He bases this argument upon the chief legal counsel\u2019s refusal to consider his \u201cdiary.\u201d This argument must fail. Complainant never produced the \u201cdiary\u201d for either the Department or the chief legal counsel to review. Moreover, complainant never explained why he did not offer the \u201cdiary\u201d to the Department during its investigation or why he did not offer to supplement the record before the chief legal counsel with the \u201cdiary.\u201d Without some explanation for why complainant previously omitted the submission of the \u201cdiary,\u201d the chief legal counsel did not abuse her discretion in refusing to consider this so-called evidence.\nThe chief legal counsel was empowered to review the Department\u2019s order, any argument or supplemental evidence submitted, and the results of any additional investigation conducted by the Department. Marinelli, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 253; 775 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 101.1(B) (West 1996). The chief legal counsel reviewed the Department\u2019s factual findings and determined that there was no substantial evidence to support complainant\u2019s charge of discrimination. In making this determination, the chief legal counsel was required to adopt the Department\u2019s factual findings unless they were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Marinelli, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 253; 775 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 101.1(B) (West 1996):\nThe record is clear that there was ample evidence from which the Department could find Midco\u2019s reason for firing complainant to be legitimate. The record is devoid of any evidence to support complainant\u2019s argument that Midco\u2019s explanation was pretextual. In fact, complainant\u2019s arguments consist entirely of speculation, conjecture, and complainant\u2019s opinion that the other witnesses were not worthy of belief. Thus, the chief legal counsel\u2019s decision, sustaining the Department\u2019s dismissal of complainant\u2019s charge of discrimination, was not an abuse of discretion.\nFor all the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the chief legal counsel dismissing complainant\u2019s charge for lack of substantial evidence.\nAffirmed.\nMAAG and KUEHN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "David Stevens, of Heller, Holmes & Associates, P.C., of Mattoon, for petitioner.", "Roy G. Davis and Janet L. Jannusch, both of Davis & Campbell, L.L.C., of Peoria, for respondent Midco International.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Michael A. Rakov, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondent Department of Human Rights." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES J. ROEDL, Petitioner, v. MIDCO INTERNATIONAL et al., Respondents.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201497\u20140481\nOpinion filed April 29, 1998.\nDavid Stevens, of Heller, Holmes & Associates, P.C., of Mattoon, for petitioner.\nRoy G. Davis and Janet L. Jannusch, both of Davis & Campbell, L.L.C., of Peoria, for respondent Midco International.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Michael A. Rakov, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondent Department of Human Rights." }, "file_name": "0213-01", "first_page_order": 231, "last_page_order": 238 }