{ "id": 222617, "name": "STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREGORY LEE MARTIN, SR., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Martin", "decision_date": "1998-05-06", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201495\u20140810", "first_page": "466", "last_page": "474", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 466" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 1079", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1082" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3082811 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/88/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592553 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783179 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.E. 942", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "944" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 Ill. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4717341 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/257/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 1338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1351" }, { "page": "1350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. 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Super.", "case_ids": [ 365680 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "sexual abuse" }, { "parenthetical": "sexual abuse" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/239/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 A.2d 1100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7358122 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "sexual abuse" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/568/1100-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 N.W.2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10662682 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "sexual abuse" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/422/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 A.2d 3", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7936515 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "assault with a gun" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/605/0003-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 N.E. 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1898, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3157979 ], "year": 1898, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/176/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2817719 ], "year": 1882, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/101/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3385601 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 N.E.2d 1190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1195" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2604243 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the arson-related death of an arson coconspirator was not intended and was therefore an \"accident\" within the meaning of an accident insurance policy" }, { "page": "6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2785749 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the arson-related death of an arson coconspirator was not intended and was therefore an \"accident\" within the meaning of an accident insurance policy" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/11/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3114017 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. App. 3d 1146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5610203 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/79/1146-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 921", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592618 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "927" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0921-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.E. 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2403264 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/267/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 N.E.2d 1121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1123" }, { "page": "1123-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Ill. App. 3d 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5576143 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" }, { "page": "792-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/70/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 1157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1159" }, { "page": "1161" }, { "page": "1161" }, { "page": "1161" }, { "page": "1161" }, { "page": "1159" }, { "page": "1159" }, { "page": "1161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3383978 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. App. 3d 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3241315 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/69/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 N.E.2d 953", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "958" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3494471 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649557 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 N.E.2d 494", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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GREGORY LEE MARTIN, SR., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KUEHN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm), filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of whether it owed its insured, Gregory Lee Martin, Sr. (Martin), a defense and indemnification in two underlying wrongful death suits. These suits were based upon Martin\u2019s involvement in an arson which resulted in the death of two firemen. State Farm appeals from trial court orders finding that it had a duty to defend and to indemnify Martin. We affirm.\nThis case originated with an arrangement between Martin and Delaney Gordon, Sr. (Gordon), to destroy a building. Martin owned the designated building. The building was located in Alton, Illinois. Gordon was one of Martin\u2019s tenants, and in exchange for his participation, Martin offered him a reduced rental rate.\nOn October 24, 1992, at approximately 2 a.m., Gordon ignited the fire by leaving an unattended candle in a hamper in the basement. An accelerant was used. By the time the fire was reported and firemen responded, the building was in flames. As the fire intensified, the building\u2019s second floor collapsed onto some of the firemen. Firemen Timmie Lee Lewis and Gary Porter perished.\nMartin and Gordon were indicted by a federal grand jury for damaging by fire a building used in interstate commerce, directly causing a death, in violation of section 844(i) of the Anti-Arson Act of 1982 (18 U.S.C. \u00a7 844(0 (1988)).\nDefendants Scott Lewis (Lewis) and Ethelyn J. Gorham (Gorham) were appointed executors of the estates of Timmie Lee Lewis and Gary Porter, respectively. Lewis filed a wrongful death suit against Martin and Gordon on or about June 7, 1993. Gorham filed her suit on or about July 7, 1993. Both suits alleged that Martin negligently started the fire with the knowledge that firemen would respond.\nState Farm insured Martin\u2019s building. Martin tendered both wrongful death suits to State Farm. State Farm denied coverage and refused to defend Martin. Martin did not answer the suits.\nState Farm filed the declaratory judgment action on August 20, 1993, alleging that the underlying actions did not constitute an occurrence as defined in the policy and that Martin\u2019s actions triggered two coverage exclusions. State Farm asked the trial court to declare that there was no coverage under the Martin liability policy for the suits filed by the deceased firemen\u2019s estates. State Farm also asked the trial court to declare that it had no duty to defend Martin in the underlying suits because of the lack of coverage. Defendant Gorham sought to stay the declaratory judgment action until the federal criminal cases then pending against Martin and Gordon were resolved. Defendant Lewis had not yet answered State Farm\u2019s declaratory judgment petition and thus did not file a motion to stay. State Farm opposed the stay. The trial court entered an order on February 24, 1994, staying the declaratory judgment action. The order further stated that any party could move to lift the stay upon resolution of the criminal cases. The record does not contain any order staying the wrongful death suits.\nOn September 23, 1994, Martin was found guilty on the indictment and in December 1994 was sentenced to 50 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nDuring the summer of 1995, Gorham and Lewis defaulted Martin on the wrongful death suits. On August 8, 1995, the trial court entered judgment on the negligence counts of Gorham\u2019s wrongful death suit against Martin in the amount of $10 million. On September 5, 1995, the trial court entered judgment on Lewis\u2019s suit against Martin in the amount of $9 million. Sometime in September 1995, after default judgments were taken in both suits, State Farm offered Martin a defense.\nThe record contains no order lifting the stay imposed upon the declaratory judgment action following the criminal case\u2019s conclusion. However, on April 18, 1995, approximately seven months after Martin\u2019s conviction, State Farm filed a summary judgment motion in the declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Martin in the underlying suits. On August 30, 1995, the trial court found that coverage existed, and the court denied State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nGorham filed her motion for summary judgment on September 20, 1995. On September 29, 1995, State Farm filed a motion to reconsider the order denying its summary judgment motion. On October 4, 1995, the trial court granted Gorham\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied State Farm\u2019s motion to reconsider. The record does not reflect that Lewis filed a motion for summary judgment, but the October 4, 1995, order stated that he did. The order granted Lewis\u2019s summary judgment motion. The trial court determined that coverage existed and that State Farm had a duty to both defend and indemnify Martin. State Farm appeals both orders.\nSummary judgment should only be granted when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Myers v. Health Specialists, S.C., 225 Ill. App. 3d 68, 72, 587 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1992). On appeal, courts review summary judgment orders de novo. Myers, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 72, 587 N.E.2d at 497.\nWhen an insurer questions whether an insured\u2019s claim possibly falls within the scope of coverage, the insurer essentially has two options. The insurer must either (1) secure a declaratory judgment as to its rights and obligations before or pending trial or (2) defend the insured under a reservation of rights. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 160 Ill. App. 3d 146, 151-52, 513 N.E.2d 490, 494 (1987); Trovillion v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 694, 700, 474 N.E.2d 953, 958 (1985); Reis v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 69 Ill. App. 3d 777, 782, 387 N.E.2d 700, 704 (1978); Thornton v. Paul, 51 Ill. App. 3d 337, 340-41, 366 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (1977), ajfd in part & rev\u2019d in part, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 384 N.E.2d 335 (1978).\nFor the reasons that follow, we affirm. The issues on appeal are somewhat intertwined in that State Farm\u2019s contentions that it owed its insured no duty to defend or indemnify, on the basis that there was no potential for coverage, rest on the bigger issue of whether State Farm\u2019s policy actually provides coverage for this incident.\nThere is no dispute that State Farm did not defend Martin until some time after default judgments were taken against him in both wrongful death suits. State Farm filed the declaratory judgment but then did not advance the suit. State Farm allowed the declaratory judgment to linger without resolution while the underlying wrongful death suits proceeded to default against its unrepresented insured.\nGiven the possibility that State Farm could lose the declaratory judgment, we remain perplexed that State Farm failed to take the safest and simplest route available and provide some sort of defense pending the outcome of its declaratory judgment action.\nState Farm contends that its policy defenses were preserved by merely filing the declaratory judgment suit, essentially arguing that so long as the insurance company at least filed suit, it can ignore its insured and watch the case proceed to default without repercussions. We find it difficult to accept this argument and note that the cases State Farm cites do not detail facts similar to these. However, we do not need to further interpret the meaning of the terms seek or secure and will not otherwise determine this case\u2019s outcome on an estoppel basis. We turn to State Farm\u2019s contentions regarding the interpretation of its policy provisions in light of the underlying facts.\nState Farm initially contends that Martin\u2019s actions do not amount to an \u201coccurrence.\u201d Its policy provides business liability for claims made or suits brought against its insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured premises. The policy definition of bodily injury includes death resulting from bodily harm, sickness, or disease. \u201cOccurrence\u201d is defined as \u201can accident, including exposure to conditions, which results in: (a) bodily injury *** during the policy period.\u201d\nIn the wrongful death suits at issue, the parties complain that Martin knew or should have known that firemen would respond to the fire and could be injured and that Martin was guilty of one or more of several negligent acts or omissions related to the fire and the firemen\u2019s response. State Farm argues that while the complaints sound in negligence, Martin\u2019s involvement in the arson does not qualify as an accident.\nState Farm also contends that coverage is barred by one of its exclusionary clauses. This policy exclusion bars coverage if Martin expected or intended the firemen\u2019s deaths.\nThese accident and exclusionary clause issues are closely related and as we reach the same conclusion on both, we will analyze them concurrently.\nThe trial court determined that the facts of this case fell squarely within State Farm\u2019s definition of an accident in that the policy equates \u201cexposure to conditions\u201d to an accident. The trial court went on to conclude that the firemen\u2019s deaths were an unintended result of an intended act and that therefore the occurrence qualified as an accident under the policy and that the exclusionary clause was ineffective.\nThis court previously defined accident as utilized in State Farm\u2019s policies as follows: \u201c \u2018An accident has been defined as an unforeseen occurrence, usually of an untoward or disastrous character or an undesigned sudden or unexpected event of an inflictive or unfortunate character. The natural and ordinary consequences of an act do not constitute an accident.\u2019 \u201d State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Watters, 268 Ill. App. 3d 501, 506, 644 N.E.2d 492, 495-96 (1994), quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d 617, 619, 411 N.E.2d 1157, 1159 (1980). This court further explained the term by stating that an accident \u201cinvolves the consideration of whether the injury was expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.\u201d Watters, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 506, 644 N.E.2d at 496.\nThe determination of whether or not an occurrence qualifies as an accident requires reviewing the matter from the objective foreseeability of the insured to determine whether the contingency is \u201c \u2018known to all sensible men as likely to follow\u2019 \u201d naturally from the insured\u2019s conduct. Marsh v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 790, 792, 388 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (1979), quoting Hutton v. States Accident Insurance Co., 267 Ill. 267, 269, 108 N.E. 296, 297 (1915). A certain outcome resulting from an insured\u2019s actions could be deemed foreseeable for purposes of tort liability and/or criminal liability, but not necessarily for insurance policy foreseeability, as the threshold is higher. Marsh, 70 Ill. App. 3d at 792-93, 388 N.E.2d at 1123-24. Moreover, except in situations involving sexual abuse and assault and battery where intent to injure is inferred, coverage is not excluded unless Martin acted with a specific intent to cause personal injury with conscious knowledge that the deaths were practically certain to occur. Scudder v. Hanover Insurance Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 921, 927, 559 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1990); Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Frierdich, 79 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1148, 399 N.E.2d 252, 254 (1979); Bay State Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 96 Ill. 2d 487, 493-94, 451 N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (1983).\nThe negligence counts of the complaints in issue do not allege a specific intent to injure the firemen. Martin acknowledged that his intent was to destroy a building. He. contends that the firemen\u2019s deaths were an unexpected event. While his participation in the crimes resulting in death was obviously criminal, it does not clearly follow that Martin expected or intended the deaths. See Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 11 Ill. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957) (holding that the arson-related death of an arson coconspirator was not intended and was therefore an \u201caccident\u201d within the meaning of an accident insurance policy). The record establishes that Martin did not foresee the deaths or intend any bodily injury or death.\nWe agree with the trial court\u2019s assessment that the facts of this case reflect \u201can unintended result of an intended act.\u201d Accordingly, we conclude that the occurrence at issue amounted to an accident. Not only was there a potential of coverage under this policy relative to State Farm\u2019s duty to defend Martin, but we conclude that State Farm\u2019s policy in fact provides liability coverage for the unintended accidental deaths of the two firemen. Furthermore, coverage is not excluded by the \u201cexpected or intended\u201d clause of State Farm\u2019s policy.\nWe next turn to State Farm\u2019s contention that its \u201cwillful and malicious acts\u201d policy exclusion bars coverage for this occurrence. State Farm\u2019s policy excludes coverage for bodily injury caused by an insured\u2019s willful and malicious acts but then fails to define those terms. In its brief, State Farm offers no definition of the term willful. We turn to case law for the definitions. Willful has been interpreted in a criminal context to mean a conscious awareness that the act in question is practically certain to cause a particular result. People v. Pratt, 213 Ill. App. 3d 69, 75, 571 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (1991). Malice has been defined to mean \u201c \u2018the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent.\u2019 \u201d Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d 617, 622, 411 N.E.2d 1157, 1161 (1980), quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). Illinois cases define it as \u201c \u2018an intent to do wrongful harm and injury and without just cause\u2019 \u201d (Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 622, 411 N.E.2d at 1161, quoting Candalaus Chicago, Inc. v. Evans Mill Supply Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 38, 47, 366 N.E.2d 319, 326 (1977)), as \u201c \u2018[a] wrong inflicted on another with an evil intent or purpose *** [requiring] the intentional perpetration of an injury or wrong on another\u2019 \u201d (Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 622, 411 N.E.2d at 1161, quoting First National Bank v. Burkett, 101 Ill. 391, 394 (1882)), and as \u201c\u2018an intent to do a wrongful harm and injury\u2019 \u201d (Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 622, 411 N.E.2d at 1161, quoting Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 615, 52 N.E. 924, 926 (1898)).\nThe trial court analyzed this issue in the same manner as it did the \u201cexpected and intended\u201d exclusion. We agree with that analysis. State Farm accurately argues that in assessing this exclusion\u2019s applicability, we must focus on the insured\u2019s conduct. Martin did not intend to kill two firemen or expect that their deaths would occur. He did intend to burn his building and collect the proceeds of his State Farm policy relative to the building\u2019s worth. This case presents a unique factual situation. For Martin\u2019s intent to burn his building, he should be precluded from property damage coverage under his State Farm policy. An insured should not be allowed to consciously control covered insurance risks through intentional acts. Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 620, 411 N.E.2d at 1159. To hold otherwise would circumvent the very purpose of insurance. Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 620, 411 N.E.2d at 1159. But to also exclude coverage for injuries sustained by the families of the firemen sets a dangerous precedent. This is not a specific-intent-crime coverage issue. We do not permit defendants to argue that they are entitled to insurance coverage for the unintended physical or psychological damage that their sexual abuse victim suffers (see Watters, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 507, 644 N.E.2d at 496-97) or the unexpected specific type of injuries that the victim sustained in a typical fistfight (see Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 622, 411 N.E.2d at 1161). Those cases involve direct involvement with the victim with intended acts upon that victim. Their specific intent to harm is inferred as a matter of law. If the injury is slightly different or greater than the defendant expected, he should not be covered for those differences under an \u201cunexpected\u201d or \u201cunintended\u201d theory. As this case involves an issue different from the intent-based crimes, the \u201cwillful and malicious acts\u201d policy exclusion does not bar coverage.\nState Farm also contends that insurance coverage for the arson-related activities is against public policy and is thus void. State Farm cites no Illinois authority for this contention. The four cases State Farm cites as authority are from other states. All four cases are distinguishable in that none involve an arson-related death. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hackendorn, 605 A.2d 3 (Del. 1991) (assault with a gun); Altena v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 422 N.W.2d 485 (Iowa 1988) (sexual abuse); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 568 A.2d 1100 (Me. 1990) (sexual abuse); Atlantic Employers Insurance Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-School Day Care Center, Inc., 239 N.J. Super. 276, 571 A.2d 300 (1990) (sexual abuse).\nIllinois public policy clearly prevents Martin from recovering policy proceeds for the building\u2019s worth, given his involvement in the arson of that building. See University of Illinois v. Continental Casualty Co., 234 Ill. App. 3d 340, 359, 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1351 (1992); Checkley v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 257 Ill. 491, 496-97, 100 N.E. 942, 944 (1913). However, our supreme court has held that interpreting an insurance contract to provide coverage for an intent-based act violates no established public policy of this state. Dixon Distributing Co. v. Hanover Insurance Co., 161 Ill. 2d 433, 446-47, 641 N.E.2d 395, 401-02 (1994); Taylor, 11 Ill. 2d at 230, 142 N.E.2d at 6. Furthermore, public policy encourages the compensation of victims. University of Illinois, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 358, 599 N.E.2d at 1350.\nIf Martin was seeking coverage for intentionally caused injuries or to profit from his arson involvement, no court would hesitate to find that such coverage was beyond the intent of the parties. Given our analysis on the coverage issues and the public policy encouragement of victim compensation, we find no public policy obstacle with finding liability coverage for the unintended and unexpected outcome of Martin\u2019s acts.\nWe find that no genuine issue of material facts exists, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is hereby affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH, P.J., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.\nOther cases use the term seek in place of the term secure. See, e.g., Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 207-08, 579 N.E.2d 322, 335 (1991); Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill. 2d 444, 451, 430 N.E.2d 1079, 1082 (1981).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KUEHN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen W. Thomson, of Thomson & Behr, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellant.", "Ralph J. Mendelsohn, of Mendelsohn Law Offices, of Alton, for appellee Gregory Lee Martin, Sr.", "Samuel A. Mormino, of Wiseman, Shaikewitz, McGivern, Wahl, Flavin, Hesi & Mormino, P.C., of Alton, for appellee Scott Lewis.", "Joseph E. Hoefert, of Hoefert & Perica, P.C., of Alton, and John Long, of Troy, for appellee Ethelyn J. Gorham." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREGORY LEE MARTIN, SR., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201495\u20140810\nOpinion filed May 6, 1998.\nStephen W. Thomson, of Thomson & Behr, P.C., of Edwardsville, for appellant.\nRalph J. Mendelsohn, of Mendelsohn Law Offices, of Alton, for appellee Gregory Lee Martin, Sr.\nSamuel A. Mormino, of Wiseman, Shaikewitz, McGivern, Wahl, Flavin, Hesi & Mormino, P.C., of Alton, for appellee Scott Lewis.\nJoseph E. Hoefert, of Hoefert & Perica, P.C., of Alton, and John Long, of Troy, for appellee Ethelyn J. Gorham." }, "file_name": "0466-01", "first_page_order": 484, "last_page_order": 492 }