{ "id": 222664, "name": "BRIAN E. MATTIS, Indiv. and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Mattis v. State Universities Retirement System", "decision_date": "1998-05-29", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201497\u20140941", "first_page": "675", "last_page": "683", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 675" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "596 N.E.2d 1269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1272" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5204175 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/231/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1216" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223609 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 651", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365833 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 1250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810424 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 1159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477655 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258571 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "575 N.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294758 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 N.E.2d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "524" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172424 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" }, { "page": "773" }, { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0770-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 802, "char_count": 19320, "ocr_confidence": 0.729, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.280435734361168e-07, "percentile": 0.6173483473360802 }, "sha256": "7c1dcc651b06585cda0f1c836c22d46df4b9785920a366ef68640427cafba41d", "simhash": "1:bdf7bf30c85e9c94", "word_count": 3112 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:46.961592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BRIAN E. MATTIS, Indiv. and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nIn June 1993, plaintiff Brian E. Mattis filed an irrevocable election for early retirement from his position as a law professor at Southern Illinois University (SIU). The defendant State Universities Retirement System (System) informed plaintiff of the monthly payment he would receive from his annuity. Plaintiff challenged the amount of that payment. Following a hearing, the System concluded article 15 of the Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1992)), particularly section 15 \u2014 136.2 (40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136.2 (West 1992)), mandated the monthly annuity payment it determined for plaintiff. Plaintiff disagreed, arguing the System misinterpreted the statutes. Plaintiff filed suit in the circuit court of Champaign County seeking administrative review of the System\u2019s decision, as well as seeking relief through the court\u2019s original jurisdiction.\nThe circuit court agreed with the System\u2019s interpretation. On April 29, 1996, the circuit court dismissed the counts seeking the original jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court reserved an equal protection argument added to count I, the count seeking administrative review. On August 6, 1997, the circuit court confirmed the agency\u2019s decision. Plaintiff appeals, arguing (1) the System and the circuit court misinterpreted the Code, resulting in a surplus of funds for the System, and (2) the circuit court improperly dismissed the remaining counts. We agree with plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of the Code and reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPlaintiff opted for early retirement, signing an \u201cirrevocable\u201d election to have his \u201cretirement annuity processed under the Early Retirement Incentive pursuant to Section 15 \u2014 136.2\u201d (40 ILCS 5/15\u2014 136.2 (West 1992)). Plaintiff estimated his monthly retirement income would be approximately $3,600 per month. Plaintiff learned the System determined his retirement income to be approximately $2,800 per month. He requested his resignation be rescinded, but SIU denied his request.\nIn a March 3, 1994, letter, SIU offered plaintiff a payment of $60,558, if he would waive the early retirement option (ERO). If plaintiff accepted, SIU would have been relieved of expending the early retirement payment of $122,929. SIU explained to plaintiff under the ERO he would receive an additional estimated $144 per month after taxes. With a waiver and $60,558, plaintiff could earn $216 per month by purchasing a tax-deferred annuity from Aetna.\nPlaintiff informed the System of SIU\u2019s offer and proposed the transfer of the funds contributed to the System by SIU to his individual retirement account (IRA). The System\u2019s attorney contacted plaintiff via April 19, 1994, letter, to inform him the System could not apply the employer\u2019s contribution to his IRA and his claim would be forwarded for administrative review by the claims committee.\nThe System, in a letter dated August 24, 1994, informed plaintiff the value of his account as of May 31, 1994, was $329,935.42. This amount did not include the $122,928.60 SIU paid pursuant to section 15 \u2014 136.2. The letter also informed plaintiff his annuity under the general formula (Rule 1) amounted to $2,815.98, and the money purchase amount (Rule 2) was $2,586.37. See 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136(a) (West 1992). Prior to the ERO, plaintiff had an annuity of approximately $2,090 under Rule 1, and an annuity of approximately $2,600 under Rule 2.\nOn August 29, 1994, a hearing was held before the System\u2019s claims committee. The claims committee considered whether \u201cthe [System should] include the $122,928.60 employer [ERO] payment in the calculation of retirement benefits under Section 5/15 \u2014 136 Rule 2.\u201d A statement provided by the System to plaintiff estimated his monthly annuity at age 60 would have been $3,640. The System assisted in \u201cfine-tuning the language\u201d of section 15 \u2014 136.2 of the Code. By letter dated December 22, 1994, the claims committee denied plaintiffs appeal. The executive committee concurred in that decision.\nOn February 16, 1995, plaintiff filed a six-count complaint in the circuit court of Champaign County against the System and three members of the System\u2019s executive committee. Plaintiff sought administrative review of the executive committee\u2019s decision and set forth other claims in the circuit court\u2019s original jurisdiction. Both plaintiff and the System filed briefs on the issue of statutory interpretation. On January 17, 1996, the circuit court ruled in the System\u2019s favor on the issue of statutory interpretation.\nPlaintiff amended his complaint on February 15, 1996, to add a number of facts and an additional count. (Plaintiff abandoned counts III and V.) Count I was amended to add an equal protection argument. In addition to the statutory interpretation argument, plaintiff contended the irrevocable clause was not applied to everyone equally, as individuals had been permitted to revoke their election. Count II set forth a claim for the equitable action of an accounting and included the equal protection argument in count I. Count IV was almost identical to count II, but sought the remedy of a constructive trust. In count VI, plaintiff maintained his civil rights were violated. In count VII, plaintiff alleged a claim of economic duress.\nAt a hearing on April 29, 1996, the circuit court considered the System\u2019s motion to dismiss as a section 2 \u2014 615 motion (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 1996)). The circuit court denied the System\u2019s motion to dismiss the equal protection argument added to count I, but granted the motion dismissing the remaining counts. The circuit court concluded the equal protection argument need not be considered for counts II and IV. The circuit court concluded because the System\u2019s interpretation of the Code was correct, the other issues in counts II and VI were dismissed. The circuit court determined there was no evidence in the record of a due process violation argued in count VI and of economic duress set forth in count VII.\nOn August 6, 1997, the circuit court heard arguments on the motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied the motion. The circuit court found the agency\u2019s decision was neither against the manifest weight of the evidence nor contrary to law. Plaintiff appealed.\nII. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION\nThe parties dispute whether the $122,928.60 employer ERO payment should be included in the calculation of plaintiff\u2019s retirement benefits under Rule 2 in section 15 \u2014 136 of the Code. The System\u2019s argument relies on an interpretation of section 15 \u2014 136.2 in conjunction with section 15 \u2014 136, whereas plaintiff relies on an interpretation of section 15 \u2014 136.2 in conjunction with both sections 15 \u2014 185 and 15 \u2014 136 (40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 185, 15 \u2014 136 (West 1992)). It is not disputed the System\u2019s interpretation of the Code results in more funds than necessary, perhaps as much as $90,000, to fund plaintiff\u2019s retirement under Rule 1.\nCourts usually provide great deference to an agency\u2019s interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering. The agency\u2019s interpretation is not binding and is to be rejected if it is erroneous. Denton v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 277 Ill. App. 3d 770, 774, 661 N.E.2d 520, 524 (1996). When a statute is unclear and ambiguous, judicial construction of statutory language becomes necessary. Buckellew v. Board of Education of Georgetown-Ridge Farm Community Unit School District No. 4, 215 Ill. App. 3d 506, 511, 575 N.E.2d 556, 559 (1991). The main rule in judicial construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Denton, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 661 N.E.2d at 524. In deciding legislative intent, factors a court may consider include the necessity and reason for the law, the evils to be remedied, and goals to be met. The interpreting court will assume the legislature did not intend to produce an unjust or absurd result. Dunahee v. Chenoa Welding & Fabrication, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 201, 205, 652 N.E.2d 438, 442 (1995).\nA presumption exists statutes on the same subject are guided by one policy and the legislature will not create a law in complete contradiction to an earlier statute without expressly repealing the prior statute. John v. Troy Fire Protection District, 163 Ill. 2d 275, 279-80, 644 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (1994). Courts should construe apparent conflicts between statutes on the same subject in harmony with each other, if reasonably possible. Collins v. Board of Trustees of Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 112, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993). Because a purely legal question is presented for review, our consideration is de novo. Denton, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 661 N.E.2d at 524.\nThree sections of the Code are particularly relevant to this appeal: sections 15 \u2014 136, 15 \u2014 136.2, and 15 \u2014 185. Section 15 \u2014 136 of the Code lists four rules from which the amount of a university employee retirement annuity is determined. The amount of the annuity must be determined by the rule that applies and provides the greatest annuity. Rules 1 and 2, both applicable to plaintiff, lie at the center of this controversy. Rule 1 determines an annuity based on years of service and a percentage of an individual\u2019s earnings during those years. Rule 1 is a \u201cdefined-benefit\u201d plan; the formula used to calculate the amount of an annuity does not relate to contributions made by the employer and employee. It provides the base amount a retiring employee will receive. The formula in Rule 2, however, determines an annuity based on employer and employee contributions to the System on the employee\u2019s behalf. 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136(a) (West 1992). Subsection (b) of section 15 \u2014 136 outlines a reduction in the retirement annuity set forth under Rules 1 and 3, not Rule 2, should a participant retire under the age of 60 or with less than 35 years of service. 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136(b) (West 1992).\nSection 15 \u2014 136.2 sets forth the requirements for an \u201c[e]arly retirement without discount.\u201d A participant retiring within a listed time period may do the following:\n\u201celect at the time of application to make a one time employee contribution to the System and thereby avoid the early retirement reduction in retirement annuity specified under subsection (b) of Section 15 \u2014 136. The exercise of the election shall obligate the last employer to also make a one time non-refundable contribution to the System.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136.2 (West 1992).\nSection 15 \u2014 185 states, \u201cThe accumulated employee and employer contributions shall be held in trust for each participant and annuitant.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 185 (West 1992).\nThe System interprets the language of section 15 \u2014 136.2 to permit application of the employer contribution to only the Rule 1 determination of the retirement annuity. The System relies on the heading of section 15 \u2014 136.2 and its language \u201cavoid the early retirement reduction *** under subsection (b),\u201d which by its own terms applies to Rule 1. Thus, plaintiffs annuity under Rule 1 jumped from $2,090 to approximately $2,800, whereas under Rule 2 it stayed at approximately $2,600.\nPlaintiff maintains there is no need to reference Rule 2 in section 15 \u2014 136.2. Plaintiff maintains Rule 2 is neutral from an actuarial standpoint, because a retirement annuity calculated under Rule 2 is financed through employee and employer contributions and the resulting interest, not through support by the state or the System as in Rule 1. Plaintiff contends the purpose of section 15 \u2014 136.2 is to treat retirees as if they retired at the age of 60.\nWe find two alternative purposes to section 15 \u2014 136.2. Plaintiff set forth the first: the intent to treat early retirees as if they were 60. The second is the intent to place early retirees at the minimum threshold of retirement funds under Rule 1, as if the retiree was 60 or had 35 years of service. Given the section\u2019s title \u201cwithout discount\u201d (there is no discount in Rule 2), the language \u201cthereby avoid,\u201d and the formula for determining the amount of the one-time employer contribution (based on the age of the individual and years of service), the latter purpose seems to be the true purpose of the early retirement statute. 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136.2 (West 1992).\nEven if the legislature intended section 15 \u2014 136.2 to meet only the minimum threshold for retirement, it is clear the drafting of section 15 \u2014 136.2 may result in funds in excess of the amounts necessary to satisfy Rule 1. The issue thus remains what should he done with excess funds after the one-time contribution has been made. Did the legislature intend all contributions on plaintiff\u2019s behalf under the early retirement statute be attributed to the plaintiff\u2019s retirement? On the other hand, did the legislature intend any excess funds be used to fund the System?\nPlaintiff relies on section 15 \u2014 185 for his argument, whereas the System relies on language in section 15 \u2014 136.2. Section 15 \u2014 185 provides, \u201c[t]he accumulated employee and employer contributions shall be held in trust for each participant.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 185 (West 1992). The System argues because section 15 \u2014 136.2 states payments should go \u201cto the System,\u201d the excess should be used for its funding.\nThe System cites no additional statutory or case law authority, and the Code does not appear to set forth any means by which funding for the System\u2019s operation originates from employee and employer contributions. We find the System\u2019s argument unpersuasive, and we agree with plaintiff\u2019s argument: where else would the ERO payments go but to the System? It would be anomalous to require employers to fund the operation of the System in the manner proposed by the System, especially when employers can avoid payment to the System by offering payments to the retirees instead. If the surplus was meant to be for the funding of the System, would not the statute prohibit such waivers? Providing funding for the System in this manner would be unreliable and inconsistent, as well as difficult to monitor, because one would have to evaluate each retiree to determine whether excess funds were contributed and the amount of those funds.\nThe System further argues the language of Rule 2 does not permit the application of an ERO contribution, as it is not a \u201cnormal\u201d employer contribution as set forth in section 15 \u2014 155 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 155 (West 1992)). Plaintiff argues Rule 2 permits consideration of the ERO funds. Plaintiff notes section 15 \u2014 136.2 of the Code refers to the ERO contribution as an \u201cemployer contribution,\u201d not a \u201cspecial\u201d contribution.\nRule 2 provides the following:\n\u201cThe retirement annuity shall be the sum of the following ***:\n(i) The normal annuity which can be provided on an actuarial equivalent basis, by the accumulated normal contributions as of the date the annuity begins; and\n(ii) an annuity from employer contributions of an amount which can be provided on an actuarially equivalent basis from the accumulated normal contributions made by the participant***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136(a) (West 1992).\nThe \u201cemployer contributions\u201d listed in subsection (ii) indicate they are linked to \u201caccumulated normal contributions\u201d of the participant. 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136(a)(ii), (a)(i) (West 1992). Thus, one interpretation is that those employer contributions are \u201cnormal.\u201d The formula in Rule 2, by its own language, however, does not limit consideration to \u201cnormal\u201d employer contributions. Subsection (ii) states the employer contributions \u201ccan be provided\u201d on this scheme, allowing the consideration of employer contributions through other means. 40 ILCS 5/15 \u2014 136(a)(ii) (West 1992). In addition, the formula for determining the ERO indicates legislative intent that the ERO contribution serves as a replacement of the \u201cnormal contributions\u201d that would have been made had the retiree not elected early retirement.\nThe existence of section 15 \u2014 185, requiring employer contributions be held in trust for each annuitant, coupled with the absence of any statutory authority permitting the System to use the funds for its own purpose, mandates all of the funds contributed on plaintiffs behalf pursuant to the ERO be used for plaintiffs benefit. To do so in this case requires the computation of plaintiffs retirement annuity according to the formula in Rule 2.\nIII. MOTION TO DISMISS\nPlaintiff argues the circuit court erred in dismissing the remaining counts. The System maintains the circuit court properly dismissed with prejudice the remaining counts on the merits, because plaintiff was not entitled to relief under his theories because the retirement annuity was properly calculated.\nIn reviewing dismissals for failure to state a cause of action under section 2 \u2014 615, this court takes as true all well-pleaded facts and their reasonable inferences, while rejecting unsupported conclusions of fact or law, to determine de novo whether sufficient facts are alleged in the pleading that could, if proved, entitle plaintiff to relief. Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 597, 599, 646 N.E.2d 651, 652 (1995). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a cause of action, a trial court may only consider the allegations in the complaint and not other supporting material. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 91, 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1216 (1996). A trial court decision to dismiss a complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action will be upheld if it clearly appears no facts could be set forth that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Hensler v. Busey Bank, 231 Ill. App. 3d 920, 924, 596 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (1992).\nBecause we disagree with the System\u2019s and the circuit court\u2019s interpretation of the Code, we find the dismissal of arguments set forth in counts II and IV on that basis inappropriate. We also find the dismissal of counts VI and VII improper. The record clearly demonstrates the circuit court improperly considered matters beyond the complaint when it ruled on the motion to dismiss.\nWe note, assuming joinder is proper in this case, consideration on administrative review is different than consideration of matters of original jurisdiction. Those matters need to be kept separate. The parties and the circuit court blurred the lines between the cases. Separation of the two matters may be appropriate on remand.\nReversed and remanded.\nGARMAN, P.J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\nspecially concurring:\nI believe that Rule 2 provides a safety valve: however the defined benefits are calculated under Rule 1, the employee will get back at least the annuity value of the contributions made on his behalf. I see no justification for allowing the System to divert this contribution, the ERO payment made by plaintiff\u2019s employer on plaintiff\u2019s behalf, to purposes other than plaintiff\u2019s retirement. This employer contribution should be considered in determining benefits under Rule 2.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael E. Raub (argued), of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Urbana, for appellant.", "Michael R. Cornyn and Linda L. Laugges (argued), both of Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, of Champaign, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRIAN E. MATTIS, Indiv. and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201497\u20140941\nOpinion filed May 29, 1998.\nCOOK, J., specially concurring.\nMichael E. Raub (argued), of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Urbana, for appellant.\nMichael R. Cornyn and Linda L. Laugges (argued), both of Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, of Champaign, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0675-01", "first_page_order": 693, "last_page_order": 701 }