{ "id": 222655, "name": "In re A.J., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. R.V., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. R.V.", "decision_date": "1998-05-27", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201497\u20141038", "first_page": "903", "last_page": "918", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 903" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456182 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" }, { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498928 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463-64" }, { "page": "465-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5288486 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156800 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260438 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5194362 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0088-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1140, "char_count": 35195, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.461123935159971e-07, "percentile": 0.6573082059996548 }, "sha256": "b4932b88d4bd10dc42e1d0ce58e4a236d9d520ab0bfc1b42dcf66e1083c620d6", "simhash": "1:aea371e02ac75a01", "word_count": 5639 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:46.961592+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re A.J., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. R.V., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, R.V., appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County finding him an unfit parent and terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter, A.J. Respondent contends that (1) the court\u2019s finding that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the minor\u2019s welfare was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the court erred in admitting and considering hearsay; and (4) the court erred in finding that it was in the minor\u2019s best interest that respondent\u2019s parental rights be terminated.\nA.J. was born on February 29, 1992, with cocaine in her system. The court adjudicated the minor neglected on May 7, 1992. Respondent acknowledged paternity of A. J. on December 10, 1992.\nOn February 20, 1997, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights, alleging that respondent was an unfit parent. During a two-day bench trial, the State\u2019s only witness was Terri Cummings, a caseworker from Central Baptist Family Services (CBFS), who testified regarding the various client service plans developed for respondent.\nCummings testified that, because respondent had not acknowledged paternity, the first case plan involved only the minor\u2019s mother, T.J., who is not a party to this appeal. The first case plan specifically involving respondent was prepared in January 1993. It called for respondent to obtain adequate housing, obtain a mental health assessment, obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow its recommendations, submit to random urine tests, complete parenting classes, provide proof of income sufficient to support himself and the minor, and cooperate with caseworkers from CBFS and the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).\nWhen that plan was evaluated in July 1993, respondent received an overall unsatisfactory rating. However, he received satisfactory ratings with regard to five of the seven specific tasks outlined in the plan, including obtaining a drug and alcohol assessment and following the recommendations, completing parenting classes, and showing proof of income. However, respondent had not completed a home study to determine whether his housing situation was adequate and had not received a mental health assessment. Respondent\u2019s visitations were rated satisfactory. The report appears to contain a satisfactory rating for submitting to random urine screens. However, the remarks at the bottom of the page state that drug screening was canceled because respondent was unavailable.\nThe minor\u2019s mother received a satisfactory rating, although she had not been heard from since June 25, 1993, and had not returned to drug treatment. Cummings testified that she was not the caseworker assigned to the case at that time.\nCummings testified that she prepared a court report in October 1993. At that time, respondent was not working on the assigned tasks and had not provided a drug test. Respondent told Cummings that he did not return from work until 5 p.m., at which time the agency that was to perform the tests was closed. Cummings said that \u201cthere were not a lot of other options\u201d for drug testing at that time. Cummings characterized respondent as uncooperative in providing urine screens between 1992 and mid-1996.\nIn another court report dated December 1993, Cummings stated that respondent had not been able to accomplish any of the assigned tasks. However, in the evaluation of the case plan on January 21, 1994, respondent\u2019s overall progress was rated satisfactory. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory for failing to submit to random urine screens, show proof of income, and obtain a psychological evaluation.\nRespondent reported that he did not have an ongoing relationship with the minor\u2019s mother. At that time, T.J. had not been in contact with the caseworkers for more than a year. The goal of the service plan was the return of the child to respondent.\nDespite his denials, respondent was referred to Al-Anon based on the belief that he had an ongoing relationship with T.J. According to Cummings, it was important for respondent to \u201caddress issues surrounding being in a relationship with a substance abuser.\u201d\nCummings prepared another court report on April 4, 1994. At that time, respondent had not been maintaining consistent contact with her. He had not obtained a psychological evaluation or been given a drug test. Cummings had asked respondent to call her on a day he was not working to see if a screen could be arranged for that day. Respondent did not call. Respondent did not provide proof of income or verify his attendance at Al-Anon meetings.\nThe minor was then living with a foster family. Respondent told Cummings that he saw A.J. every day, but the foster mother said this was not true. Respondent said that things between him and T.J. were \u201cso so,\u201d but said that, if the child were returned to him, he would terminate his relationship with T.J.\nOn June 2, 1994, Cummings prepared another court report. By then, respondent had completed a parenting class but was not complying with random drug testing.\nCummings testified that respondent did have a drug screen on April 17, 1994, and that he tested positive for cocaine. Respondent objected on the basis of hearsay. The trial court stated that the evidence was inadmissible to prove the allegation in the State\u2019s petition that respondent was unfit by virtue of being a habitual drug user. The court further stated:\n\u201cThe Court can weigh that evidence. It would not be treated as evidence that the drug screen was actually proven to be a positive drug screen or that it positively showed the presence of cannabis or cocaine. But to the extent that the workers testify as to the ACRs, the goals, and the work towards return home of the child, they may testify as to the information that they received and their conclusions from that.\u201d\nOver objection, Cummings testified that respondent had another positive drug test on May 9 and canceled another on May 18. At that time, the recommended permanency goal was to return the child to respondent. At a court hearing on June 9, 1994, the court found that the plan and goal had not been achieved and that DCFS had abused its discretion in setting the goal of returning the minor to her parents. The court further found that to return home was not in the minor\u2019s best interests and ordered DCFS to reconsider its permanency goal.\nCummings and DCFS caseworker Ann Wells conducted a case review on July 25, 1994. At that time, the goal was still to return the child home. Respondent\u2019s overall progress was rated satisfactory although he had failed to submit to random urine screens or attend Al-Anon meetings. The handwritten comments show that respondent obtained a psychological evaluation and provided CBFS with the report. He submitted to two drug screens while reporting that his work schedule hindered his ability to submit to more tests. Respondent completed a parenting class and attended one Al-Anon meeting, although the plan called for weekly attendance. The report concludes, \u201c[Respondent] has been cooperative on most recommendations with the exception of urine screens and Al-Anon.\u201d\nRespondent was given numerous tasks to perform for the ensuing six-month period, including continuing to submit to random urine drops and attend Al-Anon meetings. Apparently T.J. had resurfaced and respondent and T.J. were directed to \u201cassess their relationship; if they decide to remain a couplet,] they will become involved in couples counseling.\u201d\nDuring August 1994, respondent missed approximately three drug tests. Apparently, at a September 1994 court hearing, the judge again requested that DCFS consider abating its plan to have the minor returned home and ordered the agency to seek \u201cpreadoptive placement\u201d of the minor.\nAnother court hearing was set for November 10, 1994. Since the previous hearing, respondent had completed three drug screens. Over objection, Cummings stated that two came back negative and one was positive. Respondent missed another scheduled test on October 31. He later stated that he had gone home and gone right to sleep.\nDuring this time, respondent maintained that he was not involved in a relationship with T.J. Over respondent\u2019s hearsay objection, Cummings was permitted to testify that respondent\u2019s mother had said that they were \u201cseeing each other and talking on the phone.\u201d\nWhen a case review was conducted on December 16, 1994, the goal had been changed to long-term foster care. The report states that at the September 15 hearing, \u201cthe Judge stated she didn\u2019t feel it was feasable [sic] to have a return home goal. The Department would like to continue working with [respondent] as a return home option but realizes he has his issues to work on.\u201d\nRespondent was rated unsatisfactory on the tasks of assessing his relationship with the minor\u2019s mother and attending couples counseling. Typewritten remarks state that respondent denied having a relationship with T.J. and felt that Al-Anon and relationship counseling were unnecessary. However, \u201cthere have been conflicting reports\u201d from respondent\u2019s mother \u201cthat at times she has seen [T.J.] with\u201d respondent.\nRespondent was also rated unsatisfactory for being available for random drug tests and attending Al-Anon meetings. The typewritten remarks at the bottom of this page state, \u201c[Respondent] has made himself available for random urine screens. Not all of [respondent\u2019s] urine screens have been negative and thus [A.J.] was unable to be returned to his custody.\u201d\nRespondent was rated satisfactory on all other tasks. The report notes that he had been maintaining contact with the CBFS worker, had attended all meetings and court dates, and had been working full time at Motorola.\nIn a progress report prepared near the end of 1994, Cummings stated that respondent was complying with most tasks except for drug screening and Al-Anon meetings. The agency was still pursuing a goal of returning the minor to his care.\nCummings testified regarding respondent\u2019s failure to obtain drug tests during March and April 1995. At that time, she felt he was not cooperating with the service plans and that visitations were not \u201cconsistent.\u201d At a hearing on April 13, the court found it was in the minor\u2019s best interest that the permanency goal remain long-term foster care.\nRespondent appeared at that hearing with cuts on his face. Cummings testified, over objection, that she had heard that T.J. had cut respondent during a fight and was then in the county jail as a result of that incident. A court report dated July 6, 1995, stated that respondent had had some negative urine screens.\nThe July 1995 case review rated respondent unsatisfactory for all tasks except attending meetings and court hearings related to his daughter and providing proof of income. The comments note that he had submitted to some drug screens but at other times was unavailable. Respondent\u2019s visitations were rated satisfactory.\nIn the case review of January 22, 1996, the goal had been changed back to returning the minor to respondent. Respondent was being allowed unsupervised visits with A.J. In this review, the tasks of respondent\u2019s assessing his relationship with T.J. and attending couples counseling were discontinued. The comments state, \u201c[Respondent] and [T.J.] have not been involved as a couple.\u201d Respondent is rated satisfactory in all other areas. The report states:\n\u201c[Respondent] has been available for random urine screens as requested. [Respondent] has supplied verification of attendence [sic] at [Narcotics Anonymous] meetings. [Respondent] has not tested positive for any substances.\n* * *\n[Respondent] has been maintaining contact with CBFS worker. [Respondent] has attended all meetings regarding [A.J.] [Respondent] has attended all court hearings and is cooperating with court orders. [Respondent] has not reported any status changes.\u201d\nThe report further states that respondent had been attending weekly, unsupervised visitations with A.J. Visitations lasted five hours except Christmas Eve, which was eight hours.\nCummings prepared a report for an April 30, 1996, court hearing. She stated that respondent failed to provide a urine drop on April 8. Respondent told her that he missed the appointment because he had to work late. However, he later stated that he had gone to a domestic violence class that night. According to Cummings, respondent missed another drug test on May 13.\nAt the State\u2019s request, the court took judicial notice that on June 13, 1996, the court ordered respondent\u2019s visitation with the minor suspended until he participated in an outpatient treatment program and remanded him to the Lake County jail for 28 days.\nA July 9, 1996, case review rated respondent\u2019s progress unsatisfactory. The report states:\n\u201c[Respondent] continues to state that he is not involved in a relationship with [T.J.] and thus does not need to be involved in couples counseling, however, there have been allegations made that the two continue to see each [sic] (i.e. [A.J.] stating that [respondent] took her to see her mother).\n\u2756 \u2756 \u2756\n[Respondent] failed to submit to a random urine screen on 4/8/ 96, [respondent] did submit to other urine screens. [Respondent] again tested positive and thus was court ordered to become involved in out patient substance abuse treatment. [Respondent] has not provided verification as to his receiving substance abuse treatment.\n* * *\n[Respondent] has been maintaining contact with CBFS worker. [Respondent] has not been maintaining contact with foster parents and thus is not fully aware of [A.J.\u2019s] behaviors and feelings regarding the increased visitation. [Respondent] has been attending meetings regarding [A.J.]. [Respondent] has been attending court hearings, however, has not been complying with all court orders. [Respondent] has not notified CBFS of any changes in his status. [Respondent] has not provided recent income verification. [Respondent] is living with his parents and it is unknown if [A.J.] would be allowed to live there as well.\u201d\nCummings testified that in July 1996 the goal was changed back to long-term foster care. She stated that she ceased being the caseworker on the case after the July case review. On February 20, 1997, the State filed its petition to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case, the trial court granted respondent\u2019s motion for a directed finding on several counts of the petition, including those alleging that respondent was habitually addicted to drugs and that he failed, for a period of 12 months, to communicate with the child or with the agency. \u25a0\nRespondent testified that he learned the child was his shortly after her birth. He initially denied that the child was his but later accepted his responsibility. He testified that he had not used illegal drugs for more than seven years. He specifically denied ingesting any cocaine from the time the case started to the time of trial. When asked why he failed to submit to random drug tests, he answered:\n\u201cMost of it was working late. Other times, missed the messages, stubborness [sic] also. I was thinking that why do I have to go through this. Most of the time I was just pigheaded; just didn\u2019t want to go through it.\u201d\nRespondent denied that he had a \u201cphysical\u201d or \u201cdating\u201d relationship with the child\u2019s mother. He testified that they sometimes met or called for \u201ca brief moment.\u201d\nThe incident that resulted in T.J. being charged with aggravated battery started as a random visit to T.J.\u2019s sister\u2019s house. It began as a friendly conversation and ended with respondent being cut with a razor blade. Although he did not feel it was necessary, respondent attended domestic violence counseling.\nRespondent had attended Narcotics Anonymous or Alcoholics Anonymous meetings from 1995 until the time of trial. Since July 1996, he had been going two to three times per week.\nRespondent worked at Motorola from 1991 until he was laid off in 1995. He later worked for a temporary employment agency. He often worked 10 hours per day Monday through Friday, and six hours per day on Saturday and Sunday.\nThe trial court found that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the minor\u2019s welfare and failed to make reasonable progress toward the goal of the return of the minor. After a separate hearing, the court determined that the minor\u2019s best interests would be served by terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. The court denied respondent\u2019s posttrial motions and this timely appeal followed.\nRespondent first contends that the court\u2019s finding that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the minor\u2019s welfare is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because the termination of parental rights is an extraordinarily serious matter, the State must prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d 88, 113 (1992). A trial court\u2019s finding of unfitness will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re V.O., 284 Ill. App. 3d 686, 690 (1996).\nThe trial court did not explain its finding that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and responsibility for the minor\u2019s welfare except to state that respondent had \u201cdemonstrated some interest, varying degrees at varying times, some concern, relatively little responsibility towards the minor, some visitation, following some of the orders, not others.\u201d\nThese findings are, quite simply, not supported by the record. Except for one case review, occurring near the middle of the case, respondent always received satisfactory ratings for visitation. In 1996, he was having weekly, five-hour, unsupervised visitations with the minor until the trial court suspended visitation. Cummings testified that the visits had been going well before they were suspended. We cannot agree that this record can be dismissed as engaging in \u201csome visitation\u201d and that it fails to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest in the minor\u2019s welfare.\nRespondent generally received satisfactory ratings in the other areas that could be considered as most directly reflecting his interest, concern, and responsibility for the minor. He completed a parenting class. Except for one or two hearings prior to acknowledging paternity, respondent attended all court proceedings and administrative meetings relating to his daughter. Prior to the July 1996 case review, respondent had been consistently providing income verification and had received satisfactory ratings for obtaining housing.\nThe July 1996 case review rated respondent unsatisfactory for these tasks, noting that he had not provided a recent income verification. However, there is no evidence of a substantive change in his circumstances during this time. The only comment relative to his housing situation is that it was unclear whether A.J. would be allowed to live at his parents\u2019 house. However, there is no indication that she would not be able to, and because the State bears the burden of proving respondent an unfit parent, we cannot find that these isolated observations support the trial court\u2019s finding.\nMoreover, we cannot accept the court\u2019s apparent rationale that any failure to comply with court orders or agency directives necessarily demonstrates a lack of interest or concern for the minor. We disapproved of this type of \u201cbootstrapping\u201d in In re S.J., 233 Ill. App. at 120. As discussed more fully below, compliance with agency service plans is intended to be a means to an end, not an end in itself. S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 120. The statute includes a number of specific acts or conditions that may form the basis of a finding of parental unfitness. The State must prove conduct or conditions falling within one of these statutorily defined areas. To hold that the failure to comply with any agency directive constitutes evidence of a lack of interest or concern, and thus unfitness, would give the agency virtually unlimited discretion to terminate a party\u2019s parental rights for reasons unrelated to his or her fitness as a parent. The State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the minor\u2019s welfare.\nThis does not end our inquiry, however. The court also found respondent unfit on a second basis, failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor. Respondent contests this finding as well. Because each statutory basis is an independent ground for a finding of unfitness, we must consider whether the evidence supports a finding of unfitness on this ground.\nRespondent also objects to the use of hearsay in support of the allegations of the petition. Because these latter two issues are inherently interrelated, we consider them together.\n\u201cReasonable progress\u201d involves an objective judgment based upon progress measured from the conditions in existence when the minor was removed from the parents\u2019 custody and requires demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. In re L.N., 278 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50 (1996); In re S.G., 216 Ill. App. 3d 668, 669-70 (1991). Thus, evidence of the precise conditions at the time of the neglect adjudication is not essential to the determination of whether a parent has made reasonable progress. S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 119, citing In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 463-64 (1991). The crucial consideration is the actual progress made. Nevertheless, even in this context, DCFS service plans ought to be directed to the parental deficiencies that led to the removal of the child. S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 120.\nBy definition, progress requires movement from some point to some other point. In other words, there must be a yardstick by which progress can be measured. While the yardstick need not necessarily be the condition which caused the child\u2019s removal in the first place, it must, as we held in S.J., bear some relationship to a parental shortcoming that would inhibit the return of the child to the parent. S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 120. The overarching difficulty with this case is that there has been no clear indication of what that parental shortcoming was or is.\nThe basis for the neglect proceeding was that the child was born with cocaine in her system. This clearly reflects drug usage by the mother, but not necessarily by the father. In finding respondent unfit, the trial court referred to his failure to cooperate in drug testing and attending Al-Anon meetings and couples counseling. The State repeatedly emphasizes these facts in its brief. The missing ingredient is competent evidence that these tasks were necessary to facilitate respondent\u2019s ability to be a parent to his daughter.\nAs the State appears to concede, the caseworkers apparently assumed that because the child\u2019s mother was a drug user respondent was too. Certainly, the goal of providing a drug-free environment for the minor is laudable. Furthermore, such assumptions may be acceptable, and even necessary, in developing a service plan. However, they cannot substitute for admissible evidence at a trial on the issue of parental fitness.\nThe only competent evidence in the record relating to respondent\u2019s drug usage was his own testimony that he had not used cocaine or marijuana for more than seven years, a time well before the minor\u2019s birth. Obviously, such testimony is self-serving and could properly be viewed with skepticism if there were any viable alternative. However, none of the properly admitted evidence establishes that respondent had a drug problem that would endanger the minor\u2019s welfare.\nEarly on in the case, respondent was directed to have a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow its recommendations. He was given a satisfactory rating for having done so. The results of the evaluation are not in the record. However, it is interesting to note that he was not referred for inpatient or outpatient drug treatment at that time. At some point while the case was open, respondent was directed to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings and he did so with some regularity. This is not necessarily inconsistent with his testimony (by negative implication) that he had used drugs some years before. It was not until July 1996, four years after the case was opened, that respondent was ordered to undergo outpatient drug treatment. It is also noteworthy that the trial court entered a directed finding for respondent on the allegation that he was a habitual drug user. Respondent testified that he was \u201cstubborn\u201d about undergoing drug testing because he did not feel it was necessary.\nCummings did testify that approximately three of respondent\u2019s drug tests came back positive. However, respondent objected to this evidence on hearsay grounds. The trial court understood the hearsay problem and stated that it would not consider that evidence for the truth of the matter asserted. Thus, there was no evidence the trial court could properly consider that respondent had a problem with using illegal drugs while this case was open.\nA similar situation obtains with regard to the requirements that respondent attend Al-Anon and \u201ccouples counseling.\u201d (While it is not identified in the record, we take judicial notice that Al-Anon is a support group for spouses, families, and friends of alcohol and drug abusers.) Cummings testified that these programs were necessary if respondent were having a relationship with T.J., an admitted drug abuser. However, with one arguable exception, respondent denied at all times that he was having such a relationship, and no competent evidence in the record contradicts this assertion.\nCummings based her conclusion that respondent was having a relationship with T.J. on various reports she received from third parties, including statements from respondent\u2019s mother that she had seen them together and talking on the phone, statements from the minor that respondent had taken her to see her mother, and statements from T.J. herself that she had battered respondent on one occasion.\nWe note that, even if true, these statements would not necessarily establish an ongoing relationship. They are entirely consistent with respondent\u2019s testimony that he had occasional social contact with T.J. but that they were not \u201cdating.\u201d More importantly, however, these statements were hearsay. The trial court recognized this and stated that it would not consider them for the truth of the matter asserted.\nWe are left, then, with an order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights to his daughter because he failed to follow agency recommendations which were not proved to be related to any parental shortcoming of respondent. This court extensively discussed the relationship between service plan tasks and defective parenting skills in In re S.J. Because that discussion is equally relevant to this case, we quote it at some length. We said:\n\u201c[C]ompliance with DCFS service plans is a means to a desired end, not the end in itself; thus, although we have held that the conditions imposed upon a parent whose child has been adjudicated neglected need not relate to the specific facts that led to the neglect adjudication [citation], even L.L.S. states that DCFS service plans ought to be directed, primarily at least, at the parental deficiencies that led to the initial removal of the child. (L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 465-66.) A parent might succeed at reaching a goal envisioned by DCFS without following DCFS\u2019 specific directives. In this case, for instance, the weight of the evidence at the hearing was that [respondent mother] early succeeded in ceasing her use of cocaine even though she was discharged from her initial therapy, did not obtain inpatient treatment as recommended, and enrolled in a program not recommended by her original counselor. To hold that her failure to comply with the specifics of the service plans in this regard is probative of her lack of reasonable progress would unfairly and irrationally elevate administrative means over statutory ends.\nSecond, to place undue emphasis on compliance with service plans would raise the danger of a form of \u2018bootstrapping\u2019 under which a parent could lose her rights to her children because she failed to do things that were not necessarily related to her previously established shortcomings as a parent.\u201d S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 120.\nThis case presents the type of bootstrapping of which S.J. disapproved. The State utterly failed to establish \u2014 at least by competent evidence \u2014 that respondent had a drug problem that hindered his ability to raise his child or that he was having a destructive relationship with the child\u2019s mother that required him to undergo counseling. The only reason for terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights was his failure to comply with administrative directives that had nothing to do with his ability as a parent.\nThe State does not, and cannot, argue that merely undergoing drug testing necessarily makes one a better parent. The statute imposes no such requirement. Similarly, requiring a bachelor who is not involved in an ongoing relationship to undergo counseling designed for couples with substance abuse problems is absurd.\nThe only basis for requiring respondent to complete these tasks was hearsay information that respondent had had positive drug tests and was maintaining a relationship with T.J. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Rodriguez, 291 Ill. App. 3d 55, 60 (1997). Unless hearsay falls within a recognized exception, it is inadmissible. Rodriguez, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 60.\nThe trial court stated that it was not considering the hearsay for the truth of the matter asserted but would permit the caseworkers to testify \u201cas to the information that they received and their conclusions from that.\u201d As detailed above, however, without accepting the hearsay for the truth of the matter asserted, there is absolutely no basis for concluding that the tasks required in the service plans were necessary or appropriate. Respondent may not be found unfit merely because he failed to follow the specific directives of a service plan unless the State can establish that those directives relate to some perceived shortcoming. Here, the State made the requisite showing, if at all, through inadmissible hearsay.\nThis case demonstrates clearly why hearsay is inadmissible. The source of the information regarding respondent\u2019s drug tests is unknown. We do not know whether Cummings received reports directly from the laboratory conducting the tests or merely heard from someone else \u2014 perhaps someone with a motive to lie \u2014 that respondent had failed a drug test. No information is available about the procedures used in testing, the substances involved, or the amounts in question. Respondent was unable to cross-examine witnesses about the testing procedures.\nSimilarly, Cummings required respondent to undergo relationship counseling on the basis of hearsay statements that he was dating the child\u2019s mother. As noted, all the statements cited by Cummings are inherently ambiguous, subject to more than one interpretation. In no way could respondent cross-examine the sources of these statements to determine precisely what they saw and whether they accurately reported it.\nThe State does not respond directly to respondent\u2019s argument that the court relied on improper hearsay. The State instead suggests, under the guise of responding to the hearsay argument, that \u201crespondent has failed to raise even a scintilla of evidence as to why he is a fit person to be a parent.\u201d Of course, the State has the burden to prove that respondent is an unfit parent. S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 113. The State may not excuse its failure to present admissible evidence by shifting the blame to respondent.\nThe State also suggests that any error was harmless, contending that the properly admitted evidence established respondent\u2019s unfitness. However, in recounting the \u201cproper\u201d evidence, the State repeatedly refers to the fact that respondent failed drug tests\u2014 precisely the evidence to which respondent objects. It is disingenuous at best to argue that the error in admitting evidence is harmless because the erroneously admitted evidence proves the proposition for which it was introduced.\nParenthetically, we note that, even if the evidence of positive drug tests is taken at face value, this would not necessarily establish respondent\u2019s unfitness. In S.J., we rejected the notion that evidence of sporadic drug use conclusively rendered a parent unfit, stating:\n\u201cTo uphold the trial court\u2019s finding of no \u2018reasonable efforts\u2019 would effectively allow the court to terminate [the mother\u2019s] parental rights because she had smoked marijuana after the birth of her child. We recognize that marijuana is a controlled substance and do not intend to condone its possession or use. However, we do not believe that [the mother\u2019s] conduct relating to the use or possession of marijuana in the case before us should suffice as a basis for judicial action as sweeping and devastating as the termination of a parent\u2019s rights in her child. In any event, the statute cannot fairly be read to allow such a result, at least under the facts of this case.\u201d S.J., 233 Ill. App. 3d at 118.\nIn S.J., as in this case, the minor was born with cocaine in her system. Unlike in this case, the respondent was the mother, an admitted drug user. Nevertheless, isolated incidents of drug use (proved by competent \u2014 or at least unobjected to \u2014 evidence) were an insufficient basis, without more, to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nWe emphasize that cocaine and marijuana are illegal drugs. Criminal statutes provide penalties for their use, but these do not include the loss of one\u2019s child. In this case, the trial court rejected the State\u2019s allegation that respondent was a habitual drug user. In light of the circumstances of A.J.\u2019s birth, we do not denigrate the importance of the goal of providing a relatively drug-free environment for her. We hold only that the State failed to prove that respondent was failing to do this.\nThe cases the State cites in support of its contention that the evidence was sufficient are readily distinguishable. All involve conduct far more egregious than that established here. Because of our resolution of this case, it is unnecessary to consider respondent\u2019s final contention.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed.\nReversed.\nRATHJE and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Elliott A. Pinsel, of Daniels, Mauro & Pinsel, of Waukegan, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P. Moltz and Peggy F.J. Bradford, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re A.J., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. R.V., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201497\u20141038\nOpinion filed May 27, 1998.\nElliott A. Pinsel, of Daniels, Mauro & Pinsel, of Waukegan, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P. Moltz and Peggy F.J. Bradford, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0903-01", "first_page_order": 921, "last_page_order": 936 }