{ "id": 910281, "name": "In re M.D.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Johnny Ray Howell, Respondent-Appellant (Cheryl Baxter, Respondent))", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Howell", "decision_date": "1998-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201498\u20140038", "first_page": "181", "last_page": "192", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 181" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293563 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289510 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376", "parenthetical": "the concept of \"injurious environment\" is amorphous and cannot be defined with particularity; therefore, each case must be reviewed based upon its specific facts" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2945747 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79", "parenthetical": "the concept of \"injurious environment\" is amorphous and cannot be defined with particularity; therefore, each case must be reviewed based upon its specific facts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 N.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "258-59" }, { "page": "259" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291629 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427-28" }, { "page": "427-28" }, { "page": "427-28" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "427" }, { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" }, { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597007 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" }, { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 N.E.2d 1178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1184" }, { "page": "1184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2989551 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "776" }, { "page": "776" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "1987 Ill. Laws 2578", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" }, { "page": "881-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3336041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5188806 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1014" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 1345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1349" }, { "page": "1348-49" }, { "page": "1349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236934 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 950, "char_count": 26731, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3781841534785164e-07, "percentile": 0.7965528106078772 }, "sha256": "8a4b6e4241bfa43493ae24ce8e65e951b34004a28c256945229d8cb1af6e2799", "simhash": "1:a3ec31b6862449d5", "word_count": 4505 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:41:46.412422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re M.D.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Johnny Ray Howell, Respondent-Appellant (Cheryl Baxter, Respondent))." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September 1997, the State filed an amended petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that M.D.H. (born November 13, 1981), the minor child of respondent father, Johnny Howell, and respondent mother, Cheryl Baxter, was neglected and abused. In November 1997, the trial court conducted a hearing and found that M.D.H. was a neglected and abused minor, pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 3(1)(b) and 2 \u2014 3(2)(iii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(b), (2)(iii) (West 1996)). After a December 1997 dispositional hearing, the court formally adjudicated M.D.H. a ward of the court and appointed the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as her guardian with the power to place her.\nRespondent father appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by allowing M.R.H., M.D.H.\u2019s 13-year-old brother, to testify outside of respondent father\u2019s presence; (2) the court erred by refusing to strike a certain witness\u2019 testimony; and (3) the court\u2019s findings of neglect and abuse were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nBecause the parties are familiar with the evidence, we discuss it only to the extent necessary to put respondent father\u2019s arguments in context. In its September 1997 amended petition, the State alleged that (1) respondent father had neglected M.D.H. because he created an environment injurious to her welfare in that he put her at risk of sexual harm by sexually abusing S.H., M.D.H.\u2019s minor brother, and L.G., M.D.H.\u2019s minor stepsister (count I) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(1)(b) (West 1996)); and (2) respondent father had abused M.D.H. because he committed a sex offense against M.D.H. by having sexual intercourse with her (count II) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(2)(iii) (West 1996)).\nAt the November 1997 adjudicatory hearing, the evidence showed the following. Sheila Catron, a social service worker in Lewis County, Missouri, testified that, in May 1997, she interviewed S.H. (born June 15, 1991) pursuant to a report that he had attempted to kiss his female cousin\u2019s \u201ccrotch area\u201d during an after-school program. During the interview, S.H. told her that respondent father had taught him how to kiss respondent father\u2019s private area. S.H. told Catron that respondent father asked him \u201cto get under his father to kiss his private area.\u201d S.H. also correctly identified the genital area using a stuffed animal. Catron stated that, based upon S.H.\u2019s responses, these incidents took place when S.H. was between three and six years of age.\nDavid Parrish, a juvenile officer in Lewis County, testified substantially the same as Catron regarding what S.H. said during the May 1997 interview.\nOn cross-examination, Catron testified that S.H.\u2019s mother had told her that \u201cwith [S.H.\u2019s] age and stuff[,] he did like to tell stories.\u201d S.H.\u2019s counselor also indicated that he had \u201ca very large imagination.\u201d S.H. testified that he used to live with respondent father, but he moved out because respondent father tried \u201cto do the sex\u201d with S.H. when S.H. visited him. S.H. stated that respondent father was \u201cgoing to try to touch [S.H.\u2019s] private and [S.H.] didn\u2019t want him to do it.\u201d Respondent father also wanted S.H. to touch respondent father\u2019s \u201cprivate,\u201d but S.H. never did. S.H. also stated that the incident happened in June, \u201ca long time ago.\u201d S.H. further stated that M.D.H. was there and tried to stop respondent father.\nOn cross-examination, S.H. testified that the incident happened when he was two years old. S.H. stated that he did not know the present year or month. Upon questioning by the trial court, S.H. testified that he knew the difference between the truth and a lie.\nDr. Shari Marshall, the superintendent of schools for the Barry, Illinois, school system (where M.D.H. was a junior high school student during 1996), testified that in March 1996, M.D.H. came to her office and asked to speak with Marshall. M.D.H. was \u201cvery upset and crying.\u201d During that conversation, M.D.H. told Marshall that \u201c[s]he felt that she was being required to do many, many, many chores, her homework, take care of her little brotherf,] *** [and] [s]he just felt like she was just being required to be a wife.\u201d Marshall stated that because of an earlier conversation, she asked M.D.H. if by being a wife M.D.H. meant that she also slept with respondent father. M.D.H. responded \u201csometimes.\u201d Marshall also stated that because of the earlier conversation, she thought M.D.H. meant that she slept with respondent father \u201cin a sexual manner.\u201d Marshall acknowledged that M.D.H. recanted within a week of their conversation and that M.D.H. \u201ctold DCFS that that\u2019s not what she meant.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Marshall testified that she instructed the school principal to report to DCFS the possible sexual relationship between M.D.H. and respondent father. Marshall stated that, in May 1996, DCFS sent the principal a letter indicating that it had investigated the report and determined that it was \u201cunfounded.\u201d\nOn redirect examination, Marshall testified that when she asked M.D.H. what she meant by having to do \u201ceverything else a wife has to do,\u201d M.D.H. began crying harder and responded, \u201cyou know, everything.\u201d\nM.R.H., M.D.H.\u2019s brother and respondent father\u2019s biological child, testified that during the summer of 1995, he lived with respondent father and M.D.H. for a period of two to three months. M.R.H. stated that, one evening during that period, he came home and noticed that the television was on at a loud volume. He turned the television off and then looked in respondent father\u2019s room because he thought he heard M.D.H. say \u201chelp.\u201d He saw respondent father on top of M.D.H., \u201cmoving up and down.\u201d Respondent father and M.D.H. were covered up to their backs, and neither was wearing any clothing that M.R.H. could see.\nOn cross-examination, M.R.H. testified that he did not tell anyone about the incident because he did not think it was anyone\u2019s business. M.R.H. also stated that he observed respondent father and M.D.H. for about one minute. M.R.H. further stated that he takes Prozac, Ritalin, and a blood pressure medication, and he attends classes for students with behavior disorders. He also acknowledged that he did not like respondent father, and he moved out of respondent father\u2019s home, in part, because respondent father had broken a \u201c2 by 4\u201d and a pool cue over his back.\nM.D.H. testified that respondent father had not acted in a sexually inappropriate manner with her, and she had never told anyone otherwise. She stated that she talked with Marshall because she was upset about having to do chores. She also stated that she forgot to tell Marshall that when she slept in respondent father\u2019s bed, he slept on the couch.\nOn cross-examination, M.D.H. testified that Marshall did not ask her what she meant by the phrase \u201ceverything that a wife has to do.\u201d She denied telling Marshall that \u201ceverything\u201d meant \u201cyou know, everything.\u201d She stated that following their conversation, she tried to explain to Marshall what she had meant, but Marshall was too busy.\nBased on this evidence, the trial court adjudicated M.D.H. a neglected minor based upon respondent father\u2019s sexual abuse of S.H., as alleged in count I, and an abused minor as alleged in count II. The court found that the State failed to prove that respondent father had sexually abused L.G. as alleged in count I.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. M.R.H.\u2019s Testimony Outside of Respondent Father\u2019s Presence\nRespondent father first argues that the trial court erred by allowing M.R.H. to testify outside respondent father\u2019s presence. We disagree.\nSection 2 \u2014 18(4)(d) of the Act provides as follows:\n\u201cThere shall be a rebuttable presumption that a minor is competent to testify in abuse or neglect proceedings. The court *** may allow the minor to testify in chambers with only the court, the court reporter!,] and attorneys for the parties present.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(d) (West 1996).\nSection 1 \u2014 3(10) of the Act defines \u201cminor\u201d as \u201ca person under the age of 21 years subject to this Act.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(10) (West 1996).\nRespondent father objected to M.R.H.\u2019s testifying outside of respondent father\u2019s presence on the ground that section 2 \u2014 18(4)(d) of the Act does not permit a nonparty minor who was not named in the petition to testify outside of a respondent\u2019s presence. The court overruled respondent father\u2019s objection and stated the following:\n\u201cThe [c]ourt does have wide discretion. The statute is clear that the minor that is the subject of abuse can testify outside of the presence of the parents or the respondents. The theory I assume is that it would put pressure on a minor to be required to testify in front of their parent or parents of acts that were committed by their parent or parents against them or other children. The pressure would still exist in the case of an observer, in other words, pressure to testify to an incident in front of their parent or parents, so I will allow this witness to testify.\u201d\nWe agree with the trial court that \u2014 under the circumstances of this case \u2014 M.R.H., a then 13-year-old child, would have experienced a similar fear of and pressure about testifying in the presence of respondent father as would a child who was the subject of the abuse petition. M.R.H. testified that he watched his father commit a morally reprehensible act upon M.D.H. Specifically, M.R.H. saw his father and M.D.H. in bed together without any clothes on their upper bodies, and his father was on top of M.D.H., \u201cmoving up and down.\u201d Moreover, M.R.H.\u2019s testimony that his father had previously hurt him by breaking a \u201c2 by 4\u201d and a pool cue over his back provides further support for M.R.H.\u2019s fear of testifying in respondent father\u2019s presence.\nThe overriding purpose of the Act is \u201cto ensure that the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family, and the community are served.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 566 N.E.2d 1345, 1349 (1991). At each step of the adjudication process, the trial court has a duty to further that purpose. In re A.F., 234 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1014, 602 N.E.2d 480, 483 (1991). In addition, the trial court shall administer the Act \u201cin a spirit of humane concern, not only for the rights of the parties, but also for the fears and the limits of understanding of all who appear before the court.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2(2) (West 1996). Furthermore, a proceeding under the Act constitutes a civil proceeding \u2014 \u25a0 meaning that no sixth amendment right to confront witnesses is implicated (U.S. Const., amend. VI) \u2014 and is nonadversarial in nature. J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8, 566 N.E.2d at 1348-49; In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 340, 379 N.E.2d 872, 881 (1978).\nSection 2 \u2014 18(4)(d) of the Act does not expressly authorize a nonparty minor to testify outside the respondent\u2019s presence. Nonetheless, considering (1) the overriding purpose of the Act, (2) that the trial court has a duty to ensure that the best interests of not only the minor but the minor\u2019s family are served at every stage of the proceedings under the Act, and (3) that the court must administer the Act \u201cin a spirit of humane concern\u201d for \u201call who appear before the court,\u201d we conclude that, under the particular circumstances present in this case, the court did not err by allowing M.R.H., a minor child of respondent father, to testify outside of respondent father\u2019s presence.\nWe find support for this conclusion in Brooks, in which the appellate court \u2014 prior to the enactment of section 2 \u2014 18(4)(d) of the Act in Public Act 85 \u2014 601 (Pub. Act 85 \u2014 601, eff. January 1, 1988 (1987 Ill. Laws 2578, 2683)) \u2014 upheld a trial court\u2019s decision to allow a minor to testify outside the respondents\u2019 presence, but with counsel for all parties present. In upholding the trial court\u2019s decision, the Brooks court wrote the following:\n\u201c[A] child-neglect case is a nonadversary proceeding and the primary concern is the best interests and welfare of the child. [Citation.] As in custody cases, the trial court must have discretion to interview the child in the privacy of chambers. Generally, there is an inherent fear in the child to testify, which may be ail obstacle to ascertaining the truth.\u201d Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 340, 379 N.E.2d at 881-82.\nB. The Trial Court\u2019s Refusal To Strike Marshall\u2019s Testimony\nRespondent father next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to strike Marshall\u2019s testimony because DCFS investigated Marshall\u2019s report of possible sexual relations between respondent father and M.D.H. and determined that the report was \u201cunfounded.\u201d Specifically, he contends that either (1) DCFS\u2019 \u201cunfounded\u201d report should have been admitted into evidence; or (2) the court should have stricken Marshall\u2019s testimony. We disagree.\nInitially, we note Marshall testified that, in May 1996, the principal of M.D.H.\u2019s school received a letter from DCFS indicating that it had determined that the report of possible sexual relations between respondent father and M.D.H. (based upon Marshall\u2019s March 1996 conversation with M.D.H.) was unfounded. Thus, the trial court had before it \u2014 and could consider \u2014 the fact that DCFS had determined that the report was unfounded. Indeed, the court specifically indicated \u2014 in response to a question by respondent father\u2019s counsel\u2014 that it had heard the evidence that DCFS had determined that the report was unfounded. The court also noted that none of the parties even requested that the unfounded report be admitted into evidence.\nRespondent father also asserts that the trial court should have stricken Marshall\u2019s testimony because it \u201cwas not corroborated by a \u2018founded\u2019 report, and thus admissible by [section 2 \u2014 18(4) (a) of the Act] (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(a)[) (West 1996)].\u201d The problem with this assertion \u2014 as the State correctly points out \u2014 is that Marshall\u2019s testimony was admissible pursuant to section 2 \u2014 18(4)(c) of the Act, not section 2 \u2014 18(4)(a) (which provides for the admission of \u201c[a]ny writing, record, photograph!,] or x-ray of any hospital or public or private agency\u201d) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(a) (West 1996)). Section 2 \u2014 18(4) (c) provides that \u201c[p]revious statements made by the minor relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 18(4)(c) (West 1996); In re N.S., 255 Ill. App. 3d 768, 776, 627 N.E.2d 1178, 1184 (1994). Thus, we hold that the court did not err by refusing to strike Marshall\u2019s testimony regarding M.D.H.\u2019s statements to her.\nC. Adjudication of Neglect\nRespondent father next argues that the trial court\u2019s finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nInitially, we address respondent father\u2019s contention that, to prove that M.D.H. was neglected due to an injurious environment, the State was required to prove that respondent father committed the offense of criminal sexual abuse against S.H., as defined in the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 15(a)(2) (West 1996)). He thus claims that the State failed to sustain its burden of proof because the trial court found only that respondent father attempted to touch S.H.\u2019s sex organs and asked S.H. to touch respondent father\u2019s sex organs. We disagree.\nIn count I of its amended petition, the State alleged, in relevant part, that respondent father had neglected M.D.H. because he created an environment injurious to her welfare in that he put her at risk of sexual harm by sexually abusing S.H., M.D.H.\u2019s minor brother (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(b) (West 1996)). In adjudicating M.D.H. neglected based upon an injurious environment as alleged in count I, the trial court found that respondent father \u201cdid at least attempt to touch [S.H.\u2019s] private parts and asked [S.H.] to touch his private parts,\u201d and sufficient evidence existed \u201cthat the environment in the home of [respondent father] is injurious to the welfare of the minor child [M.D.H.] based on his sexual abuse of S.H.\u201d\nProof that one minor is neglected, abused, or dependent is admissible evidence on the issue of neglect, abuse, or dependency of any other minor for whom the parent is responsible. In addition, a parent\u2019s behavior toward one minor may he considered when deciding whether a sibling is exposed to an injurious environment. In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d 728, 736, 682 N.E.2d 95, 100 (1997).\nIn In re Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d 422, 654 N.E.2d 255 (1995), the State alleged that the minor, Z.R, was neglected based upon an injurious environment in that respondent uncle made inappropriate sexual comments to his 10-year-old niece (J.K.) and exposed himself to his 8-year-old nephew (C.K.). In upholding the trial court\u2019s determination that Z.R. was neglected based upon an injurious environment, this court wrote the following:\n\u201cA finding of abuse of one sibling establishes aprima facie case of neglect based upon an injurious environment to another. [Citations.]\nAlthough respondent was found to have made inappropriate sexual comments to J.K. and exposed himself to C.K., he argues there is no indication in the record Z.R. was even aware of the conduct, let alone affected by it. Neglect due to injurious environment has been found where the child did not know about nor was he exposed to sexual abuse of a sibling [citation] and where the father was previously adjudged unfit because of sexual abuse of daughters by a prior marriage but had failed to address the problem even though there was no evidence of sexual abuse of the children \u25a0of the present marriage [citation].\u201d (Emphasis added.) Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 427-28, 654 N.E.2d at 259.\nIn Z.R., this court concluded \u2014 implicitly, at least \u2014 that a respondent\u2019s inappropriate sexual comments and exposure of himself to another child constitute \u201csexual abuse,\u201d and a finding of such abuse establishes a prima facie case of neglect based upon an injurious environment. Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 427-28, 654 N.E.2d at 259.\nConsistent with Z.R., we conclude that when the State alleges \u2014 as in this case \u2014 that a minor is neglected due to an injurious environment based upon the respondent\u2019s \u201csexual abuse\u201d of a sibling, \u201csexual abuse\u201d may have a broader meaning than \u201ccriminal sexual abuse\u201d as it is defined in section 12 \u2014 15(a)(2) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 15(a)(2) (West 1996)).\nIn so concluding, we note that were we to accept respondent father\u2019s contention, the trial court here could not have found M.D.H. to be a neglected minor based upon an injurious environment as a result of respondent father\u2019s attempting to touch S.H.\u2019s sex organs or his requests that S.H. touch respondent father\u2019s sex organs. Clearly, such conduct on respondent father\u2019s part falls within the concept of statutory neglect based upon an injurious environment. See In re B.M., 248 Ill. App. 3d 76, 79, 618 N.E.2d 374, 376 (1993) (the concept of \u201cinjurious environment\u201d is amorphous and cannot be defined with particularity; therefore, each case must be reviewed based upon its specific facts). Thus, the court could consider respondent father\u2019s sexual abuse of S.H. (by attempting to touch S.H.\u2019s sex organs and requesting that S.H. touch respondent father\u2019s sex organs) in determining whether M.D.H. was a neglected minor based upon an injurious environment. See K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 682 N.E.2d at 100; see also Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 427-28, 654 N.E.2d at 259. Moreover, we note that accepting respondent father\u2019s contention would be contrary to the overriding purpose of the Act \u2014 namely, \u201cto ensure that the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family, and the community are served.\u201d J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8, 566 N.E.2d at 1349.\nIn a proceeding under the Act for adjudication of abused, neglected, or dependent minors, the State must prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. N.S., 255 Ill. App. 3d at 776, 627 N.E.2d at 1184. We will not disturb a trial court\u2019s findings that a child was abused or neglected unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re B.W., 216 Ill. App. 3d 410, 414, 576 N.E.2d 346, 349 (1991). Further, this court in Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 427, 654 N.E.2d at 258-59, wrote the following:\n\u201cA finding of the trial court is *** against the manifest weight of the evidence only if a review of the record \u2018clearly demonstrates\u2019 the opposite result was the proper one. [Citation.] We will not overturn the trial court\u2019s findings merely because we might have reached a different conclusion. We will not second-guess the trial court on the issue of credibility. The trial court is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses.\u201d\nIn Z.R., this court upheld on appeal the trial court\u2019s finding of neglect despite discrepancies between the prior statements and trial testimony of the child witnesses. Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 427, 654 N.E.2d at 259.\nIn finding that M.D.H. was neglected, the trial court stated, in relevant part, the following:\n\u201cWe have the testimony of Miss Catron who investigated an incident involving [S.H.] that was called in through the hotline where [S.H.] indicated in response to being questioned about some improper touching at the [after-school program]; that during visitation with [respondent] father[,] his father taught him to do it and some other language about privates of his father\u2019s and his. Seemed to be a rather frank response from a child who was fairly young at the time, one that I don\u2019t believe was an effort to pin something on his father to get himself out of trouble.\n[We also have t]he evidence of David Parrish, that he likewise interviewed [S.H.] and his answers were consistent with that of Miss Catron\u2019s.\n* * *\nWe have the testimony of [S.H.], [a six-]year[-]old minor who really I thought did a fairly good job testifying. He certainly has a problem with dates. I do find him to be a person who knew the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie. I do find that his testimony was credible, that his father did at least attempt to touch\nhis private parts and asked him to touch his private parts.\n* * *\n*** I believe there was an argument about the word sexual abuse being defined in the statute, not being within the \u2014 not being with the exact evidence that has been submitted here today. In this [c]ourt\u2019s opinion[,] there is sufficient evidence before this [cjourt that shows that the environment in the home of [respondent father] is injurious to the welfare of the minor child [M.D.H.] based on his sexual abuse of S.H.\u201d\n. Reviewing the record before us in accordance with the proper standard of review, we cannot conclude that it \u201c \u2018clearly demonstrates\u2019 the opposite result was the proper one.\u201d Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d at 427, 654 N.E.2d at 259, quoting In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062, 574 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1991). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court\u2019s adjudication of M.D.H. as a neglected minor was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nD. Adjudication of Abuse\nLast, respondent father argues that the trial court\u2019s finding of abuse was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nAs earlier stated, we will not disturb a trial court\u2019s findings that a child was abused or neglected unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. B.W., 216 Ill. App. 3d at 414, 576 N.E.2d at 349.\nIn finding that M.D.H. was abused, the trial court stated, in relevant part, the following:\n\u201cThe [c]ourt has considered the evidence adduced in these proceedings and the arguments of counsel.\n* *\n[We have the testimony of Dr. Marshall. Now, the fact that Dr. Marshall did not appear at the first hearing in my opinion adds to her credibility. Dr. Marshall at the outset had a discussion with the minor who is the primary subject of this petition. *** Dr. Marshall is an educator and a very sensibly educated person. She understands things that are said to her that may not be said in specific language.\nThe discussion between Dr. Marshall and the minor[,] in this [cjourt\u2019s opinion!,] clearly was an admission by the minor that she was having sexual relations with [respondent] father, and I specifically find Dr. Marshall\u2019s testimony in that aspect to be credible.\nWe then have today testimony of [M.R.H.] ***. *** [M.R.H.] has certain problems in and of himself that are being addressed through medication. I didn\u2019t find the effects of his medication in any way [detracted] from his credibility. He testified to observing an incident. Wasn\u2019t exactly sure when it occurred but it was well over a year ago. He *** was pretty specific as to what he saw. He was really consistent in his answers except for a few!,] which does not totally \u2014 which is not unexpected. I think and I do find that [M.R.H.\u2019s] testimony was credible, that he saw what he said he saw.\n* * *\nThen we have the testimony of [M.D.H.], and I can certainly understand the dilemma that [M.D.H.] is facing and faced today. A person who she has lived with for the entirety of her life and who has been her primary caretaker for all but 6 months or a little bit more than that of her life is[,] in this [c]ourt\u2019s opinion[,] a person who she has had a sexual relationship with; and to come to [c]ourt and have to acknowledge that, indicate that that occurred, would be a very difficult situation. So the reasons for her testimony not being credible are fairly evident, and I do not find her testimony to be credible.\n* * *\nCount 2 said minor is an abused minor as defined under [section 2 \u2014 3(iii) of the Act] [Q705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(iii) (West 1996)[)] in that the minor\u2019s father has committed a sex offense against the minor by having sexual intercourse with her. Certainly what [M.R.H.] observed gave the appearances of sexual intercourse. The minor[,] in this [c]ourt\u2019s opinion!,] did admit to Dr. Marshall, although not using those words, but sexual intercourse had taken place. Therefore, the [c]ourt does find again by a preponderance of the evidence that Count 2 has been proven.\u201d\nReviewing this record in accordance with the proper standard of review, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s adjudication of M.D.H. as an abused minor was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nCARMAN, EJ., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Hollahan, of Hollahan Law Office, of Pittsfield, for appellant.", "Brett Irving, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pittsfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re M.D.H., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Johnny Ray Howell, Respondent-Appellant (Cheryl Baxter, Respondent)).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201498\u20140038\nOpinion filed June 26, 1998.\nMichael J. Hollahan, of Hollahan Law Office, of Pittsfield, for appellant.\nBrett Irving, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pittsfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Jeffrey K. Davison, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0181-01", "first_page_order": 199, "last_page_order": 210 }