{ "id": 910234, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD D. CORDEVANT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cordevant", "decision_date": "1998-06-19", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201496\u20140543", "first_page": "193", "last_page": "205", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 193" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794593 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809", "parenthetical": "the trial court must thwart transparent and manipulative tactics of the defendant while ensuring there is good cause for the defendant's complaints about counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150162 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57337 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 823", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5261249 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0823-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725049 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591083 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3347365 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864538 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307256 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "411", "parenthetical": "the court noted that \"no hearing is required where the defendant's right to a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104 - 21(a" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544904 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 437", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1481180 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "2574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295784 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223628 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295767 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" }, { "page": "383-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783176 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5274589 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778578 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2582159 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3366502 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534", "parenthetical": "it is within the trial court's discretion whether to appoint another attorney for, if not, defendants would be encouraged to file frivolous motions and avoid cooperating with their court-appointed counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249139 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82-83", "parenthetical": "a lawsuit or ARDC claim against a defendant's attorney does not create a per se conflict, but it is the defendant's responsibility to provide the court with legitimate reasons supporting his request for new counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260218 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2965421 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75410 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278448 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0173-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1043, "char_count": 30290, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0941143192248684e-07, "percentile": 0.5664206677686614 }, "sha256": "0dc2efa2d982136ca4fdbf1bf7e797218743fc91adf1872ce319be170f6b6b6e", "simhash": "1:ababf04e7b0e9cd9", "word_count": 4783 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:41:46.412422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD D. CORDEVANT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Ronald Cordevant, appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a) (West 1992)). Defendant was sentenced to 53 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to appoint other counsel to represent defendant with respect to his post-trial allegation that his attorney suborned perjury and in failing to sufficiently examine the factual basis for defendant\u2019s other pro se post-trial claims. We affirm.\nFACTS\nDefendant was charged by indictment with the murder of his wife, Mary Dawn Cordevant. Prior to trial, a jury found defendant fit to stand trial. During the fitness hearing, Dr. John Rabun, the State\u2019s physician expert, testified that even though defendant was not taking Thorazine at the time of the hearing, defendant would remain fit to stand trial even if defendant began taking Thorazine. Dr. Rabun explained that people are often placed on medication that is not needed and that he had restored people to stand trial using such medication.\nAfter defendant was found fit to stand trial, he filed a pro se motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender who had been representing him. The court appointed special counsel to represent defendant with respect to his pro se motion. Following a hearing, defendant\u2019s motion was denied. The public defender continued to represent defendant.\nAt trial, eight eyewitnesses to the shooting testified on behalf of the State, in addition to two police officers, a crime-scene technician, a firearms examiner, a forensic pathologist, and the victim\u2019s mother. The testimony revealed that on December 20, 1993, at Rally\u2019s restaurant in Cahokia, defendant and Mary Cordevant were arguing in defendant\u2019s truck, and this argument was overheard on Rally\u2019s drive-through intercom. Gary Francis, Gary Donnelley, and Shanda Robertson, employees of Rally\u2019s restaurant, testified that they heard Mary yell: \u201cDon\u2019t. You don\u2019t have to do it. Don\u2019t do it. Don\u2019t, don\u2019t.\u201d They heard defendant say, \u201cShut up.\u201d Mary jumped out of the truck and began running. Defendant, with a gun in his hand, chased Mary and shot at her. Mary staggered but kept running. Defendant caught her, picked her up by the collar, and shot her again. Mary attempted to brush the gun away. Defendant then aimed the gun at Mary\u2019s head and fired.\nThereafter, defendant fled the scene in his truck. Charles Aligholi, an employee of Rally\u2019s, testified that he wrote down the perpetrator\u2019s license plate, which was later identified as being registered to defendant.\nAgainst the advice of his counsel, defendant testified that he did not shoot his wife and that, instead, her death was an accident. Defendant stated that he and his wife were having a discussion outside Rally\u2019s, concerning whether Mary should go to her mother\u2019s or not, when Mary left defendant\u2019s truck. Defendant said that he followed Mary and caught her. Defendant stated that when Mary turned to him, she had a gun in her hand, and the gun discharged as he pushed it back to her. Defendant asserted that the gun discharged again as Mary fell and as defendant attempted to seize the gun from her. Defendant stated he fled the scene in his tmck and disposed of the gun on a back road. The gun was never recovered.\nDr. Raj Nanduri, a forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Mary\u2019s body, found six gunshot wounds, two of which were exit wounds. The cause of Mary Dawn Cordevant\u2019s death was a gunshot wound that penetrated her skull.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant\u2019s attorney filed a posttrial motion, and defendant filed his pro se posttrial motion. Among other contentions, defendant alleged that his trial attorney had been ineffective at trial because (1) counsel suborned perjury from defendant and (2) counsel failed to seek a mistrial when a young girl, within view of the jury, requested that the prosecutor point out the \u201cbad man\u201d and the prosecutor pointed at defendant.\nPrior to sentencing, the trial court noted that it had reviewed counsel\u2019s and defendant\u2019s posttrial motions. Defense counsel indicated that arguing defendant\u2019s pro se motion could create a conflict of interest for him. In addition, counsel declined the court\u2019s offer to present oral argument with respect to his own motion. Similarly, defendant declined the court\u2019s request to supplement his written motion with any oral statement. No evidence in mitigation was presented by defense counsel. The court denied all posttrial motions, and defendant was thereafter sentenced to imprisonment for 53 years.\nTrial counsel filed a motion to reduce sentence, and defendant filed a pro se motion to reduce sentence. In his pro se postsentencing motion, defendant alleged that his attorney failed to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, defendant alleged that defendant\u2019s family and friends were not called to testify on defendant\u2019s behalf. Defendant also alleged that he was unfit to stand trial because the county jail was giving him Thorazine, a psychotropic drug, during trial and sentencing. Defendant alleged that his trial attorney had been ineffective for failing to inform the court and the psychologist who testified for defendant at his fitness hearing that defendant was taking Thorazine.\nAt the postsentencing motion hearing, defense counsel noted that since the sentencing hearing, defendant had attempted suicide and that counsel had learned that defendant was taking psychotropic medication. No explanation appears in the record for the source of counsel\u2019s knowledge that defendant was taking psychotropic medication. Counsel indicated, however, that he never had a bona fide doubt concerning defendant\u2019s fitness. Although the trial court requested that defendant make an oral statement in support of the motion, defendant declined to do so. The trial court denied counsel\u2019s and defendant\u2019s postsentencing motions.\nDISCUSSION\nAPPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL\nConflict-of-interest Analysis\nInitially, defendant contends the trial court erred when it failed to appoint new counsel to represent him once he alleged that his attorney suborned perjury. Defendant argues that as a result of his subornation-of-perjury allegation, trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest and that, therefore, the trial court should have appointed new counsel to argue the posttrial motions. Defendant asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand the cause for posttrial proceedings with directions that new counsel be appointed. We decline to do so.\nDefendant\u2019s posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not automatically require the appointment of new counsel. See People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 251 (1991). The sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel includes a right to conflict-free counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A conflict of interest, however, is not created simply because defendant claims that his representation was ineffective. People v. Cook, 279 Ill. App. 3d 718, 724 (1995).\nDefendant alleged in his posttrial motion that counsel suborned perjury. Defendant cites People v. Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d 562 (1976), for the proposition that an attorney may not represent a defendant at posttrial proceedings where the defendant has accused his attorney of suborning perjury. In Brown, prior to the sentencing hearing, the defendant alleged that his attorney conditioned his representation of the defendant on the defendant testifying falsely. Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 563. At the sentencing hearing, the court requested the State\u2019s Attorney to investigate the matter. Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 563. Defense counsel denied the accusation and stated that he felt he should withdraw. Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 563. In response to the trial court\u2019s inquiry, however, defense counsel stated he was willing to represent the defendant at the sentencing hearing, and the defendant stated he was willing to be represented by this attorney because \u201csentencing is sentencing.\u201d Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 563.\nThe court in Brown held that once the defendant made this accusation known to the court and the attorney and once the court requested an investigation into the validity of the charge, the attorney labored under an obvious and inherent conflict. Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 564. The court stated:\n\u201cHere, the conflict is readily apparent. Counsel, having been accused of subornation of perjury, was placed in the awkward position of defending himself and denying the validity of defendant\u2019s accusation while urging the court to consider defendant\u2019s good moral character in an attempt to obtain probation or leniency.\u201d Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 564.\nThe court held that even though a dissatisfied client may falsely accuse his attorney, the conflict arose because of the duplicitous position counsel was placed in before the sentencing hearing. Brown, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 564.\nIn the present case, counsel was not placed in the same duplicitous position as in Brown. Trial counsel was not in the awkward position of defending himself and denying the validity of defendant\u2019s accusations while urging the court to consider defendant\u2019s good moral character and honesty in an attempt to obtain leniency. Unlike Brown, no formal complaint or investigation was under way concerning defendant\u2019s allegations. Trial counsel was not requested to respond to defendant\u2019s allegations, and counsel was not obligated to attack defendant\u2019s truth-telling ability to protect himself.\nSimilarly, subsequent Illinois case law, while not involving subornation-of-perjury allegations, nevertheless offers instruction concerning defendant\u2019s allegation that trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest. Illinois cases have consistently found no conflict of interest even where the defendant filed an Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee (ARDC) complaint or a lawsuit against defense counsel. Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that it is within the judge\u2019s discretion to avoid a defendant\u2019s attempt to delay or impede the effective administration of justice. See People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 252 (1989); see also People v. Massa, 271 Ill. App. 3d 75, 82-83 (1995) (a lawsuit or ARDC claim against a defendant\u2019s attorney does not create a per se conflict, but it is the defendant\u2019s responsibility to provide the court with legitimate reasons supporting his request for new counsel); People v. Gardner, 47 Ill. App. 3d 529, 534 (1977) (it is within the trial court\u2019s discretion whether to appoint another attorney for, if not, defendants would be encouraged to file frivolous motions and avoid cooperating with their court-appointed counsel).\nInherent in a trial judge\u2019s authority to preside over a criminal trial is the discretion to conclude that a defendant\u2019s pursuit of an otherwise legal right is frivolous and is merely an attempt to frustrate the administration of justice. See People v. Hardeman, 203 Ill. App. 3d 482 (1990). Here, defendant made previous attempts to replace the public defender with outside counsel. The trial court had the discretion to determine that defendant\u2019s posttrial and postsentencing allegations, made for the purpose of obtaining new counsel, were frivolous and were intended to delay the effective administration of justice.\nFurthermore, the present case is less persuasive than the previously mentioned cases because here no ARDC complaint or civil lawsuit was pending against counsel. A conflict of interest certainly did not arise merely because defendant alleged subornation of perjury in his pro se motion. The trial court was correct in rejecting the automatic appointment of new counsel to argue defendant\u2019s pro se allegations of the ineffective assistance of counsel, including subornation of perjury, under a conflict-of-interest analysis.\nDefendant\u2019s Underlying Allegations of Ineffective Assistance\nDefendant suggests that when the ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged, some automatic requirement to appoint new counsel exists. This is not the law. If in the sound discretion of the trial court the allegation lacks merit or involves matters of trial strategy, the appointment of new counsel is not required and the pro se motion may be denied. People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68 (1993). New counsel should be appointed only if the defendant\u2019s allegation of the ineffective assistance of counsel shows the possible neglect of the case. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d at 86. In People v. Woodson, 220 Ill. App. 3d 865, 877 (1991), the court explained:\n\u201c[I]t is not necessary to appoint new counsel where a trial judge finds the claim to be spurious, and such a finding will not be overturned on appeal unless the finding is manifestly erroneous.\u201d\nThus, we now turn to the merits of defendant\u2019s ineffectiveness argument. Before this court, defendant alleges that four instances of incompetence require a reversal and a remand with the appointment of new counsel. Defendant argues that trial counsel (1) suborned perjury, (2) failed to present mitigating evidence at sentencing, (3) failed to move for a mistrial when the prosecutor pointed out defendant as \u201cthe bad man\u201d in view of the jury, and (4) failed to inform the court and defendant\u2019s fitness-hearing medical expert that defendant was taking Thorazine, a psychotropic drug, during trial and sentencing. Because the matters complained of clearly lack merit or simply involve questions of trial strategy, we conclude that the trial judge did not err in failing to appoint new counsel to represent defendant.\nFirst, the record refutes defendant\u2019s allegation of suborned perjury. Defendant\u2019s testimony, that Mary\u2019s death was an accident and that Mary had the gun in her hand as it discharged when defendant grabbed her, mirrored his statements after his arrest before his trial attorney was involved. Second, trial counsel went on record to state that defendant was testifying against his advice. The trial court asked defendant if he wanted to testify against his lawyer\u2019s advice, and defendant answered in the affirmative. Clearly, defense counsel did not coerce defendant into testifying falsely. Defendant\u2019s allegation of subornation of perjury lacks merit.\nNext, defendant contended in his pro se posttrial motion that his attorney was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial when the prosecutor, in response to a young girl\u2019s question in front of the jury, identified defendant as the \u201cbad man.\u201d However, we find that defendant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that defense counsel\u2019s action constituted sound trial strategy. A motion for a mistrial would have further highlighted the event; defense counsel\u2019s failure to move for a mistrial was a strategic decision. An attorney\u2019s decisions regarding trial tactics or strategy are matters of professional judgment, to which a review of a counsel\u2019s competency does not extend. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.\nIn addition, the prosecutor\u2019s affirmative answer that defendant was a \u201cbad man\u201d is harmless. Such a statement does not rise to the level of prejudicing the defendant so that the result of the proceeding becomes unreliable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. In the present case, defendant was seen running after and repeatedly shooting his wife by numerous, disinterested witnesses. Defendant himself testified that he and his wife were arguing and that after the shooting he fled the scene and disposed of the gun. The jury\u2019s finding of guilt did not rest on counsel\u2019s failure to move for a mistrial. Thus, the trial court correctly found no ineffectiveness on the part of trial counsel and properly denied defendant\u2019s pro se motion without appointing new counsel.\nNext, defendant, in his pro se postsentencing motion, faulted trial counsel for failing to pursue mitigating evidence. Citing People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (1994), defendant contended that his attorney\u2019s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at sentencing constituted the ineffective assistance of counsel. In Thompkins, the court held that a \u201cjudge or jury in a capital case may not refuse to consider, or be prevented from considering, relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defense.\u201d Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d at 167. The Thompkins court noted that the mitigating evidence proposed by the defendant would have complimented counsel\u2019s sentencing-hearing strategy, which was to show that the defendant\u2019s role in the offenses was subject to doubt and did not justify sentencing the defendant to death. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d at 167.\nIn People v. Tenner, another capital case, the court nevertheless distinguished Thompkins, noting that counsel did not ignore or fail to introduce a substantial amount of mitigation evidence. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 384 (1997). The court held that defense counsel employed a coherent strategy at the sentencing hearing and was not ineffective in failing to take the course suggested by the defendant, which was to obtain a mental evaluation of the defendant and offer the evidence in mitigation. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d at 383-84; see also People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453 (1996) (the supreme court found that the defendant\u2019s allegation that his attorney was ineffective for failing to present additional mitigation evidence was correctly held to be without merit because the defendant failed to offer any explanation revealing the character of the mitigating evidence or how it would have changed the outcome).\nDecisions whether to call witnesses for the defense are generally matters of trial strategy and are beyond the scope of review. People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 45 (1996). In the case at bar, defendant\u2019s contentions failed to demonstrate counsel\u2019s neglect or concerned counsel\u2019s decisions that were well within the bounds of proper trial strategy.\nUnlike the cases relied on by defendant, defendant herein was not subjected to a capital sentencing hearing. Similar to Tenner, however, defendant\u2019s attorney employed a coherent strategy at the sentencing hearing, noting 7 of 13 mitigating factors applicable in defendant\u2019s case. Although defendant claims that his family and friends should have been called to testify, he does not characterize the testimony or explain how it would have changed the outcome of the hearing. Instead, defendant declined to comment or elaborate on his allegations, though he was given the opportunity to do so by the trial court. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that defendant\u2019s counsel was ineffective for failing to present this alleged mitigating evidence, and defendant\u2019s pro se motion was properly denied without appointing new counsel.\nFinally, defendant contended, in his pro se postsentencing motion, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to inform the court or defendant\u2019s fitness-hearing expert that defendant was taking Thorazine during trial and sentencing and was unable to understand the proceedings. Defendant asks that we remand the cause to the circuit court so that additional information may be presented about medications defendant might have been receiving at the time of trial. We decline to do so.\nThe due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the prosecution of a person who is unfit to stand trial. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 440, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574 (1992). To protect this due process requirement, Illinois statutory law and case law require the trial court to hold a fitness hearing if there is a bona fide doubt concerning a defendant\u2019s mental fitness to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his or her defense. 725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 10 (West 1992).\nAt the time of defendant\u2019s trial, the law provided that defendants receiving psychotropic medication were entitled to a fitness hearing. 725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 21(a) (West 1994); see also 725 ILCS 5/104\u2014 21(a) (West Supp. 1995) (which was found unconstitutional in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 523 (1997), and therefore was void ah initio). Thereafter, the statute was amended to eliminate automatic fitness hearings for defendants receiving psychotropic medication. Pub. Act 89 \u2014 689, \u00a7 90, eff. December 31, 1996. The amended statute provides: \u201cA defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs shall not be presumed to be unfit to stand trial solely by virtue of the receipt of those drugs or medications.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 21(a) (West 1996).\nDefendant cites People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394 (1995), alleging that the law requires a fitness hearing for persons tried and sentenced while taking psychotropic medication and that defendant\u2019s attorney was ineffective for failing to inform the court and defendant\u2019s fitness-hearing expert that defendant was taking such medication. In Kinkead, the record established that the defendant was being treated with the antipsychotic drug Thorazine while in jail awaiting trial. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 406. The Illinois Supreme Court could not determine if the administration of Thorazine was proximate enough to Kinkead\u2019s guilty plea and sentencing to trigger the right to a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104 \u2014 21(a). Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 415. The matter was remanded for a clarification of the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s use of psychotropic medications. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 415. Our supreme court recently rendered an opinion after the remand. People v. Kinkead, 182 Ill. 2d 316 (1998).\nIn this case defendant\u2019s assertion regarding the application of Kinkead is unpersuasive. As a threshold issue, defendant in the case sub judice received a jury trial to determine fitness. Further, defendant\u2019s argument fails because he has not offered one kernel of evidence showing the actual ingestion of Thorazine. Unlike Kinkead, the record in the case sub judice fails to establish that defendant was taking any antipsychotic drug. Defendant asserted for the first time in his pro se postsentencing motion that he was taking Thorazine during trial and sentencing and that it was prescribed by the medical staff of the St. Clair County jail. However, defendant failed to name, or even describe, the physician prescribing the Thorazine, the staff members dispersing it to him daily, or the pharmacy distributing the Thorazine to him. Defendant did not request the trial court to subpoena any link of this Thorazine distribution chain. Defendant\u2019s attorney, at defendant\u2019s postsentencing motion hearing, asserted that it had been brought to his attention that defendant was taking psychotropic medication. Yet absent from the record is any evidence that defendant\u2019s ingestion of Thorazine was brought to counsel\u2019s attention by someone other than defendant. In fact, defendant\u2019s presentence investigation report recited that defendant stated he was not being treated for a physical illness or condition at the time and believed his health to be good. By virtue of having failed to provide any information to suggest that defendant actually ingested Thorazine, defendant has necessarily failed to establish his entitlement to a second fitness hearing under section 104 \u2014 21(a). See Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 411 (the court noted that \u201cno hearing is required where the defendant\u2019s right to a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104 \u2014 21(a) is not established, as where there is no indication that defendant was being treated with psychotropic medication during the relevant times, and the trial court has not otherwise abused its discretion in concluding that no bona fide doubt of unfitness is present\u201d).\nThe information available to the trial judge indicated that defendant remained fit to stand trial, and trial counsel did not neglect defendant\u2019s case by failing to request a second fitness hearing or by failing to notify the court or the expert of defendant\u2019s medical information. Because defendant was previously found fit to stand trial, he is presumed to remain fit, unless shown otherwise. See People v. Sanders, 61 Ill. App. 3d 566 (1978). Defendant\u2019s trial counsel stated at the postsentencing hearing that he had no bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s fitness to stand trial. At the pretrial fitness hearing, Dr. John Rabun testified that defendant would remain fit to stand trial even if medicated by Thorazine. Defendant\u2019s testimony was coherent, as were his various pro se motions. Defendant demonstrated to the trial court that he was mentally fit to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings and to assist in his defense. We refuse to remand this cause for the trial court to appoint new counsel or conduct further investigation into defendant\u2019s claims.\nFACTUAL INQUIRY\nIn the alternative, defendant contends the trial court failed to sufficiently examine the factual basis for defendant\u2019s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. As a result', defendant asks this court to remand this cause so that the circuit court may conduct the required preliminary inquiry into defendant\u2019s claims that his attorney was ineffective. After conducting such an inquiry, defendant requests the court to appoint new counsel if the trial court finds merit in defendant\u2019s allegations. Defendant cites the supreme court decisions in People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82 (1991), and People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68 (1993), to allege that his case must be remanded for further posttrial proceedings due to the trial court\u2019s failure to adequately inquire into defendant\u2019s pro se posttrial and postsentencing motions alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel.\nIn Nitz, the supreme court held that the trial court should conduct a preliminary inquiry into a defendant\u2019s allegations of the ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether the claim lacks merit or pertains only to trial tactics and, if so, then no new counsel need be appointed. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 134.\nIn Robinson, the supreme court held that the trial court must examine the factual matters underlying a defendant\u2019s claim. Although the defendant\u2019s claims may be without merit, the trial court should afford the defendant the opportunity to specify and support his complaints. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d at 86.\nSince Nitz and Robinson, appellate courts have generally held that there should be some interchange or investigation by the trial court into the underlying factual basis, if any, of the allegations of ineffectiveness before a defendant\u2019s claim may be dismissed. People v. Baltimore, 292 Ill. App. 3d 159, 164-65 (1997); People v. Parsons, 222 Ill. App. 3d 823, 830 (1991).\nThe defendant in People v. Munson asserted that the trial court was required to make a \u201cpreliminary investigation\u201d of his ineffectiveness claim and that, in failing to do so, the court erred and the cause should have been remanded for the appointment of new counsel and a hearing. People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 199 (1996). The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant\u2019s contention, stating that the trial court made every effort to ascertain the nature and substance of the defendant\u2019s ineffectiveness claim because the defendant had been given two opportunities to offer substance to his ineffectiveness claims but he provided no facts from which the court could infer a basis in support of his claim. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d at 201. The supreme court concluded that the trial court committed no error in declining to appoint new counsel to represent the defendant on his pro se motion, and the court rejected the defendant\u2019s notion that the cause should be remanded because the trial court failed to make a \u201cpreliminary investigation\u201d of his ineffectiveness claim. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d at 201; see also People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. App. 3d 972, 980 (1996) (the defendant was sufficiently sophisticated to have addressed the trial court concerning his claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel, but he failed to do so, and under such circumstances the trial court did not commit manifest error when it did not further inquire into defense counsel\u2019s conduct during the trial); see also People v. Johnson, 227 Ill. App. 3d 800, 809 (1992) (the trial court must thwart transparent and manipulative tactics of the defendant while ensuring there is good cause for the defendant\u2019s complaints about counsel).\nUnlike Robinson and Nitz, the trial court in the case sub judice offered defendant the opportunity to specify and support his complaints at the hearings on his posttrial motion and postsentencing motion, but defendant chose to refrain from argument. Similar to Munson, the trial court made every effort to ascertain the nature and substance of defendant\u2019s ineffectiveness claim. Yet defendant provided no facts from which the court could infer a basis in support of such claim. In addition, defendant demonstrated his sophistication through his numerous pro se motions. Thus, as in Stokes, defendant was sophisticated enough to have addressed the trial court concerning his claims of the ineffective assistance of counsel, but he nevertheless failed to do so. The trial court did not commit manifest error when it did not make any further inquiry into defense counsel\u2019s conduct during the trial.\nWe conclude that defendant\u2019s posttrial allegations of the ineffective assistance of counsel either were meritless or concerned matters of trial strategy. The trial court did not neglect to provide defendant with an opportunity to argue his allegations. Without some specification by defendant to give the trial court a gist of the claim, we refuse to determine that the trial court was required to make any further inquiry.\nFor the foregoing reasons, defendant\u2019s conviction is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nWELCH, EJ., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli and Peter A. Carusona, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Robert Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kevin Sweeney all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD D. CORDEVANT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201496\u20140543\nOpinion filed June 19, 1998.\nRobert Agostinelli and Peter A. Carusona, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nRobert Haida, State\u2019s Attorney, of Belleville (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kevin Sweeney all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0193-01", "first_page_order": 211, "last_page_order": 223 }