{ "id": 910214, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT L. MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellee (Dennis Lovell, Contemnor-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mitchell", "decision_date": "1998-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201497\u20140075", "first_page": "206", "last_page": "210", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 206" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2582357 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182734 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490830 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228739 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "225" }, { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0210-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 10595, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.12157588522594e-07, "percentile": 0.5735888462995333 }, "sha256": "55c50665a267d49fb7a9b530be3d2b8a39af76d7882582935ed5d6aa4c501322", "simhash": "1:54bd34867362084d", "word_count": 1718 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:41:46.412422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT L. MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellee (Dennis Lovell, Contemnor-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAppellant, Captain Dennis Lovell of the Illinois State Police, appeals from the trial court\u2019s order that found him in civil contempt for refusing to comply with defendant\u2019s, Robert L. Mitchell\u2019s, subpoena duces tecum and from the order that denied his motion to quash defendant\u2019s subpoena. We affirm in part and vacate in part.\nFACTS\nThe facts adduced are from police reports contained in the record. These reports established that on December 3, 1996, at approximately 12:10 p.m., Illinois State Trooper Mitchell McClaren stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle on Interstate 57 for speeding. Defendant was going 81 miles per hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone. During the stop, Trooper McClaren ran a computer check on defendant, which revealed that defendant had prior drug-related arrests. According to Trooper Vogles\u2019 report, Vogles arrived at the scene at 12:10 p.m. to assist Trooper McClaren with the stop. Vogles also reported that Trooper Mehl and his \u201cK-9\u201d police dog were already there when he arrived. Trooper Mehl\u2019s report of the incident stated that he arrived at 12:20 p.m. with his police dog Icar and did a walk-around of defendant\u2019s car. Icar alerted positive for the presence of drugs. While stopped, defendant inadvertently disclosed $1,000 he had in his pocket, and when defendant was told that Icar detected drugs in his car, defendant admitted he had five marijuana cigarettes in his glove box. The marijuana cigarettes were retrieved by the officers. Defendant was placed under arrest at 12:50 p.m. for possession of cannabis. At the time of his arrest, defendant was found to have approximately $5,200 on him.\nOn January 3, 1997, defendant was charged by information with possession of less than 2.5 grams of cannabis, a misdemeanor (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 1996)). Subsequently, defendant\u2019s counsel directed a subpoena duces tecum to Lovell, asking Lovell to produce the following documents:\n\u201call photographs; complete log of telecommunicator\u2019s notes of audio recordings of radio transmissions and telephone calls; December 3, 1996 Activity, Notes, and Inquiry Transaction Report for M. McClaren, T. Mehl, and B. Vogles; written and recorded statement(s) (Robert Mitchell and Paul Golish); Statement of Constitutional Rights and Waiver (Robert Mitchell and Paul Golish); and video recordings, related to the apprehension, arrest, and post-arrest interrogation, of Robert L. Mitchell on December 3, 1996.\u201d\nThe Illinois Attorney General\u2019s office, representing Lovell, filed a motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum.\nAt the hearing on the motion to quash the subpoena, Lovell advised the trial court that no photographs, no written and recorded statements of the defendant, no statements of defendant\u2019s waiver of rights, and no video recordings existed and that, therefore, none could be provided. Lovell objected to producing the remaining two items sought, the log of the telecommunicator\u2019s notes and \u201cthe activity, notes and inquiry transactions reports\u201d of the arresting officers, arguing that the documents were irrelevant to whether the officers had probable cause to arrest defendant, that the requests were too broad, and that defendant was using the subpoena as a discovery tool. In response, defendant contended that he wanted the documents in order to investigate whether the length of defendant\u2019s stop was unreasonable, that the documents sought were relevant to this issue, and that the documents were not otherwise discoverable.\nThe court denied the State\u2019s motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum and stated its reasons as follows:\n\u201cHe [defendant] has limited his request only to matters involving this defendant and the officers involved in the arrest. Regarding the fact that this information is sought directly from the Illinois State Police as opposed to through the prosecuting authority, this circuit has taken some pride in the fact that it does require all subpoenas to be returnable in open court so that if there [are] any objections to be raised regarding any sensitive matter or matters that are not relevant or that some way jeopardize another investigation or in any way harm anyone, [they] can be reviewed by the Court and that [sic] addressed; and it\u2019s the same thing here. The State\u2019s Attorney or the Attorney General can come to court[ \u2014 ] these records have yet to be turned over to the defendant[ \u2014 ]and can object. So there is a protection built in for all of that.\u201d\nAfter the court ruled on the motion to quash, Lovell declined to produce the records. The court found Lovell to be in \u201cwillful contempt\u201d and fined him $100, to be paid within seven days. An additional fine of $100 was to be imposed for every week thereafter that Lovell failed to comply with the order. The court stated that filing a notice of appeal would toll the accumulation of additional fines. Lovell filed his notice of appeal.\nANALYSIS\n1. Motion to Quash Subpoena\nLovell contends that the court erred in denying his motion to quash defendant\u2019s subpoena because it was clear the documents sought were irrelevant and immaterial to the underlying criminal matter. Lovell argues that because there was a reasonable basis for the stop, defendant\u2019s speeding, there is no basis for the suggestion that Trooper McClaren\u2019s stop was pretextual for making a drug arrest or that defendant\u2019s detention was unlawful.\nParenthetically, we note that a review of Lovell\u2019s contempt order encompasses a review of the court\u2019s denial of his motion to quash (generally a nonreviewable order) to determine if the underlying order, which Lovell refused to comply with, was proper. See People v. Shukovsky, 128 Ill. 2d 210 (1988). The use of subpoenas is a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses or documentary evidence in all criminal prosecutions and is gu\u00e1ranteed by the sixth amendment. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Shukovsky, 128 Ill. 2d at 222; People ex. rel. Fisher v. Carey, 77 Ill. 2d 259 (1979). A subpoena is separate from the rules of discovery. Carey, 77 Ill. 2d at 267.\nTo justify a pretrial subpoena, a defendant must show that (1) the documents are evidentiary and relevant, (2) the documents are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by the exercise of due diligence, (3) the party cannot properly prepare for trial without production and inspection in advance of trial and the failure to obtain an inspection may tend to unreasonably delay the trial, and (4) the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general \u201cfishing expedition.\u201d Shukovsky, 128 Ill. 2d at 225. Any material sought by subpoena is to be sent directly to the court rather than the party who caused the subpoena to issue. People v. Nohren, 283 Ill. App. 3d 753 (1996). The court then reviews the documents in camera and decides whether the documents are relevant, material, or privileged and whether the request is unreasonable or oppressive, prior to allowing the moving party to view the subpoenaed material. Nohren, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 759. A court should grant a motion to quash a subpoena if a request is oppressive, unreasonable, or overbroad. Carey, 77 Ill. 2d at 270.\nHere, defendant\u2019s request was relevant and material. Defendant wanted the documents so that he could investigate whether defendant was detained after the traffic stop an unduly long period of time. The records sought would show the time frames of the stop, show when the assisting officers arrived, and show whether the stop was unduly lengthy. Defendant could not otherwise procure the information through discovery, because these documents are not routinely provided by the police to the State\u2019s Attorney. The documents were pertinent for defendant\u2019s preparation of a motion to suppress and were needed to prevent a delay of trial. Additionally, the request did not amount to a general \u201cfishing expedition,\u201d because all the requested documents related to defendant\u2019s traffic stop on December 3, 1996.\nWe do not find defendant\u2019s request overbroad, for he limited the material sought to one incident and to one day, the day of defendant\u2019s traffic stop on December 3, 1996. There is no showing that defendant\u2019s request overburdens the State or is oppressive or unreasonable. As the trial court duly noted, the built-in safeguards for the review and release of information under a subpoena will adequately protect the State from unreasonable requests. We find that the trial court properly denied Lovell\u2019s motion to quash the subpoena.\n2. Order of Contempt\nLovell next contends that, even if his motion to quash the subpoena was properly denied, the entry of the contempt order against him was an abuse of discretion. Lovell argues that his refusal to comply with the subpoena was a formal objection designed to allow him to appeal the court\u2019s denial of his motion to quash and was not done out of disdain or disrespect for the trial court. Therefore, Lovell asks this court to vacate the contempt order and the fines imposed. We allow this request.\nIt is recognized that subjecting one\u2019s self to contempt proceedings is an appropriate method for obtaining appellate review of a court\u2019s ruling. Shukovsky, 128 Ill. 2d at 219. When the substance of a public official\u2019s contempt is purely formal and motivated by a desire to obtain appellate review, a reviewing court can appropriately vacate the contempt citation. Buss v. Edwards, 203 Ill. App. 3d 992 (1990). That is the situation in the case at bar. Lovell\u2019s attorney made it clear to the court that it meant no disrespect to the court when Lovell declined to provide the documents required by the subpoena, but that Lovell only desired to appeal the court\u2019s order. The record reflects that the trial court understood that an appeal was the reason for the refusal. Thus, we vacate the court\u2019s order of contempt and the fines imposed against Lovell.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Effingham County is affirmed as to the order denying the motion to quash subpoena but is vacated as to the order for contempt and the fines imposed.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part.\nGOLDENHERSH and KUEHN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Susan Frederick Rhodes and Diane M. Buschmann, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lou J. Viverito, of Taylor Law Offices, P.C., of Effingham, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT L. MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellee (Dennis Lovell, Contemnor-Appellant).\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201497\u20140075\nOpinion filed June 29, 1998.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Susan Frederick Rhodes and Diane M. Buschmann, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellant.\nLou J. Viverito, of Taylor Law Offices, P.C., of Effingham, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0206-01", "first_page_order": 224, "last_page_order": 228 }