{ "id": 910242, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCUS BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brooks", "decision_date": "1998-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20140825", "first_page": "581", "last_page": "585", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 581" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 858", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3649527 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/160/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365877 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105923 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a generalized allegation of prejudice from the prosecution's closing arguments will not preserve specific comments for review" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2568689 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863", "parenthetical": "a generalized allegation of prejudice from the prosecution's closing arguments will not preserve specific comments for review" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 N.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3179638 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 1234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236913 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738931 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159-60" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172441 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0392-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 591, "char_count": 9300, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.115076113004316e-08, "percentile": 0.38103920344390735 }, "sha256": "0b324958c14b5a546269a31cef03bdd04179dde92264483fb12fc77c55fc4da3", "simhash": "1:a34cddadb36fbdf6", "word_count": 1511 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:41:46.412422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCUS BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a 1992 jury trial Marcus Brooks (Brooks) was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery and was sentenced to 50 years\u2019 imprisonment. Brooks appealed, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. See People v. Brooks, 277 Ill. App. 3d 392, 660 N.E.2d 270 (1996). On February 13, 1997, Brooks again was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery and again was sentenced to 50 years\u2019 imprisonment. He appeals. We affirm.\nOur opinion in Brooks\u2019 first appeal summarized the background facts of this case. We will present facts here where relevant to the issues in his second appeal.\nBrooks raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present hearsay evidence regarding Detective James Oliver\u2019s investigatory steps; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to present evidence the police \u201chunted\u201d Brooks for a week after the shooting; (3) the prosecution made prejudicial comments during closing argument; and (4) the trial court abused its sentencing discretion.\nBrooks filed a posttrial motion alleging a wide variety of putative trial errors, but he did not raise the first and second issues in his posttrial motion. Illinois courts have consistently held if a defendant fails to raise an issue in a posttrial motion, the defendant waives such an issue on appeal, in the absence of plain error. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 187, 522 N.E.2d 176 (1988); see also 725 ILCS 5/116 \u2014 1(c) (West 1992) (\u201c[A] motion for a new trial shall specify the grounds therefor\u201d). Thus, Brooks waived these issues. Because the State\u2019s evidence was strong, we decline to inspect the record for plain error.\nAdditionally, on its merits, Brooks\u2019 first contention would fail.\nHearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted; hearsay generally is inadmissible at trial. People v. Rogers, 81 Ill. 2d 571, 577, 411 N.E.2d 223 (1980). However, when an out-of-court statement is offered into evidence for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the statement is not hearsay. People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 173, 572 N.E.2d 947 (1991). \u201c[A] hearsay statement is allowed where it is offered for the limited purpose of showing the course of a police investigation where such testimony is necessary to fully explain the State\u2019s case to the trier of fact ***.\u201d People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 313, 692 N.E.2d 1109 (1998); People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 248, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (1988); People v. Jordan, 282 Ill. App. 3d 301, 305-06, 668 N.E.2d 90 (1996).\nA police officer may testify to his investigatory procedures, including the existence of conversations, without violating the hearsay rule. People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155, 159-60, 606 N.E.2d 1145 (1992). Such testimony may not gratuitously reveal the substance of the conversations. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 304, 568 N.E.2d 1234 (1990).\nBrooks contends Oliver\u2019s testimony violated the hearsay rule. Oliver testified he spoke with Officer Troy Williams and received a physical description (African-American male, 5 feet 7 inches, 180 pounds) and nickname (\u201cShaun\u201d or \u201cSean\u201d) of one possible suspect. Oliver testified he used this information to search his files, eventually obtaining Brooks\u2019 name and address.\nArguably, this testimony did gratuitously reveal the substance of the conversation between Oliver and Williams, but its primary purpose was to recount Oliver\u2019s investigatory procedure. Williams did not attach the physical description and nickname to Brooks, much less identify him as a suspect. Oliver\u2019s subsequent investigation revealed Brooks\u2019 name. And Oliver had to discover Brooks\u2019 name somehow: \u201cAny chronological retelling of the events is going to have to include the point in time when the defendant became a suspect.\u201d Jones, 153 Ill. 2d at 161. Oliver\u2019s testimony was not inadmissible hearsay.\nBrooks misrepresents the record in his second contention. The prosecution did not offer evidence the police \u201chunted\u201d Brooks for a week after the shooting. In fact, no prosecution witness used the word \u201chunted.\u201d Rather, the police officers who testified merely outlined their investigative steps which led to Brooks.\nBrooks contends this evidence of a lengthy investigation led to a prejudicial inference that Brooks avoided arrest. A week-long murder investigation, however, is not particularly lengthy. Additionally, such an inference is not improper, especially where Brooks testified he was aware he was a murder suspect but did not go to the police: \u201cI don\u2019t just return to accusations like that. Now, they say \u2014 police say something or just an accusation I don\u2019t just do things like that.\u201d See People v. Wilson, 87 Ill. App. 3d 693, 699, 409 N.E.2d 344 (1980).\nBrooks\u2019 posttrial motion did allege, \u201cThe assistant state\u2019s attorneys made prejudicial, inflammatory and erroneous statements in both opening and closing argument that were designed to arouse the prejudice and passions of the jury ***.\u201d Brooks\u2019 posttrial motion specified several comments as prejudicial, but none of these comments match those he challenges here. Thus, he waived this issue. See People v. Forbes, 205 Ill. App. 3d 851, 863, 563 N.E.2d 860 (1990) (a generalized allegation of prejudice from the prosecution\u2019s closing arguments will not preserve specific comments for review).\nAdditionally, on its merits, Brooks\u2019 third contention would fail.\nBrooks contends the prosecution made prejudicial comments during its closing argument when it said his alibi witness, Trina Davis, did not testify. Brooks relied on his alibi defense and testified he was with Davis on the night of the crimes. However, Davis did not testify at trial. \u201c[Wjhere a defendant injects into the case the name of an alibi witness and then fails to call the witness, the prosecutor may legitimately comment on the lack of such evidence ***.\u201d People v. Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d 437, 498, 447 N.E.2d 247 (1983); see People v. Colts, 269 Ill. App. 3d 679, 695-96, 645 N.E.2d 225 (1993); People v. Pressley, 160 Ill. App. 3d 858, 865-66, 513 N.E.2d 921 (1987). The prosecution\u2019s comments on Davis\u2019 unexplained absence were not improper.\nWe note the trial court sustained an objection to this comment. Taken together with the court\u2019s admonishment that jurors should disregard any comments to which it sustained an objection, the court\u2019s ruling alleviated any possible unfair prejudice this comment may have caused. See People v. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 160-61, 544 N.E.2d 357 (1989).\nIn its closing, the prosecution also said:\n\u201cPeople say why doesn\u2019t someone do something about *** crime. I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that today you are that someone. You can do something about the crime that riddles our community. You can do it by returning a verdict of guilty \u2014 guilty of murder and guilty of armed robbery.\u201d\nBrooks contends this comment also was unfairly prejudicial. We disagree. Virtually the same argument was made in Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 544 N.E.2d 357. The court found no error: \u201cIt is entirely proper for the prosecutor to dwell on the evil results of crime and to urge the fearless administration of the law.\u201d Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 159.\nFinally, Brooks did not challenge his sentence in a posttrial motion. \u201cA defendant\u2019s challenge to the correctness of a sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made by a written motion filed within 30 days following the imposition of sentence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) (West 1996). A defendant must raise sentencing issues before the trial court in order to preserve such issues on appeal. People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997). Thus, Brooks waived this issue. \u25a0\nEven if Brooks had not waived this issue, the trial court\u2019s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference on appeal. People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882 (1977). \u201cA trial judge is in a far better position than an appellate court to fashion an appropriate sentence, because such judge can make a reasoned judgment based upon firsthand consideration of [the evidence] ***; whereas the appellate court has to rely entirely on the record.\u201d People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19, 566 N.E.2d 1351 (1991). This court will not disturb a sentence that falls within the statutory limits unless it is an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion, even if this court would have weighed the evidence differently. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d at 19.\nThis sentence falls within the statutory limits of 20 to 60 years for first degree murder. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1) (West 1992). The trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. See People v. Montanez, 281 Ill. App. 3d 558, 567, 667 N.E.2d 548 (1996).\nAffirmed.\nCERDA, EJ., and SOUTH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Bruce C. Landrum, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Marie Quinlivan Czech, and Michael Cho, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCUS BROOKS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20140825\nOpinion filed June 18, 1998. \u2014\nRehearing denied July 29, 1998.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Bruce C. Landrum, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Marie Quinlivan Czech, and Michael Cho, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0581-01", "first_page_order": 599, "last_page_order": 603 }