{ "id": 910261, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ONTARIO ERVIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ervin", "decision_date": "1998-06-19", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20140238", "first_page": "586", "last_page": "595", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 586" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "622 N.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777562 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 1096", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5080985 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1105-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/1096-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 1040", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1043", "parenthetical": "holding tape-recorded statements by the other coconspirators to the withdrawn coconspirator admissible provided the State could lay the proper foundation by independent proof of a conspiracy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 1097", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365920 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1101", "parenthetical": "holding tape-recorded statements by the other coconspirators to the withdrawn coconspirator admissible provided the State could lay the proper foundation by independent proof of a conspiracy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/1097-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 1252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1263", "parenthetical": "defendants' appearance at crime scene was insufficient to establish their knowledge that a crime was being committed or their participation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5298737 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362-63", "parenthetical": "defendants' appearance at crime scene was insufficient to establish their knowledge that a crime was being committed or their participation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77, 478" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156841 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224, 227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 N.E.2d 957", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 833", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5238666 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0833-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 N.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380-81", "parenthetical": "victim's testimony corroborated coconspirators' testimony" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383451 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "victim's testimony corroborated coconspirators' testimony" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863-64", "parenthetical": "five gang members testified" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150205 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771-72", "parenthetical": "five gang members testified" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 946", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476988 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 974", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" }, { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5188671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481665 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "same proposition" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2616968 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" }, { "page": "795" }, { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "same proposition" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" }, { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236877 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "226-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3195786 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" }, { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 943", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384943 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "944" }, { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0943-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292209 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526-27" }, { "page": "527" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 1222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1229" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" }, { "page": "780", "parenthetical": "two witnesses solicited to commit the murders testified" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 882", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660663 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "945" }, { "page": "946-97", "parenthetical": "two witnesses solicited to commit the murders testified" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0882-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292317 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456182 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60-61" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 N.E.2d 1010", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1018" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597001 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 939", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156819 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 N.E.2d 1221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872475 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" }, { "page": "857" }, { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141932 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563775 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0012-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 991, "char_count": 21757, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.7639662982072164e-08, "percentile": 0.36028876587013375 }, "sha256": "e1dcebaa9310ec9e3e6a8dfbc38aaa8ee938f11a3313776887390a903a1c65c5", "simhash": "1:3ad544b7fbc1d617", "word_count": 3515 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:41:46.412422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ONTARIO ERVIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THEIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Ontario Ervin, was charged by indictment with first-degree murder pursuant to section 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (now 720 ILCS 5/9\u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1996)). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced to 28 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant now appeals, contending that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the circuit court erred by allowing the State to introduce defendant\u2019s statement as an admission; (3) the court erred by admitting coconspirator statements because the State did not establish defendant\u2019s participation in the conspiracy by independent evidence; and (4) the prosecutor committed reversible error in making certain statements to the jury during closing argument. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nOn September 20, 1992, the 411 Club, located at 411 East 63rd Street in Chicago, Illinois, was robbed by several men wearing masks and wielding guns. During the robbery, the bar manager, John Conley, was shot and killed by Norman Williams, one of the robbers. Except for Williams, all of the robbers wore stocking masks to hide their identity. The police found three masks on the sidewalk outside the bar. Several men were arrested shortly after the crime. On September 22, 1992, Larry Gullette confessed to the crime and implicated Brian Collins, Nathan Green, Demon Body, Norman Williams, and defendant.\nAt defendant\u2019s trial in October 1996, the State presented five robbery witnesses and Larry Gullette. None of the robbery witnesses could specifically identify defendant. Londa Higgins and Katherine Allen both testified to seeing a man with a red jacket and another man with a silver gun wearing a stocking cap on his face. Erma Pitchford also saw a man wearing a stocking cap with a silver gun in his hand.\nRicardo Williams, an employee of the 411 Club, testified that he saw a man with a gun wearing a mask and another man standing at the front door yelling. The man at the front door also had a gun and was not wearing a mask. Williams later identified the man at the door in a police lineup. That man was not defendant.\nCharles Clark testified that he was looking out the front door of the 411 Club when he saw a group of guys pulling stocking masks down onto their faces. Clark returned to the club and pulled the door closed, trying to hold it shut. When he could no longer hold the door shut, Clark tried to run to the back of the bar. As he was turning to run, one of the men held a gun to Clark\u2019s head and took his keys and wallet. Clark then tried to leave the bar, but a man standing at the door told Clark he could not leave. Clark recalled the man had a gold tooth. Someone then grabbed Clark and threw him to the floor. From the floor, Clark saw another person enter the bar but could not identify that person.\nAfter stipulations regarding medical and forensic evidence, the State then called Larry Gullette. Gullette testified that he had received a reduced sentence for his armed robbery conviction pursuant to the robbery of the 411 Club, in exchange for his testimony against defendant. Gullette testified that the State dropped the murder charge in exchange for his testimony.\nLarry Gullette testified that on September 19, 1992, he was with Brian Collins, Nathan Green, Demon Body, and defendant at defendant\u2019s sister\u2019s apartment discussing robbing the 411 Club. Upon hearing their discussion, defendant\u2019s sister kicked them out of the apartment. The five men then moved to Brian Collins\u2019 sister\u2019s apartment in the same building. Gullette testified that Collins got three pair of stockings and cut them up with scissors. In the apartment, Brian Collins and defendant both had guns.\nGullette testified that the men planned to enter the club with pistols and to tell everyone to lie down. The men then left the apartment. On their way to the 411 Club, the five ran into Norman Williams, who called Brian Collins over and the two spoke for awhile. Norman Williams indicated he would join the others in the crime and the six men then entered the abandoned building next door to the 411 Club. According to Gullette, Norman Williams made defendant give Williams the gun. Then, Norman Williams started telling everyone what to do. At that point, defense counsel objected to Gullette\u2019s testimony as to Williams\u2019 statements. Over defendant\u2019s objection, the court allowed Gullette to continue.\nAccording to Gullette, the robbery went as planned. Nathan Green and Brian Collins went to the back of the bar. Gullette and defendant stayed in the middle of the bar and collected money from the patrons. Gullette testified that defendant pulled money from the cash register. At one point, Gullette saw defendant on top of the bar and then down again.\nNext, the State called Officer Ken Epich of the Chicago police department. On March 29, 1996, Officer Epich was present at the seventh district police station when defendant sought to turn himself in on a probation warrant. Defendant indicated to Officer Epich that he thought he had a second warrant for murder. After confirming defendant\u2019s outstanding warrant for first-degree murder, Officer Epich advised defendant of his rights and then questioned defendant regarding the murder warrant. Officer Epich testified that \u201c[defendant] told me, he was with some dudes, who stuck up a fag bar, the 411 Club at 63rd and King.\u201d On cross-examination, Epich conceded that he had written the initial arrest report around the time defendant was arrested at 5:12 p.m. but that defendant\u2019s statement was not memorialized until Epich\u2019s supplementary report was written around 8 p.m. after Epich had spoken to the detectives investigating the murder.\nAfter the State rested, defense counsel made a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied. The defense presented no case. After closing arguments, the court instructed the jury. The jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and the court sentenced him to 28 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nOn appeal, defendant first argues that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant participated in the armed robbery. Defendant contends that none of the State\u2019s evidence showed six men in the bar and the only evidence of defendant\u2019s involvement came from Larry Gullette, an inherently incredible witness. The jury, however, was repeatedly informed as to the reliability of Gullette\u2019s testimony and as to the deal Gullette had made with the State. The testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to sustain a conviction. People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 44, 535 N.E.2d 889, 903 (1989). Moreover, a criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable that there remains a reasonable doubt as to defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 276-77 (1985). Here, defendant\u2019s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence\u2019\n\u20222 Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the statement made by defendant to Officer.Epich at the time of defendant\u2019s arrest. At trial, Officer Epich testified as follows:\n\u201cA. The first question I asked him was [after giving the Miranda warning], what was the murder about, who was murdered?\nQ. And what did he state to you?\nA. He [the defendant] told me, he was with some dudes, who stuck up a fag bar, the 411 Club at 63rd and King.\u201d\nBefore trial, defendant presented a motion in limine to exclude the statement which was denied.\nOn appeal, defendant argues the circuit court erred in admitting the ambiguous statement because it does not allow an inference of defendant\u2019s guilt necessary to constitute an admission. The State counters that the defendant\u2019s statement is admissible and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the statement. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).\nIn Illinois, the proper evidentiary foundation for admission of prior out-of-court statements by a defendant is unclear. The Illinois Supreme Court has defined an \u201cadmission\u201d as \u201ca statement or conduct from which guilt may be inferred, when taken in connection with other facts, but from which guilt does not necessarily follow.\u201d People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 57, 473 N.E.2d 840, 857 (1984). Such admissions are not objectionable under the rule against hearsay. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d at 57, 473 N.E.2d at 857.\nOne recent appellate case, however, has suggested distinctions between admissions by a party and inculpatory admissions by a defendant as distinct from criminal confessions. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 637 N.E.2d 1221 (1994). Accord People v. Shaw, 278 Ill. App. 3d 939, 951, 664 N.E.2d 97, 105 (1996). Until our supreme court provides guidance to the contrary, we analyze defendant\u2019s statement under the traditional and more stringent formula, which requires an inference of guilt before the statement is admissible. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d at 57, 473 N.E.2d at 857. See People v. Grisset, 288 Ill. App. 3d 620, 631, 681 N.E.2d 1010, 1018 (1997).\nDefendant cites to People v. Rodriguez, 291 Ill. App. 3d 55, 684 N.E.2d 128 (1997), as support for a case in which defendant\u2019s statement was held not to constitute an admission. In Rodriguez, defendant was charged with unlawful use of weapons after allegedly engaging the victim in a car chase and shooting at the victim. According to the victim\u2019s father, when asked if he had done the shooting, defendant allegedly responded, \u201cI am a sharp shooter.\u201d Rodriguez, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 60-61, 684 N.E.2d at 131. The court held that the statement was not an admission but, rather, was inadmissible hearsay because the statement was not one from which guilt could be inferred. Rodriguez, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 61, 684 N.E.2d at 131.\nIn the instant case, defendant stated that \u201che was with some dudes, who stuck up a fag bar, the 411 Club at 63rd and King.\u201d Defendant\u2019s knowledge of the crime, inherent in his statement, allows the permissible inference regarding defendant\u2019s participation in the crime. Thus, defendant\u2019s statement was properly admitted with the jury assessing its reliability. \u201c[I]t is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide what weight should be given to the witnesses\u2019 testimony.\u201d Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 452, 603 N.E.2d 508, 511-12 (1992).\nDefendant next challenges the State\u2019s introduction of statements made by Norman Williams, as testified to by Larry Guflette, because the State did not prove through independent evidence that a conspiracy existed. During Gullette\u2019s direct testimony, Gullette began testifying about statements made by Norman Williams prior to entering the bar:\n\u201cA. Next thing that happened, Norman Williams started telling everybody what to do.\nQ. Okay.\nTell us what Norman Williams said everybody was going to do?\u201d Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The State argued that the conversation constituted an exception to the hearsay rule as either (1) an admission by defendant as he was participating in the conversation; or (2) a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy. The State further argued that the statements were not hearsay in that they were not offered to prove the truth of the directives but, rather, to prove the conspiracy. Defense counsel again objected, arguing that the hearsay could not clearly establish a conspiracy. The court ruled that Norman Williams\u2019 directions to the other conspirators were admissible and that defendant\u2019s participation, whether voluntary or not, was for the jury to decide. The court preserved defense counsel\u2019s objection regarding any conspiracy language.\nGullette continued his testimony as to Williams\u2019 directions:\n\u201cQ. What did Norman \u2014 what assignment did Norman Williams give to everybody?\nA. Well, he pointed toward Nathan and Brian and say, you, 2, go to the back.\nQ. When you say that he pointed to Nathan and Brian, you mean Nathan Green and Brian Collins?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And what did he tell them to go?\nA. Yaw [sic], go in first. Yaw [sic] go to the back of the bar.\nQ. Okay.\nAnd then what did \u2014 what else did Norman Williams say to the others?\nA. He said, you and you, pointing to me and [defendant], yaw [sic] just stay in the middle of the bar and make sure everybody lay down on the ground. When they put their money on the floor, pick it up.\u201d\nWhile we conclude that admission of the statements was not error, a discussion of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is necessary.\nIn Illinois, the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule allows into evidence the acts and declarations of a coconspirator, made in furtherance of the conspiracy, even when those acts and declarations are made out of the defendant\u2019s presence. People v. Columbo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 882, 945, 455 N.E.2d 733, 779 (1983). Statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy are those having the effect of advising, encouraging, aiding, or abetting its perpetration. People v. Miller, 128 Ill. App. 3d.574, 585, 470 N.E.2d 1222, 1229 (1984).\nTo admit Norman Williams\u2019 declarations in furtherance of the conspiracy into evidence, the State must provide prima facie independent evidence of the conspiracy and defendant\u2019s participation in the conspiracy. People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 526-27, 603 N.E.2d 519 (1992); People v. Kabakovich, 245 Ill. App. 3d 943, 944, 615 N.E.2d 855, 856 (1993). \u201cIn establishing a prima facie case of conspiracy, proof of the agreement, which is the essence of a conspiracy, need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be inferred from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the acts and declarations of the accused defendant.\u201d People v. Gray, 85 Ill. App. 3d 726, 729, 410 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1980); People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 234, 568 N.E.2d 837, 849 (1991), citing People v. Duckworth, 180 Ill. App. 3d 792, 795, 536 N.E.2d 469, 472 (1989). Thus, \u201c[w]hile evidence of a conspiracy can be totally circumstantial, such evidence must be sufficient, substantial, and independent of the declarations made in order to admit statements by a declarant under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.\u201d Duckworth, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 795, 536 N.E.2d at 471.\nIn this case, the State argues that Gullette\u2019s trial testimony regarding the conspiracy among the six men constitutes sufficient independent evidence of the conspiracy to allow Gullette to also testify as to the statements made by coconspirator Norman Williams. The State urges that Gullette\u2019s own knowledge of the conspiracy is sufficient independent evidence upon which to establish the foundation for admission of coconspirator Williams\u2019 statements. In contrast, defendant argues that in the absence of any independent evidence of his participation in the conspiracy, admission of the coconspirator statements by Norman Williams, as- testified to by coconspirator Gullette, improperly bolsters defendant\u2019s participation in the conspiracy.\nPrior Illinois cases considering the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule and its independent evidence requirement all locate a distinct source for the conspiracy evidence independent of the declarations made. Thus, circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy and defendant\u2019s participation has been provided by the testimony of undercover and surveillance police officers (People v. Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d 278, 281, 408 N.E.2d 215, 216 (1980); People v. Roppo, 234 Ill. App. 3d 116, 122, 599 N.E.2d 974, 979 (1992)) and by other individuals whom defendant told of his participation (People v. Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d 498, 527, 603 N.E.2d 519, 530 (1992)). Direct testimony by coconspirators has been sufficient when more than one testify (People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 292, 647 N.E.2d 946, 952 (1995); People v. Jackson, 281 Ill. App. 3d 759, 771-72, 666 N.E.2d 854, 863-64 (1996) (five gang members testified); People v. Columbo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 882, 946-97, 455 N.E.2d 733, 780 (1983) (two witnesses solicited to commit the murders testified)), or when supported by other witness testimony (People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 234, 568 N.E.2d 837 (1991); People v. Spears, 256 Ill. App. 3d 374, 380, 628 N.E.2d 376, 380-81 (1993) (victim\u2019s testimony corroborated coconspirators\u2019 testimony); People v. Ervin, 226 Ill. App. 3d 833, 842, 589 N.E.2d 957, 964 (1992)).\nEven in cases in which the defendant\u2019s acts constitute circumstantial evidence of his participation in the conspiracy, the evidence of . those acts is often testified to by a source outside of the conspiracy. People v. Martinez, 278 Ill. App. 3d 218, 224, 227, 662 N.E.2d 473, 476-77, 478 (1996); Kabakovich, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 947, 615 N.E.2d at 858; People v. Roppo, 234 Ill. App. 3d 116, 125, 599 N.E.2d 974, 980 (1992). But see People v. Darnell, 214 Ill. App. 3d 345, 362-63, 573 N.E.2d 1252, 1263 (1990) (defendants\u2019 appearance at crime scene was insufficient to establish their knowledge that a crime was being committed or their participation); People v. Duckworth, 180 Ill. App. 3d 792, 795, 536 N.E.2d 469, 472 (1989) (same proposition).\nWe have found no Illinois case in which the uncorroborated trial testimony of a single coconspirator provided the independent foundation necessary for admission of a third coconspirator\u2019s statements, as testified to by the in-court coconspirator, against the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Swerdlow, 269 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1101, 647 N.E.2d 1040, 1043 (1995) (holding tape-recorded statements by the other coconspirators to the withdrawn coconspirator admissible provided the State could lay the proper foundation by independent proof of a conspiracy). That being said, we nevertheless find from the totality of the circum-' stances that there was sufficient independent evidence of the conspiracy and defendant\u2019s participation to allow admission of the coconspirator statements. People v. Pintos, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1105-06, 527 N.E.2d 312, 318 (1988).\nAt trial, the State presented evidence of an armed robbery conducted by several men, a statement by defendant indicating his presence at the crime, and Gullette\u2019s in-court testimony implicating defendant. Five eyewitnesses to the robbery gave testimony tending to corroborate Gullette\u2019s placement of the conspirators in the bar and the division of labor implying that directions had been given beforehand.\nAlthough defendant is correct that no eyewitness identified defendant as a participant, the circumstantial evidence of defendant\u2019s involvement was provided by defendant\u2019s own statement made at the police station. Defendant\u2019s statement indicated his knowledge of the nature of the crime, the location and character of the establishment, and that multiple defendants were involved. These implications, combined with defendant\u2019s presence, imply his participation in the conspiracy agreement.\nAnd finally, when considered with Gullette\u2019s in-court recitation of the conspiracy, we find the totality of circumstantial evidence provided a sufficient foundation to allow the coconspirator statements of Norman Williams. Moreover, Gullette\u2019s accomplice testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction. People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 226-27, 568 N.E.2d 837, 845 (1991), citing Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d at 44, 535 N.E.2d at 903. Thus, the circuit court did not err by allowing Gullette to testify regarding statements made by Norman Williams in furtherance of the conspiracy.\nFinally, defendant objects to certain statements made by the prosecutor in closing arguments. Specifically, defendant challenges the prosecutor\u2019s comments regarding defendant\u2019s statement to Officer Epich including his suggestion that the jury did not have to determine why the statement was not in the arrest report. Defendant further contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Larry Gullette\u2019s credibility. In contrast, the State asserts that defendant has waived any error as no objections were registered at trial or in defendant\u2019s posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d\n1124, 1129 (1988). We agree with the State that no errors were made in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument and certainly none that rise to the level of plain error pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615.\nProsecutors are given wide latitude in closing arguments to make all reasonable inferences based on the evidence. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 507, 622 N.E.2d 774, 786-87 (1993). The prosecutor\u2019s interpretation of defendant\u2019s statement as admitting his participation in the robbery is reasonably inferable from the evidence. Moreover, the prosecutor did not mislead the jury as to its role in assessing the truth or weight to be assigned to defendant\u2019s alleged statement. And finally, the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the credibility of Gullette\u2019s trial testimony, which was called into issue time and again. The State argued fairly that Gullette was a bad man and received a deal from the State. The jury understood its role in assigning the weight attributable to such testimony. The complained-of statements during the State\u2019s closing arguments did not constitute error, let alone plain error.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN, PJ., and HARTMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THEIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Elizabeth D. McGoogan, of Welsh & Katz, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Janet Powers Doyle, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ONTARIO ERVIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20140238\nOpinion filed June 19, 1998.\nElizabeth D. McGoogan, of Welsh & Katz, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Janet Powers Doyle, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0586-01", "first_page_order": 604, "last_page_order": 613 }