{ "id": 910268, "name": "SARAH CHRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATTI SAYLOR, Defendant-Appellee (Ronald E. Kranig et al., d/b/a Asset Recovery Systems, Assignees and Plaintiffs-Appellants)", "name_abbreviation": "Christiansen v. Saylor", "decision_date": "1998-07-09", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201497\u20140742", "first_page": "719", "last_page": "725", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 719" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2736512 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2890429 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3359314 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/216/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4969992 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/323/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2707188 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/6/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592352 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 1135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5501555 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1140-41" }, { "page": "1141-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/1135-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557625 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173712 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0294-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 575, "char_count": 13012, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6962706795451218e-07, "percentile": 0.7000703515919268 }, "sha256": "ccc95540c44e722914bd04813850e626f496ead0c263fafad7820830a09d2d69", "simhash": "1:3b9991e95b4ee820", "word_count": 2071 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:41:46.412422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SARAH CHRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATTI SAYLOR, Defendant-Appellee (Ronald E. Kranig et al., d/b/a Asset Recovery Systems, Assignees and Plaintiffs-Appellants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAssignee-plaintiffs, Ronald E. Kranig and Mark E Mannebach, d/b/a Asset Recovery Systems (plaintiffs), appeal from an order of the circuit court of Lake County that denied their motion to reconsider a previous order that vacated a default judgment against defendant, Patti Saylor. The order appealed from also directed a finding in favor of defendant.\nThe record reveals the following facts. On December 20, 1996, the original plaintiff, Sarah Christiansen, filed a small claims complaint against defendant. The complaint alleged that defendant owed Christiansen $1,450 \u201cfor rent due for the apartment located at 932 W Rollins Road, Round Lake Heights, Illinois.\u201d\nSummons was issued December 20, 1996. The summons requested service on defendant \u201cc/o Onie Watkins 936 W. Rollins Rd. Apt. 2 Round Lake Heights, IL.\u201d The affidavit of service submitted by a deputy sheriff indicates that defendant was personally served on December 23, 1996, at 936 W. Rollins Rd., Apt No. 2, Round Lake Heights, Illinois. The affidavit shows that service was had on a 52-year-old white female.\nThe summons required defendant to appear before the trial court to answer the complaint on January 24, 1997. On that date, defendant did not appear, and the trial court entered a default judgment against defendant and in favor of Christiansen in the amount of $1,450.\nOn April 15, 1997, Christiansen assigned the judgment to plaintiffs for unspecified valuable consideration. On April 28, 1997, plaintiffs filed a citation to discover assets against defendant. The affidavit of service for the summons related to the citation to discover assets shows that defendant was personally served on May 2, 1997, at 150 Antaris Circle, Round Lake, Illinois. The affidavit shows that service was had on a 47-year-old white female.\nDefendant responded to the citation to discover assets by filing a motion pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 1996)). The motion sought to quash service with respect to Christiansen\u2019s complaint against defendant and to vacate the judgment.\nDefendant appeared at a hearing on the matter and denied that she received the summons related to Christiansen\u2019s complaint. Defendant testified that she never lived at 936 W. Rollins, the address where she was purportedly served. According to defendant, the first time she heard anything about this case was early in May 1997. She testified that she then immediately contacted the manager of the apartment complex that was the subject of Christiansen\u2019s complaint (Lynwood Apartments) and established that she did not owe Lynwood Apartments any rent. Defendant acknowledged that she knew who Christiansen was, but denied owing Christiansen any money.\nOn cross-examination, defendant denied ever borrowing any money from Christiansen. Defendant also denied that Christiansen ever paid any rent for her. Defendant admitted knowing Onie Watkins. Defendant denied ever living in Watkins\u2019 apartment.\nDefendant called Beth Braynard to testify at the hearing. Braynard has been the on-site manager of Lynwood Apartments since December 1996. Braynard testified that defendant did not owe Lynwood Apartments or its landlord any money. According to Braynard, Christiansen was a former manager of Lynwood Apartments. Braynard did not believe that the owner of Lynwood Apartments had authorized a suit against anyone for rents due. Braynard testified that defendant never lived at 936 W. Rollins, the address where Christian-sen\u2019s summons and complaint purportedly were served on defendant.\nPlaintiffs called Steve Trudeau. Trudeau was the deputy sheriff who signed the affidavit of service showing that he personally served Christiansen\u2019s summons and complaint on defendant. Trudeau was not able to identify defendant as the person he served. Trudeau testified that he knows Onie Watkins and that she was not the person he served. He also testified that if he had served Watkins, he would have shown substitute service on the affidavit of service.\nPlaintiffs also called Jordan Primack. Primack was Christiansen\u2019s attorney when she filed the complaint against defendant. Primack testified that Christiansen did not sue defendant as an agent for Lynwood Apartments or its owner.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled on the matter. The court first noted that it had an opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The court then found that defendant had not been served with Christiansen\u2019s summons and complaint. The court entered an order vacating the judgment against defendant and setting the matter for trial.\nPlaintiffs filed a timely motion to reconsider. In the motion, plaintiffs argued that the trial court\u2019s ruling was erroneous because (1) by making a general appearance defendant waived all challenges to jurisdictional defects, including the failure of service, and (2) plaintiffs\u2019 third-party rights stemming from their good-faith purchase of the judgment from Christiansen precluded vacating the judgment on the basis of defendant\u2019s denial of service.\nOn the same date that plaintiffs filed their motion to reconsider, the trial court entered an order denying the motion. The order stated that trial was to begin instanter and that plaintiffs were unable to continue in that they were not able to put on any evidence. The order \u201cdirected a verdict [sic]\u201d in favor of defendant. Plaintiffs\u2019 timely appeal followed.\nPlaintiffs raise the same issues on appeal that they raised in their motion to reconsider. Thus, plaintiffs first contend that defendant waived her right to challenge any jurisdictional defects, including the failure of service, by making a general appearance. Defendant responds by conceding that she made a general appearance. However, defendant contends that her general appearance did not preclude her from seeking to vacate the judgment on any grounds, including the failure of service.\nIt is essential to the validity of a judgment that the court entering the judgment have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the litigation and jurisdiction over the parties. State Bank v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308 (1986). Absent a general appearance, a court can obtain personal jurisdiction only after proper service of process. State Bank, 113 Ill. 2d at 308. A party over whom a court fails to acquire jurisdiction may, at any time, either directly or collaterally, attack and vacate a judgment that the court enters against the party. In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 547 (1989).\nA party challenging the jurisdiction of a court prior to the entry of a judgment must limit his appearance solely to that purpose by making a special and limited appearance, and, where the party raises additional defenses, he has made a general appearance and thereby submitted himself to the court\u2019s jurisdiction. Sullivan v. Bach, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 1140-41 (1981). However, where a judgment has previously been entered against a party, there is no need to file a special and limited appearance to challenge past jurisdiction unless the party also wishes to contest the court\u2019s prospective jurisdiction. Sullivan, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1141-42. This is because a general appearance does not submit a party to the court\u2019s jurisdiction retroactively and does not serve to validate a previous judgment entered without jurisdiction. J.C. Penney Co. v. West, 114 Ill. App. 3d 644, 647 (1983).\nIn this case, the trial court entered the judgment against defendant before defendant made her general appearance, and, when she made her general appearance, defendant did not challenge the trial court\u2019s prospective jurisdiction. Therefore, defendant\u2019s general appearance did not submit her to the court\u2019s jurisdiction retroactively, and she properly challenged the court\u2019s jurisdiction to enter the judgment against her. Accordingly, plaintiffs\u2019 contention that defendant waived her right to challenge the judgment on jurisdictional grounds by filing a general appearance is untenable.\nPlaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in vacating the judgment because they were third-party purchasers of the judgment who made their purchase in reliance on the facial validity of the service of summons on defendant. Plaintiffs argue that the third-party rights in the judgment that they acquired when they purchased the judgment cannot be challenged, as defendant has attempted to do in this case, on the ground of failure of service.\nDefendant responds that plaintiffs waived this issue by not raising it in the trial court. However, the record clearly shows that plaintiffs raised the issue when they filed their motion to reconsider in the trial court. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs did not waive the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court, and we will address the issue.\nIn support of their position, plaintiffs cite Janove v. Bacon, 6 Ill. 2d 245 (1955), and Kolmar, Inc. v. Moore, 323 Ill. App. 323 (1944). Plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on these cases is misplaced. Unlike the plaintiffs in Janove and Kolmar, plaintiffs in this case have not asserted third-party rights in a judgment taken upon a negotiable instrument or in a judgment where title to real property was at issue. Rather, plaintiffs in this case have merely asserted third-party rights in a judgment on an unsecured personal debt. Such a judgment is a mere chose in action, and, therefore, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to a purchaser of the judgment. Hinkley v. Champaign National Bank, 216 Ill. 559, 564 (1905). Because plaintiffs\u2019 purchase of the judgment from Christiansen did not give them rights in anything except the judgment, Janove and Kolmar are not controlling in this case.\nInstead, section 2 \u2014 1401(e) of the Code is controlling. Section 2 \u2014 1401(e) embodies the public policy regarding relief from judgments with respect to third-party purchasers in proceedings, such as this one, brought pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401. Section 2 \u2014 1401(e) provides as follows:\n\u201c(e) Unless lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears from the record proper, the vacation or modification of an order or judgment pursuant to the provisions of this Section does not affect the right, title or interest in or to any real or personal property of any person, not a party to the original action, acquired for value after the entry of the order or judgment but before the filing of the petition, nor affect any right of any person not a party to the original action under any certificate of sale issued before the filing of the petition, pursuant to a sale based on the order or judgment.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401(e) (West 1996).\nSection 2 \u2014 1401(e) is intended to protect bona fide purchasers of property from the effects of an order setting aside a judgment affecting title to the property if the purchaser was not a party to the original proceeding and lack of jurisdiction did not affirmatively appear in the record. Mountain States Mortgage Center, Inc. v. Allen, 257 Ill. App. 3d 372, 380 (1993).\nIn this case, the order vacating the judgment did not affect plaintiffs\u2019 title or interest in any property. Rather, the order affected only plaintiffs\u2019 interest in a chose in action, the judgment that they purchased from Christiansen.\nThe assignment of a judgment does not imply that the judgment is impregnable. Hinkley, 216 Ill. at 564. An action by an assignee of a judgment is generally subject to any defense or setoff existing before the assignment of the judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 403 (West 1996). A void judgment is subject to collateral attack at any time, and the judgment may be impeached in any proceeding where a right is asserted by virtue of the judgment. Reynolds v. Burns, 20 Ill. 2d 179, 192 (1960). Section 2 \u2014 1401 does not \u201caffect[ ] any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that relief.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401(f) (West 1996).\nUnder these principles, plaintiffs\u2019 third-party rights in the judgment that Christiansen assigned to them did not preclude defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction based on the failure of service. Consequently, plaintiffs\u2019 contention that the rights they acquired when they purchased the judgment from Christiansen precluded jurisdictional challenges to the judgment fails.\nIn sum, the trial court did not err when it based its decision to vacate the judgment on defendant\u2019s jurisdictional challenge to the judgment on the ground of the failure of service. The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMCLAREN and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald E. Kranig and Mark E Mannebach, both of Waukegan, appellants pro se.", "Anthony H. Buckun, of Buckun & Buckun, of Des Plaines, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SARAH CHRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATTI SAYLOR, Defendant-Appellee (Ronald E. Kranig et al., d/b/a Asset Recovery Systems, Assignees and Plaintiffs-Appellants).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201497\u20140742\nOpinion filed July 9, 1998.\nRonald E. Kranig and Mark E Mannebach, both of Waukegan, appellants pro se.\nAnthony H. Buckun, of Buckun & Buckun, of Des Plaines, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0719-01", "first_page_order": 737, "last_page_order": 743 }