{ "id": 910244, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. RANKIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rankin", "decision_date": "1998-07-22", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201497\u20140664", "first_page": "818", "last_page": "825", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 818" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222749 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 N.E.2d 1009", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1017" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544909 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504", "parenthetical": "holding that the extended-term statute, as applied to murder, only applies to the sentence of a fixed term of imprisonment of 20 to 40 years" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218566 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "holding that the extended-term statute, as applied to murder, only applies to the sentence of a fixed term of imprisonment of 20 to 40 years" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855", "parenthetical": "holding that extended-term sentencing does not apply when a death sentence is also imposed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166556 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204-05", "parenthetical": "holding that extended-term sentencing does not apply when a death sentence is also imposed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.E.2d 1279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222669 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "600 N.E.2d 1189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1191" }, { "page": "1192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291993 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83-84" }, { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353-54" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499056 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663-64" }, { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 954", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "955", "parenthetical": "\"[a] void judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543208 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5-6", "parenthetical": "\"[a] void judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 642, "char_count": 15522, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2180930373706596e-07, "percentile": 0.5975722908941795 }, "sha256": "d8822d7faaefa83e6e1ffe52c9d8bfa94a999d949b74494c6108b5c439841be3", "simhash": "1:6ba6c68af4f43cd4", "word_count": 2603 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:41:46.412422+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. RANKIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September 1996, following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Robert L. Rankin, guilty of driving while his driver\u2019s license was revoked (625 ILGS 5/6 \u2014 303 (West Supp. 1995)), improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 709 (West 1994)), unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(4) (West 1994)), and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(a) (West 1994)). The court entered judgments of conviction on both traffic offenses and on unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, but did not enter a judgment of conviction on unlawful use of a weapon. In November 1996, the court sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence of six years in prison for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon.\nDefendant did not directly appeal but instead filed a postconviction petition in February 1997 under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1996)). Defendant alleged in that petition that his sentence was unconstitutional and void because the trial court violated various provisions of Illinois sentencing law. In April 1997, the court conducted a hearing on the petition and denied it.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by sentencing him to an extended term because (1) it used a prior felony conviction as both (a) an element of an offense and (b) a justification to impose an extended term; (2) a court may sentence a defendant to an extended term only on the most serious class of offenses of which the defendant is convicted; and (3) a juvenile adjudication of delinquency under the Juvenile Court Act does not constitute a felony conviction and cannot be used to justify an extended term under section 5 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995)). Because we agree with each of defendant\u2019s arguments, we reverse and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe trial court conducted a sentencing hearing in November 1996. The presentence investigation report indicated that defendant had previous convictions of aggravated battery (in 1993) and several misdemeanors. He had also been adjudicated delinquent as a 16-year-old for residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 3(a) (West 1992)).\nThe trial court sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence of six years in prison for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The court also sentenced him to 364 days in jail for the offense of driving while his license was revoked, to be served concurrently with the six-year term, and fined him a total of $3,050 for his three convictions.\nThe trial court based the extended-term sentence on defendant\u2019s 1993 felony conviction. The court also stated that it could have imposed the extended term based on defendant\u2019s offense of unlawful use of a weapon or his juvenile adjudication.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Double Enhancement\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to an extended term for the conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon because using a prior felony conviction as both (1) an element of an offense, and (2) justification to sentence a defendant to an extended term constitutes an impermissible double enhancement.\nThe State first responds that defendant has forfeited this issue by failing to (1) object to the imposition of an extended term, (2) file a postsentencing motion, or (3) take a direct appeal. We disagree.\nIn People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 658 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1995), the supreme court stated that a sentence that does not conform to statutory requirements is void and may be corrected at any time. See also People v. Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6, 506 N.E.2d 954, 955 (1987) (\u201c[a] void judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally\u201d). In People v. Perruquet, 181 Ill. App. 3d 660, 663-64, 537 N.E.2d 351, 353-54 (1989), the court accepted the defendant\u2019s postconviction petition and directed that an improper extended-term sentence be reduced, holding that the excess portion of the defendant\u2019s sentence was void. Because we conclude that defendant\u2019s extended-term sentence did not conform to statutory requirements, we hold that he did not forfeit this issue and that he properly raised it in this proceeding under the Act.\nOne of the elements of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon is that the defendant has a prior felony conviction. 720 ILCS 5/24\u2014 1.1(a) (West 1994). Defendant was convicted in 1993 of aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(e) (West 1994)). The trial court subsequently imposed an extended-term sentence based on this felony conviction.\nUnder some circumstances, the trial court may impose an extended-term sentence. Section 5- \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) of the Code provides that an extended term may be imposed pursuant to section 5 \u2014 8\u20142 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142 (West 1994)), as follows:\n\u201cWhen a defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois or any other jurisdiction of the same or similar class felony or greater class felony, when such conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous conviction, excluding time spent in custody, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995).\nIn People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84, 600 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (1992), the supreme court held that it is impermissible to use \u201ca single factor both as an element of a defendant\u2019s crime and as an aggravating factor justifying the imposition of a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) In Gonzales, the supreme court upheld the defendant\u2019s extended-term sentence on the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon because the defendant had two previous felony convictions. The court used one conviction (for robbery) as an essential element of the crime and another conviction (for aggravated battery) as the aggravating factor that justified imposing an extended-term sentence. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 85, 600 N.E.2d at 1192.\nHowever, in this case, defendant has only one prior felony conviction \u2014 namely, for aggravated battery in 1993. The State contends that defendant\u2019s felony \u201cstatus\u201d is an element of the offense, not his prior conviction. The State also contends that defendant\u2019s conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon \u201cwas already a felony even without the fact that he was a felon.\u201d However, if we were to accept the State\u2019s contention, then every conviction of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon would automatically subject that defendant to an extended term. We reject the State\u2019s contention. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by relying on defendant\u2019s single 1993 felony conviction to both convict him of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and impose an extended-term sentence. In so holding, we agree with the recent decision of the Second District Appellate Court in People v. Bohena, 296 Ill. App. 3d 67, 70, 693 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (1998), which reached the same conclusion in a similar case.\nIn Illinois, when the trial court imposes a sentence greater than that permitted by statute, the excess portion of the sentence is void. Perruquet, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 537 N.E.2d at 353. Unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon is a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(e) (West 1994)), punishable by not less than two years and not more than five years in prison (730 ILCS 5/5- \u2014 8\u20141(a)(6) (West Supp. 1995)). Thus, one year of defendant\u2019s sentence is void. Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)), we direct the trial court on remand to modify the sentencing order to show that the six-year sentence on defendant\u2019s conviction of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon is reduced to five years. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(b), 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(6) (West 1994).\nB. Extended Term Available Only for Most Serious Class of Offenses\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by imposing an extended-term sentence for the Class 3 offense of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon based on its reasoning that it could have imposed such a sentence on the Class 4 offense of unlawful use of a weapon (for which it did not enter judgment) had the court not also convicted defendant of the Class 3 offense. The State defends the court\u2019s action, as follows: \u201c[Bjecause it could have [applied the extended-term statute] on a less serious offense [the Class 4 offense], it makes no sense for the court not to be able to do it on a more serious [offense].\u201d The record shows that the court viewed the matter similarly, stating as follows: \u201c[I]f I couldn\u2019t do it [(sentence defendant to an extended term)] [on] Count II, I should be able to do it on Count I. [so] I am saying it is a distinction without a difference.\u201d\nIn People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 205, 469 N.E.2d 569, 575 (1984), the supreme court held that a sentencing court may impose an extended-term sentence only \u201cfor the class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted.\u201d The State argues that Jordan does not apply here because the court did not enter judgment on defendant\u2019s Class 4 offense. The State relies on People v. Neal, 111 Ill. 2d 180, 204-05, 489 N.E.2d 845, 855 (1985) (holding that extended-term sentencing does not apply when a death sentence is also imposed), and People v. Young, 124 Ill. 2d 147, 162, 529 N.E.2d 497, 504 (1988) (holding that the extended-term statute, as applied to murder, only applies to the sentence of a fixed term of imprisonment of 20 to 40 years). We disagree.\nA defendant\u2019s eligibility for an extended-term sentence is not transferable from one offense to another. Because defendant had been convicted of a Class 3 felony, Jordan prohibited the trial court from imposing an extended-term sentence on defendant\u2019s Class 4 felony conviction.\nIn passing, we note that the State could have extricated itself from this situation by voluntarily dismissing the Class 3 offense at any time before the trial court. Had the State done so, the court could have entered judgment on the Class 4 conviction, applied the extended-term sentencing provision, and sentenced defendant accordingly to six years in prison.\nC. Juvenile Adjudication Does Not Constitute a Conviction\nDefendant next argues that the trial court had no authority to impose an extended-term sentence based on his juvenile adjudication for residential burglary. In response, the State contends that a juvenile adjudication constitutes a \u201cconviction\u201d for purposes of extended-term sentencing. We agree with defendant.\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 of the Code authorizes extended-term sentencing when a defendant is convicted of any felony, \u201cafter having been previously convicted in Illinois or any other jurisdiction of the same or similar class felony or greater class felony.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) (West 1994).\nThe Code defines \u201cconviction\u201d as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Conviction\u2019 means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1\u20145 (West 1994).\nThis definition does not include juvenile adjudications. Further, a term of well-known legal significance can be presumed to have that meaning in a statute. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1017 (1996). \u201cConviction\u201d is commonly known to mean \u201cthe result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the accused is guilty as charged.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 333 (6th ed. 1990).\nAt one point during the hearing on defendant\u2019s postconviction petition, the trial court stated that a juvenile adjudication is \u201cnot really a conviction,\u201d noting that it is inadmissible for impeachment purposes. Nevertheless, the court then stated as follows:\n\u201c[M]y holding is that that adjudication of delinquency for residential burglary, a Class 2 felony, can \u2014 my ruling is it can be used as a factor for the court to impose an extended term. *** The court finds that a juvenile adjudication may be used for purposes of imposing an extended[-]term sentence. *** It certainly *** can be used as an aggravating factor under the Illinois Criminal Code in imposing a sentence. And within the section concerning aggravating factors is where we find extended sentences. *** So I know of no reason to distinguish between a Class 2 felony committed by [defendant] when he was a little bit under the age of 17 and a residential burglary, that that cannot be if it can be used as an aggravating factor, *** and that together with his accumulation of a myriad of other offenses as to the length of the sentence, I don\u2019t believe that it acts \u2014 there is a bar for the court to consider it as a necessary factor of imposition of an extended term.\u201d\nTrial courts may consider juvenile delinquency adjudications in sentencing. Subsection (a)(3) of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 of the Code expressly provides that courts may consider as aggravating factors in sentencing \u201ca history of prior delinquency or criminal activity.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 5 \u2014 3.2(a)(3) (West Supp. 1995). A different subsection \u2014 (b)(1)\u2014of that same section (5 \u2014 5\u20143.2) contains the language at issue (namely, reference to a person\u2019s \u201chaving been previously convicted\u201d (emphasis added) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995)). To accept the State\u2019s arguments would mean we would need to conclude that the legislature did not intend to distinguish between prior \u201cdelinquency adjudications\u201d on the one hand and \u201cprior convictions\u201d on the other. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995). We would further need to conclude that the legislature failed to distinguish between these two terms even though it used those terms in the same section \u2014 namely, section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 of the Code.\nIn this case, defendant was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/ 1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1994)) for his offense of residential burglary. Proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act are not criminal. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320, 657 N.E.2d 908, 915 (1995).\nThe legislature could have included juvenile delinquency adjudications in its definition of \u201cconviction\u201d under section 5 \u2014 1\u20145 of the Code or made specific reference to such adjudications in section 5 \u2014 5\u2014 3.2(b)(1) of the Code, discussing when an extended-term sentence may be imposed (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1\u20145, 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995)). However, it did not do so. Thus, we conclude that defendant\u2019s juvenile delinquency adjudication does not provide a basis for the imposition of an extended-term sentence.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand with directions.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nCARMAN, EJ., and KNECHT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas, John M. McCarthy, and Gretchen Kogel, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT L. RANKIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201497\u20140664\nOpinion filed July 22, 1998.\nDaniel D. Yuhas, John M. McCarthy, and Gretchen Kogel, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Linda Susan McClain, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0818-01", "first_page_order": 836, "last_page_order": 843 }