{
  "id": 1073582,
  "name": "BUSINESS SERVICE BUREAU, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGELA WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Business Service Bureau, Inc. v. Webster",
  "decision_date": "1998-08-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 4-98-0070",
  "first_page": "257",
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          "parenthetical": "legal malpractice claims may not be assigned"
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1990,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "1021"
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    {
      "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 273",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        2569492
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      "year": 1990,
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1994,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "822"
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    {
      "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 76",
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      "reporter": "Ill. 2d",
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:38.148323+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "BUSINESS SERVICE BUREAU, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGELA WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 1995, defendant Angela Webster received ambulance services from Arrow Medical Services (Arrow) and was billed $454. Webster became delinquent on the account and Arrow assigned the debt to plaintiff Business Service Bureau, Inc. (Bureau), a licensed debt collection agency. In July 1997, the Bureau sued Webster for collection of the debt. Webster filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the alleged assignment did not comply with the Collection Agency Act (Act) (225 ILCS 425/8b (West 1996)). The court denied the motion and entered judgment in favor of the Bureau for $454 plus costs. Webster appeals. We reverse.\nThe purported assignment document from Arrow to the Bureau stated:\n\u201cFor valuable consideration of an agreed to percentage of the amount collected, and pursuant to the Collection Agency Agreement, the undersigned representative of ARROW MEDICAL SERVICES, hereby assigns all of its rights, title and interest in and to the following named delinquent accounts owing by the person or persons so specified, to BUSINESS SERVICE BUREAU, to sue for and take all legal steps that may be deemed proper or necessary to affect collection thereof, in such company\u2019s own name.\u201d\nThe document had a date at the top of the paper that read \u201c03/07/1997.\u201d At the bottom of the document, Rita Allen, an agent of Arrow, had signed the document. Underneath her signature was written, \u201c[sjigned and sworn to before me this 13th day of March 1997.\u201d The document was notarized and specified Webster\u2019s account as the one being assigned.\nSection 8b(a) of the Act states that an account may be assigned to a collection agency, provided: \u201cThe document manifesting the assignment shall specifically state and include: (i) the effective date of the assignment; and (ii) the consideration for the assignment.\u201d 225 ILCS 425/8b(a)(i), (a)(ii) (West 1996). Section 8b(e) states: \u201cNo litigation shall commence in the name of the licensee as plaintiff unless *** there is an assignment of the account that satisfies the requirements of this Section.\u201d 225 ILCS 425/8b(e) (West 1996).\nWebster contends the assignment was invalid because it did not specify the effective date of the assignment. Instead, it contains two dates, neither of which \u201cspecifically states\u201d the \u201ceffective date of assignment.\u201d Also, Webster argues the assignment fails to specify the consideration for the assignment. The instrument merely states \u201c[for] valuable consideration of an agreed to percentage.\u201d Webster argues this violates the plain language and meaning of the statute, which states the parties are required to declare what the consideration is.\nWe conclude the assignment agreement did not satisfy the \u201ceffective date\u201d requirement of the Act. It is important that a debtor know the exact date of the assignment so that he will know when he must deal with the assignee and when he must cease dealing with the assignor. The March 7 date at the top of the document, apparently the date when the Bureau drafted the document, was meaningless and served only to confuse when the assignment became effective.\nMoreover, the assignment agreement does not specifically state the consideration. The assignment agreement stated the consideration was \u201can agreed to percentage of the amount collected.\u201d Theoretically, this \u201cagreed to\u201d percentage could be anything from 100% to 0%. This description of the consideration is tantamount to stating nothing and can hardly be called \u201cspecific.\u201d The agreement failed to meet this requirement of the statute and the trial court\u2019s judgment must be reversed.\nOur holding is consistent with the language of the Act. The \u2022 language of the statute is the best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994). The Act\u2019s plain and ordinary language unambiguously states that the consideration must be specifically stated for the assignment to be valid. Therefore, reversal is required regardless of whether Webster was actually prejudiced by the assignment\u2019s lack of precision.\nOur holding is also consistent with the policy of the Act. Concerns have been expressed about assignments of choses in action. At early common law, the doctrines of champerty and maintenance prohibited altogether the assignment of choses in action in order to prevent multiple and useless lawsuits as enterprises and speculations. In re Marriage of Malee, 205 Ill. App. 3d 273, 289, 562 N.E.2d 1010, 1021 (1990); Brocato v. Prairie State Farmers Insurance Ass\u2019n, 166 Ill. App. 3d 986, 988-89, 520 N.E.2d 1200, 1201-02 (1988) (legal malpractice claims may not be assigned). Today, assignments are permitted by the Act (225 ILCS 425/8b (West 1996)); however, the Act requires that the terms of the assignment be open and precise to protect the consumer from repetitive litigation and debt collection abuse. In the present case, the purported assignment\u2019s lack of specificity violates this policy. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County is reversed.\nReversed.\nGREEN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE COOK"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "George Bell (argued) and David M. Cialkowski, law student, both of University of Illinois College of Law Clinic, of Champaign, for appellant.",
      "Sherman J. Brown, of Champaign, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BUSINESS SERVICE BUREAU, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGELA WEBSTER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201498\u20140070\nArgued July 14, 1998.\n\u2014 Opinion filed August 5, 1998.\nGeorge Bell (argued) and David M. Cialkowski, law student, both of University of Illinois College of Law Clinic, of Champaign, for appellant.\nSherman J. Brown, of Champaign, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0257-01",
  "first_page_order": 277,
  "last_page_order": 280
}