{ "id": 1073741, "name": "EDGAR BAIRD WOOLSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD S. WILTON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Woolsey v. Wilton", "decision_date": "1998-08-11", "docket_number": "No. 4-97-1003", "first_page": "582", "last_page": "584", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 582" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 109", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159529 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35443 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3292030 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228-29", "parenthetical": "for res judicata to apply \"it must either appear upon the face of the record or be shown by extensive evidence that the precise question, or point, was raised in determining the former suit\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778589 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0484-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 308, "char_count": 4271, "ocr_confidence": 0.722, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.46981059513508316 }, "sha256": "2e17ef6d271b001adc43dd9bf4a27180e969aca94118ac28b8d6d03a8cf233ea", "simhash": "1:9b4aa1d69fc18621", "word_count": 710 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:29:38.148323+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EDGAR BAIRD WOOLSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD S. WILTON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter prevailing as defendant in a suit for breach of contract, plaintiff Edgar Baird Woolsey filed this action to recover his attorney fees. The circuit court dismissed the suit on the basis of res judicata. We affirm.\nThe pertinent facts are not in dispute. In 1992, Richard S. Wilton filed suit against Edgar Baird Woolsey for breach of contract. Woolsey then sought and obtained leave to file a counterclaim for attorney fees. For reasons not appearing in the record, Woolsey failed to file the counterclaim. Rather, after obtaining a favorable jury verdict, Woolsey filed this suit to recover his attorney fees pursuant to a \u201cprevailing party\u201d provision in the contract. Wilton filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(4) (West 1994)), and the trial judge granted the motion.\n\u201cUnder the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.\u201d Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 490, 626 N.E.2d 225, 228 (1993). The essential elements of res judicata are: (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of causes of action; and (3) identities of parties or their privies. People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285, 294, 602 N.E.2d 820, 825 (1992). Where these elements are satisfied, \u201cthe doctrine of res judicata extends not only to every matter that was actually determined in the prior suit but to every other matter that might have been raised and determined in it.\u201d Torcasso, 157 Ill. 2d at 490, 626 N.E.2d at 228.\nThe parties agree that the final judgment in the prior suit was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and this case involves the same parties and contract. Woolsey argues, however, that res judicata should not apply because counterclaims are permissive in Illinois (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 608(a) (West 1994)) and the issue of Woolsey\u2019s rights as prevailing party was never decided in the prior litigation. See Torcasso, 157 Ill. 2d at 491, 626 N.E.2d at 228-29 (for res judicata to apply \u201cit must either appear upon the face of the record or be shown by extensive evidence that the precise question, or point, was raised in determining the former suit\u201d).\nIn Wilson v. M.G. Guio & Associates, Inc., 294 Ill. App. 3d 897, 691 N.E.2d 875 (1998), this court held that a hearing on an attorney-client fee dispute in a divorce case did not constitute a res judicata bar to a separate action alleging malpractice. After reviewing the record, we held that the two proceedings did not satisfy the \u201csame cause of action\u201d requirement because (a) the first dispute involved only the number of hours expended by the attorneys, (b) the issue of negligent representation was not raised by the attorneys\u2019 fee petition, and (c) the trial judge expressly excluded any evidence relating to the attorneys\u2019 competency. Wilson, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 901, 691 N.E.2d at 877-78.\nThe case before us presents a substantially different situation. Woolsey sought and obtained leave to raise his contractual right to attorney fees in the preceding contract litigation. Thus, while there are no compulsory counterclaims in Illinois, Woolsey voluntarily introduced into the first litigation the very issue that he now seeks to raise in this case. See Bennett v. Gordon, 282 Ill. App. 3d 378, 384, 668 N.E.2d 109, 113 (1996). Though Woolsey failed to pursue his claim for attorney fees in the first suit, the issue was raised and therefore constituted a matter that might have been determined in that litigation.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOMER, EJ., and BRESLIN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Burt L. Dancey, of Elliff, Keyser, Oberle & Dancey, PC., of Pekin, for appellant.", "David B. Radley, of Baymiller & Radley, of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EDGAR BAIRD WOOLSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD S. WILTON, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 4\u201497\u20141003\nOpinion filed August 11, 1998.\nRehearing denied September 14, 1998.\nBurt L. Dancey, of Elliff, Keyser, Oberle & Dancey, PC., of Pekin, for appellant.\nDavid B. Radley, of Baymiller & Radley, of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0582-01", "first_page_order": 602, "last_page_order": 604 }