{ "id": 221440, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. LELAND COLE, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cole", "decision_date": "1998-09-25", "docket_number": "No. 3-97-0136", "first_page": "229", "last_page": "235", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 229" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134760 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3471056 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0830-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 619, "char_count": 12935, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.252048873797595e-08, "percentile": 0.38610281912188704 }, "sha256": "6f82327fae1d65e69b1d2b289d1487cca9db6313a451f4457751aed3f199b512", "simhash": "1:b3f73478e3f0b75a", "word_count": 2041 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:02:33.989314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HOMER, RJ., and LYTTON, J., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. LELAND COLE, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, the trial court found respondent, Leland L. Cole, to be a \u201csexually dangerous person,\u201d as that term is defined in section 1.01 of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/ 0.01 et seq. (West 1996) (the Act)). 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 1996). On appeal, respondent contends: (1) that a clinical diagnosis of pedophilia cannot satisfy both the \u201cmental disorder\u201d component of the definition of \u201csexually dangerous person\u201d and the other elements of the definition; and (2) that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent is a \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nInitially, we note that this court granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) leave to withdraw as counsel for respondent. OSAD made its motion on the premise that section 10 of the State Appellate Defender Act (725 ILCS 105/10 (West 1996)) does not permit OSAD to represent clients in civil matters, such as those under review here (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1996)). The State then filed a motion asking our supreme court to issue a supervisory order directing this court to vacate its earlier order and enter an order denying OSAD\u2019s motion for leave to withdraw. The supreme court denied the State\u2019s motion.\nIn its brief, the State asks this court to reconsider the decision to allow OSAD to withdraw in light of the supreme court\u2019s recent resolution of a similar controversy in the second district. In that-case, the Second District Appellate Court denied OSAD\u2019s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel for a respondent who was appealing his commitment as a \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d OSAD then asked the supreme court for a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its earlier order and enter an order allowing OSAD\u2019s motion for leave to withdraw. The supreme court denied OSAD\u2019s motion.\nWe must agree with the State that the supreme court has not exercised its supervisory power consistently in addressing this issue. However, in view of the late stage of this appeal and the circuit court\u2019s appointment of competent appellate counsel to represent respondent, the interest in judicial economy weighs heavily in favor of reaching the merits of respondent\u2019s appeal without further delay. Accordingly, the State\u2019s motion to reconsider is denied.\nWe now turn to a review of the proceedings in the trial court. At trial, T.L., a 10-year-old boy, testified that he stayed overnight at his grandfather\u2019s home on several occasions during July and August 1995. When he visited his grandfather, T.L. would sleep on the living room floor. Respondent would sleep on a couch in the living room. On four or five occasions, respondent undid T.L.\u2019s pants and sucked on his penis. During these events, no one else was present except for T.L.\u2019s grandfather, who was asleep in the next room.\nMilo L., T.L.\u2019s father, testified T.L. spent several evenings at his grandfather\u2019s home during July and August 1995. At some point, however, T.L. refused to stay there. During the autumn of 1995, T.L. began to protest that he did not want to go to school. Once at school, T.L. would cry and ask to go home. The school\u2019s principal allowed T.L. to call home every morning. On some occasions, T.L. had to be picked up and taken home. Milo asked T.L. what was wrong. T.L. told his father that he could not tell him what was -wrong. In February 1996, Milo asked T.L. whether anyone had ever touched him \u201cwhere they\u2019re not supposed to.\u201d T.L. answered that someone had and identified respondent as the person who had done so.\nOn the State\u2019s motion, the trial court took judicial notice of respondent\u2019s prior sex offense convictions. In 1990, respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual abuse for fondling the penis of a boy under the age of 13 and was sentenced to a five-year prison term. In 1985, respondent was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse for fondling the penis of a boy under the age of 13 and placed on probation. In 1981, respondent was convicted of contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor for fondling a boy under the age of 14 and sentenced to a one-year prison term. In 1974, respondent was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor for fondling a boy under the age of 14 and placed on probation.\nDr. Robert E. Chapman, a court-appointed psychiatrist, testified on behalf of the State. In an interview with Chapman, respondent denied any sexual activity with children. However, in view of respondent\u2019s long history of molesting prepubescent males, Chapman concluded that respondent is a \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d Specifically, Chapman found that respondent suffers from pedophilia and anti-social personality disorder and that respondent had suffered from these mental disorders for more than one year prior to the filing of the State\u2019s petition.\nChapman testified he had evaluated respondent in 1990 as part of an earlier attempt to commit respondent. In his 1990 evaluation, Chapman had concluded that he did not have sufficient information to diagnose respondent as a pedophile. However, respondent\u2019s conviction on the 1990 charges and his most recent arrest provided Chapman with enough information to make a diagnosis of pedophilia. On cross-examination, Chapman admitted that his diagnosis of pedophilia was based entirely on respondent\u2019s history of committing sex offenses against young boys.\nDr. Anthony James Caterine, another court-appointed psychiatrist, testified on behalf of the State. In an interview with Caterine, respondent denied any sexual activity with children. Respondent also refused to submit to a penile plethysmography test, a test which can determine a male\u2019s principal sexual preference by measuring changes in the circumference of the penis.\nCaterine concluded that respondent is a \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d In particular, Caterine diagnosed respondent as suffering from pedophilia. Caterine explained that respondent met the criteria for pedophilia outlined in the latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV). Caterine set forth the following as the DSM IV criteria for pedophilia: (1) over a period of at least six months, the subject has had recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children (generally age 13 years or younger); (2) the fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning; and (3) the subject is at least 16 years of age and at least five years older than the child who is the subject of the fantasies, urges, or behaviors. In applying these criteria to respondent, Caterine concluded that the similarities among respondent\u2019s sex offenses demonstrated a long-term pattern of behavior involving sexual activity with prepubescent males. In addition, respondent\u2019s legal problems stemming from his sexual activity with young males, including a five-year term of imprisonment, satisfied the second DSM IV criterion.\nDr. Richard L. Grant, a licensed psychiatrist, testified on behalf of respondent. In his interview with Grant, respondent denied ever engaging in any sexual activity with children. Grant agreed with Chapman and Caterine that respondent has propensities to commit sex offenses against children, but disagreed that respondent suffers from a mental disorder which would permit him to be classified as a \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d\nWith respect to whether respondent suffers from a mental disorder, Grant disagreed with Caterine\u2019s application of the DSM IV criteria for pedophilia. According to Grant, repeated sexual activity with prepubescent children is not sufficient to support a diagnosis of pedophilia. Grant opined that a pedophile\u2019s principal object of sexual arousal is the prepubescent child. In view of respondent\u2019s denial of such arousal and the lack of a penile plethysmography result, Grant concluded that it was impossible to determine that children are the principal object of respondent\u2019s sexual desire. In addition, Grant asserted that incarceration resulting from sexual activity with children is not the kind of impairment contemplated by the second DSM TV criterion for pedophilia.\nAt the close of evidence, the trial court found respondent to be a \u201csexually dangerous person\u201d under the Act and committed him to the Department of Corrections.\nOn appeal, respondent contends that his history of sex offenses against young boys cannot satisfy the \u201cmental disorder\u201d component of the definition of \u201csexually dangerous person,\u201d while also meeting the second and third prongs of the definition.\nUnder the Act, a \u201csexually dangerous person\u201d is a person who: (1) has suffered from a \u201cmental disorder\u201d for at least one year; (2) has criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses; and (3) has demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children. 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 1996).\nThe evidence adduced at trial clearly shows that the State\u2019s experts based their opinions primarily, if not entirely, on respondent\u2019s long history of legal troubles related to his commission of sex acts with young boys. The State\u2019s experts agreed that this history supports a diagnosis of pedophilia and that respondent has suffered from this disorder for more than one year before the filing of the State\u2019s petition in this matter. It is also clear that this same history of sex offenses against prepubescent males meets the second and third prongs of the Act\u2019s definition of \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d\nHowever, respondent does not explain why it is impermissible for his criminal history to support both a psychiatric diagnosis (pedophilia) and a legal conclusion (sexually dangerous person). Respondent does not identify any right, whether it be constitutional, statutory or otherwise, which has been denied to him.\nMoreover, contrary to respondent\u2019s contention, the Act\u2019s \u201cmental disorder\u201d requirement is not rendered superfluous because a pattern of criminal behavior is the sole support for the diagnosis of a mental disorder. The \u201cmental disorder\u201d requirement may be satisfied by a number of means other than criminal conduct. A qualified psychiatrist could diagnose a \u201cmental disorder\u201d based on an interview, standardized testing, a physical test like penile plethysmography, or some combination of these indicators. In short, because the \u201cmental disorder\u201d element may be established by means other than criminal conduct, the fact that it is established by a pattern of criminal conduct in this case does not render the requirement a nullity. See People v. Cochran, 167 Ill. App. 3d 830, 522 N.E.2d 261 (1988) (statutory language awarding good-time credit to insanity acquittees is not rendered superfluous merely because an insanity acquittee may be committed for a term of natural life and good-time credit is not permitted for a life sentence \u2014 the credit is still available to insanity acquit-tees who have not been committed for natural life). Accordingly, we hold that the same evidence which supports a psychiatric diagnosis of a mental disorder may also meet the remaining elements of the Act\u2019s definition of \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d\nNext, respondent maintains that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d\nUnder the Act, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a respondent is a \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1996). A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court\u2019s finding that the respondent is a \u201csexually dangerous person\u201d unless the evidence is so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt. People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 481 N.E.2d 690 (1985).\nTwo qualified, licensed psychiatrists agreed that respondent suffers from pedophilia. Court records and evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that respondent has engaged in at least five episodes of sexual conduct with prepubescent boys since 1974. The trial court heard the testimony of the latest victim and his father. The trial court was in the best position to observe the demeanor of these witnesses and assess their credibility. Accordingly, this court will not disturb the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent is a \u201csexually dangerous person.\u201d\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Knox County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOMER, RJ., and LYTTON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Christopher W Kanthak, of Galesburg, for appellant.", "Paul Mangieri, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg (John X. Breslin and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. LELAND COLE, Respondent-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201497\u20140136\nOpinion filed September 25, 1998.\nChristopher W Kanthak, of Galesburg, for appellant.\nPaul Mangieri, State\u2019s Attorney, of Galesburg (John X. Breslin and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0229-01", "first_page_order": 247, "last_page_order": 253 }