{ "id": 221491, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN J. WORDEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Worden", "decision_date": "1998-10-27", "docket_number": "No. 2-97-0553", "first_page": "836", "last_page": "842", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 836" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222586 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3513648 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45730 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783185 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544904 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514-15" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "517" }, { "page": "517" }, { "page": "514" }, { "page": "514-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4739021 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 483556 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/165/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 1014", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75355 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1020" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/1014-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260421 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198922 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45748 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0034-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 816, "char_count": 15465, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.83550015869542e-08, "percentile": 0.5337044746624224 }, "sha256": "7b40554448738acb06a8f8a6967807fe84cb7d04b7498b1fb19c19138693ffcf", "simhash": "1:69394e807dca45b9", "word_count": 2493 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:02:33.989314+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "GEIGER, EJ, and INGLIS, J, concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN J. WORDEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RATHJE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Martin Worden, pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(b)(1) (West 1994)). The trial court sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals, contending that he should have the mittimus corrected to reflect that he is eligible for good-conduct credit without reference to the recently enacted truth-in-sentencing legislation. We affirm the judgment as modified.\nDefendant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a six-year sentence and the State\u2019s agreement to dismiss two misdemeanor charges. After delaying sentencing to examine the presentence materials, the trial court concurred in the agreement and sentenced defendant to six years in prison.\nDefendant filed a pro se notice of appeal that included allegations amounting to grounds to withdraw his guilty plea. This court found that the trial court\u2019s admonishments pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(b) (145 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)) were insufficient and remanded the cause to the trial court to permit defendant to file a postplea motion. People v. Worden, No. 2 \u2014 96 \u2014 0607 (October 18, 1996) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23).\nDefendant thereafter moved to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that he was mistakenly told that the \u201ctruth-in-sentencing\u201d provisions requiring him to serve at least 85% of his sentence did not apply to him. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that he is not subject to the truth-in-sentencing provisions because this court has held the implementing legislation unconstitutional. In People v. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d 34, 42 (1998), appeal allowed, 178 Ill. 2d 591 (1998), we held that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 (the Act) (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, eff. August 20, 1995)), containing the truth-in-sentencing provisions, was passed in violation of the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV( \u00a7 8(d)).\nThe State responds to defendant\u2019s argument by asking us to overrule Reedy. The State maintains that it can demonstrate a natural and logical connection between the various sections of Public Act 89 \u2014 404. Therefore, the Act does not violate the constitution because all of its provisions pertain to a single subject.\nWe issued Reedy on March 11, 1998. Generally, when a rule of law has been settled, contravening no statute or constitutional principles, the rule ought to be followed under the doctrine of stare decisis unless it can be shown that serious detriment is likely to arise that will prejudice the public interest. Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 349 (1995). Stare decisis is a policy of the courts to leave settled points of law undisturbed. People v. Goebel, 284 Ill. App. 3d 618, 624 (1996). Absent compelling reasons for doing so, courts are reluctant to abandon or modify an earlier decision of the court soon after its adoption. People v. Delatorre, 279 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1020 (1996).\nThe State, while castigating this court for \u201cconsistently declin[ing] to reconsider the Reedy decision or to even address the new arguments,\u201d does not itself address the important policy considerations underlying the stare decisis doctrine. The State does not posit any \u201cserious detriment\u201d it will suffer if Reedy is left undisturbed. As both parties point out, Reedy is presently on appeal to the supreme court. If this court were to overrule Reedy at this point in time, the decision would likely have little practical effect. However, because Public Act 89 \u2014 404 does implicate potentially important public interests, and in the interest of maintaining a sound, well-reasoned body of precedent, we will consider the State\u2019s arguments.\nArticle I\\( section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution provides as follows:\n\u201cBills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV( \u00a7 8(d).\nThe single subject rule is a substantive requirement for the passage of bills and is therefore subject to judicial review. People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 254 (1995). One purpose of the rule is to prevent the passage of legislation that, standing alone, could not muster the necessary votes for passage. Geja\u2019s Caf\u00e9 v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 258 (1992). Another purpose of the rule is to permit legislators to consider pending legislation in an orderly fashion, with an appropriate opportunity to read and discuss each bill as it comes up for consideration. See Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 514-15 (1997). The term \u201csubject\u201d must be liberally construed and the subject may be as broad as the legislature chooses. Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 423-24 (1994). Nevertheless, the matters included in each bill must have some natural and logical connection. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 515.\nIn Johnson, the supreme court invalidated another public act (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 428, eff. December 13, 1995) because it violated the single subject rule. After detailing the numerous provisions of Public Act 89 \u2014 428 and its legislative history, the court concluded, \u201cBy no fair intendment may the many discordant provisions in Public Act 89 \u2014 428 be considered to possess a natural and logical connection.\u201d Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 517. The court could not find any logical connection between topics as diverse as child sex offenders, employer eavesdropping, and environmental impact fees imposed on the sale of fuel. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 517.\nIn Reedy, this court followed Johnson in finding that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 also violated the single subject rule. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 42. We found that the bill\u2019s various provisions, including removal of the homestead exemption from property subject to forfeiture, increasing the burden of proof to assert the insanity defense in a criminal case, truth-in-sentencing legislation, and new procedures for the perfection and attachment of hospital liens, lacked the natural and logical connection to be considered a single subject. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 42.\nIn People v. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182 (1998), the Appellate Court, Fourth District, also held that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 violated the single subject rule. That court found a sufficient connection between 9 of the Act\u2019s 10 provisions in that they all related in some fashion to criminal law or procedure. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 189. However, the court could not find the necessary connection between those provisions and section 50 of the Act, which amended the Hospital Lien Act (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 50, eff. August 20, 1995 (amending 770 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 1996))), and thus found the enactment unconstitutional in its entirety. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 189.\nThe State first urges us to follow Pitts to the extent it holds that 9 of the 10 provisions of Public Act 89 \u2014 404 are connected under the general rubric of criminal law and procedure. Next, the State, while acknowledging that it failed to do so before, argues that it can supply the necessary connection between the other nine sections of the Act and the hospital lien amendments.\nAccording to the State, all the provisions relate to the single subject of \u201cpolice/law enforcement matters.\u201d While admitting that the connection is not \u201creadily apparent,\u201d the State argues that the Hospital Lien Act applies, inter alia, to hospitals owned by counties. See 770 ILCS 35/1 (West 1996). The State\u2019s Attorney of each county is required to prosecute all actions in which the people of the county are concerned. 55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 9005 (West 1996). Thus, the State\u2019s Attorney would be responsible for perfecting and enforcing the lien of a county hospital. The State notes that then Cook County State\u2019s Attorney Jack O\u2019Malley testified in favor of the legislation before the Senate committee that was considering the bill.\nWe simply cannot accept that the fact that State\u2019s Attorneys prosecute criminals and may also enforce hospital liens in some cases establishes the necessary connection between the otherwise unrelated provisions. That some of a State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s duties relate to law enforcement does not render every action of the State\u2019s Attorney one in pursuance of law enforcement.\nA State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s role under the Hospital Lien Act is dissimilar to his role in the criminal justice system. While he may \u201cenforce\u201d the criminal laws by securing the indictment and conviction of offenders, the State\u2019s Attorney does not \u201cenforce\u201d the Hospital Lien Act. Rather, the Hospital Lien Act merely offers him or her a means of enforcing the county hospital\u2019s common-law contractual right to payment.\nMoreover, by its terms, the Hospital Lien Act also applies to private, nonprofit hospitals. 770 ILCS 35/1 (West 1996). The State does not explain how a private entity\u2019s attempt to enforce its contractual rights against another private entity relates in any manner to law enforcement.\nNormally, \u201claw enforcement\u201d refers to the enforcement of the criminal laws, not civil remedies. See Henderson v. Bradford, 168 Ill. App. 3d 777, 782 (1988); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 282(a) (now 820 ILCS 315/2(a) (West 1996) (\u201claw enforcement officer\u201d means \u201c \u2018any person employed *** as a policeman, peace officer, auxiliary policeman or in some like position ***\u2019 \u201d)). Another provision of Public Act 89 \u2014 404, although ineffectual, contains a definition of \u201cLaw enforcement agency\u201d as \u201ca municipal police department or county sheriffs office of this State.\u201d Pub. Act 89 \u2014 404, \u00a7 30, eff. August 20, 1995. This definition belies any inference that the legislature could have considered the Hospital Lien Act provisions as connected to the rest of the statute by virtue of being a law enforcement measure.\nIn this regard, the State\u2019s argument is little more than a reformulation of its contention \u2014 rejected in Reedy and Pitts \u2014 that the provisions of Public Act 89 \u2014 404 are logically connected because they all relate to \u201cgovernmental matters.\u201d We observed in Reedy that virtually every piece of legislation concerns in some fashion the affairs of the government and that construing the single subject rule to embrace such a broad subject would effectively write it out of the constitution as a meaningful constraint on the legislative power. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 43; see also Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 189. Similarly, defining \u201claw enforcement\u201d as the State does \u2014 any government action taken pursuant to a law \u2014 and permitting it to serve as the requisite subject would render the single subject rule meaningless. Virtually every action taken by a government official is mandated or authorized by some law. This contention, too, fails to give the single subject rule and the Johnson holding their proper scope.\nThe State next contends that the legislative debates on Public Act 89 \u2014 404, which we cited in Reedy, demonstrate that the legislature complied with the \u201cspirit\u201d of the single subject rule. The State quotes the comments of Senator Kirk Dillard to the effect that each of the provisions comprising Public Act 89 \u2014 404 had already passed both houses nearly unanimously. See Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 42, citing 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 24, 1995, at 60 (statements of Senator Dillard). The State contends that these comments show that the legislature complied with the \u201cspirit\u201d of the single subject rule because each of the provisions would have passed the legislature on its own merits. The State urges us to create a balancing test whereby \u201ca defendant\u2019s right to raise a constitutional challenge to legislation based on an alleged title or single subject matter violation must be balanced against the need for finality in legislation.\u201d\nThe short answer to this contention is that neither the constitution nor Johnson provides for such a test. As with any other statute, where the constitution\u2019s language is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See Sassali v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 296 Ill. App. 3d 80, 83 (1998). Nothing in the language of article IV section 8, demonstrates an intention by the drafters of the constitution to create a balancing test. The supreme court in Johnson expressly held that the single subject rule is a substantive requirement subject to judicial review. Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514. The court omitted to prescribe a balancing test whereby a party\u2019s substantive right to relief must be balanced against administrative convenience. We are not authorized to engraft such a provision onto the constitution.\nIn any event, Johnson observed that the single subject rule has at least two purposes. While the State\u2019s argument addresses the first concern the court mentioned, the possibility of piggybacking unpopular legislation on the back of popular measures, the State does not address the second concern identified in Johnson. The comments the State cites give no indication whether and to what extent the individual measures were considered by the two houses prior to passage. See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514-15.\nFinally, the State argues that, even if we reaffirm Reedy, we cannot grant defendant the relief he seeks, but must remand the cause to the circuit court for resentencing. The State maintains that the unconstitutionality of the truth-in-sentencing provisions renders defendant\u2019s sentence void ab initio and, because the court imposed a void sentence, we must remand the cause. We disagree.\nNeither Reedy nor Pitts found that the sentences were void. Rather, both courts merely modified the sentences to reflect the proper computation of credit. As in those cases, defendant\u2019s sentence is not void. He was sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. A six-year sentence was, and continues to be, an authorized sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault. See 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(b)(1) (West 1994); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8 \u2014 1(a)(3) (West 1994). Although the invalidation of the truth-in-sentencing provisions potentially affects the percentage of his sentence that defendant may eventually have to serve, it does not render the entire sentence void from its inception.\nWe similarly reject the State\u2019s contention that the record evidences the trial court\u2019s intention that defendant serve 5.1 years in prison, the time he would have been required to serve under the truth-in-sentencing provisions. Rather, the record merely reflects that the trial court concurred in the parties\u2019 agreement that defendant receive the minimum sentence of six years. In summary, we continue to hold that Public Act 89 \u2014 404 is invalid; defendant is entitled to receive the good-time credit for which he would have been eligible prior to its enactment. The mittimus is hereby corrected to reflect that he is eligible to receive day-for-day good-time credit.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Stephenson County is affirmed as modified.\nAffirmed as modified.\nGEIGER, EJ, and INGLIS, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RATHJE" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Kathleen J. Hamill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Michael E Bald, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (Martin E Moltz and Richard S. London, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the Feople." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN J. WORDEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201497\u20140553\nOpinion filed October 27, 1998.\nG. Joseph Weller and Kathleen J. Hamill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMichael E Bald, State\u2019s Attorney, of Freeport (Martin E Moltz and Richard S. London, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Frosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the Feople." }, "file_name": "0836-01", "first_page_order": 854, "last_page_order": 860 }