{
  "id": 2839694,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vernon J. Knox, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Knox",
  "decision_date": "1971-12-01",
  "docket_number": "No. 54118",
  "first_page": "22",
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    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:53:03.474127+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vernon J. Knox, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE BURMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis cause comes up for the second time on appeal. In People v. Knox, 90 Ill.App.2d 149, 234 N.E.2d 128, this court reviewed defendant\u2019s conviction of larceny, for which he was sentenced to a term of two to five years in the penitentiary, and found that, on the evidence, defendant had been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the trial court had erred in not holding a hearing on the voluntariness of two statements made by defendant prior to trial. This court then remanded the cause, directing the trial court to hold a hearing on the voluntariness of the statements, and if it found that they were voluntarily made, to sentence the defendant in accordance with the verdict of the jury.\nThe trial court conducted the requisite hearing and found that the statements were voluntarily given. It denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and entered a new judgment. The defendant then moved to be admitted to probation. The court denied the motion, stating, \u201cI have no authority to give this man probation. * * * I have no authority as I understand the law to do it. The mandate of the Appellate Court being what it is.\u201d The court then proceeded to hear evidence in aggravation and mitigation and sentenced the defendant to a term of one to four years in the penitentiary. It is from this sentence that the defendant appeals.\nDefendant\u2019s sole contention is that the trial court, in reconsidering the sentence on remand, erred in refusing to exercise its statutory authority to grant him probation. We believe, however, that the trial court on remand was without authority to reconsider the sentence, and hence also without authority to grant him probation.\nIt is well settled that \u201cwhere a cause is re-docketed after litigation is prosecuted to a court of review and passed upon, not only the questions that were raised and considered, but also all that could have been raised and passed upon, are res judicata whether they were raised or not.\u201d (Village of Oak Park v. Swigart, 266 Ill. 60, 61, 107 N.E. 158, 159.) Whether defendant was entitled to probation was a question which could have been raised and passed upon in the initial appeal. It is too late in the proceedings for him to raise it now for the first time.\nThe rule of law is that when a cause is remanded with special directions, those directions must be followed, and the trial court may take only such proceedings as conform to the judgment of the Appellate Court. (Thomas v. Durschlag, 410 Ill. 363, 102 N.E.2d 114.) In the instant case, the Appellate Court remanded the cause with the following directions:\n\u201cThis case is therefore remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate the judgment of conviction and conduct a hearing in accordance with this opinion.\nIf the court finds that the statements of the defendant were made involuntarily the trial court shall grant the defendant a new trial. If the court finds that the statements were made voluntarily by the defendant the court shall enter a new judgment and sentence in accordance with the verdict of the jury.\u201d People v. Knox, 90 Ill.App.2d 149, 167, 234 N.E.2d 128, 136.\nIt is clear that the Appellate Court mandate empowered the trial court solely to rule on the voluntariness of the two statements, and if it found the statements were voluntarily made, to enter a new judgment and to reinstate the original sentence of two to five years.\nThe trial court erred in holding a hearing on aggravation and mitigation and in changing the sentence previously imposed on defendant. Consequently, the conviction is affirmed, the resentencing of defendant to a term of one to four years is reversed, and the original sentence of two to five years is reinstated.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nADESKO, P. J., and DIERINGER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE BURMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Adamowski, Newey & Riley, of Chicago, (Francis X. Riley, of counsel,) for appellant.",
      "Edward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and Daniel J. Pierce, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vernon J. Knox, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 54118;\nFirst District\nDecember 1, 1971.\nRehearing denied January 5,1972.\nAdamowski, Newey & Riley, of Chicago, (Francis X. Riley, of counsel,) for appellant.\nEdward V. Hanrahan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, (Robert A. Novelle and Daniel J. Pierce, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0022-01",
  "first_page_order": 42,
  "last_page_order": 44
}